Holding

The prosecution failed to prove the essential circumstantial elements, including the last‑seen‑together theory, CCTV evidence, confession‑derived discoveries and DNA reports, so the convictions and death sentence were set aside.

Summary

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for murder, kidnapping, rape and offences under the POCSO Act based on four alleged pillars of evidence: a last‑seen‑together theory, CCTV footage, a confession‑derived disclosure statement and DNA profiling. The Supreme Court examined whether each of these pillars was proved beyond reasonable doubt and found serious deficiencies: the key witness failed to disclose the alleged observation timely, the CCTV footage was never produced, the confession was shown to be pre‑recorded and the forensic chain of custody was not established. The Court also noted violations of the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial, including failure to provide counsel and documents under Section 207 CrPC. Applying the strict standards for circumstantial evidence, the Court held that the prosecution’s case was untenable. Consequently, the convictions and death sentence were set aside and the appellant was acquitted.

Issues considered

The prosecution’s failure to prove the 'last seen together' circumstance beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the alleged CCTV footage can be relied upon in the absence of the actual recording.
Whether the confessional/disclosure statement was voluntarily made and can support the discoveries.
Whether the forensic DNA reports are admissible given the lack of chain of custody.
Whether the trial complied with the constitutional right to a fair defence and procedural safeguards under the CrPC.

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023s. 165, s. 168
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173(2), s. 207, s. 209, s. 366, s. 6, s. 7, s. 8 r/w 5(m)
Constitution of India
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 354-B, s. 363, s. 366
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012s. 6 r/w 5(m), s. 8 r/w 7

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Trial Court found appellant guilty for the charges framed u/ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC and s.8 r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) of the POCSO Act. An appeal against the said conviction was dismissed by the High Court and confirmed the death sentence awarded to the prosecution has proved the vital circumstances, viz., (i) last seen together theory; (ii) suspicious movement of the appellant captured in the video footage of the CCTV camera installed at a nearby temple; (iii) confessional/disclosure statement made by the appellant leading to the

Subjects

MurderChild missingCharred bodyDisclosure statementConfessionLast seen together theoryCCTV footageIncriminating discoveriesFSL reportsDNA profilingCircumstantial evidenceHeinous crimeMoral convictionsConjecturesFalse implicationDeath sentenceDiscrepency in versions of witnessesConstitutional right to defendNatural JusticeCriminal LawTrialFair opportunity of defending

Judgment

[2025] 10 S.C.R. 587 : 2025 INSC 1203

Dashwanth
v.
State of Tamil Nadu
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 3633-3634 of 2024)
08 October 2025
[Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Trial Court found appellant guilty for the charges framed u/ss.302,
201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC and s.8 r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w.
s.5(m) of the POCSO Act. An appeal against the said conviction
was dismissed by the High Court and confirmed the death
sentence awarded to the appellant. Whether the prosecution has
proved the vital circumstances, viz., (i) last seen together theory;
(ii) suspicious movement of the appellant captured in the video
footage of the CCTV camera installed at a nearby temple; (iii)
confessional/disclosure statement made by the appellant leading
to the incriminating discoveries/recoveries and (iv) FSL reports
establishing the DNA profiling comparison, which constituted the
entire edifice of the prosecution case and on which the conviction
of the appellant was based.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC –
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.8
r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) – A 7 year old female child went
missing – Later, a charred body of the child was recovered in
furtherance of the disclosure statement made by the appellant
herein – Trial Court found appellant guilty for the charges
framed u/ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC and s.8
r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) of the POCSO Act – Appellant
was sentenced in each of the aforesaid sections along with
a death sentence – The trial Court also forwarded a reference
u/s.366 of the CrPC for confirmation of the death sentence –
Appeal preferred by the appellant before the High Court was
dismissed and death sentence was confirmed – Correctness:
Held: 1. The prosecution has miserably failed to prove the vital
circumstances, viz., (i) last seen together theory; (ii) suspicious
movement of the appellant captured in the video footage of the CCTV
* Author
588 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

camera installed at a nearby temple; (iii) confessional/disclosure
statement made by the appellant leading to the incriminating
discoveries/recoveries and (iv) FSL reports establishing the DNA
profiling comparison, which constituted the entire edifice of the
prosecution case and on which the conviction of the appellant
was based – It would not be safe to uphold the conviction of the
appellant as recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the High
Court – Thus, the conviction of the appellant and the sentences
awarded to him, by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court
are also set aside. [Paras 81-83]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC –
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.8
r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) – Appellant was found guilty for
the charges framed u/ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the
IPC and s.8 r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) of the POCSO Act by
the Courts below – Whether the prosecution has proved the
vital circumstance, viz., last seen together theory:
Held: The first and most critical circumstance on which the
prosecution placed reliance was that of last seen together – The
witness who gave evidence in support of this circumstance was
PW-3, who claimed that on the fateful day, he saw the appellant and
the victim playing on the second floor of the building, on the first
floor whereof, the complainant (PW-1) being the father of the victim
resided with his family – When the frantic process for searching
the victim started, PW-3 claims to have informed the complainant
(PW-1) that his daughter was not in the house and might be playing
upstairs and advised him to go and look for her on the upper floor
of the building – Had there been an iota of truth in the version of
PW-3, he would definitely have told the complainant (PW-1) that he
had seen the victim in the company of the appellant between 6:00
p.m. to 6:15 p.m. on the second floor of the building – The glaring
omission on the part of PW-3 in failing to share this vital information
is also manifest from the complaint filed by the complainant (PW-1) –
The theory put forth in the evidence of (PW-3) that he had seen
the victim in the company of the appellant on 05.02.2017 i.e., the
date of the incident, is nothing but a sheer concoction, bereft of
credibility – The statement of PW-3 that the said witness, for the
first time, divulged the information comprising the circumstance of
last seen together to the 2nd Investigating Officer (PW-30) only
on 24.04.2017, i.e., more than two months and 20 days after the
incident – Therefore, the circumstance of last seen together was
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 589

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

created by the Investigating Officer (PW-30) through the witness
(PW-3) in order to lend credence to the otherwise weak case of
the prosecution. [Paras 44-46]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC –
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.8 r/w.
s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) – Appellant was found appellant guilty
for the charges framed u/ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of
the IPC and s.8 r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) of the POCSO Act
by the Courts below – Whether the prosecution has proved the
vital circumstance of the video footage of the CCTV camera:
Held: The next piece of circumstantial evidence on relied upon
was in the form of the video footage of the CCTV camera, the
primary evidence of the so-called CCTV footage is not available
on record – The oral evidence regarding the CCTV footage was
given by PW-6 being the In-charge of the nearby temple – In the
absence of the CCTV footage being collected and exhibited as
per law, no credence can be given to the evidence of PW-6, more
so, when there is grave discrepancy between his version and the
version of the complainant (PW-1). [Paras 47, 49, 51]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC –
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.8
r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) – Appellant was found guilty for
the charges framed u/ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the
IPC and s.8 r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) of the POCSO Act by
the Courts below – Whether the prosecution has proved the
vital circumstance of the confessional/disclosure statement/s
made by the appellant leading to the incriminating discoveries/
recoveries:
Held: The third circumstance on which the prosecution relied
upon to bring home the guilt of the appellant was in form of the
confessional/disclosure statement/s made by the appellant leading
to the incriminating discoveries/recoveries – The fact that the police
officers had told the complainant regarding the location where the
body of the victim was disposed of, in the morning of 08.02.2017,
is itself sufficient to discard the theory of the prosecution that all the
incriminating discoveries were made in pursuance of the disclosure
statement made by the appellant – It is apparent that the police had
already created the entire story and later on, tried to fit the same
into a sequence by postponing the formal arrest of the appellant
590 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in order to implicate him in this case – Thus, the claim made by
the prosecution that the dead body of the victim was recovered
in furtherance of the disclosure statement made by the appellant
is belied by cogent material available on record – There is no
hesitation in holding that recoveries of the bag, allegedly containing
the bottles in which petrol was carried and the undergarment of
the victim, were not effected at the instance of the appellant and
were planted recoveries – The theory of confessional/disclosure
statement of the appellant leading to the discoveries is nothing
but a creation of the Investigating Officer (PW-29) and as a matter
of fact, all the incriminating facts and circumstances were already
in the knowledge of the Investigating Officer (PW-29) and were
subsequently woven into a story, projecting a hypothesis that a
voluntary confession was made by the appellant leading to the
incriminating discoveries of the dead body, the ornaments, etc. –
The signatures of appellant were obtained on the confessional
statements by detaining him in advance and torturing and beating
him and that the appellant was implicated in the case falsely.
[Paras 52, 54, 55, 60, 67]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC –
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – s.8
r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) – Appellant was found guilty for
the charges framed u/ss.302, 201, 363, 366 and 354-B of the
IPC and s.8 r/w. s.7 and s.6 r/w. s.5(m) of the POCSO Act by
the Courts below – Whether the prosecution has proved the
vital circumstance of the FSL reports establishing the DNA
profiling comparison, which constituted the entire edifice
of the prosecution case and on which the conviction of the
appellant was based:
Held: The testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-29) confirms
that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the chain of
custody of the forensic articles/samples right from the time of
seizure till they reached the FSL – The malkhana In-charge of
the police station was not examined in evidence – Neither any
forwarding documents except for a forwarding letter, authorising
the movement of the forensic articles/samples were proved by the
Investigation Officer (PW-29) nor any witness who carried these
samples from the police station to the Court or the concerned
laboratories, was examined in evidence – Since the sanctity of
the samples was not proved by proper evidence, as a necessary
corollary, the reports of scientific analysis would lose significance
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 591

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

and cannot be relied upon – Though the scientific experts concluded
that the DNA profile of the semen stain found on the underwear
of the victim was matching with the DNA profile of the appellant
but as the very factum of recovery of the Material Object, i.e., the
undergarment of the victim has not been established beyond doubt,
as a consequence, no sanctity whatsoever can be attached to the
conclusions drawn in the Expert Report (Exhibit P-32) – A very
serious question has to be posed regarding the time of collection
of the blood samples of the appellant – There was no reason
whatsoever for the Investigating Agency to have waited for four
months before collecting the blood samples of the appellant –
There is a strong possibility that the delay may have been utilized
to manipulate the samples. [Paras 71, 76, 78]

