Holding

A person is eligible to contest a Scheduled Caste reserved constituency only if he belongs to the specified caste and, through himself or his ancestors, was a permanent resident of the state as of the 1950 Order; mere ritual observance does not constitute professing another religion, and a caste certificate may be challenged only under the statute that issued it.

Summary

The appellant, A. Raja, contested and won the Devikulam Assembly seat, a constituency reserved for Scheduled Castes, by filing a nomination stating he belonged to the Hindu Parayan caste, supported by a caste certificate. The respondent challenged the election, alleging that the appellant's paternal grandparents migrated from Tamil Nadu after 1950 and that the appellant and his parents had converted to Christianity, thus disqualifying him. The High Court held the election void, shifting the burden of proof onto the appellant to disprove the allegations. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the twin conditions for eligibility—being a Hindu Parayan caste member and being a permanent resident of Kerala as of the 1950 Order—were satisfied, and that mere ritual observance does not amount to professing another religion. The Court also ruled that a caste certificate can be challenged only under the specific statute governing its issuance, not in an election petition, and that the burden of proof lies on the petitioner. Consequently, the High Court's judgment was set aside, the election petition dismissed, and the appellant’s election upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant belongs to the Hindu Parayan caste in the State of Kerala and is covered by the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.
Whether the appellant’s ancestors were permanent residents of Kerala as of the date of the 1950 Order.
Whether the appellant, having allegedly been baptized as a Christian, has ceased to profess Hinduism and thus is ineligible for a Scheduled Caste reserved seat.
Whether a caste/community certificate can be challenged in an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Legislation cited

Citizenship Act, 1955
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950
Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 114
Kerala (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1996s. 10
Kerala (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Rules, 2002
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 100(1)(a), s. 100(1)(d)(i), s. 116-A1, s. 116-C(2)
States Reorganisation Act, 1956

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the Appellant belongs to the Hindu Parayan caste in the State of Kerala and is covered by the 1950 Order insofar as it relates to the State of Kerala; whether the Appellant had still retained the Hindu Parayan caste, as a member of the Hindu religion, when he Constituency for Legislative Assembly of Kerala. Headnotes† Representation of the People Act, 1951 – s.116-A and s.100(1)(a) and (d)(i) – Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 – Part VIII of the Schedule – Validity of election – Appellant filed his

Subjects

Hindu Parayan casteElectionConstituency reserved for the Scheduled CastesNomination papersScheduled CastePart VIII of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950BaptizedAncestors permanent resident of the State of KeralaMere observance/performance of a ritualProfessesBorn in a particular religion can profess another religionChristianityCaste CertificateShifting the burden of proofOverwritings, edits and deletions in RegisterFabrication and correctionPlead and prove beyond reasonable doubtElection petition

Judgment

[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1809 : 2025 INSC 629

A. Raja
v.
D. Kumar
(Civil Appeal No. 2758 of 2023)
06 May 2025
[Abhay S. Oka, Ahsanuddin Amanullah* and
Augustine George Masih, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Appellant belongs to the Hindu Parayan caste in the
State of Kerala and is covered by the 1950 Order insofar as it relates
to the State of Kerala; whether the Appellant had still retained the
Hindu Parayan caste, as a member of the Hindu religion, when
he contested from the Devikulam Assembly Constituency for
Legislative Assembly of Kerala.

Headnotes†
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – s.116-A and s.100(1)(a)
and (d)(i) – Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 –
Part VIII of the Schedule – Validity of election – Appellant
filed his nomination papers declaring therein that he belongs
to the Hindu Parayan caste as per Caste Certificate from a
Constituency reserved for the Scheduled Castes – Appellant
was elected – Election of the Appellant was challenged – The
ground of challenge laid therein was that the Appellant’s
paternal grandparents had migrated from Tamil Nadu to Kerala
and since the Appellant’s grandparents on the paternal side
were persons who had migrated from Tamil Nadu, they and
their successors were not entitled to claim that they belonged
to ‘Hindu Parayan’ of Kerala State – Further, it was contended
that the Appellant was a Christian and not entitled to contest
from a Constituency reserved for the Scheduled Castes – High
Court declared the election of the Appellant void – Correctness:
Held: The twin conditions needing to be satisfied would be (i) being
of the Hindu Parayan caste, and; (ii) being, himself/herself or
through one’s ancestors, permanent resident of the State of Kerala
as on the date of the 1950 Order – Upon fulfilment of both these
conditions, a person can claim a legal right to derive any benefits
* Author
1810 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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available to Hindu Parayan caste in the State of Kerala – In the
instant case, fulfilment of the same would enable the Appellant
to become eligible to contest from the Constituency reserved for
the Scheduled Castes – There is no dispute on the factum that,
originally, the grandparents of the Appellant belonged to the Hindu
Parayan caste in the erstwhile State of Travancore-Cochin having
migrated from the State of Tamil Nadu but prior to 1950 – In this
regard, there is sufficient evidence available on the record – As
far as contention that appellant is Christian is concerned, mere
observance/performance of a ritual of/associated with any religion
does not ipso facto and necessarily mean that the person ‘professes’
that religion – That is why the term used in the 1950 Order is
‘professes’, signifying that a person although born in a particular
religion can profess another religion, inter alia, by practicing the
rituals of that other religion as the basic tenets of his beliefs and
lifestyle – Adherence merely to some ritual of another religion
would not tantamount to giving-up the original religion, unless
the person concerned makes such belief explicit – From the
evidence available, it is not possible to hold that the Appellant
‘professes’ Christianity – The evidence adduced from the side of
the Appellant would reveal that the Caste Certificate(s) issued in
his favour by the Competent Authority till date hold the field – The
Appellant’s Caste Certificate has not been interfered with, either
by the Impugned Judgment or by the authority(ies) concerned –
High Court erred by shifting the burden of proof on the Appellant
to prove in the negative the allegations – Further, even the entries
in the Register are not conclusively established in the sense that
they relate to the Appellant or his family members – Apropos
this, the High Court has noticed many over-writings, edits and
deletions re the purported names of the Appellant and his parents
as alleged to have appeared in the Register – This has prompted
the High Court to note that ‘fabrication and correction’ were made
to the entry(ies) in the Register(s) – The High Court, on the whole,
accepted whatever was presented by the Respondent and in such
approach, disregarded and ignored the material lacuna in the
pleadings of the Election Petition as also the evidence brought in
by the Respondent – Election Petitioner is obligated to plead and
prove his case beyond reasonable doubt – Appellant retained the
Hindu Parayan caste, as a member of the Hindu religion, when
he contested from the constituency – Impugned judgment of the
High Court is set aside – Election petition dismissed – Appellant
entitled to all consequential benefits as a Member of the Legislative
Assembly. [Paras 30, 34, 36, 50, 57, 58, 59]
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1811

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

Election Laws – Challenge to the caste certificate in election
petition – Position of law:
Held: A duly issued Caste/Community Certificate would be amenable
to challenge only under the provisions of the statute concerned,
and not in an Election Petition – In case no statute governing
the field in a State/Union Territory is operative, the Madhuri Patil
guidelines, as modified in Dayaram, shall be followed. [Para 64]

Case Law Cited
Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to SCs/STs v. Union
of India [1994] Supp. 1 SCR 714 : (1994) 5 SCC 244; Punjabrao v.
D. P. Meshram [1965] 1 SCR 849 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 76;
Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, Govt. of Tripura
[1973] 1 SCR 533 : (1972) 2 SCC 442; Supreme Court Bar Assn. v.
Union of India [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409; State of
A.P. v. Abdul Khader [1962] 1 SCR 737 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC
149; Ghaurul Hasan v. State of Rajasthan [1962] 1 SCR 772 :
1961 SCC OnLine SC 3; Akbar Khan Alam Khan v. Union of India
[1962] 1 SCR 779 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 4 – followed.
M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu [2010] 11 SCR 38 : (2010) 9 SCC
712; J.Chandrasekhara Rao v. V. Jagapathi Rao [1992] Supp. 3
SCR 786 : (1993) Supp. 2 SCC 229 – relied on.
Puducherry SC People Welfare Assn. v. UT of Pondicherry [2014]
13 SCR 1087 : (2014) 9 SCC 236; Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat v.
Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe [1995] Supp. 2 SCR 186 : (1995) 5
SCC 347; Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C. P. Joshi [2011] 2 SCR
216 : (2011) 11 SCC 786; Goka Ramalingam v. Boddu Abraham
[1969] 2 SCR 992 : (1969) 1 SCC 24; Virender Nath Gautam v.
Satpal Singh [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 413 : (2007) 3 SCC 617; Hari
Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi [2001] Supp. 3 SCR 38 : (2001)
8 SCC 233; Punit Rai v. Dinesh Chaudhary [2003] Supp. 2 SCR
743 : (2003) 8 SCC 204; K. P. Manu v. Scrutiny Committee for
Verification of Community Certificate [2015] 3 SCR 243 : (2015)
4 SCC 1; Madhuri Patil v. Commr., Tribal Development [1994]
Supp. 3 SCR 50 : (1994) 6 SCC 241; Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham
[2011] 15 SCR 1092 : (2012) 1 SCC 333; Food Corporation of
India v. Jagdish Balaram Bahira [2017] 11 SCR 271 : (2017) 8
SCC 670; Maharashtra Adiwasi Thakur Jamat Swarakshan Samiti v.
State of Maharashtra [2023] 3 SCR 1100 : (2023) 16 SCC 415;
Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [1953] 1 SCR 677 : (1953) 1
1812 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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SCC 492; B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal [2011] 3 SCR 932 :
(2011) 4 SCC 266; Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. [2017] 7 SCR 765 : (2017) 14 SCC 663; DDA v. Virender Lal
Bahri [2019] 4 SCR 469 : (2020) 15 SCC 328; State of Bombay v.
Hospital Mazdoor Sabha [1960] 2 SCR 866 : 1960 SCC OnLine
SC 44; U.P.SEB v. Hari Shankar Jain [1979] 1 SCR 355 : (1978)
4 SCC 16; Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Limited v. CCE [1990] 2
SCR 797 : (1990) 3 SCC 447; Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti
Gangadhara Swamy [2005] 1 SCR 848 : (2005) 2 SCC 244;
Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur [1988] Supp. 2 SCR
929 : (1989) 1 SCC 101; State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals
Ltd. [1991] 3 SCR 64 : (1991) 4 SCC 139; A-One Granites v.
State of U.P. [2001] 1 SCR 1085 : (2001) 3 SCC 537; Bhagwati
Prasad Dixit v. Rajeev Gandhi [1986] 2 SCR 823 : (1986) 4 SCC
78; Lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, SC & ST [2005] Supp. 4
SCR 87 : (2005) 8 SCC 283; Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu
and Kashmir National Conference [2023] 12 SCR 68 : 2023 INSC
804 – referred to.
Sapna Jacob v. State of Kerala, 1992 SCC OnLine Ker
233 – referred to.

List of Acts
Representation of the People Act, 1951; Schedule to the
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950; Kerala (Schedule
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community
Certificates Act, 1996; Evidence Act, 1872; Constitution of India;
Kerala (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of
Issue of Community Certificates Rules, 2002; States Reorganization
Act, 1956; Citizenship Act, 1955.

List of Keywords
Hindu Parayan caste; Election; Constituency reserved for the
Scheduled Castes; Nomination papers; Scheduled Caste; Part
VIII of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order,
1950; Baptized; Ancestors permanent resident of the State of
Kerala; Mere observance/performance of a ritual; Professes; Born
in a particular religion can profess another religion; Christianity;
Caste Certificate; Shifting the burden of proof; Overwritings, edits
and deletions in Register; Fabrication and correction; Plead and
prove beyond reasonable doubt.; Election petition.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1813

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2758 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.03.2023 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in EP No. 11 of 2021

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
V. Giri, T. Krishnanunni, N Raghuraj, Sr. Advs., Prakash, Joice
George, Mrs. Beena Prakash, Jishnu M L, Mrs. Priyanka Prakash,
Anoop R, Rahul Narang.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Narendra Hooda, Sr. Adv., Aljo K. Joseph, Anurag Kumar,
Ms. Meenakshi, Vinay Kumar Puvvala, Dushyant Chaudhary,
Santosh Kumar Kolkonda, Abhinav P Dhanodkar, Saket Jee,
Ranjan Kumar.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

This is an appeal preferred under Section 116-A1 of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) against
the Final Judgment and Order dated 20.03.2023 (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’)2 passed by the High Court of Kerala
at Ernakulam (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’), in
Election Petition No.11 of 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Election Petition’), filed by the Respondent (hereinafter also
referred to as the ‘Election Petitioner’), declaring the election of the
Appellant to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala from the Devikulam

1 ‘116-A. Appeals to Supreme Court.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court on any question (whether of law or fact) from
every order made by a High Court under Section 98 or Section 99.
(2) Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the
order of the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99:
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days
if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.’
2 2023:KER:16955; 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 1643; (2023) 2 KLT 716; (2023) 2 KLJ 1.
1814 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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Legislative Assembly Constituency 088 in Idukki District, Kerala,
which is reserved for the Scheduled Castes, as void under Section
100(1)(a) and (d)(i)3 of the Act.

FACTUAL PRISM:
2. General Elections to the Devikulam Assembly Constituency for
membership of the Legislative Assembly of Kerala were to be
conducted in 2021. The Appellant filed his nomination papers before
the Returning Officer on 17.03.2021 declaring therein that he belongs
to the Hindu Parayan caste as per Caste Certificate dated 09.03.2021
issued by the Tehsildar, Devikulam. The said caste has been declared
as a Scheduled Caste in relation to the State of Kerala in Part VIII
of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1950 Order’) issued on 10.08.1950 by
Hon’ble the President of India. Oral objections before the Returning
Officer were raised by the Respondent contending that the Appellant
was not a member of the Scheduled Castes from Kerala and
instead, he was a Christian. The Returning Officer, after examining
the nomination papers of the Appellant rejected the objections and
accepted the nomination papers. Polling in the Constituency took
place on 06.04.2021 and after counting, the result of the election was
declared on 02.05.2021. The Appellant secured 59,049 votes and was
declared elected by a margin of 7848 votes over the Respondent-
defeated candidate who had secured 51,201 votes.
3. The election of the Appellant was challenged by the Respondent
in Election Petition No.11 of 2021 before the High Court. The

3 ‘100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the
High Court is of opinion—
(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be
chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act or the Government of Union Territories Act,
1963 (20 of 1963); or
(b) …
(c) …
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially
affected—
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or
(ii) …
(iii) …
(iv) …
the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.’
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1815

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

ground of challenge laid therein was that the Appellant’s paternal
grandparents had migrated from Tamil Nadu to Kerala in 1951.
They were of the ‘Hindu Parayan’ caste in the State of Tamil Nadu.
‘Parayan’ is included in the list of Scheduled Castes of both States
viz. Tamil Nadu and Kerala in the 1950 Order, as originally brought
into force. Since the Appellant’s grandparents on the paternal side
were persons who had migrated from Tamil Nadu, they and their
successors were not entitled to claim that they belonged to ‘Hindu
Parayan’ of Kerala State. It was averred that hence, the Appellant is
not entitled to contest from a Constituency reserved for candidates
belonging to the Scheduled Castes from Kerala. The Appellant was
born on 17.10.1984 to Mr Antony and Mrs Esther. Mr Antony and
Ms Esther, it was asserted, were Christians baptized by the CSI’s4
Church in Kundala Estate by a pastor named Ebenezer Mani in the
year 1982. The Appellant, born in 1984, also was baptized by the
said Ebenezer Mani. Thus, the Appellant was a Christian and not
entitled to contest from a Constituency reserved for the Scheduled
Castes.
4. The High Court took up the Election Petition. It framed issues,
examined witnesses, admitted documents and on consideration of
the oral testimony and documentary evidence in trial proceeded to
declare the election of the Appellant void, by way of the Impugned
Judgment. The issues remaining5 before the High Court and decided
through the Impugned Judgment are as under:
‘(I) Whether the returned candidate is a person belonging
to Scheduled Caste among Hindus in the State of Kerala?
(II) Whether the acceptance of nomination of returned
candidate is proper?
(III) Whether the election of returned candidate is liable
to be set aside?
(IV) Reliefs and cost.’

4 Church of South India.
5 By its Order dated 10.03.2022, the High Court had already rejected the Appellant’s contentions that
(a) the Election Petition was liable to be dismissed at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for want of cause of action, and; (b) the Election Petition was barred by
limitation.
1816 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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5. This Court granted a conditional stay of the Impugned Judgment by
Order dated 28.04.20236, which was continued on different dates
subsequently. Vide Order dated 15.05.2024, this Court directed that
the interim relief would ‘… continue till the final disposal of this Appeal.’

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
6. Learned senior counsel Mr. V. Giri, for the Appellant, submitted that
the paternal grandparents of the Appellant started residing in the
erstwhile State of Travancore (which subsequently became part
of the State of Kerala) much prior to 1950 and that the paternal
grandmother and grandfather of the Appellant came to Kundala
Estate in Munnar with their respective families in 1940s before their
marriage and both families started residing in Munnar. From then
onwards, both families have been residents of Munnar. Antony, the
Appellant’s father, was born in 1952 at Kundala Estate, Devikulam,
Munnar. It was submitted that the Appellant’s paternal grandmother
was an employee of Kannan Devan Hills Plantation in Munnar in
the year 1949, as per Certificate dated 17.11.2021 issued by the
Deputy General Manager, Kannan Devan Hills Plantation at Munnar.
7. Further, learned senior counsel submitted that the burden to prove
that the Appellant’s family had migrated to Travancore only after 1950
is entirely upon the Election Petitioner and relied on paragraph no.82
of M. Chandra v M. Thangamuthu, (2010) 9 SCC 712, where this
Court held that the burden of proof is on the Election Petitioner to
prove the charges he alleges beyond reasonable doubt.
8. It was canvassed that the High Court took the view that even though
the ancestors of the Appellant started residing in Travancore before
1950, their residence in Travancore can be only for the purpose of
employment and they cannot be treated as permanent residents.

6 ‘…
Till the next date of hearing, there shall be a conditional stay of the impugned judgment and order to the
following extent:
(i) The appellant shall be entitled to participate in the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly;
(ii) The appellant shall, however, not be entitled to vote on any motion in the Legislative Assembly.
He shall also not be entitled to vote in his capacity as a Member of the Legislative Assembly on
any other matter;
(iii) The appellant shall not be entitled to receive any allowance or monetary benefits in any other form
which is admissible to a Member of the Legislative Assembly.
…’
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1817