Crime – Heinous crime – Punishment cannot be based on
moral convictions or conjectures – Prosecution is duty-bound
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt:
Held: The present case pertains to the commission of a heinous
offence involving a girl of tender age of 7 years, at the same time,
this Court cannot ignore or bypass the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution is duty-bound to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt – The onus
is heavier in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence –
However, regrettably, the prosecution has miserably failed to do so
in the instant case, leaving the Court with no choice but to acquit
the appellant, despite the heinous nature of the crime – While
it is acknowledged that the acquittal of an individual involved in
a heinous crime can lead to societal distress and cause grave
anguish to the victim’s family, the legal framework does not permit
the Courts to punish an accused person based merely on moral
convictions or conjectures – Each case must be adjudicated by the
Courts rigorously on its individual merits and in strict conformity
with the law, without yielding to public sentiment and external
pressures. [Para 80]

Constitution of India – Constitutional right to defend:
Held: The constitutional right afforded to an accused charged with
an offence to defend himself is not illusory or imaginary – For the
trial to be fair and reasonable, an effective opportunity to defend
must be provided to the accused and representation by a counsel
of choice is an important component of this guarantee – In a
592 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

case where accused is facing charges for offences which carry
capital punishment, this constitutional mandate becomes even
more sacrosanct, and it is the duty of the Court as well as the
State to ensure that the accused is not prejudiced or deprived of
a fair opportunity of defending himself in a case where he may be
awarded death penalty. [Para 36]

Natural Justice – Criminal Law – Trial – Fair opportunity of
defending:
Held: Such opportunity would require: (a) Providing copies of all
relied upon documents to the accused immediately on submission
of report u/s.173(2) CrPC (Section 193 BNSS)/committal of case
u/s.209 CrPC (Section 232 BNSS); (b) Ensuring that the accused
is represented by a lawyer of his own choice and in case, he/she
is not in a position to engage a private counsel then, a legal aid
defence counsel having requisite experience must be appointed to
represent him at the trial; (c) The legal aid counsel so appointed
should be given sufficient opportunity to go through the record and
prepare the matter for carrying out effective cross-examination
from the witnesses; (d) The Court should not act as a mute
spectator during recording of evidence, as provided u/s.165 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 168 of the Bhartiya Sakshya
Adhiniyam, 2023) – The Court must remain vigilant, and in case
any important question necessary to arrive at a just decision of the
case is omitted to be put to the witnesses either by the defence
counsel or the public prosecutor, the Court must not let such
lacuna creep into the proceedings, and it must be ensured that
Court put questions to the witnesses for ensuring fairness in the
proceedings. [Para 37]

Case Law Cited
Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR
88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116; Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v.
State of Maharashtra [2023] 8 SCR 152 : 2023 SCC Online SC
666 – relied on.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983] 1 SCR 145; Santa
Singh v. State of Punjab [1977] 1 SCR 229 : (1976) 4 SCC 190;
Allauddin Mian and Ors. v. State of Bihar [1989] 2 SCR 498 :
(1989) 3 SCC 5; Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab [1991] 2 SCR
256 : (1991) 4 SCC 341; Dattaraya v. State of Maharashtra [2019]
11 SCR 295 : (2020) 14 SCC 290; Anokhilal v. State of Madhya
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 593

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

Pradesh [2019] 18 SCR 1196 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1637; State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya [1961] 1 SCR 14 : 1960
SCC OnLine SC 8; Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra
[1976] 1 SCR 715 : (1976) 1 SCC 828; Earabhadrappa v. State of
Karnataka [1983] 2 SCR 552 : (1983) 2 SCC 330; Bodhraj alias
Bodha and Others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [2002] Supp.
2 SCR 67 : (2002) 8 SCC 45 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India;
Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023.

List of Keywords
Murder; Child missing; Charred body; Disclosure statement;
Confession; Last seen together theory; CCTV footage; Incriminating
discoveries; FSL reports; DNA profiling; Circumstantial evidence;
Heinous crime; Moral convictions; Conjectures; False implication;
Death sentence; Discrepency in versions of witnesses; Constitutional
right to defend; Natural Justice; Criminal Law; Trial; Fair opportunity
of defending.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
3633-3634 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.07.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 234 of 2018 and RT No. 1
of 2018

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manasa Ramakrishna, Vishwajeet
Singh, Ms. Trisha Chandran, Karan Dhalla, Prashanth Sharmila
Prakash, Ms. Shreya Rastogi, Ms. Rajni Gupta, Abhimanue
Shrestha, Shivendra Gupta.
Advs. for the Respondent:
V.Krishnamurthy, Sr. Adv./AAG, Sabarish Subramanian, Vishnu
Unnikrishnan, Ms. Azka Sheikh Kalia, Ms. Jahnavi Taneja, Danish
Saifi.
594 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.
2. The appellant herein was tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila
Court, Chengalpet1 in Special Sessions Case No. 33 of 2017 for the
offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 354-B, 302, and 201
of the Indian Penal Code, 18602 and Section 8 read with Section 7
and Section 6 read with Section 5(m) of the Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 20123. The trial Court, vide judgment
of conviction and order of sentence dated 19 th February, 2018
convicted the accused-appellant4 for the aforementioned offences
and sentenced him in the terms indicated below: -

Section Sentence
S. 363 IPC 7 years
S. 366 IPC 10 years
S. 354-B IPC 7 years
S. 201 IPC 7 years
S. 302 IPC Death Penalty
S. 6 r/w S. 5 (m) of POCSO Act 10 years
S. 8 r/w S. 7 of POCSO Act 5 years

3. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal5 before the High
Court of Judicature at Madras6 for assailing his conviction and the
sentences awarded to him. The trial Court also forwarded a reference7

1 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘trial Court’.
2 For short, ‘IPC’.
3 For short, ‘POCSO Act’.
4 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘appellant’.
5 Criminal Appeal No. 234 of 2018.
6 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘High Court’.
7 Referred Trial No. 1 of 2018.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 595

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19738 for
confirmation of the death sentence. The learned Division Bench of the
High Court vide common judgment dated 10th July, 2018, dismissed
the appeal preferred by the appellant and answered the reference
in the affirmative thereby confirming the death sentence awarded to
the appellant by the trial Court. The said judgment of the High Court
is the subject matter of challenge in these appeals by special leave.

FACTUAL MATRIX: -
4. In brief, the story of the prosecution is that a seven-year old female
child victim9, being the daughter of C.S.D. Babu (PW-1)10 and Sridevi
(PW-2), went missing on 5th February, 2017. The parents had gone
out shopping, and when they returned at about 7:15 p.m., they did
not see their daughter around, upon which a search was made with
the help of the neighbours including the appellant. The police were
also informed, but the efforts to trace out the child did not yield any
results. The hapless father, C.S.D. Babu (PW-1) filed a complaint11
at Mangadu Police Station at around 10:00 p.m. on 5th February,
2017 itself and based upon the same, a missing persons’ case
was registered. The complainant (PW-1), in his efforts to get clues
about the whereabouts of his child, claims to have browsed video
footage of a CCTV camera installed at a nearby temple which gave
an indication as to the manner in which the child victim might have
been kidnapped. The police also followed the lead provided by the
complainant (PW-1) and went through the CCTV footage after which
the needle of suspicion turned towards the appellant.
5. Based on this suspicion, the appellant was arrested on 8th February,
2017 at about 9 a.m. He allegedly confessed and made a disclosure
statement12 to N. Ravikumar, 1st Investigation Officer (PW-29)13 in
the presence of Sumathi (PW-7), Village Administrative Officer,
Madanandhapuram Village, and Mohandass (PW-8) who is the
assistant of PW-7.

8 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CrPC’.
9 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘victim’ or ‘child victim’.
10 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘complainant (PW-1)’.
11 Exhibit P-1
12 Exhibit P-8.
13 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Investigation Officer (PW-29)’.
596 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

6. The Investigating Officer (PW-29) claims that the charred body of
the child victim was recovered on 8th February, 2017 in furtherance
of the disclosure statement made by the appellant. The body was
identified by Muneesekar (PW-14), the Administrative Officer of the
school where the victim was studying. Based on the said recovery
of the victim’s body, the missing persons’ case was converted to a
crime report14 for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 201,
363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC and Section 8 read with Section
7 and Section 6 read with Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act. The
disclosure statement of the appellant further led to the recovery of
an Apache motorcycle and a Oppo mobile phone. The Investigation
Officer (PW-29) prepared an observation mahazar15 and a rough site
sketch16 of the place from where the body of the victim was recovered.
The appellant also identified the blue-coloured travel bag17 in which
undergarments18 worn by the victim and two cold drink bottles19 were
placed. Forensic material was collected from the dead body of the
victim and the crime scene.
7. Thereafter, the appellant allegedly took the police to his flat which
was located on the second floor of the very same building in which
the complainant (PW-1) also resided and pointed out the place where
the victim had been subjected to sexual abuse and later, murdered.
The Investigation Officer (PW-29) prepared the observation mahazar20
and site inspection plan21 of the said flat. The jeans pant22 and
t-shirt23 allegedly worn by the appellant at the time of commission
of the offence were recovered from the flat and the earrings24 and

14 FIR bearing Crime No. 285 of 2017.
15 Exhibit P-4.
16 Exhibit P-35.
17 Material Object No. 6.
18 Material Object No. 1.
19 Material Object No. 11.
20 Exhibit P-6.
21 Exhibit P-36.
22 Material Object No. 12.
23 Material Object No. 13.
24 Material Object No. 2.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 597

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

anklets25 of the victim along with the ATM card26, PAN card27, and
identity card28 of the appellant were also recovered from his purse29
during this sequence. Recovery of a helmet30 was also effected,
based on the interrogation conducted from the appellant.
8. After the completion of the inquest proceedings, the child’s body was
forwarded to the Kilpauk Medical College and Hospital, Chennai for
post-mortem examination. The body of the victim was subjected to
post-mortem by Dr. Karthika Devi (PW-16), medical officer, attached
with the Kilpauk Medical College and Hospital, Chennai. The medical
officer noticed that the body of the victim was charred and there were
bruises over the lower lip. The lower incisor teeth were loosened with
bruises around the surrounding area. The thigh bones collected from
the dead body were forwarded for DNA analysis, and the skull was
forwarded for superimposition so as to ascertain the identity of the
victim. Since the body was completely charred, the medical officer
expressed inability to give a definite opinion regarding the exact
cause of her death. However, on queries raised by the Investigation
Officer (PW-29), the medical officer gave an opinion that death by
smothering could not be ruled out. The appellant was subjected to
medical examination on 13th February, 2017.
9. The Investigating Officer (PW-29) examined Santosh Kumar (PW-18),
who had purportedly sold petrol to the appellant which he carried in
the two bottles31 recovered from the blue bag32. The witness provided
information regarding the appellant making payment through a credit
card and based on the said statement, the credit card slip pertaining
to the purchase of petrol by the appellant was also seized.
10. Upon carrying out the scientific procedure of superimposition and
DNA examination, it was concluded that the body was of none other
than that of the victim, daughter of C.S.D. Babu (PW-1) and Sridevi
(PW-2).