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

This finding is assailed on the ground that this was neither pleaded,
nor proved by the respondent.
9. It was further canvassed that the 1950 Order was subsequently
amended in 1956 pursuant to the passing of the States Re-organization
Act, 1956. As per the direction in the States Re-Organization Act,
1956 amendments were brought about to the 1950 Order in 1956
by the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1956 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘1956 Order’). The date on which the residence
of the Appellant’s grandparents changed to the State of Kerala
on 01.11.1956, being the date when the then State of Travancore
became part of the State of Kerala. It was the case in the Election
Petition that the grandparents of the Appellant migrated to Kerala in
1951. If that be so, the Appellant’s grandparents would be, without
any doubt, ‘Hindu Parayan’ of Kerala in 1956 as the State of Kerala,
upon merger, was formed on 01.11.1956. The 1950 Order was
again amended in 1976 by the Parliament and the date on which
the ‘residence’ is to be reckoned shifted to 01.05.1976. Even in the
Impugned Judgment, the High Court finds that the family of the
Appellant started permanently residing in Kerala from 1970. In that
case also, it was urged, the Appellant is to be treated as a ‘Hindu
Parayan’ of Kerala.
10. Learned senior counsel relied on paragraph no.13 of Puducherry
SC People Welfare Assn. v UT of Pondicherry, (2014) 9 SCC 236
which states ‘ … Once Presidential Order has been issued under
Article 341(1) or Article 342(1), any amendment in the Presidential
Order can only be made by Parliament by law as provided in Article
341(2) or Article 342(2), as the case may be, and in no other manner.
The interpretation of “resident” in the Presidential Order as “of origin”
amounts to altering the Presidential Order.’ It was stated that the
term ‘resident’ therefore, assumes importance in the context. The
evidence on record would show that the ancestors of the Appellant
were residents of Kundala Estate in Munnar, a part of the erstwhile
Travancore, before 10.08.1950, the date on which the 1950 Order
came into force.
11. It was also argued that the High Court went beyond the pleadings
of the parties and the evidence adduced and made out a third case,
taking a view that even though the Appellant’s ancestors started
residing in Travancore before 1950, their residence in Travancore
1818 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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can be only for the purpose of employment and they cannot be
treated as permanent residents. Such case was neither pleaded, nor
proved by the respondent. Even when the Appellant was examined
as RW2, not even a single suggestion was put to him in this regard.
12. Learned senior counsel also contended that there was no challenge
to the Caste Certificate issued in the Appellant’s favour. If the
Respondent’s case is that the Appellant’s Caste Certificate is not
properly issued, it is for him to prove that the Caste Certificate
issued is invalid and improper. Reliance in this context was placed
on paragraph no.85 of M. Chandra (supra), where it was observed:
‘There is nothing on record to show that the community certificate
was issued illegally or in contravention of the valid procedure. The
election petitioner should have examined the person in charge while
the certificate was being issued to bring to light to alleged malpractice
in issuance of the said Certificate. The validity of the issuance of
the community certificate is presumed unless shown otherwise by
Respondent 1, who clearly failed to do so. …’7 Hence, in the case
at hand, the Respondent, who has not objected to acceptance of
the Caste Certificate by the Returning Officer, though he makes a
vague averment that he had orally objected to the acceptance of
the Caste Certificate, which is disputed as being factually incorrect,
has not chosen to examine either the Competent Authority, which
issued the Caste Certificate, nor has he examined the Returning
Officer to prove otherwise.
13. It was contended that the case of the Respondent is that in the year
1982, Pastor Ebenezer Mani baptized the father and mother of the
Appellant in CSI Church and thus, they became Christians in 1982.
Thereafter in 1984, the Appellant was born and the Respondent
alleges that the Appellant was also baptized by the said Ebenezer
Mani. Ebenezer Mani was examined as PW8, as a witness of the
Respondent, and deposed that he was born in 1968, which means
that he was only about 14 years of age in 1982, the year when he,
according to the Respondent, had allegedly baptized the parents
of the Appellant. He further deposed that he became an Evangelist
at the age of 24 and that an Evangelist cannot perform the rite of
baptism. Even in the examination-in-chief of PW8, there was no
attempt on the side of the Respondent to prove that Ebenezer Mani

7 Emphasis added by the Appellant.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1819

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

was instrumental in baptizing the Appellant’s father and mother as
also the Appellant.
14. Learned senior counsel contended that a totally new case was
attempted to be developed while examining PW9, on 17.10.2022, on
the strength of some alleged tampering in a Baptism Register and
Family Register produced before the High Court by Church authorities.
The case attempted to be projected was that in 1992, the Appellant’s
father, mother and their children (including the Appellant) together
converted to Christianity. It is submitted that entries in the so-called
Baptism Register are not proved. In fact, since the said Baptism
Register from 1997 to 2008 was marked through PW9, who admittedly
joined as a pastor in the CSI Church concerned only in 2013, he is
incompetent to prove any of the entries. The person who conducted
the baptism ceremony was not identified or examined. Anybody
knowing the handwriting and signature of the person/s who made
those entries was also not examined. Above all, the dates of birth of
the persons so baptized shown in the afore-mentioned Registers do
not tally with the actual dates of birth of the Appellant’s father, mother
and their children, including the Appellant, as per official records.
15. It was further argued that as per Section 818 of the Act, dealing with
the pleadings in an Election Petition, the petitioner should plead
specifically, the ground(s) on which he claims the election is to be
set aside, relying on the following decisions of this Court in support
of above said proposition: paragraph no.33 of Gajanan Krishnaji
Bapat v Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe, (1995) 5 SCC 347; paragraph
no.79 of M. Chandra (supra), and; paragraph no.19 of Kalyan Singh
Chouhan v C. P. Joshi, (2011) 11 SCC 786.
16. Learned senior counsel stressed that the specific case pleaded in the
Election Petition was that the ancestors of the Appellant migrated to

8 ‘81. Presentation of petitions.—(1) An election petition calling in question any election may be
presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 to
the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier
than the date of election of the returned candidate or if there are more than one returned candidate at
the election and dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “elector” means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to
which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not.
(2) [Omitted]
(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents
mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature
to be a true copy of the petition.’
1820 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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Kerala in 1951. Without even a whisper in the Election Petition or in
the evidence adduced by the Respondent that the ancestors came for
employment to Kerala, a completely new case was developed after
the period of limitation to file an Election Petition that the Appellant’s
ancestors came for employment to Kerala. Learned senior counsel
relied on Goka Ramalingam v Boddu Abraham, (1969) 1 SCC 24
and contended that after the period of limitation, a new contention,
changing the whole nature of the case, can neither be raised nor
pressed into service.
17. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant, further argued that the
instant appeal be allowed, pointing out that in the Impugned Judgment,
the High Court held that the burden to prove that the Appellant is
a member of the Scheduled Castes within the State of Kerala and
that his family had migrated prior to 1950 was entirely cast upon
the Appellant, which is contrary to the settled proposition of law in
M. Chandra (supra). Emphasis was placed particularly on paragraphs
no.81 & 82 thereof.

RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS:
18. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Narender Hooda, for the Respondent
submitted that the burden of proving the authenticity of the Caste
Certificate was fully on the Appellant as per Section 10 of the Kerala
(Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of
Community Certificates Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Kerala Act’), which reads as under:
‘10. Burden of proof:-
Where an application is made to the Competent Authority
under Section 4 for the issue of a community certificate
in respect of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or in
any enquiry conducted by the Competent Authority, the
Expert Agency, or the Scrutiny Committee or in any trial
or offence under this Act, the burden of proving that he
belongs to such Caste or Tribe shall be on the claimant.’9
19. Learned senior counsel laid emphasis on ‘or in any trial’ to support
the proposition that an Election Petition would fall within the ambit

9 Emphasis added by the Respondent.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1821

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

of the burden contemplated under Section 10 of the Kerala Act. It
was argued that in the present case, it was rightly understood by
all parties, based on the pleadings and the issues formulated by the
High Court and evidence adduced, that the challenge was made to
the Caste Certificate produced by the Appellant before the Returning
Officer issued by the Competent Authority under the Kerala Act.
The burden of proving the authenticity of the Caste Certificate was
fully on the Appellant which he failed to discharge. It was urged that
the Election Petitioner/Respondent had pleaded material facts and
particulars, as laid down in Virender Nath Gautam v Satpal Singh,
(2007) 3 SCC 617.
20. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Caste Certificate issued
to a returned candidate can be challenged in an Election Petition
and he relied on Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi, (2001) 8
SCC 233 and Punit Rai v Dinesh Chaudhary, (2003) 8 SCC 204.
21. It was submitted that a 5-Judge Bench of this Court in Action
Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to SCs/STs v Union
of India, (1994) 5 SCC 244 has interpreted the word ‘Resident’ as
used in the 1950 Order to mean ‘permanent resident’.
22. It was further argued by learned senior counsel that the marriage of
the Appellant was also conducted according to Christian rituals and
customs. None of the Hindu rituals or customs were followed during
the marriage function of the Appellant. Thus, when these are the
special facts within the knowledge of the Appellant, the burden shifts
to the Appellant, and it becomes his duty to explain such facts within
his knowledge. It was canvassed that simple denial of material facts
is not sufficient discharge of the burden under Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’),
nor rebuts the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.
23. Learned senior counsel further contended that a person claiming the
status of a Schedule Caste in a particular State has to demonstrate
his/his ancestors’ permanent residence in that particular State
on the date of the Presidential Order. In India, a Hindu inherits
his caste from his father. In the instant case, the Appellant would
inherit his caste from his father i.e., Mr. Anthony, who, in turn, would
get his caste from his father Lachmanan. To claim the benefit of
reservation for Schedule Castes in relation to the State of Kerala,
the Appellant had to establish that his grandfather Lachmanan was
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a permanent resident of Kerala much prior to the 1950 Order as per
Action Committee (supra). The High Court in paragraph no.17 of
the Impugned Judgment has recorded a categorical finding of fact,
after meticulous examination of the entire documentary as well as
oral evidence before it, that the Appellant’s grandfather was not a
permanent resident of the State of Kerala before the 1950 Order.
24. It was further argued that when the Appellant himself admitted the
fact of migration of his grandparents from Tamil Nadu to Kerala, it
was his responsibility to prove that his grandparents migrated before
independence to the erstwhile State of Travancore-Cochin from
Tamil Nadu and were permanent residents of Travancore-Cochin on
10.08.1950 i.e., the date the Presidential Order was issued.
25. It was submitted that since the Appellant was a minor when he
converted, the doctrine of eclipse followed him till he became a major.
The Appellant ought to have converted to Hinduism by following any
custom/ritual which was otherwise prescribed to be followed by the
community at large. The case of the Appellant that he never converted
to Christianity cannot be accepted since it was proved that the parents
converted to Christianity. The minor has no right to claim any religion
or caste so long as the parents have converted to another religion
along with the family. This being the factual position, it would be the
Appellant’s responsibility to prove that he had come out of the eclipse
by explaining the facts in his personal knowledge under Section 106
of the Evidence Act. As long as the Respondent had discharged his
initial burden of proving the allegation against the Appellant, unless
the presumption is rebutted, under Section 114 of the Evidence
Act, it would be presumed that the circumstances and evidence are
conclusive qua the allegations made in the Election Petition.
26. Learned senior counsel in support of his proposition apropos the
doctrine of eclipse relied on K. P. Manu v Scrutiny Committee for
Verification of Community Certificate, (2015) 4 SCC 1.
27. Learned senior counsel summed up his arguments and contended
that even though it is not mandatory under the Kerala Act to obtain
a certificate from the Scrutiny Committee, but if any challenge to
such Caste Certificate comes before any enquiry conducted by the
Competent Authority, the Expert Agency, or the Scrutiny Committee
or in any trial or offence under the Kerala Act, the burden will be
on the claimant (in this case, the Appellant herein) to prove that
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1823

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

he belongs to such caste or tribe. It was urged that the appeal be
dismissed, and the Impugned Judgment be upheld.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
28. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties at length
and bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival contentions
assiduously advanced at the Bar, we are of the opinion that the
judgment impugned warrants interference.
29. Article 341 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Constitution’) reads as under:
‘341. Scheduled Castes.—(1) The President may with
respect to any State or Union Territory, and where it is
a State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by
public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or
parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which
shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to
be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union
territory, as the case may be.
(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the
list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued
under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group
within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a
notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied
by any subsequent notification.’
30. In exercise of power conferred under Article 341(1) of the Constitution,
Hon’ble the President issued the 1950 Order. The central issue in
the entire controversy is whether the Appellant belongs to the Hindu
Parayan caste in the State of Kerala and is covered by the 1950
Order insofar as it relates to the State of Kerala. The twin conditions
needing to be satisfied would be (i) being of the Hindu Parayan
caste, and; (ii) being, himself/herself or through one’s ancestors,
permanent resident of the State of Kerala as on the date of the 1950
Order. Upon fulfilment of both these conditions, a person can claim
a legal right to derive any benefits available to Hindu Parayan caste
in the State of Kerala. In the instant case, fulfilment of the same
would enable the Appellant to become eligible to contest from the
Devikulam Legislative Assembly Constituency 088 in Idukki District,
Kerala, reserved for the Scheduled Castes.
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31. There is no dispute on the factum that, originally, the grandparents of
the Appellant belonged to the Hindu Parayan caste in the erstwhile
State of Travancore-Cochin having migrated from the State of Tamil
Nadu but prior to 1950. In this regard, there is sufficient evidence
available on the record. The next relevant question which would
arise would be as to whether the Appellant had still retained the
Hindu Parayan caste, as a member of the Hindu religion, when he
contested from the Devikulam Legislative Assembly Constituency?
32. This is hotly contested between the parties. The Respondent-Election
Petitioner contends that the Appellant’s parents had converted to
Christianity and the entire family, including the Appellant, were
baptized. In this regard, certain registers of the CSI Church were
produced before the High Court. However, from the evidence, it
is also apparent that the entries in such registers were not very
specific, inasmuch as the name of the Appellant was not mentioned
and other details with regard to the age of his siblings also did not
match. Even some names of the siblings were different. Were this
an ordinary civil suit at trial, we could have possibly applied the
‘preponderance of probabilities’ yardstick, which may have resulted
in some leeway and latitude in favour of the Respondent and against
the Appellant. However, as per the dicta in J. Chandrasekhara
Rao v V. Jagapathi Rao, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 229 and M. Chandra
(supra), Election Petitions, including those wherein no allegations
of corrupt practices are levelled, have to be treated akin to criminal
proceedings and the Election Petitioner has to prove the charges
levelled beyond reasonable doubt. This enunciation of the law has
guided our decision-making.
33. Most importantly, Ebenezer Mani/PW8, from the Respondent’s
side, who claimed to have baptized the Appellant and his family,
during evidence, admitted that he was aged 54 years on the date
of deposition, which meant he was aged only 14 years in the year
1982, when he purportedly baptized the Appellant’s parents. This
is, clearly, unbelievable and unsustainable.
34. It is relevant to observe that mere observance/performance of a ritual
of/associated with any religion does not ipso facto and necessarily
mean that the person ‘professes’ that religion. That is why the term
used in the 1950 Order is ‘professes’, signifying that a person although
born in a particular religion can profess another religion, inter alia,
by practicing the rituals of that other religion as the basic tenets of
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1825

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

his beliefs and lifestyle. Adherence merely to some ritual of another
religion would not tantamount to giving-up the original religion, unless
the person concerned makes such belief explicit. In Sapna Jacob v
State of Kerala, 1992 SCC OnLine Ker 233, a learned Single Judge
of the (Kerala) High Court (as he then was) observed:
‘6. … It may be true that the court cannot test or gauge the
sincerity of religious belief; or where there is no question of
the genuineness of a person’s belief in a certain religion,
the court cannot measure its depth or determine whether it
is an intelligent conviction or ignorant and superficial fancy.
But a court can find the true intention of men lying behind
their acts and can certainly find from the circumstances
of a case whether a pretended conversion was really a
means to some further end. …’
(emphasis supplied)10

35. The term ‘professes’ has been examined by five of our learned
predecessors in Punjabrao v D. P. Meshram, 1964 SCC OnLine
SC 76 in like background:
‘13. What clause (3) of the Constitution (Scheduled
Castes) Order, 1950 contemplates is that for a person to
be treated as one belonging to a Scheduled Caste within
the meaning of that Order, he must be one who professes
either Hindu or Sikh religion. The High Court, following its
earlier decision in Karwadi v. Shambharkar [AIR 1958 Bom
296] has said that the meaning of the phrase “professes
a religion” in the aforementioned provision is “to enter
publicly into a religions state” and that for this purpose
a mere declaration by a person that he has ceased to
belong to a particular religion and embraced another
religion would not be sufficient. The meanings of the word
“profess” have been given thus in Webster’s New World
Dictionary:“to avow publicly; to make an open declaration
of … to declare one’s belief in : as, to profess Christ. To
accept into a religious order”. The meanings given in

10 The afore-extract recently found this Court’s approval in C. Selvarani v Special Secretary-cum-District
Collector, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3470.
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the Shorter Oxford Dictionary are more or less the same.
It seems to us that the meaning “to declare one’s belief
in: as to profess Christ” is one which we have to bear in
mind while construing the aforesaid order because it is
this which bears upon religious belief and consequently
also upon a change in religious belief. It would thus follow
that a declaration of one’s belief must necessarily mean a
declaration in such a way that it would be known to those
whom it may interest. Therefore, if a public declaration is
made by a person that he has ceased to belong to his
old religion and has accepted another religion he will be
taken as professing the other religion. In the face of such
an open declaration it would be idle to enquire further as to
whether the conversion to another religion was efficacious.
The word “profess” in the Presidential Order appears to
have been used in the sense of an open declaration or
practice by a person of the Hindu (or the Sikh) religion.
Where, therefore, a person says, on the contrary, that he
has ceased to be a Hindu he cannot derive any benefit
from that Order.’
(emphasis supplied)

36. From the evidence available, it is not possible to hold that the
Appellant ‘professes’ Christianity. In the factual setting of the present
lis, the evidence adduced from the side of the Appellant would reveal
that the Caste Certificate(s) issued in his favour by the Competent
Authority till date hold the field. The Appellant’s Caste Certificate
has not been interfered with, either by the Impugned Judgment or
by the authority(ies) concerned. In Madhuri Patil v Commr., Tribal
Development, (1994) 6 SCC 241, the Court stated, in the context
of fake certificate(s) having been obtained to secure admissions in
educational institutions:
‘13. The admission wrongly gained or appointment wrongly
obtained on the basis of false social status certificate
necessarily has the effect of depriving the genuine
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or OBC candidates
as enjoined in the Constitution of the benefits conferred
on them by the Constitution. The genuine candidates
are also denied admission to educational institutions or
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appointments to office or posts under a State for want
of social status certificate. The ineligible or spurious
persons who falsely gained entry resort to dilatory tactics
and create hurdles in completion of the inquiries by the
Scrutiny Committee. It is true that the applications for
admission to educational institutions are generally made
by a parent, since on that date many a time the student
may be a minor. It is the parent or the guardian who may
play fraud claiming false status certificate. It is, therefore,
necessary that the certificates issued are scrutinised at the
earliest and with utmost expedition and promptitude. For
that purpose, it is necessary to streamline the procedure
for the issuance of social status certificates, their scrutiny
and their approval, which may be the following:
1. The application for grant of social status certificate shall
be made to the Revenue Sub-Divisional Officer and Deputy
Collector or Deputy Commissioner and the certificate shall
be issued by such officer rather than at the Officer, Taluk
or Mandal level.
2. The parent, guardian or the candidate, as the case
may be, shall file an affidavit duly sworn and attested by
a competent gazetted officer or non-gazetted officer with
particulars of castes and sub-castes, tribe, tribal community,
parts or groups of tribes or tribal communities, the place
from which he originally hails from and other particulars
as may be prescribed by the Directorate concerned.
3. Application for verification of the caste certificate by
the Scrutiny Committee shall be filed at least six months
in advance before seeking admission into educational
institution or an appointment to a post.
4. All the State Governments shall constitute a Committee
of three officers, namely, (I) an Additional or Joint Secretary
or any officer high-er in rank of the Director of the
department concerned, (II) the Director, Social Welfare/
Tribal Welfare/Backward Class Welfare, as the case may
be, and (III) in the case of Scheduled Castes another
officer who has intimate knowledge in the verification and
issuance of the social status certificates. In the case of the
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Scheduled Tribes, the Research Officer who has intimate
knowledge in identifying the tribes, tribal communities,
parts of or groups of tribes or tribal communities.
5. Each Directorate should constitute a vigilance cell
consisting of Senior Deputy Superintendent of Police in
over-all charge and such number of Police Inspectors to
investigate into the social status claims. The Inspector
would go to the local place of residence and original
place from which the candidate hails and usually resides
or in case of migration to the town or city, the place from
which he originally hailed from. The vigilance officer should
personally verify and collect all the facts of the social
status claimed by the candidate or the parent or guardian,
as the case may be. He should also examine the school
records, birth registration, if any. He should also examine
the parent, guardian or the candidate in relation to their
caste etc. or such other persons who have knowledge of
the social status of the candidate and then submit a report
to the Directorate together with all particulars as envisaged
in the pro forma, in particular, of the Scheduled Tribes
relating to their peculiar anthropological and ethnological
traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of marriage, death
ceremonies, method of burial of dead bodies etc. by the
castes or tribes or tribal communities concerned etc.
6. The Director concerned, on receipt of the report from
the vigilance officer if he found the claim for social status
to be “not genuine” or ‘doubtful’ or spurious or falsely or
wrongly claimed, the Director concerned should issue
show-cause notice supplying a copy of the report of the
vigilance officer to the candidate by a registered post
with acknowledgement due or through the head of the
educational institution concerned in which the candidate
is studying or employed. The notice should indicate that
the representation or reply, if any, would be made within
two weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice and
in no case on request not more than 30 days from the
date of the receipt of the notice. In case, the candidate
seeks for an opportunity of hearing and claims an inquiry
to be made in that behalf, the Director on receipt of such
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