25 Material Object No. 3.
26 Material Object No. 16.
27 Material Object No. 17.
28 Material Object No. 18.
29 Material Object No. 14.
30 Material Object No. 19.
31 Supra Note 19.
32 Supra Note 17.
598 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

11. The Investigating Officer (PW-29) was transferred and thus further
investigation of the case was assigned to R.D. Vivekanandan, 2nd
Investigation Officer (PW-30)33 who completed the investigation and
filed a chargesheet against the appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 363, 366, 354-B, 302 and 201 of the IPC and Section
8 read with Section 7 and Section 6 read with Section 5(m) of the
POCSO Act in the trial court.
12. The trial Court framed charges against the appellant for the
aforementioned offences, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed
trial. The prosecution examined 30 witnesses and exhibited 45
documents and 19 material objects in order to prove its case.
13. By resorting to the procedure under Section 313 CrPC, the appellant
was questioned and confronted with the incriminating circumstances
appearing against him in the case put up by the prosecution.
He refuted these allegations and claimed to have been falsely
implicated. A written statement was filed on behalf of the appellant
under Section 315 CrPC. However, neither any oral evidence was
led, nor any document was exhibited on his behalf in defence. The
plea taken by the appellant in the written statement was that he
returned from his office on 7th February, 2017 at about 5:00 a.m.
On the same day, the police officials came to his house at about
7:30 a.m. and questioned him and his family members for about 30
minutes. Thereafter, between 11:00 a.m. and 12 noon, an inspector
came to his house and took him to the police station where, he was
kept confined and was forced to sign blank papers and was then
remanded to judicial custody.
14. The trial Court upon appreciating the arguments advanced by the
Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel and upon analysing
the oral and documentary evidence available on record, found the
appellant guilty for the charges framed under Sections 302, 201,
363, 366 and 354-B of the IPC and Section 8 read with Section
7 and Section 6 read with Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act and
sentenced him as noted above, vide judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 19th February, 2017.
15. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal under Section
374(2) CrPC to the High Court challenging his conviction and

33 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Investigation Officer (PW-30)’.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 599

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

sentences awarded to him whereas, a reference was forwarded
by the trial Court under Section 366 CrPC to the High Court, for
confirmation of the death sentence awarded to the appellant. The
appeal filed by the appellant was rejected and the reference was
answered in the affirmative by the High Court vide common judgment
dated 10th July, 2018 which is the subject matter of challenge in the
present appeals by special leave.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: -
16. Learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently and fervently contended
that the entire case of the prosecution is false and fabricated. The
prosecution story is full of improbabilities and loopholes. The evidence
of the material prosecution witnesses is flimsy and does not inspire
confidence. The conduct of the witnesses is highly suspicious which
makes their testimony doubtful and unworthy of credence. The
conduct of Murugan @ Venkata Murugan Guna (PW-3)34, the alleged
witness of the last seen together circumstance, is highly unnatural
inasmuch as, in spite of claiming to have seen the victim playing
with the appellant on the second floor of the same building where
the complainant (PW-1) used to reside, he never divulged the said
fact either to the father of the victim or to the police officers, who had
reached the area soon after the victim was reported missing. It is the
admitted case of the prosecution that after the parents of the victim
raised a hue and cry regarding their daughter having gone missing,
an extensive search operation was launched. The appellant also
participated in the search efforts, and he remained with the search
party till 4:00 a.m. in the morning of 6th February, 2017. It was, thus,
submitted that the evidence of Murugan (PW-3), the sole witness of
the last seen together circumstance cannot be relied upon.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Murugan (PW-3),
the self-proclaimed witness of last seen together circumstance
claimed that he had seen the victim playing with the appellant on
the second floor of the building. Had there been an iota of truth in
this version then in the natural course of events, he would have
immediately disclosed this fact to the parents of the victim, and an
immediate attempt would have been made to search the second

34 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Murugan (PW-3)’.
600 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

floor of the building including the flat of the appellant. However, no
such effort was made by the search party or the police officers which
completely discredits the theory put forth by Murugan (PW-3) that
he had seen the victim in the company of the appellant soon before
her disappearance.
18. It was further submitted that the recoveries allegedly made at the
instance of the appellant were planted and fabricated and hence,
unbelievable. The appellant was apprehended by police officials
on 7th February, 2017, and was kept in illegal custody at the police
station, where he was forced to sign several blank papers and
that, the recoveries were planted to provide padding to the false
prosecution narrative.
19. Learned counsel referred to the examination-in-chief of the
complainant (PW-1) to urge that the victim was seen playing with her
friends, by her mother at 6:00 p.m. on 5th February, 2017. Immediately
thereafter, both the parents left to buy vegetables. They returned
home inside of an hour but did not see their child around, on which
the search efforts were commenced. Thus, there was only a gap of
one hour in which the entire incident is stated to have taken place.
20. Learned counsel submitted that since the search was commenced
within an hour of the victim having gone missing, there was practically
neither enough time nor any possibility for the appellant to subject
the child victim to rape and to have disposed of the dead body of
the victim in the time and manner as alleged by the prosecution. He
pointed out that the prosecution has surmised that the appellant after
committing the ghastly crime, concealed the victim’s body in a bag;
carried it down two flights of stairs; took it to the petrol pump on his
motorcycle; purchased petrol and then carried the body to a remote
location before setting it ablaze. He submitted that this sequence of
events put forth by the prosecution is totally unbelievable and could
not have been completed in the small window of about an hour. It
was emphasised with reference to the evidence of the complainant
(PW-1) and Sridevi (PW-2) that right from the inception, the appellant
was participating in the search and remained with the search party
till 4:00 a.m. in the morning of 6th February, 2017.
21. Attention of the Court was drawn to the version of the complainant
(PW-1), i.e., the father of the victim wherein he alleged that previously,
the victim had made a complaint to her mother that the appellant
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 601

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

indulged in pinching her cheeks and also used to kiss her. It was
contended that looking at the said previous conduct, it is impossible
to believe that the suspicion of the parents would not have shifted
on to the appellant once the information regarding the victim having
gone missing was received.
22. Learned counsel further contended that looking at this past history
as referred to supra and the fact that Murugan (PW-3), being the
member of the search party, claimed to have seen the child victim
playing with the appellant on the second floor of the same building,
the immediate and natural reaction of the witnesses would have
been to make a search on the second floor as well as inside the
flat of the appellant. Learned counsel contended that a theory tried
to be built up by the prosecution witnesses claiming that the flat of
the appellant was found locked and hence, it could not be searched,
does not hold water when it is seen that the material prosecution
witnesses, namely, the complainant (PW-1) and Sridevi (PW-2)
themselves admitted that the appellant was also assisting them in
the search till 4:00 a.m. in the morning of 6th February, 2017.
23. He further submitted that if at all, Murugan (PW-3) had actually seen
the child playing with the appellant on the second floor and soon
thereafter, a hue and cry was raised regarding the child having gone
missing, then the said witnesses would have immediately divulged
the said information to the complainant (PW-1) being the father of
the child victim. In this scenario, the police personnel who arrived at
the spot would also have been, instantaneously sounded about the
gravely suspicious circumstance thereby putting everyone at guard
regarding the conduct of the appellant and the finger of suspicion
would have turned towards him at the first instance. Had there been
an iota of truth in these allegations, the family members and the police
officials would never have permitted the appellant to participate in the
search efforts and further they would have immediately proceeded
to search the second floor of the building and particularly, the flat of
the appellant. If such an exercise had taken place, the same would
have immediately exposed the circumstances prevailing at the alleged
crime scene and would have provided an important lead for further
investigation. It was also submitted that the entire set of incriminating
circumstances and recovered articles have been subsequently planted
by the police officials for oblique motives.
602 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

24. Learned counsel further urged that the prosecution case regarding
the appellant having purchased petrol in the bottles is false and
unsubstantiated. The recovery of the blue bag with the undergarment
of the victim is clearly planted because when the initial observation
mahazar (Exhibit P-4) was prepared by the police officers pursuant
to the alleged disclosure statement of the appellant, the presence of
the said bag was not mentioned in the memorandum. It was further
submitted that the Investigating Officer (PW-29) did not prove the
disclosure statements of the appellant as per law and hence the
recoveries pale into insignificance.
25. It was also contended that the body of the victim had already been
discovered much prior to the disclosure statement of the appellant
being recorded which fact is evident from the testimony of the
complainant (PW-1), i.e., the father of the victim. Thus, the discovery
of the body cannot be treated as having been made in pursuance
of the disclosure statement of the appellant.
26. It was also submitted that not only is the recovery of the ornaments
suspicious but, in addition thereto, there is a grave doubt in the manner
in which the identification proceedings of these articles were held.
27. Learned senior counsel vehemently urged that there has been a failure
of a fair trial in this case inasmuch as the appellant was hardly given
any opportunity to defend himself in the case. The charge was framed
against the appellant on 24th October, 2017 and the calendar for the
summoning of the witnesses was finalised on 20th November, 2017.
However, compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section
207 CrPC, i.e., providing copies of the relied upon documents to the
accused, was ensured only on 13th December, 2017 and just four
days thereafter, the prosecution evidence was commenced. Thus,
as per the learned counsel, the entire procedure adopted by the trial
Court right from the framing of charges to recording of evidence of
the prosecution witnesses is hasty and vitiated and tantamounts to
denial of fair trial inasmuch as the trial Court proceeded to frame
charges against the appellant without providing the relied upon
documents to him as mandated by law and thus, the subsequent
proceedings would be automatically vitiated.
28. He further contended that the appellant was unrepresented in the trial
proceedings and requested for the services of a legal aid counsel.
It was, for the first time, on 13th December, 2017, the trial Court
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 603

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

appointed a legal aid counsel to represent the appellant in the trial
proceedings. The documents under Section 207 CrPC were supplied
on the same day and without giving any time for preparation to the
legal aid counsel; the evidence of the prosecution was commenced
from 18th December, 2017, i.e., within 4 days of the legal aid counsel
being appointed, and evidence of as many as 30 witnesses was
completed within one month and sixteen days. He further submitted
that the judgment of conviction was pronounced on 19th February,
2018 and on the very same day, the trial Court proceeded to pass
the sentence of death penalty against the appellant, which is in gross
contravention to the tenets of fair trial and the sentencing principles
as consistently laid down by this Court. To fortify these assertions,
learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in
the cases of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab35, Santa Singh v.
State of Punjab36, Allauddin Mian and Ors. v. State of Bihar37,
Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab38, and Dattaraya v. State of
Maharashtra39.
29. On these grounds, learned counsel for the appellant implored the
Court to accept the appeals, set aside the conviction of the appellant,
and acquit him of the charges levelled against him.
30. Without prejudice to the above, learned counsel representing the
appellant urged that the incident took place way back in the year
2017, and the appellant has already been incarcerated in prison for
almost 8 years. Neither the trial Court nor the High Court undertook the
mandatory exercise of procuring the report in respect of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances; no effort was made to get conducted
the psychological evaluation of the appellant; and to get a report
about the conduct of the appellant in jail before passing the order
of sentence. The entire sentencing exercise was completed by the
trial Court on the very same day on which the judgment of conviction
was pronounced. Hence, the capital punishment awarded to the
appellant is totally vitiated since the sentencing exercise was a mere
formality and no proper opportunity was provided to the appellant

35 1983 (1) SCR 145.
36 (1976) 4 SCC 190.
37 (1989) 3 SCC 5.
38 (1991) 4 SCC 341.
39 (2020) 14 SCC 290.
604 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in the said process. He, thus, submitted that in case, the conviction
of the appellant is upheld, he deserves leniency on the aspect of
the sentence.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE: -
31. Per contra, learned senior counsel representing the State, vehemently
and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by the appellant’s
counsel. He urged that Murugan (PW-3) had no reason to falsely
implicate the appellant. His statement to the effect that the victim
was playing with the appellant on the second floor of the building is
absolutely truthful and constitutes unimpeachable evidence in support
of the circumstance of last seen together which has been established
against the appellant beyond all manner of doubt. Immediately
thereafter, the child victim went missing. Hence, the onus would shift
onto the accused to explain the circumstances under which the child
victim was found murdered and her body burnt.
32. He further submitted that the burnt dead body of the victim was
recovered in furtherance of the disclosure statement of the appellant
for which he has offered no explanation whatsoever. The jewellery
articles worn by the victim on the day of the incident were also
recovered from the house of the appellant which also gives rise to
a presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
The appellant failed to offer any explanation whatsoever for these
damning incriminating recoveries, and thus, the trial Court and the
High Court were absolutely justified in drawing the presumption of
guilt against the appellant. On these grounds, learned senior counsel
for the respondent-State sought dismissal of the appeals.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS: -
33. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
advanced at bar and have gone through the impugned judgments
and the material placed on record.
34. First and foremost, we will address the submission advanced by
learned counsel for the appellant that there has been a total failure
of justice inasmuch as the trial was not conducted in a fair manner
and no proper opportunity was provided to the appellant to defend
himself. The following chronological list of dates is essential to
appreciate the above issue raised by the counsel: -
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 605

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

Date Event
17.08.2017 Chargesheet filed by the police.
24.10.2017 Charges were framed against the appellant, who
was not represented by a defence counsel and was
not provided services of a legal aid defence counsel.
20.11.2017 A calendar was fixed for the trial of the appellant.
Schedule for examination of witnesses by the
prosecution was fixed and 34 witnesses were
sought to be examined in 4 days, commencing
from 18th December, 2017.
13.12.2017 Compliance with the mandatory provision of Section
207 CrPC was made. On the same day, for the first
time, a legal aid counsel was appointed to represent
the appellant, on his request.
18.12.2017 Prosecution evidence was commenced.
30.01.2018 Prosecution evidence completed.
19.02.2018 Judgment of conviction was passed by the trial
Court and on the same day, the appellant was
awarded death penalty.

35. A bare perusal of the above sequence of events and proceedings
makes it clear that right from the stage of framing of the charges, the
trial was conducted in a lopsided manner and without due deference
to the principles of fair trial. The appellant herein was not represented
by a defence counsel, and the services of a free legal aid counsel
were provided to him on 13th December, 2017, only after the charges
were framed. The documents relied upon by the prosecution were not
provided to the appellant and without complying with the mandate of
Section 207 CrPC (Section 230 BNSS40), the charges were framed
against the appellant on 24th October, 2017, who was unrepresented
on that date. The schedule for examination of 30 prosecution witnesses
was fixed for four days starting from 18th December, 2017 without
providing the services of a legal aid counsel to the appellant who
was left to face the charges of such grave nature unrepresented by

40 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
606 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

a counsel of his choice or a legal aid counsel in gross disregard to
the mandate of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India and
the guidelines issued by NALSA41. As noted above, copies of the
documents relied upon by the prosecution and the services of the
legal aid counsel were, for the first time, provided to the appellant
only on 13th December, 2017 and the evidence commenced within
a period of four days therefrom. Recording of prosecution evidence
was concluded within a period of one and a half months. In this
background, we are of the firm view that the legal aid counsel appointed
to defend the appellant could, by no stretch of imagination, have had
a reasonable and effective opportunity to prepare the matter and
conduct the cross-examination from the witnesses.
36. The constitutional right afforded to an accused charged with an
offence to defend himself is not illusory or imaginary. For the trial to
be fair and reasonable, an effective opportunity to defend must be
provided to the accused and representation by a counsel of choice is
an important component of this guarantee. In a case where accused
is facing charges for offences which carry capital punishment, this
constitutional mandate becomes even more sacrosanct, and it is the
duty of the Court as well as the State to ensure that the accused is
not prejudiced or deprived of a fair opportunity of defending himself
in a case where he may be awarded death penalty.
37. Such opportunity would unquestionably require: -
(a) Providing copies of all relied upon documents to the accused
immediately on submission of report under Section 173(2) CrPC
(Section 193 BNSS)/committal of case under Section 209 CrPC
(Section 232 BNSS).
(b) Ensuring that the accused is represented by a lawyer of his
own choice and in case, he/she is not in a position to engage
a private counsel then, a legal aid defence counsel having
requisite experience must be appointed to represent him at the
trial. As has been laid down by this Court in Anokhilal v. State
of Madhya Pradesh42, in capital punishment offences, a legal
aid defense counsel so appointed should preferably have an
experience of 10 years at the bar.

41 National Legal Services Authority.
42 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1637.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 607

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

(c) The legal aid counsel so appointed should be given sufficient
opportunity to go through the record and prepare the matter
for carrying out effective cross-examination from the witnesses.
(d) The Court should not act as a mute spectator during recording
of evidence, as provided under Section 165 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (Section 168 of the Bhartiya Sakshya
Adhiniyam, 2023). The Court must remain vigilant, and in case
any important question necessary to arrive at a just decision
of the case is omitted to be put to the witnesses either by the
defence counsel or the public prosecutor, the Court must not
let such lacuna creep into the proceedings, and it must be
ensured that Court put questions to the witnesses for ensuring
fairness in the proceedings.
38. However, the chronological list of events reproduced (paragraph 34
supra) makes it clear that these mandatory requirements were totally
bypassed/violated by the trial Court while conducting the proceedings.
Hence, prejudice and denial of opportunity of effective defence to
the accused are writ large on the face of the record.
39. The conviction of the appellant was recorded on 19th February,
2018, and on the very same day, the learned trial Judge proceeded
to undertake a pretentious exercise of hearing the appellant on the
aspect of sentence and awarded the death penalty to him. Evidently,
the manner in which the trial Court proceeded to pass the sentencing
order indicates hot haste leaving much to be desired and would vitiate
the death sentence awarded to the appellant. Neither the trial Court
nor the High Court undertook the mandatory exercise of seeking a
report of mitigating and aggravating circumstances; the psychological
examination report of the appellant and a report concerning the
conduct of the appellant in jail, before passing the order of sentence
and confirming the same. Thus, the sentencing procedure is in direct
conflict with the judgments of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State
of Punjab43, Santa Singh v. State of Punjab44, Allauddin Mian