representation/reply shall convene the committee and the
Joint/Additional Secretary as Chairperson who shall give
reasonable opportunity to the candidate/parent/guardian
to adduce all evidence in support of their claim. A public
notice by beat of drum or any other convenient mode may
be published in the village or locality and if any person
or association opposes such a claim, an opportunity to
adduce evidence may be given to him/it. After giving
such opportunity either in person or through counsel, the
Committee may make such inquiry as it deems expedient
and consider the claims vis-à-vis the objections raised by
the candidate or opponent and pass an appropriate order
with brief reasons in support thereof.
7. In case the report is in favour of the candidate and
found to be genuine and true, no further action need be
taken except where the report or the particulars given are
procured or found to be false or fraudulently obtained and
in the latter event the same procedure as is envisaged in
para 6 be followed.
8. Notice contemplated in para 6 should be issued to
the parents/guardian also in case candidate is minor to
appear before the Committee with all evidence in his or
their support of the claim for the social status certificates.
9. The inquiry should be completed as expeditiously as
possible preferably by day-to-day proceedings within such
period not exceeding two months. If after inquiry, the Caste
Scrutiny Committee finds the claim to be false or spurious,
they should pass an order cancelling the certificate
issued and confiscate the same. It should communicate
within one month from the date of the conclusion of the
proceedings the result of enquiry to the parent/guardian
and the applicant.
10. In case of any delay in finalising the proceedings,
and in the meanwhile the last date for admission into
an educational institution or appointment to an officer
post, is getting expired, the candidate be admitted by the
Principal or such other authority competent in that behalf
or appointed on the basis of the social status certificate
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already issued or an affidavit duly sworn by the parent/
guardian/candidate before the competent officer or non-
official and such admission or appointment should be
only provisional, subject to the result of the inquiry by the
Scrutiny Committee.
11. The order passed by the Committee shall be final and
conclusive only subject to the proceedings under Article
226 of the Constitution.
12. No suit or other proceedings before any other authority
should lie.
13. The High Court would dispose of these cases as
expeditiously as possible within a period of three months. In
case, as per its procedure, the writ petition/miscellaneous
petition/matter is disposed of by a Single Judge, then no
further appeal would lie against that order to the Division
Bench but subject to special leave under Article 136.
14. In case, the certificate obtained or social status
claimed is found to be false, the parent/guardian/the
candidate should be prosecuted for making false claim.
If the prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence of
the accused, it could be regarded as an offence involving
moral turpitude, disqualification for elective posts or offices
under the State or the Union or elections to any local body,
legislature or Parliament.
15. As soon as the finding is recorded by the Scrutiny
Committee holding that the certificate obtained was false,
on its cancellation and confiscation simultaneously, it
should be communicated to the educational institution
concerned or the appointing authority by registered post
with acknowledgement due with a request to cancel the
admission or the appointment. The Principal etc. of the
educational institution responsible for making the admission
or the appointing authority, should cancel the admission/
appointment without any further notice to the candidate
and debar the candidate from further study or continue
in office in a post.
xxx
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

15. The question then is whether the approach adopted
by the High Court in not elaborately considering the case
is vitiated by an error of law. High Court is not a court
of appeal to appreciate the evidence. The Committee
which is empowered to evaluate the evidence placed
before it when records a finding of fact, it ought to prevail
unless found vitiated by judicial review of any High Court
subject to limitations of interference with findings of fact.
The Committee when considers all the material facts
and records a finding, though another view, as a court of
appeal may be possible, it is not a ground to reverse the
findings. The court has to see whether the Committee
considered all the relevant material placed before it or has
not applied its mind to relevant facts which have led the
Committee ultimately record the finding. Each case must
be considered in the backdrop of its own facts.’
(emphasis supplied)

37. A perusal of the decision by 2 learned Judges in Madhuri Patil
(supra) would indicate that a Caste Certificate could be invalidated, in
the first instance, by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, whose decision
could be challenged in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution. A 3-Judge Bench in Dayaram v Sudhir Batham, (2012)
1 SCC 333, ruled as under:
‘17. The directions issued in Madhuri Patil [(1994) 6
SCC 241: 1994 SCC (L&S) 1349: (1994) 28 ATC 259]
were towards furtherance of the constitutional rights of
the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. As the rights in
favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
are a part of legitimate and constitutionally accepted
affirmative action, the directions given by this Court to
ensure that only genuine members of the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes were afforded or extended
the benefits, are necessarily inherent to the enforcement
of fundamental rights. In giving such directions, this
Court neither rewrote the Constitution nor resorted to
“judicial legislation”. The judicial power was exercised
to interpret the Constitution as a “living document”
and enforce fundamental rights in an area where the
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will of the elected legislatures have not expressed
themselves.
xxx
22. Therefore, we are of the view, that Directions 1 to 15
issued in exercise of power under Articles 142 and 32
of the Constitution, are valid and laudable, as they were
made to fill the vacuum in the absence of any legislation, to
ensure that only genuine Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe candidates secured the benefits of reservation and
the bogus candidates were kept out. By issuing such
directions, this Court was not taking over the functions
of the legislature but merely filling up the vacuum till the
legislature chose to make an appropriate law.
xxx
44. In view of the above, we hold that the second sentence
of Direction 13 of Madhuri Patil [(1994) 6 SCC 241:
1994 SCC (L&S) 1349: (1994) 28 ATC 259] providing
that where the writ petition is disposed of by a Single
Judge, no further appeal would lie against the order of
the Division Bench (even when there is a vested right to
file such intra-court appeal) and will only be subject to a
special leave under Article 136, is not legally proper and
therefore, to that extent, is held to be not a good law. The
second sentence of Direction 13 stands overruled. As a
consequence, wherever the writ petitions against the orders
of the Scrutiny Committee are heard by a Single Judge
and the State law or Letters Patent permits an intra-court
appeal, the same will be available.’
38. We may, in the interest of completeness take note of the decision
by another 3-Judge Bench in Food Corporation of India v Jagdish
Balaram Bahira, (2017) 8 SCC 670, which while noticing that the
Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified
Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes
and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and
Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000 had been enacted to
provide a statutory mechanism to answer the concerns expressed
in Madhuri Patil (supra), re-affirmed the guidelines laid down
thereunder, albeit innocent of the modification(s) effected thereto via
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

Dayaram (supra). Pertinently, one of us (Abhay S. Oka, J.) speaking
for a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Maharashtra Adiwasi Thakur
Jamat Swarakshan Samiti v State of Maharashtra, (2023) 16
SCC 415 has conclusively held that once the competent Legislature
passes/had passed legislation, such legislation would govern the
field and not the Madhuri Patil (supra) guidelines. Ergo, the Kerala
Act assumes special relevance.
39. For proper appreciation, it is apt to re-reproduce the concerned
provision from the Kerala Act:
‘10. Burden of proof:-
Where an application is made to the Competent Authority
under Section 4 for the issue of a community certificate
in respect of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or in
any enquiry conducted by the Competent Authority, the
Expert Agency, or the Scrutiny Committee or in any trial
or offence under this Act, the burden of proving that he
belongs to such Caste or Tribe shall be on the claimant.’
40. The Kerala Act, attention to which was drawn by the learned senior
counsel for the Respondent, was enacted after Madhuri Patil (supra).
It provides, vide Section 10 thereof, that the burden of proof would
be on the claimant (which would be the Appellant herein), but in a
scenario ‘Where an application is made to the Competent Authority
under Section 4 for the issue of a community certificate in respect of
a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or in any enquiry conducted
by the Competent Authority, the Expert Agency, or the Scrutiny
Committee or in any trial or offence under this Act…’11 Contextualised
thus, Section 10 of the Kerala Act does not aid the Respondent’s case.
On deeper perusal of the Kerala Act, it is obvious that an elaborate
scheme has been laid down covering Caste/Community Certificates12,
from issuance to verification to cancellation et al. We are unable to
accept the contention of Mr. Hooda, learned senior counsel that ‘in
any trial’ would encompass within its fold an Election Petition.
41. In Poppatlal Shah v State of Madras, 1953 1 SCC 492, it was held
‘It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative

11 Emphasis supplied by us.
12 The Kerala Act uses these terms interchangeably.
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intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together
and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light
of the general purpose and object of the Act itself.’13 We are quite
cognizant that it is not for us to add or read words into a statute, nor
should we venture into the legislative arena, in respectful concurrence
with B. Premanand v Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266; Mukund
Dewangan v Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2017) 14 SCC 663,
and; DDA v Virender Lal Bahri, (2020) 15 SCC 328. In this context,
the principles of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis merit closer
scrutiny. In State of Bombay v Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, 1960
SCC OnLine SC 44, the Court commented:
‘9. It is, however, contended that, in construing the
definition, we must adopt the rule of construction noscuntur
a sociis. This rule, according to Maxwell, means that, when
two or more words which are susceptible of analogous
meaning are coupled together they are understood to
be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were
their colour from each other, that is, the more general is
restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The
same rule is thus interpreted in Words and Phrases (Vol.
XIV, p. 207):“Associated words take their meaning from
one another under the doctrine of noscuntur a sociis the
philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful
word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning
of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader than
the maxim Ejusdem Generis.” In fact the latter maxim “is
only an illustration or specific application of the broader
maxim noscuntur a sociis”. The argument is that certain
essential features or attributes are invariably associated
with the words “business and trade” as understood in the
popular and conventional sense, and it is the colour of
these attributes which is taken by the other words used
in the definition though their normal import may be much
wider. We are not impressed by this argument. It must
be borne in mind that noscuntur a sociis is merely a
rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where
it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately

13 Emphasis supplied by us.
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

used in order to make the scope of the defined word
correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of
the legislature in associating wider words with words of
narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear
that the present rule of construction can be usefully
applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the
words of wider import is doubtful; but, where the object
of the legislature in using wider words is clear and free
of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot
be pressed into service. As has been observed by Earl
of Halsbury, L.C., in Corporation of Glasgow v. Glasgow
Tramway and Omnibus Co. Ltd. [(1898) AC 631 at p. 634]
in dealing with the wider words used in Section 6 of
Valuation of Lands (Scotland) Act, 1854, “the words ‘free
from all expenses whatever in connection with the said
tramways’ appear to me to be so wide in their application
that I should have thought it impossible to qualify or cut
them down by their being associated with other words
on the principle of their being ejusdem generis with the
previous words enumerated”. If the object and scope of
the statute are considered there would be no difficulty in
holding that the relevant words of wide import have been
deliberately used by the legislature in defining “industry” in
Section 2(j). The object of the Act was to make provision
for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes,
and the extent and scope of its provisions would be
realised if we bear in mind the definition of “industrial
dispute” given by Section 2(k), of “wages” by Section
2(rr), “workman” by Section 2(s), and of “employer”
by Section 2(g). Besides, the definition of public utility
service prescribed by Section 2(m) is very significant.
One has merely to glance at the six categories of public
utility service mentioned by Section 2(m) to realise that
the rule of construction on which the appellant relies is
inapplicable in interpreting the definition prescribed by
Section 2(j).’
(emphasis supplied)

42. 5 learned Judges in Amar Chandra Chakraborty v Collector of
Excise, Govt. of Tripura, (1972) 2 SCC 442 held:
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‘9. Before dealing with the contention relating to Article 19
we consider it proper to dispose of the argument founded on
the ejusdem generis rule and Article 14 of the Constitution.
It was contended by Shri Sen that the only way in which
Section 43 can be saved from the challenge of arbitrariness
is to construe the expression “any cause other than” in
Section 43(1) ejusdem generis with the causes specified
in clauses (a) to (g) of Section 42(1). We do not agree
with this submission. The ejusdem generis rule strives to
reconcile the incompatibility between specific and general
words. This doctrine applies when (i) the statute contains
an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of the
enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that class
or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the
general term follows the enumeration and (v) there is no
indication of a different legislative intent. In the present
case it is not easy to construe the various clauses of
Section 42 as constituting one category or class. But
that apart, the very language of the two sections and the
objects intended respectively to be achieved by them also
negative any intention of the legislature to attract the rule
of ejusdem generis.’
(emphasis supplied)

43. In U.P.SEB v Hari Shankar Jain, (1978) 4 SCC 16, it was held:
‘15. The High Court expressed the views that the
expression “any other rules or regulations” should be
read ejusdem generis with the expressions “Fundamental
and Supplementary Rules”, “Civil Services, Control,
Classification and Appeal Rules” etc. So read, it was said,
the provisions of Section 13-B could only be applied to
industrial establishments in which the workmen employed
could properly be described as Government servants. We
are unable to agree that the application of the ejusdem
generis rule leads to any such result. The true scope of
the rule of “ejusdem generis” is that words of a general
nature following specific and particular words should be
construed as limited to things which are of the same nature
as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be
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“applied with caution and not pushed too far”. It is a rule
which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to
unduly or unnecessarily limit general and comprehensive
words. If a broad-based genus could consistently be
discovered, there is no warrant to cut down general words
to dwarf size. If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be.
It is true that in Section 13-B the species specifically
mentioned happen to be Government servants. But they
also possess this common characteristic that they are all
public servants enjoying a statutory status, and governed
by statutory rules and regulations. If the Legislature
intended to confine the applicability of Section 13-B to
industrial undertakings employing Government servants
only nothing was easier than to say so instead of referring
to various rules specifically and following it up with a
general expression like the one before us. The words
‘rules and regulations’ have come to acquire a special
meaning when used in statutes. They are used to describe
subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom the
statute delegates that function. The words can have no
other meaning in Section 13-B. Therefore, the expression
“workmen. . . to whom ... any other rules or regulations
that may be notified in this behalf” means, in the context
of Section 13-B, workmen enjoying a statutory status,
in respect of whose conditions of service the relevant
statute authorises the making of rules or regulations. The
expression cannot be construed so narrowly as to mean
Government servants only; nor can it be construed so
broadly as to mean workmen employed by whomsoever
including private employers, so long as their conditions of
service are notified by the Government under Section 13-B.’
(emphasis supplied)

44. In Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Limited v CCE, (1990) 3 SCC 447,
it was explained:
‘12. The principle of statutory interpretation by which a
generic word receives a limited interpretation by reason
of its context is well established. In the context with
which we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon
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the “noscitur a sociis” principle. This expression simply
means that “the meaning of a word is to be judged by the
company it keeps.”
…
This principle has been applied in a number of contexts in
judicial decisions where the court is clear in its mind that
the larger meaning of the word in question could not have
been intended in the context in which it has been used.
The cases are too numerous to need discussion here.
It should be sufficient to refer to one of them by way of
illustration. In Rainbow Steels Ltd. v. CST [(1981) 2 SCC
141: 1981 SCC (Tax) 90] this Court had to understand the
meaning of the word ‘old’ in the context of an entry in a
taxing traffic which read thus:
“Old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete
machinery, stores or vehicles including waste
products......”
Though the tariff item started with the use of the wide
word ‘old’, the court came to the conclusion that “in order
to fall within the expression ‘old machinery’ occurring in
the entry, the machinery must be old machinery in the
sense that it has become non-functional or non-usable”.
In other words, not the mere age of the machinery, which
would be relevant in the wider sense, but the condition of
the machinery analogous to that indicated by the words
following it, was considered relevant for the purposes of
the statute.
13. The maxim of noscitur a sociis has been described
by Diplock, C.J. as a “treacherous one unless one knows
the societas to which the socii belong” (vide Letang v.
Cooper [(1965) 1 QB 232: (1964) 2 All ER 929]). The
learned Solicitor General also warns that one should not
be carried away by labels and Latin maxims when the
words to be interpreted is clear and has a wide meaning.
We entirely agree that these maxims and precedents are
not to be mechanically applied; they are of assistance
only insofar as they furnish guidance by compendiously
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summing up principles based on rules of common sense
and logic. As explained in CCE v. Parle Exports (P) Ltd.
[(1989) 1 SCC 345, 357: 1989 SCC (Tax) 84] and Tata
Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. CCE [(1989) 4 SCC 541, 545-46:
1990 SCC (Tax) 22] in interpreting the scope of any
notification, the court has first to keep in mind the object
and purpose of the notification. All parts of it should be
read harmoniously in aid of, and not in derogation of, that
purpose. In this case, the aim and object of the notification
is to grant a concession to small scale factories which
manufacture paper with unconventional raw materials.
The question naturally arises: Could there have been any
particular object intended to be achieved by introducing the
exceptions set out in the proviso? Instead of proceeding
on the premise that it is not necessary to look for any
reason in a taxing statute, it is necessary to have a
closer look at the wording of the proviso. If the proviso
had referred only to ‘coated paper’, no special object
or purpose would have been discernible and perhaps
there would have been no justification to look beyond
it and enter into a speculation as to why the notification
should have thought of exempting only ‘coated paper’
manufactured by these factories from the purview of the
exemption. But the notification excepts not one but a group
of items. If the items mentioned in the group were totally
dissimilar and it were impossible to see any common
thread running through them, again, it may be permissible
to give the exceptions their widest latitude. But when four
of them — undoubtedly, at least three of them — can be
brought under an intelligible classification and it is also
conceivable that the government might well have thought
that these small scale factories should not be eligible for
the concession contemplated by the notification where
they manufacture paper catering to industrial purposes,
there is a purpose in the limitation prescribed and there
is no reason why the rationally logical restriction should
not be placed on the proviso based on this classification.
In our view, the only reasonable way of interpreting the
proviso is by understanding the words ‘coated paper’ in
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a narrower sense consistent with the other expressions
used therein.’
(emphasis supplied)

45. Adopting and applying the afore-referred precedents, it is clear
that ‘in any trial’ would refer only to a trial under the Act. The terms
preceding and succeeding ‘in any trial’ also fortify our conclusion.
Even the start and end of Section 10 are hemmed in by reference
to the Kerala Act itself. The meaning of ‘any trial’ has to be ‘judged
by the company it keeps.’ The Kerala Act in Section 24 bars the
jurisdiction of Civil Courts, but Section 21 establishes Special Courts
to try offences thereunder. As such, arguendo, even if we brush
aside the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis principles, on a
harmonious reading of the Kerala Act as a whole, we are not able
to countenance that the Legislature intended ‘any trial’ occurring in
Section 10 to include an Election Petition. In the wake of the above
discussions, we have no hesitation to hold that a Caste/Community
Certificate cannot be assailed in an Election Petition. Exception to
the above proposition can only be by way of legislative carve-out
in the State concerned, which will be determinative. Exempli gratia,
if the legislation permits challenge to Caste/Community Certificate
in an Election Petition, then the Madhuri Patil (supra) guidelines
cannot come in the way. In the absence of which, the Madhuri Patil
(supra) guidelines, as modified per Dayaram (supra), will prevail,
under which challenge to a Caste Certificate cannot be mounted in
an Election Petition. Obviously, the guidelines issued in Madhuri
Patil (supra) were in exercise of power under Article 142 of the
Constitution. As elucidated by the 5-Judge Bench in Supreme
Court Bar Assn. v Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, ‘Indeed,
these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by
any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are
not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly
in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute
dealing expressly with the subject.’ It was further stated ‘… the
power is used with restraint without pushing back the limits of the
Constitution so as to function within the bounds of its own jurisdiction.
To the extent this Court makes the statutory authorities and other
organs of the State perform their duties in accordance with law,
its role is unexceptionable but it is not permissible for the Court to
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

“take over” the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the
State and “perform” their functions.’
46. Our endeavour cannot conclude at this stage. A Coordinate Bench’s
view in Sobha Hymavathi Devi v Setti Gangadhara Swamy, (2005)
2 SCC 244, the relevant paragraph wherefrom reads as below, is
to be dealt with:
‘11. What remains is the argument based on the
certificates allegedly issued under the Andhra Pradesh
(Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward
Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates
Act, 1993. The High Court has not accepted the
certificates as binding for the reason that the evidence
showed that the certificates were issued based on the
influence exercised by the appellant as a member of the
Legislative Assembly, one after another, immediately on
an application being made and without any due or proper
inquiry. We are impressed by the reasons given by the
High Court for not acting on these certificates. That apart,
a reference to Section 3 of the Act would indicate that a
certificate thereunder, insofar as it relates to elections,
is confined in its validity to elections to local authorities
and cooperative institutions. It does not embrace an
election to the Legislative Assembly or to Parliament.
Therefore, in any view of the matter, it cannot be said
that the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under the
Representation of the People Act in an election petition
is precluded from going into the question of status of a
candidate or proceeding to make an independent inquiry
into that question in spite of the production of a certificate
under the Act. At best, such a certificate could be used
in evidence and its evidentiary value will have to be
assessed in the light of the other evidence let in, in an
election petition. Therefore, nothing turns on the factum
of a certificate being issued by the authority concerned
under the Act of 1993. We are also satisfied as the High
Court was satisfied, that no proper inquiry preceded the
issuance of such a certificate and such a certificate was
issued merely on the say-so of the appellant. We have,
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therefore, no hesitation in overruling this argument raised
on behalf of the appellant.’
(emphasis supplied)

47. The Court in Sobha Hymavathi Devi (supra) proceeded on the
premise that a certificate under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh
(Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes)
Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Andhra Pradesh Act’) [Section 3 of the Andhra
Pradesh Act is mostly identical to Section 3 of the Kerala Act] ‘insofar
as it relates to elections, is confined in its validity to elections to
local authorities and cooperative institutions. It does not embrace
an election to the Legislative Assembly or to Parliament.’ While the
Caste/Community Certificates are undoubtedly issued by the State/
UT authorities, a candidate contesting elections to the Parliament
or to the State Legislative Assembly/Council is permitted to file the
same with Nomination Papers, under instructions of the Election
Commission of India. By virtue of Section 5 of the Kerala Act, a
detailed procedure is laid down for issuance of the Community
Certificate by the Competent Authority. It would not be out of place
to emphasise that, as such, the Competent Authority functions akin
to a quasi-judicial authority. Section 11 of the Kerala Act enables any
person to seek the cancellation of a false Community Certificate – the
Scrutiny Committee established under Section 8 of the Kerala Act is
empowered to cancel the Community Certificate issued under Section
5 thereof. Appellate, review, stay and revisionary provisions can also
be found in Sections 12 and 13 of the Kerala Act. Section 14 of the
Kerala Act confers the powers of a Civil Court on the Competent
Authority, the Expert Agency and the Scrutiny Committee. As noted
above, Section 21 of the Kerala Act establishes Special Courts to
try offences thereunder, and Section 24 ousts the jurisdiction of Civil
Courts qua any order passed by any officer/authority thereunder. What
is evincible from a conjoint reading of the Kerala Act is that it is a
complete code in itself. The Kerala Act mirrors the Andhra Pradesh
Act, but Sobha Hymavathi Devi (supra) has not examined the statute
as a whole. As such, what is observed in paragraph 11 of Sobha
Hymavathi Devi (supra) cannot be said to be a binding precedent.
We are, therefore, unhesitant to state that paragraph no.11 is of no
precedential value being sub-silentio, in view of our afore-evaluation.
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

48. In Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101,
3 learned Judges opined:
‘11. Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the
ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not
authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who
passed the order in Jamna Das case [Writ Petitions Nos.
981-82 of 1984] and to the learned Judge who agreed with
him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow
it. It was delivered without argument, without reference
to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express
power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal
of encroachments from any public place like pavements
or public streets, and without any citation of authority.
Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of
the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong
in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the
relevant provisions. A decision should be treated as given
per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of
a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. So far
as the order shows, no argument was addressed to the
court on the question whether or not any direction could
properly be made compelling the Municipal Corporation
to construct a stall at the pitching site of a pavement
squatter. Professor P.J. Fitzgerald, editor of the Salmond
on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. explains the concept of sub
silentio at p. 153 in these words:
A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical
sense that has come to be attached to that
phrase, when the particular point of law involved
in the decision is not perceived by the court or
present to its mind. The court may consciously
decide in favour of one party because of point
A, which it considers and pronounces upon.
It may be shown, however, that logically the
court should not have decided in favour of the
particular party unless it also decided point B
in his favour; but point B was not argued or
considered by the court. In such circumstances,
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although point B was logically involved in the
facts and although the case had a specific
outcome, the decision is not an authority on
point B. Point B is said to pass sub silentio.
12. In Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd. (k). [(1936) 2 All ER
905 (CA)], the only point argued was on the question
of priority of the claimant›s debt, and, on this argument
being heard, the court granted the order. No consideration
was given to the question whether a garnishee order
could properly be made on an account standing in the
name of the liquidator. When, therefore, this very point
was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of
Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith
Ltd. [(1941) 1 KB 675], the court held itself not bound
by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., said
that he could not help thinking that the point now raised
had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in
order that the point of substance might be decided. He
went on to say that the point had to be decided by the
earlier court before it could make the order which it did;
nevertheless, since it was decided “without argument,
without reference to the crucial words of the rule, and
without any citation of authority”, it was not binding and
would not be followed. Precedents sub silentio and
without argument are of no moment. This rule has ever
since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the
doctrine of precedent is that a matter that has once been
fully argued and decided should not be allowed to be
reopened. The weight accorded to dicta varies with the
type of dictum. Mere casual expressions carry no weight
at all. Not every passing expression of a judge, however
eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement,
having the weight of authority.’
(emphasis supplied)

49. The principle in Gurnam Kaur (supra) found reiteration in
State of U.P. v Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC
139 and A-One Granites v State of U.P., (2001) 3 SCC 537.
We derive no pleasure in refusing to be bound by the dicta in
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

Sobha Hymavathi Devi (supra), but upon careful analysis, we are
clear that the observation in question therein was rendered sub-
silentio.
50. Back to the facts, the records from the school where the Appellant’s
children study show them as members of the Hindu-Parayan caste. In
the present time, which is a day and age of intrusive media, including
social media, where public figures, including Judges, politicians and
bureaucrats are under constant public gaze, it is not easy to hide
one’s religion or caste. The production of some photographs or
some rituals which may have been performed by the Appellant, nay,
even assuming they were actually performed by the Appellant, at
the cost of repetition, can, in no manner, take the place of evidence,
especially when matters of the like herein are being considered by
the Courts. In this regard, the High Court seems to have erred by
shifting the burden of proof on the Appellant to prove in the negative
the allegations. Further, even the entries in the Register are not
conclusively established in the sense that they relate to the Appellant
or his family members. Apropos this, the High Court has noticed
many overwritings, edits and deletions re the purported names of
the Appellant and his parents as alleged to have appeared in the
Register. This has prompted the High Court to note that ‘fabrication
and correction’ were made to the entry(ies) in the Register(s). The
High Court, on the whole, accepted whatever was presented by the
Respondent and in such approach, disregarded and ignored the
material lacuna in the pleadings of the Election Petition as also the
evidence brought in by the Respondent. As far as marriage rites are
concerned, per se, assuming a practice associated with one religion
was followed/observed, the same, ceteris paribus, would not mean
the person ‘professes’ the said other religion.
51. The Respondent has relied on Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi
(supra) [3-Judge Bench], where it was held:
‘20. Thus, looking at the scheme of the Citizenship Act,
as also the judicial opinion which has prevailed ever
since the enactment of the Citizenship Act, 1955, we are
unhesitatingly of the opinion that in spite of a certificate of
registration under Section 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act,
1955 having been granted to a person and in spite of his
having been enrolled in the voters’ list, the question whether
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he is a citizen of India and hence qualified for, or disqualified
from, contesting an election can be raised before and tried
by the High Court hearing an election petition, provided the
challenge is based on factual matrix given in the petition
and not merely bald or vague allegations.
xxx
34. To sum up, we are of the opinion that a plea that a
returned candidate is not a citizen of India and hence not
qualified, or is disqualified for being a candidate in the
election can be raised in an election petition before the High
Court in spite of the returned candidate holding a certificate
of citizenship by registration under Section 5(1)(c) of the
Citizenship Act. A plea as to constitutional validity of any
law can, in appropriate cases, as dealt with hereinabove,
also be raised and heard in an election petition where it is
necessary to decide the election dispute. The view of the
law, stated by the learned designated Election Judge of
the High Court of Allahabad cannot be sustained. To say
the least, the proposition has been very widely stated in
the impugned order of the High Court. However, in spite
of answering these questions in favour of the appellants
yet the election petitions filed by them cannot be directed
to be heard and tried on merits as the bald and vague
averments made in the election petitions do not satisfy the
requirement of pleading material facts within the meaning of
Section 82(1)(a) of RPA, 1951 read with the requirements
of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The decision of the High Court
dismissing the two election petitions at the preliminary
stage, is sustained though for reasons somewhat different
from those assigned by the High Court. The appeals are
dismissed but without any order as to the costs.’
(emphasis supplied)

52. Interestingly, the specific answer in Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia
Gandhi (supra) rested on what 5-Judge Benches (same coram)
speaking through the learned A K Sarkar, J. (as he then was) had
held in quick succession in State of A.P. v Abdul Khader, 1961
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

SCC OnLine SC 149 14; Ghaurul Hasan v State of Rajasthan,
1961 SCC OnLine SC 315, and; Akbar Khan Alam Khan v Union
of India, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 416. These three cases pertained to
the Citizenship Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Citizenship
Act’). Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi (supra) at paragraph
no.11 has noted Bhagwati Prasad Dixit v Rajeev Gandhi, (1986)
4 SCC 78. In Bhagwati Prasad Dixit (supra), it was held held:
‘12. In the circumstances it is difficult to agree with the view
of the High Court that when a question whether a person
has acquired the citizenship of another country arises
before the High Court in an election petition filed under
the Representation of the People Act, 1951 it would have
jurisdiction to decide the said question notwithstanding the
exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the authority prescribed
under Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 to decide
the question. Whatever may be the proceeding in which
the question of loss of citizenship of a person arises for
consideration, the decision in that proceeding on the said
question should depend upon the decision of the authority
constituted for determining the said question under Section
9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955.’
(emphasis supplied)

53. Undoubtedly, the 3-Judge Bench in Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia
Gandhi (supra) was not bound by the 2-Judge Bench in Bhagwati
Prasad Dixit (supra). However, there is a difference between
a Certificate of Registration issued under Section 5(1)(c) of the
Citizenship Act and a Community Certificate issued under Section 5
of the Kerala Act. The distinction being that under Section 5(1) of
the Citizenship Act, the Central Government can register persons
enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) thereof, as citizens of India.
However, for a Caste/Community Certificate issued under Section 5
of the Kerala Act, before the issuance of such Certificate, the
Competent Authority is obligated to follow the ‘prescribed procedure’.