43 Supra Note 35.
44 Supra Note 36.
608 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

and Ors. v. State of Bihar45, Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab46,
and Dattaraya v. State of Maharashtra47.
40. In view of the facts and circumstances indicated above, we would have
been persuaded to set aside the impugned judgment and could have
remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh adjudication. However,
considering the fact that almost eight years have elapsed since the
incident took place, and considering the fact that the appellant has
already suffered protracted proceedings of trial and appeal, while being
incarcerated in custody, we deem it fit to examine the case on merits.
41. At the outset, it may be noted that the case of the prosecution is
based purely on circumstantial evidence, in the form of: -
i. last seen together theory;
ii. suspicious movement of the appellant captured in the video
footage of the CCTV camera installed at a nearby temple;
iii. confessional/disclosure statement/s made by the appellant
leading to the incriminating discoveries/recoveries of: -
(a) body of the victim;
(b) the undergarments of the victim;
(c) the bottles in which the appellant procured petrol for burning
the body of the victim;
(d) ornaments of the victim.
iv. Forensic Science Laboratory48 reports establishing the DNA
profiling comparison.
42. It is trite law that in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence,
the onus is upon the prosecution to prove the chain of unbroken
circumstances beyond all manner of doubt. The chain of incriminating
circumstances must be complete, conclusive and should exclude
every hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. In other words,
it must be proved from the chain of incriminating circumstances that

45 Supra Note 37.
46 Supra Note 38.
47 Supra Note 39.
48 For short, “FSL”.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 609

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

no reasonable doubt can be entertained about the accused person’s
innocence, demonstrating that it was the accused and none other
who committed the offence. The golden principles in respect of
appreciation of evidence in a case based purely on circumstantial
evidence have been encapsulated in Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v.
State of Maharashtra49, wherein it was held that:
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that
the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where
the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that
is to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and

49 (1984) 4 SCC 116
610 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)

43. Keeping in view the above principles, we shall now proceed to discuss
and evaluate the evidence of the prosecution.
44. The first and most critical circumstance on which the prosecution
placed reliance was that of last seen together. The witness who gave
evidence in support of this circumstance was Murugan (PW-3), who
claimed that on the fateful day, he saw the appellant and the victim
playing on the second floor of the building, on the first floor whereof,
the complainant (PW-1) being the father of the victim resided with
his family. The witness (PW-3) claimed to have seen the victim, the
appellant, and the appellant’s dog playing on the second floor between
6:00 p.m. and 6:15 p.m. It may be noted that the frantic process for
searching the victim started between 7:15 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., soon
after the complainant (PW-1) and Sridevi (PW-2), i.e., the parents of
the victim, had returned to their house and found the child missing.
45. Murugan (PW-3) claims to have informed the complainant (PW-1) that
his daughter was not in the house and might be playing upstairs and
advised him to go and look for her on the upper floor of the building.
Had there been an iota of truth in the version of Murugan (PW-3), he
would definitely have told the complainant (PW-1) that he had seen
the victim in the company of the appellant between 6:00 p.m. to 6:15
p.m. on the second floor of the building. The glaring omission on the
part of Murugan (PW-3) in failing to share this vital information is also
manifest from the complaint50 filed by the complainant (PW-1) to S.
Aanandha Kumar (PW-27), Sub-Inspector posted at Mangadu Police
Station, on 5th February, 2017 at 10:00 p.m. In this complaint, there
is no reference whatsoever that anyone including the alleged witness
of the last seen together circumstance namely Murugan (PW-3),
had seen the child victim on the second floor in the company of the
appellant. If at all, any such event had taken place and the appellant

50 Supra note 11.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 611

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

had been seen playing with the victim and immediately thereafter,
she had gone missing, then the complainant (PW-1) would definitely
have been apprised of the said fact by Murugan (PW-3), his closely
known person, and consequently, this vital incriminating fact would
definitely have been mentioned in the complaint.
46. Apparently, thus, the theory put forth in the evidence of Murugan
(PW-3) that he had seen the victim in the company of the appellant
on 5th February, 2017, i.e., the date of the incident, is nothing but a
sheer concoction, bereft of credibility. In addition, thereto, we find
from the statement of Murugan (PW-3) that the said witness, for the
first time, divulged the information comprising the circumstance of
last seen together to the 2nd Investigating Officer (PW-30) only on
24th April, 2017, i.e., more than two months and 20 days after the
incident. We are, therefore, convinced that the circumstance of last
seen together has been created by the Investigating Officer (PW-30)
through the witness Murugan (PW-3) in order to lend credence to
the otherwise weak case of the prosecution.
47. The next piece of circumstantial evidence on which the prosecution
relied upon was in the form of the video footage of the CCTV camera
installed at a nearby temple and presumably maintained by Duraivelu
(PW-6), In-charge of Karpaga Vinayagar Temple, which allegedly
captured the suspicious movements of the appellant on the fateful
day. First and foremost, it must be noted that the Investigating Agency
did not care to procure the recording of the said camera and exhibit
the same in evidence. Hence, the primary evidence of the so-called
CCTV footage is not available on record. In addition thereto, we find
that the theory of incriminating CCTV footage also seems to be a
fictional creation by the Investigating Officers to somehow trap the
appellant for the crime.
48. The complainant (PW-1) testified that the process of the search
was not bearing fruits and on 7th February, 2017, Mangadu police
informed him that they had scrutinized the CCTV footage and noticed
the suspicious movements of the appellant, who was allegedly
absconding. A neighbour of the complainant (PW-1) allegedly told
him that the appellant was seen carrying a travel bag on a motorbike.
The complainant (PW-1) further stated that in the morning of 8th
February, 2017, the police told him the gory details of the incident
stating that the appellant took the victim to his house, sexually abused
her, and thereafter, murdered her. In order to screen the evidence,
612 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the dead body of the victim was concealed and packed in a travel
bag which was kept amongst bushes at Anakaputhur bypass road
and was later incinerated.
49. The oral evidence regarding the CCTV footage was given by
Duraivelu (PW-6) being the In-charge of the nearby temple. When we
peruse the evidence of this witness and compare the same with the
deposition of the complainant (PW-1), we find material contradictions
in both the versions. The complainant (PW-1) categorically stated
that the police informed him on 7th February, 2017 that they had seen
the footage of the CCTV camera installed at the temple wherein
suspicious movements of the appellant were captured. To the contrary,
Duraivelu (PW-6) stated that the complainant (PW-1) had come to
the temple on 6th February, 2017 and both of them had watched the
CCTV camera footage of 5th February, 2017 between 6:00 p.m. and
7:15 p.m. As per the witness, the said camera recording revealed
that a person riding on a motorbike was seen passing by the temple
having placed a bag on the front of his bike. The witness (PW-6)
elaborated that the face of the person was not clearly identifiable in
the recording and various other persons were also seen travelling
by bikes with bags hanging from their vehicles.
50. The timing of the recording which has been stated by the witness
creates a serious doubt on the prosecution case. It is difficult if not
impossible to believe that within this short window of 6:00 p.m. to 7:15
p.m., the entire chain of events could be completed. To recapitulate,
we may note that the victim’s parents left for the market at about 6:00
p.m.; at that time child victim was playing with her friends; Murugan
(PW-3) went to the terrace between 6:00 p.m. to 6:15 p.m. and saw
the appellant playing with the child victim. Thus, evidently, as per the
prosecution case, within a short duration of one hour, the appellant
took the child victim to his apartment; ravished and then murdered
her; packed her dead body in a bag; brought it down two flights of
stairs and carried the same away on the motorcycle (which movement
was allegedly captured by the CCTV camera). It is unlikely that this
gory sequence could have been wrapped up within the small window
of one hour. The CCTV camera purportedly captured an important
event, i.e., the moment when the appellant was allegedly seen taking
away the bag in which the dead body of the child victim was stuffed
and hence, the same could have provided a vital clue for solving
the mystery behind the crime. Failure to collect the data from the
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 613

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

Digital Video Recorder (DVR) of the CCTV camera, creates a grave
doubt on the bonafides of the Investigation Agency. It seems that
the Investigation Officers were intentionally trying to screen the truth
from being brought on record and washed their hands off the matter,
by making the appellant, a scapegoat.
51. However, in the absence of the CCTV footage being collected and
exhibited as per law, no credence can be given to the evidence
of Duraivelu (PW-6), more so, when there is grave discrepancy
between his version and the version of the complainant (PW-1). In
stark contradiction to the version of the complainant (PW-1) and
Duraivelu (PW-6), the Investigating Officer (PW-29) did not utter a
single word that he or any other police official had seen the said
CCTV footage or that any suspicious movement of a person taking
a big bag on a motorbike had been noticed by anyone inquired
during investigation. Hence, reliance placed by the prosecution on
the so-called CCTV footage is nothing but a figment of imagination
and cannot be accepted. Rather, this Court is compelled to draw
an adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding a vital
piece of evidence, i.e., the CCTV footage.
52. The third circumstance on which the prosecution relied upon to bring
home the guilt of the appellant was in form of the confessional/
disclosure statement/s made by the appellant leading to the
incriminating discoveries/recoveries. In this regard, the relevant
excerpts from the deposition of the complainant (PW-1), need to be
referred which read thus: -
“On 7.2.2017 the Mangadu Police informed me that they
watched the CCTV and found the suspicious movement of
one Mr. Dashwanth and he was absconding. My neighbour
informed me that the said Dashwanth was carrying a Travel
Bag in his bike. On 8.2.2017 morning the police informed
me that the said Dashwanth took my daughter to his house
and sexually abused her and murdered her. In order to
screen the evidence he taken away my daughter in the
travel bag and kept her in a bush at Anakaputhur Bypass
road and burn the body. On 9.2.2017 at about 5.30 a.m.
police called me to the police station and I went there.
Where they shown me my daughter’s anklet, earrings and
dresses and I confirmed that all the items shown to me
are belongs to my daughter Hasini.”
614 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

53. The aforesaid statement made by the complainant (PW-1) completely
demolishes the entire substratum of the prosecution case and creates
grave doubt on the bonafides of the Investigation Officer’s (PW-29)
actions, in recording the disclosure statement/s of the appellant and
effecting recoveries in pursuance thereof. For arriving at the above
conclusion, we shall analyse the evidence of the complainant (PW-1): -
i. That on 7th February, 2017, Mangadu Police informed him that
they had watched the CCTV footage and found the suspicious
movement of Dashwanth (appellant herein);
Observation by Court: - No such statement made by any
police officer.
ii. That his neighbour informed that the said Dashwanth (appellant
herein) was carrying a travel bag on his bike;
Observation by Court: - No such witness stepped forward to
give this information to the 1st Investigation Officer (PW-29).
iii. That in the morning of 8th February, 2017 the police informed
him that Dashwanth (appellant herein) took his daughter (victim
herein) to his house, sexually abused her, and murdered her.
In order to screen the evidence, the dead body was taken in
a travel bag which was kept in a bush at Anakaputhur bypass
road and was later set on fire.
Observation by Court: - The Investigation Officer (PW-29) had
already created a story which seems to have been transposed
into the confessional statement of the appellant.
iv. That on 9th February, 2017 at 5:30 a.m., the police called him
to the police station and showed him his daughter’s anklets,
earrings, and dress. He confirmed that all these items belonged
to his daughter (victim herein).
Observation by Court: - No Test Identification Parade was
conducted to get these articles identified.
54. This entire sequence of events as narrated by the complainant
(PW-1) brings the case of the prosecution under grave doubt. It
is the pertinent case of the appellant in his defence that he was
regularly attending his office and that the police picked him up on
7th February, 2017 at about 11:00 a.m. to 12 noon. The Investigation
Officer (PW-29) feigned ignorance regarding the presence of the
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 615

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

appellant at his workplace which creates a doubt about the story of
prosecution that the accused was absconding and was nabbed on
8th February, 2017. The appellant was shown to be arrested on 8th
February, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. However, going by the version of the
complainant (PW-1), by that time, the police had already informed
him about the minute details of the manner in which the crime was
committed, the efforts made by the appellant to destroy the evidence,
and the location where the body of the victim was disposed of. The
Investigation Officer (PW-29) showed that the appellant was arrested
on 8th February, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. and thereafter, the confessional
statement/disclosure statement (Exhibit P-8) of the appellant was
purportedly recorded at AGS Park, Mugalivakkam from 9:05 a.m.
to 10:00 a.m. Hence, there was no possibility whatsoever that the
Investigating Officer (PW-29) could have known all these facts so as
to apprise complainant (PW-1) in the morning of 8th February, 2017
unless such facts were already in the knowledge of the said police
officer, which is a more possible theory. This is consistent with the
plea of the appellant who stated that the police picked him up from
his house in the early hours of 7th February, 2017 itself. Thus, it is
apparent that the police had already created the entire story and later
on, tried to fit the same into a sequence by postponing the formal
arrest of the appellant in order to implicate him in this case. The
fact that the police officers had told the complainant regarding the
location where the body of the victim had been disposed of, in the
morning of 8th February, 2017, is itself sufficient to discard the theory
of the prosecution that all the incriminating discoveries were made in
pursuance of the disclosure statement made by the appellant. Thus,
the claim made by the prosecution that the dead body of the victim
was recovered in furtherance of the disclosure statement made by
the appellant is belied by cogent material available on record.
55. We have no hesitation in holding that recoveries of the bag,
allegedly containing the bottles in which petrol was carried and the
undergarment of the victim, were not effected at the instance of the
appellant and were planted recoveries. This conclusion is fortified by
the fact that there is no mention of the said bag in the observation
mahazar51 and the rough sketch52. The Investigating Officer (PW-29)

51 Supra note 15.
52 Supra note 16.
616 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

did not utter a word that he sealed the ornaments allegedly recovered
in furtherance of the disclosure statement given by the appellant.
Hence, the identification of these articles by the complainant (PW-1)
pales into insignificance.
56. At this stage, a very important fact that emerges from the evidence
of Sumathi (PW-7), Village Administrative Officer, Madanandhapuram
Village, needs to be noted. For ready reference, relevant extract from
the evidence of Sumathi (PW-7) is extracted hereinbelow: -
“On 08.02.2017, the Inspector of Police, Mangadu, called
me over phone and informed at 8.15 am that there was
an information regarding an important case, and that I
should come to the area namely AGS park, Mugalivakkam,
I having obtained permission from Revenue Inspector and
Tahsildar, informed my Assistant Mohandass and made him
to come and went to AGS park in his two wheeler. Police
was found gathered there. Dashvanth was also present
in that place. At that time police told me that Dashvanth
was going to tender confession statement regarding his
molesting of a girl child namely Hasini aged 7 years and
murdering her by setting her ablaze.”
57. It is clear that the witness (PW-7) stated in the examination-in-chief
that on 8th February, 2017, the Inspector of Police, Mangadu called
her over phone at about 8:15 a.m., and told her that there was
information regarding an important case and she should come to
the area, namely AGS Park, Mugalivakkam. The witness (PW-7)
took permission from the Revenue Inspector and Tahsildar and went
to the AGS Park along with her assistant, i.e., Mohandass (PW-8).
She further stated that the police team was present there with the
appellant. The police informed the witness (PW-7) that the appellant
was going to tender a confession regarding he having molested and
murdered a girl aged 7 years (victim herein) and then destroyed the
evidence by setting the dead body of the victim on fire.
58. Thus, it is clearly discernible from the evidence of the witness (PW-7)
that she was informed at around 9:00 a.m. regarding the forthcoming
situation/events which would include a confession to be made by
the appellant. This deposition completely destroys the credibility of
the actions of the Investigating Officer (PW-29) who informed the
witness (PW-7) well in advance as to the tenor of the confession
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 617

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

which the appellant would make. The appellant was arrested at 9:00
a.m. but the Investigation Officer (PW-29) told the witness (PW-7)
much earlier that there was information regarding an important
case and that she should come to AGS Park, Mugalivakkam. The
witness (PW-7) further stated that as soon as she reached AGS
Park, Mugalivakkam, she was informed by the Investigation Officer
(PW-29) that the appellant was going to tender a confession regarding
he having molested and murdered a girl aged 7 years (victim herein)
and then destroyed the evidence by setting the dead body of the
victim on fire. This disclosure was made before the recording of such
a confession and creates a grave doubt over the bonafides of the
Investigating Officer’s actions. The above analysis lends credence
to the defence version that the appellant had been illegally detained
on 7th February, 2017 and that his confession was extracted under
coercion on that day itself.
59. The fact regarding the confession of the appellant having been
extracted much prior to his arrest is also corroborated from the
testimony of the complainant (PW-1), who stated in his testimony
that the Investigating Officer (PW-29) called him in the morning of
8th February, 2017 and told that Dashwanth (appellant herein) had
murdered his daughter (victim herein). Not only this, the minute details
of the incident were also shared by the Investigating Officer (PW-29)
with the complainant (PW-1) much before the confessional statement
of the appellant had been recorded (discussed in paragraph 54 supra).
60. These facts give rise to a clear picture that the theory of confessional/
disclosure statement of the appellant leading to the discoveries is
nothing but a creation of the Investigating Officer (PW-29) and as
a matter of fact, all the incriminating facts and circumstances were
already in the knowledge of the Investigating Officer (PW-29) and
were subsequently woven into a story, projecting a hypothesis that
a voluntary confession was made by the appellant leading to the
incriminating discoveries of the dead body, the ornaments, etc.
61. At this stage, we would also like to record our serious reservation on
the manner in which the entire confessional statement of the appellant
was allowed to be reproduced by the trial court in the examination-
in-chief of the Investigating Officer (PW-29). Law is well settled by
a catena of judgments rendered by this Court that only such part of
the confessional statement of an accused which distinctly leads to
the discovery of a material fact can be permitted to be tendered in
618 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

evidence.53 In gross contradiction of this settled legal principle, the
trial Court, while recording the deposition of the Investigating Officer
(PW-29) permitted him to narrate the entire confession purportedly
made by the appellant in presence of Sumathi (PW-7), the Village
Administrative Officer and Mohandass (PW-8), assistant of PW-7.
The deposition records that the appellant confessed that he took the
child to his home; removed her clothes; committed sexual assault
on her and then ended her life by smothering her. Furthermore, the
details of the dead body of the victim being stuffed in a blue-coloured
travel bag and taken to the remote area near the Anakaputhur bypass
road and setting the same to fire are all recorded in the deposition
as if the same were the personal observations of the Investigating
Officer (PW-29).
62. In order to highlight this gross legal and procedural flaw in the
recording of evidence, we would gainfully refer to the following
extracts from the evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW-29): -
“It is presumed that the information about the child Hasini
could be obtained if the absconding person Dashvanth was
caught and enquired, based on the information given by the
Informant, he was arrested on 08.02.2017 at 09.00 a.m.
at AGS Park, Mugalivakkam and on enquiring him, he had
revealed that he sexual by harassed the child Hasini in his
house and committed murder and set her on fire. Since,
none among the general public came forward to remain
as witnesses at the time of recording his confessional
statement, information was passed on to Tmt. Sumathi,
Village Administrative Officer, Mugalivakkam and his
Assistant Mohandass, they were summoned to be present
at AGS Park and in their presence, the accused Dashvanth
revealed about him and his family in his Statement and had
told that, he, after having studied Diploma, was working
in a Call Centre at Mylapore. Further, I had recorded
Confession Statement given by him in the presence
of the witnesses Tmt. Sumathi, Village Administrative
Officer and his Assistant Tr. Mohandass at 09.05 a.m.