14 Decided on 04.04.1961.
15 Decided on 05.04.1961.
16 Decided on 05.04.1961.
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This ‘prescribed procedure’ can be found in the Kerala (Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community
Certificates Rules, 2002, Rule 4 whereof mandates that the Competent
Authority conduct ‘such enquiry, as it may deem fit’. As can be seen
from Section 14 of the Kerala Act, the Competent Authority has
powers of a Civil Court, including to record oral evidence as also
order production of documents.
54. Therefore, the view in Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi (supra)
about the permissibility of going into the citizenship of a candidate in
an Election Petition will have no applicability to an Election Petition
wherein the candidate possesses a Caste/Community Certificate
issued after the observance of the due process of law, including but
not limited to an enquiry, as prescribed under the relevant statute.
55. Insofar as Punit Rai (supra) is concerned, it turned on its set of
facts and does not aid the Respondent’s case. It is desirable, at this
juncture, to notice certain observations by this Court in M. Chandra
(supra):
‘79. It is a settled legal position that an election petition
must clearly and unambiguously set out all the material
facts which the petitioner is to rely upon during the trial,
and it must reveal a clear and complete picture of the
circumstances and should disclose a definite cause of
action. In the absence of the above, an election petition
can be summarily dismissed. To see whether material facts
have been duly disclosed or whether a cause of action
arises, we need to look at the averment and pleadings
taken up by the party.
xxx
82. An election petition challenging the election of a
returned candidate on the grounds of corrupt practices is
not a criminal proceeding; but it is no less than a criminal
proceeding with regard to the proof required to be furnished
to the court by the petitioner (see J. Chandrasekhara Rao
v. V. Jagapathi Rao [1993 Supp (2) SCC 229]). Though,
in the present case, the charges are not those of corrupt
practices, they are not any lesser in terms of seriousness;
hence the burden of proof is on the election petitioner to
prove the charges he has made beyond reasonable doubt.
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

This is done so that the purity of the election process is
maintained.
83. The testimonies of the witnesses for the election
petitioner do not qualify the test laid down in the Evidence
Act, to make the evidence admissible. It does not inspire
any confidence. The evidence is clearly hearsay. As stated
above, the opinion of the High Court is heavily relied on
the fact that the burden of proof had been discharged
and shifted to the appellant to prove that she had indeed
renounced Christianity. We do not approve of the reasoning
of the High Court to adopt this line of thinking. The burden
of proof lay squarely on the election petitioner to show that
the appellant indeed practised and professed Christianity.
In any event, the evidence put forward by the appellant is
consistent and reliable as it has relied on the testimony
of the people who have actually visited the house of
the appellant or attended her wedding or been in close
proximity with her and her husband’s family.
xxx
85. There is nothing on record to show that the community
certificate was issued illegally or in contravention of the
valid procedure. The election petitioner should have
examined the person in charge while the certificate was
being issued to bring to light any alleged malpractice in
the issuance of the said certificate. The validity of the
issuance of the community certificate is presumed unless
shown otherwise by Respondent 1, who clearly failed to do
so. It is also baffling to note that the conversion certificate
from the Arya Samaj was not examined in detail by the
respondents in spite of the High Court making a strong
observation in this regard. No proof by way of documents
or oral evidence was provided to show how the certificate
was granted and what procedure was followed. It is also
pertinent to mention that no one raised any objection to the
appellant filing her nomination for the assembly elections
in 2006 from the reserved constituency. All the issues
have been raised after the appellant won the election from
Rajapalayam Constituency.’
(emphasis supplied)
1850 [2025] 5 S.C.R.

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56. In Kalyan Singh Chouhan (supra), the Court stated, after noticing
various earlier pronouncements:
‘19. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the
court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus,
the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the
controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned
to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce
appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled
legal proposition that “as a rule relief not founded on the
pleadings should not be granted”. Therefore, a decision of
a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings
of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain
the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of
conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide
Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1897-98) 25
IA 195], Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC
456: AIR 1953 SC 235], Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh [AIR
1961 SC 1097], Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal
[(2002) 2 SCC 256: AIR 2002 SC 665], Ishwar Dutt v.
Collector (L.A.) [(2005) 7 SCC 190: AIR 2005 SC 3165]
and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co.
Ltd. [(2010) 4 SCC 518: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207])
xxx
28. Therefore, in view of the above, it is evident that
the party to the election petition must plead the material
fact and substantiate its averment by adducing sufficient
evidence. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings
and the issue cannot be framed unless there are pleadings
to raise the controversy on a particular fact or law. It is,
therefore, not permissible for the court to allow the party
to lead evidence which is not in the line of the pleadings.
Even if the evidence is led that is just to be ignored as
the same cannot be taken into consideration.’
(emphasis supplied)

57. From the totality of the afore-extracts, it is vivid that an Election
Petitioner is obligated to plead and prove his case beyond reasonable
doubt. In the case at hand, the Competent Authority who issued the
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A. Raja v. D. Kumar

Caste Certificate was not examined – this should have been sought
for by the Respondent, moreso per M. Chandra (supra). Although
even that would not take the Respondent’s case too far, adjudged
on the anvil of the afore-scrutiny undertaken by us. Admittedly, no
prayer was made in the Election Petition to set aside the Caste
Certificate(s) of the Appellant.
58. The Respondent’s Election Petition falls short of the standards
prescribed, inter alia, in M. Chandra (supra) and Kalyan Singh
Chouhan (supra). We hold that the Appellant, therefore, retained
the Hindu Parayan caste, as a member of the Hindu religion, when
he contested from the Devikulam Legislative Assembly Constituency.
59. As a result, the appeal is allowed. The Impugned Judgment rendered by
the High Court is set aside; the Election Petition shall stand dismissed.
The Appellant is entitled to all consequential benefits as a Member of
the Legislative Assembly for the entire period from the date of oath.
60. Upon serious deliberation, we refrain from passing any order
apportioning costs. As the appeal has been finally decided, pending
I.A.s stand consigned to records.
61. Registry to forthwith act in terms of Section 116-C(2) of the Act.
62. We clarify that we have not opined on the legality or otherwise of
the Caste/Community Certificate(s) held by the Appellant. Our view
herein is not determinative of its validity or invalidity. Any challenge
thereto, if and when raised in accordance with law, shall be considered
on its own merits.
63. In Lillykutty v Scrutiny Committee, SC & ST, (2005) 8 SCC 283
[2-Judge Bench], the appellant therein, who had gotten elected to
the Thannithode Gram Panchayat as a ‘Scheduled Caste’ candidate,
was found, ultimately, to not be a member of the Scheduled Castes
by the Scrutiny Committee constituted under Section 8 of the Act.
The Division Bench of the High Court upheld the decision of the
Scrutiny Committee. Before this Court in appeal, an additional point
was raised which was left open as under:
‘16. As late as on 2-9-2005, the appellant filed IA No. 2
permitting her to raise additional grounds. Apart from relying
on certain decisions of this Court, the appellant sought
leave to raise the contention that in view of Article 243-O
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of the Constitution and Section 153(14) of the Kerala
Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, it was not open to Respondents
1, 2 and 4 to enquire into the eligibility or status of the
appellant. It was also contended that the only remedy
available to Respondent 3 was to file an election petition.
The counsel submitted that the order passed by the Scrutiny
Committee for verification of community certificates and
confirmed by the High Court requires to be set aside on
these additional grounds also.
17. The learned counsel for the respondents objected to
the application submitted by the appellant at this stage. It
was stated that these grounds were neither taken before
the Scrutiny Committee nor before the High Court. At this
stage, such new plea should not be allowed to be raised.
Even otherwise, the appellant is not right in relying on
Article 243-O of the Constitution or Section 153(14) of
the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act as they do not apply to the
present case. According to the respondents, the order
passed by the Scrutiny Committee was legal, lawful and
in accordance with law, which was confirmed by the High
Court and this Court is considering whether those orders
are in consonance with law.
18. From the orders impugned, it is clear that the plea
sought to be taken by the appellant now was never taken
earlier. There is, therefore, no pleading on the point,
nor finding recorded on such plea. We are prima facie
of the view that learned counsel for the respondents
are right in submitting that the issue was whether the
appellant belonged to the Hindu Pulayan Scheduled Caste
Community. Once it is held that she did not belong to the
Scheduled Caste, the action of cancellation of certificate
could not be held illegal. Consequential actions can be
taken thereafter in pursuance of cancellation of caste
certificate.
19. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, it
is not necessary to deal with the contention sought to be
raised by the appellant since it was never raised earlier.
The application, accordingly, stands disposed of without
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1853

A. Raja v. D. Kumar

expressing final opinion on applicability or otherwise of
Article 243-O17 of the Constitution or Section 153(14)18 of
the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994.’19
(emphasis supplied)

64. We deem it appropriate to clarify the position in the wake of the
present Judgment. A duly issued Caste/Community Certificate
would be amenable to challenge only under the provisions of the
statute concerned, and not in an Election Petition. In case no statute
governing the field in a State/Union Territory is operative, the Madhuri
Patil (supra) guidelines, as modified in Dayaram (supra), shall be
followed.
65. Insofar as the constitutional bar, or any analogous provision thereto,
adverted to in Lillykutty (supra) is concerned, we feel no need to
dwell thereupon inasmuch as the interplay between such bar(s) and
the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
or by this Court has been dealt with in a number of precedents,
referred to in Union Territory of Ladakh v Jammu and Kashmir
National Conference, 2023 INSC 804, specifically at paragraph
no.36 thereof.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan

17 243-O. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters.—Notwithstanding anything in this
Constitution,—
(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such
constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 243-K, shall not be called in question
in any court;
(b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to
such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature
of a State.
18 153. Election of President and Vice-President.
…
(14) Where a dispute arises as to the validity of an election of President or Vice-President of a Panchayat,
any member of that Panchayat may file a petition.
…
19 The learned Thakker, J. wrote for the Court, which was supplemented by the learned Sinha, J.