53 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 8; Mohmed Inayatullah v.
State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 828; Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330;
Bodhraj alias Bodha and Others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2002) 8 SCC 45.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 619

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

to 10.00 a.m. wherein he had stated that, since he was
having more lust over women, he used to watch sex
videos in the cellphone, that, as he had the intention
of committing sexual relationship with a lady, he told
that, a girl child Hasini, daughter of Babu, residing
in his Apartment was cute, that, he would frequently
pinch her over her cheek and that, he had the intention
to somehow enjoy Hasini at opportune, that, he had
witnessed her parents going out in the evening leaving
their child Hasini alone on 05.02.2017, that, he made
Hasini, who was in the downstairs, to play with his
dog and he took her to his house when he was alone
in his house, had removed Hasini’s clothes in his
bedroom and had committed sexual harassment, at
that time, since Hasini raised an alarm by shouting, he
had committed murder by pressing her face with bed-
sheet and in order to conceal the murder, he wrapped
her in a blue coloured Travel Bag, which was in his
house, took her to Tambaram to Maduravoyal Bypass
Road by his unregistered Apache motor-cycle, had
thrown her in a thorny bush situated near unutilized
Telephone Booth situated near Anakaputhur and had
set her on fire by pouring petrol over her and that, he
would identify the place where Hasini’s body was burnt
and also the place where he had raped and murdered
her in his house.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

63. It is clear that the entire confessional statement of the appellant
was allowed to be reproduced in the deposition of the Investigation
Officer (PW-29) by the trial court which is in clear contravention
to the mandate of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Allowing the Investigation Officer to extract the entire confession of
the accused, in his evidence, apart from being grossly illegal, also
have a propensity of clouding the mind of the Court while appreciating
the facts and would in turn cause grave prejudice to the accused.
64. He further deposed about summoning of the forensic science expert,
Sophiya Joseph (PW-21) and the subsequent identification of the
place and body of the child victim by the appellant in presence
620 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

of Sumathi (PW-7), Mohandass (PW-8) and the scientific expert.
The deposition continues to the process of the drawing up of the
observation mahazar54, a rough sketch55 and the identification and
recovery of the blue-coloured travel bag containing the undergarment
of the child victim, the cold drink bottles with petrol like smell and
also the charred ash recovered from the place where the body of the
child victim was set to fire. The Investigation Officer (PW-29), further
narrated about the recovery of the jeans worn by the appellant, his
T-Shirt, a purse and some ornaments and so also a bed cover and
an Axis Bank ATM Card etc. These recoveries were recorded in
observation mahazar56.
65. Though the aforesaid witness in his evidence has spoken about the
confessional statement given by the appellant as reproduced supra,
but evidently the said confessional/disclosure statement was not
exhibited by him in his evidence. The only disclosure statement of
the appellant which the Investigating Officer (PW-29) exhibited and
proved in evidence was Exhibit P-8: -
“Further, the Admissible Portion, in which the accused
had stated that, he would identify his house and
would produce the clothes and Hasini’s jewelleries
kept concealed by him in his Purse, has already been
marked as Ex. P.8.”
(Emphasis supplied)

66. In cross-examination, the Investigation Officer (PW-29) made the
following important admissions: -
“There are witnesses who have witnessed the missing
child as well as the accused person together at last.
It is correct if it is stated that if a suspicious person
who is said to have been involved in criminal act had
gone missing, we would search him at his residence
and at the place where he had worked. If there is
possibility for a suspicious person to get escape at some
times, we would search him, not directly, but through

54 Supra note 15.
55 Supra note 16.
56 Exhibit P-7.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 621

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

secret informant. I came to know from investigation that
the accused Dashvanth was working in a Private Firm at
Mylapore, that, he is a Tax Assessee and that, he does
reside in a permanent address. Neither, I searched the
accused at his work place nor I conducted enquiry
there. It is correct if it is stated that, there is a distance
of one hour travel between the place of occurrence
and the place where the accused had worked. If it
is stated that, the accused, as usual, had gone to
his office for work on 05.02.2017, 06.02.2017 and
07.02.2017, I do not know about that. We became
suspicious of the accused only on 07.02.2017. If it is
stated that the accused did not get abscond on 05.02.2017,
06.02.2017 and 07.02.2017 and that, he, as usual, had
gone for work, we became suspicious of the accused
only on 07.02.2017…… It is not correct if it is stated that,
I arrested the accused on 07.02.2017 and detained him
into my custody and that, therefore, I am telling falsehood
that he was arrested on 08.02.2017 at near AGS Park
Mugalivakkam at 09.00 a.m. for the first time. It is correct
if it is stated that it is a common practice to interrogate a
person in the police station when he was arrested over the
charges of committing major crime. As far as this case
is concerned, if it is asked as to whether, the accused
began to depose confessional statement within five
minutes, as soon as he was caught on 08.02.2017 at
09.00 a.m. at AGS Park, Mugalivakkam, he started to
plead guilty as soon as he was caught and began to
interrogate. There is no possibility for the witnesses
Sumathi and Mohandass to arrive there within those
five minutes, that, since they were the government
servants, it would take time for them to come after
obtaining due permission and that, I am deposing
falsehood stating that the accused was enquired there by
summoning the witness and detaining him already.
We have not received any complaint whatsoever from
the child’s parents prior to this occurrence stating
that the accused was sexually harassing the child
viz., Hasini by touching on her cheek.
622 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

P.W.2 Sridevi during her enquiry, has deposed that the
child Hasini was playing on the ground floor along with
other children and if it is asked as to whether I conducted
enquiry with any of them, I conducted enquiry. I do not
remember as to whether I obtained statement from them
and filed it before the court. It is wrong to state that
if the accused took Hasini with him by showing the
dog, then other children, who were playing with her,
would have deposed it during my enquiry and that,
since none of them have deposed in such a manner,
I did not arrayed any of them as witness.
P.W.6 Duraivel is an Administrator of a temple in that area
and that, he had witnessed some recordings in the CCTV
camera fixed in the temple, that, he had told that he had
also seen the recordings by obtaining from him and that,
therefore, if it is asked whether I have obtained the
aforesaid CCTV footages from that witness and I have
produced it in this case, I did not produce the same,
as, the complainant has informed us about the accused
secretly and because the face was not clearly visible
in the aforesaid CCTV footage and also because only
the image was seen.”
(Emphasis supplied)

67. From an overall conspectus of the evidence of Investigating Officer
(PW-29), we feel that the defence has been able to create a grave
doubt impeaching the credibility and sanctity of the actions of the
Investigation Officer (PW-29) on the vital aspects of investigation
including the arrest of the appellant followed by disclosure statements
leading to the alleged incriminating recoveries/discoveries. The
witness (PW-29) was given a distinct suggestion by the defence
that right from the day of the incident, the appellant had regularly
gone to attend his work and never absconded. That his signatures
were obtained on the confessional statements by detaining him in
advance and torturing and beating him and that the appellant was
implicated in the case falsely. The witness (PW-29) admitted that
though it was a normal practice to seize the undergarments of the
accused in sexual harassment cases, but in the present case, he
did not seize it, as the same could not be traced out.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 623

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

68. Regarding the mobile phone of the appellant, the witness (PW-29)
was given a suggestion that the recovery was manipulated and that
there was no document confirming the fact that the mobile phone
was that of the appellant. Even the identity of the owner of the sim-
card was not established by any documentary evidence. The gross
indifference shown by the Investigation Officer (PW-29) in making
any efforts to search the flat of the appellant at the earliest available
opportunity also adds to the series of the doubtful actions during
investigation.
69. At this stage, a very significant fact needs to be noted from the
evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW-29) as the same would
have a material bearing on the scientific reports including the DNA
report. The witness did not give any indication regarding the manner in
which, the seized articles including the forensic samples were sealed
and stored after the procedure of seizure had been completed. There
is no indication in his evidence with regard to placing of the seized
articles in a sealed condition which is the normal and mandatory
protocol. Needless to state that the forensic articles/materials in a
case of such sensitive nature must be sealed at the time of seizure.
The packets containing the articles/materials must bear the case
details, the signatures of the panch witnesses, the accused and
the seizure officer. These sealed articles must be deposited in the
malkhana of the police station or any other appropriate place of
safekeeping before transmission to FSL. The prosecution has tried
to project through the evidence of Investigating Officer (PW-29) that
the material articles/forensic samples were sent to the scientific
experts under the orders of the Court, however, the prime witness
who would be required to state about the safe custody of the said
articles/materials and their fate in future including transit to the FSL
would be none other than the Investigating Officer (PW-29) himself.
70. The relevant excerpts from the evidence of the Investigating Officer
(PW-29) regarding the seizure and the safe custody of the forensic
articles/materials are reproduced hereinbelow: -
“I came to the station along with the accused and the
objects that were seized and kept in the station under
safe custody.
On 09.02.2017, advice was given to send the child’s corpse
along with the relevant documents through Tr. Murugan,
624 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Special Sub Inspector after the completion of Post mortem
for the purpose of handing it over to her relatives. On
13.02.2017, I gave the Requisition Letter with a request to
conduct Medical Examination of the accused Dashvanth
through the court. That Requisition Letter is Ex.P.38. On
16.02.2017, the accused Dashvanth was sent through the
Court to the hospital for conducting the test of masculinity.
I again produced the accused before the Court on
19.02.2017 and subjected him into custody. On 21.02.2017,
as per my request, the parents of the child viz., Tr. C.S.D.
Babu and Tmt. Sridevi were subjected for DNA Analysis
through the court. That Requisition Letter is Ex.P.39. Later
on, on 22.02.2017, Case Property and Forensic Properties
were handed over before the court, Court B.I. No. 5/2017
was obtained, based on the court order and in order to
conduct Analysis of Forensic properties, it was handed over
to the Chennai Forensic Science Department, Mylapore
through one Tr. Murugan, Special Sub Inspector. That
Requisition Application is Ex. P.40.”
71. A perusal of the above excerpts from the testimony of the Investigating
Officer (PW-29) confirms that the prosecution has miserably failed
to prove the chain of custody of the forensic articles/samples right
from the time of seizure till they reached the FSL. The malkhana In-
charge of the police station was not examined in evidence. Neither
any forwarding documents except for a forwarding letter57, authorising
the movement of the forensic articles/samples were proved by the
Investigation Officer (PW-29) nor any witness who carried these
samples from the police station to the Court or the concerned
laboratories, was examined in evidence. Since the sanctity of the
samples was not proved by proper evidence, as a necessary corollary,
the reports of scientific analysis would lose significance and cannot
be relied upon. To support our conclusion, we may gainfully refer
to the decision of this Court in Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak
Nishad v. State of Maharashtra.58 For ready reference, relevant
paragraphs from the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: -

57 Exhibit 40.
58 2023 SCC Online SC 666.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 625

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

“53. Perusal of these documents reveals that samples
of the blood and semen of the appellant were sent for
forensic analysis. Importantly though, there is nothing
on record to establish as to who took such samples, on
what date, on how many occasions and why were they
not sent all at once, we notice that none of the police
officials have testified to the formalities of keeping the
samples safe and secure being complied with.

… … … …
58. As has been hitherto observed, there is no clarity
of who took the samples of the appellant. In any event,
record reveals that one set of samples taken on 14-6-
2010 were sent for chemical analysis on 16-6-2010 and
the second sample taken, a month later on 20-7-2010 is
sent the very same day. Why there exist these differing
degrees of promptitude in respect of similar, if not the
same-natured scientific evidence, is unexplained.

… … … …
60. In the present case, the delay in sending the
samples is unexplained and therefore, the possibility
of contamination and the concomitant prospect of
diminishment in value cannot be reasonably ruled out.
On the need for expedition in ensuring that samples when
collected are sent to the laboratory concerned as soon
as possible, we may refer to “Guidelines for Collection,
Storage and Transportation of Crime Scene DNA Samples
For Investigating Officers — Central Forensic Science
Laboratory, Directorate Of Forensic Sciences Services,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India” which in
particular reference to blood and semen, irrespective of
its form i.e. liquid or dry (crust/stain or spatter) records
the sample so taken: “Must be submitted in the laboratory
without any delay.”
61. The document also lays emphasis on the “chain of
custody” being maintained. Chain of custody implies that
right from the time of taking of the sample, to the time its role
in the investigation and processes subsequent, is complete,
626 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

each person handling said piece of evidence must duly
be acknowledged in the documentation, so as to ensure
that the integrity is uncompromised. It is recommended
that a document be duly maintained cataloguing the
custody. A chain of custody document in other words is a
document, “which should include name or initials of the
individual collecting the evidence, each person or entity
subsequently having custody of it, dated the items were
collected or transferred, agency and case number, victim’s
or suspect’s name and the brief description of the item”.

… … … …
66. In the present case, even though, the DNA evidence
by way of a report was present, its reliability is not
infallible, especially not so in light of the fact that the
uncompromised nature of such evidence cannot be
established; and other that cogent evidence as can
be seen from our discussion above, is absent almost
in its entirety.”
(Emphasis supplied)

72. R.D. Vivekanandan (PW-30) was the 2nd Investigating Officer in the
case. He took over investigation from N. Ravikumar, 1st Investigating
Officer (PW-29) on 22nd April, 2017. The following important facts are
discernible from the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-30): -
a. No enquiry was made from the other children who were playing
with the victim prior to her disappearance in the evening of 5th
February, 2017.
b. It was wrong to suggest that the semen and the blood samples
of the appellant were collected against his desire by assaulting
him.
c. No call detail records pertaining to the mobile phone in use of
the appellant were procured and proved on record.
d. No identification parade was conducted in the case.
e. No enquiry was conducted from the firm where the appellant
was working to find out whether or not he was attending duty
from 5th February, 2017 to 8th February, 2017.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 627

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

f. That it was not correct to suggest that the appellant was not
arrested at the time, date and place as mentioned in the record.
73. In examination-in-chief, the witness (PW-30) stated that he recorded
the statements of certain witnesses namely, C.S.D. Babu (PW-1),
Sridevi (PW-2), Murugan (PW-3), all of whom had already given their
statements to 1st Investigating Officer (PW-29). The witness recorded
their fresh statements on 24th April, 2017. It is evident from the record
that in the statement of Murugan (PW-3) recorded by the witness
(PW-30), he divulged for the first time about having witnessed the
child victim playing with the appellant and his dog on the second
floor of the building. Furthermore, Pushpa (PW-11) also for the first
time disclosed to 2nd Investigating Officer (PW-30) that she had seen
the appellant going out from the Nikitha Flats at about 7:00 p.m.
on his motorcycle with a travel bag on the back. Apparently thus,
the introduction of these witnesses in the subsequent investigation
undertaken by 2nd Investigating Officer (PW-30) after significant
delay was aimed only at creating evidence of last seen together
and of the fact that the appellant was seen carrying away a bag on
his motorcycle. Had there been an iota of truth in these allegations,
there was no reason as to why the concerned witnesses would not
have stepped forward to narrate these vital facts to N. Ravikumar,
1st Investigating Officer (PW-29) at the earliest available opportunity.
74. The witness (PW-30) also stated that upon receiving the Court order
on 6th June, 2017, the appellant was taken out from the prison and
produced before the Government College and Hospital, Chengalpet
for collection of his blood samples. Under the same Court’s order,
the blood samples of the appellant were sent to the FSL, Chennai for
the purpose of conducting DNA test. However, the witness (PW-30)
did not prove any document or memorandum whatsoever in which
the procedure of collection of the blood samples of the appellant
and the forwarding thereof to the FSL, Chennai was recorded. Thus,
the sanctity of the procedure of drawing the blood samples of the
appellant and the forwarding thereof to the FSL has been breached
which would lead to the DNA report being rendered redundant.
75. The DNA analysis reports59 were proved by Nirmalabai Davidson
(PW-28), Scientific Officer, FSL, Chennai. She deposed that on 10th

59 Exhibit P-19, P-30, P-31 and P-32.
628 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

February, 2017, while she was on duty, she preserved two teeth and
two thigh portions placed before her in connection with the instant
case. These articles had been forwarded to the witness (PW-28) by
Professor Karthika Devi (PW-16), Medico-Legal Department, Kilpauk
Medical College and Hospital through M. Murugan (PW-26), Special
Sub-Inspector, for the purpose of conducting DNA analysis. The
witness (PW-28) proved the procedure of comparison of the DNA
samples extracted from the teeth and the thigh bones of the skeleton
and the blood samples of the parents, i.e., C.S.D. Babu (PW-1) and
Sridevi (PW-2) to conclude that the dead body was that of the child
victim. This fact is otherwise also admitted and not in dispute.
76. The witness (PW-28) further stated that in sequel to the above,
the patch of semen detected on the underwear (which was marked
as Material Object No. 2 in the analysis report) was received from
the biological division on 7th April, 2017. DNA was separated from
this semen stain and analysis was conducted by comparing the
same with the DNA profile extracted from the blood sample of the
appellant. The blood samples of the appellant were collected in
slides and were forwarded by the trial Court on 8th June, 2017. The
DNA was separated from the blood sample and on comparison, the
same matched with the DNA profile of the semen stain found on
the underwear. We may observe that though the scientific experts
concluded that the DNA profile of the semen stain found on the
underwear of the victim was matching with the DNA profile of the
appellant but as the very factum of recovery of the Material Object,
i.e., the undergarment of the victim has not been established beyond
doubt (discussed in 55 supra), as a consequence, no sanctity
whatsoever can be attached to the conclusions drawn in the Expert
Report (Exhibit P-32).
77. A further doubt is created on the veracity of the DNA report when
we consider the following answer given by Nirmalabai (PW-28) to a
question put in cross-examination.
“If it is asked as to how long does semen bio-cells
would survive after being released from the human
body, it would survive for 48 hours, but, what I have
found out was, the bio-cells separated from DNA from
the cells in semen stain.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 629

Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu

78. A very serious question has to be posed regarding the time of
collection of the blood samples of the appellant. There is no dispute
that the case of prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence,
and the appellant came to be arrested on 8th February, 2017. Thus,
there was no reason whatsoever for the Investigating Agency to
have waited for four months before collecting the blood samples of
the appellant. There is a strong possibility that the delay may have
been utilized to manipulate the samples. Doing so was very easy
because there is no evidence on record regarding the unbreached
chain of custody of any of the forensic samples.
79. Apparently thus, there is a serious doubt regarding the entire
procedure, whereby, the DNA from the semen stain found on the
undergarment of the victim was separated and the same was
compared and matched with the DNA profile of the appellant’s
blood sample. Hence, we are not inclined to rely upon the said DNA
profiling reports60.
80. We may hasten to add that while the present case pertains to the
commission of a heinous offence involving a girl of tender age of 7
years, at the same time, we cannot ignore or bypass the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution is duty-bound
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
onus is heavier in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence.
However, regrettably, the prosecution has miserably failed to do so
in the instant case, leaving the Court with no choice but to acquit
the appellant, despite the heinous nature of the crime. While it is
acknowledged that the acquittal of an individual involved in a heinous
crime can lead to societal distress and cause grave anguish to the
victim’s family, the legal framework does not permit the Courts to
punish an accused person based merely on moral convictions or
conjectures. Each case must be adjudicated by the Courts rigorously
on its individual merits and in strict conformity with the law, without
yielding to public sentiment and external pressures.
81. As a result of the above analysis, we are of the firm view that the
prosecution has miserably failed to prove the vital circumstances,
viz., (i) last seen together theory; (ii) suspicious movement of the
appellant captured in the video footage of the CCTV camera installed

60 Exhibit P-31 and P-32.
630 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

at a nearby temple; (iii) confessional/disclosure statement made by
the appellant leading to the incriminating discoveries/recoveries and
(iv) FSL reports establishing the DNA profiling comparison, which
constituted the entire edifice of the prosecution case and on which
the conviction of the appellant was based.
82. We have minutely gone through the judgments of the High Court as
well as the trial Court and find that while coming to the respective
conclusions regarding the guilt of the appellant, the trial Court and
the High Court glossed over these patent infirmities and loopholes
in the case of the prosecution. As these vital circumstances have
not been proved beyond all manner of doubt, it would not be safe to
uphold the conviction of the appellant as recorded by the trial Court
and affirmed by the High Court. Resultantly the impugned judgments
do not stand to scrutiny.
83. As an upshot of the above discussion, the appeals succeed and are
hereby allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 19th February, 2018 passed by the trial Court and the judgement
dated 10th July, 2018 passed by the High Court are set aside. The
conviction of the appellant and the sentences awarded to him, by
the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are also set aside.
84. The appellant is acquitted of the charges. He is in jail and shall be
released from custody forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.
85. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan