Holding

Under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, bail may be denied only when the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses reasonable grounds that the accusation is prima facie true; otherwise, bail must be granted, with the court conducting an accused‑specific inquiry that balances Article 21 against public security.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined bail applications of several accused in the 2020 Delhi riots case under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. It balanced the constitutional right to liberty under Article 21 against the statutory bail restriction in Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, considering the length of pre‑trial detention, the nature of the alleged conspiracy, and each accused's role. The Court held that where the prosecution material, taken at face value, shows a prima‑facie case of involvement in a terrorist act, the statutory embargo applies and bail must be denied. Applying this test, the Court denied bail to the alleged masterminds Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, but granted bail to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa‑ur‑Rehman, Mohd Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed with strict conditions, finding their roles peripheral and the statutory threshold not met. The judgment also clarified the scope of "terrorist act" under Section 15 and emphasized individualized assessment for bail under special statutes.

Issues considered

The applicability of Article 21 of the Constitution to prolonged pre‑trial incarceration in UAPA cases
Whether the prosecution material satisfies the "prima facie true" threshold of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA for each appellant
The impact of the accused's attributed role (central conspirator vs local facilitator) on bail eligibility
The interpretation of "terrorist act" under Section 15 of the UAPA in the context of the Delhi riots
The relevance of parity with co‑accused who have been granted bail

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 27
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 164, s. 207, s. 437
Constitution of Indias. Art.21
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 109, s. 114, s. 120B, s. 124A, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 153A, s. 186, s. 201, s. 212, s. 295, s. 302, s. 307, s. 34, s. 341, s. 353, s. 395, s. 420, s. 427, s. 435, s. 436, s. 452, s. 454, s. 468, s. 471
Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984s. 3, s. 4
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967s. 13, s. 15, s. 16, s. 18, s. 43D(5)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to grant of bail to accused-appellants in relation to arrests made pursuant to Delhi Riots, 2020, considering the prolonged incarceration, and the constitutional plea u/Art.21 of the Constitution. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.21 – s.43D(5) – Delhi Riots, 2020 – Bail sought by accused-appellants considering the prolonged incarceration, and constitutional plea u/Art.21 – Prosecution case that the appellants conspired to orchestrate and execute the 2020 Delhi Riots as a form of protest against

Subjects

Art.21 Constitutional PleaProlonged IncarcerationScope of Terrorist ActDelhi Riots 2020Chakka Jam StrategyLarger Conspiracy NarrativeIdeological Drivers vs Local FacilitatorsPre‑planned Criminal ConspiracyMobilisation and RadicalisationProtected Witness StatementsChoking Essential ServicesCCTV Dislocation and NeutralisationDoctrine of Parity in UAPAFinancial and Logistical FacilitationProcedural StagnationCommunal Skirmish IntentNon‑Violent Disavowal vs Private PreparationShaheen Bagh Protest ModeTriple Test for BailBailEnactment of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019Proposed NRCConspiracyWidespread communal violenceRight to life and personal libertySecurity of the societyStructured inquiry to be held by courtsJudicial inquiry at bail stageExpression "prima facie true"Delay simpliciter, if eclipses statutory regime

Judgment

[2026] 1 S.C.R. 609 : 2026 INSC 2

Gulfisha Fatima
v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
(Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2026)
05 January 2026
[Aravind Kumar* and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to grant of bail to accused-appellants in relation
to arrests made pursuant to Delhi Riots, 2020, considering the
prolonged incarceration, and the constitutional plea u/Art.21 of
the Constitution.

Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.21 – Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967 – s.43D(5) – Delhi Riots, 2020 – Bail sought by
accused-appellants considering the prolonged incarceration,
and constitutional plea u/Art.21 – Prosecution case that the
appellants conspired to orchestrate and execute the 2020 Delhi
Riots as a form of protest against enactment of the Citizenship
Amendment Act, 2019 and proposed NRC – Conspiracy
culminated in the widespread communal violence which
claimed 54 lives including senior police officer and Intelligence
Bureau official, as well as grievous injuries to several police
personnel and civilians and, extensive damage to over 1,500
public and private properties, along with substantial intangible
harm to public order, social harmony and the nation at large –
Appellants arrested in 2020 – Chargesheets filed disclosing
the alleged roles attributed to each of the appellants and
contours of the larger conspiracy purportedly orchestrated
by them – Pendency of trial – Prosecution case prima facie
attributed central role to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam and
alleged to be ideological drivers of the alleged conspiracy,
their alleged acts situated at the planning and preparatory
stage, extending over a prolonged period, alleged to have
operated remotely away from the sites of violence, with no
direct attribution of participation in acts of arson, assault,
or destruction of property, thus, involved in facilitating

* Author
610 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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execution – In contradistinction, remaining accused-Gulfisha
Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem
Khan, Shadab Ahmad, Athar Khan, and others described as
local-level facilitators, their alleged involvement site-specific
and operational, even in the narrative concerning escalation
into violence, role attributed to the remaining accused
largely proximate and reactive, arising from developments at
specific protest sites, thus involved in conceptualisation and
supervision – Bail applications by the appellants – Rejected by
the courts below – Challenge to, on the ground of prolonged
incarceration, and constitutional plea u/Art.21:
Held: Constitution does not conceive liberty in isolation – Security
of the community, the integrity of the trial process, and the
preservation of public order are equally legitimate constitutional
concerns – When bail is sought in prosecutions governed by a
special statute-s.43D(5), the Court is required to undertake a
difficult and sensitive balancing exercise, conscious that neither
liberty nor security admits of absolutism – Where the prosecution
places prima facie material suggesting organised and deliberate
activity affecting public order and security of the Nation, the Court
cannot turn a Nelson’s eye to such material merely because
incarceration is prolonged or liberty is invoked in the abstract –
Equally, where continued detention is not shown to be necessary
to serve a legitimate purpose recognised by law, the Court must
not hesitate to restore liberty, subject to stringent conditions
that safeguard the larger public interest – Constitutional role of
the Court, thus, is neither to mechanically enforce the statutory
embargo nor to neutralise it by invocation of liberty as straight-
jacket formula, but to apply it with disciplined scrutiny – Where
the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses reasonable
grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true, the
statutory restraint must ordinarily operate – Where it does not,
liberty must prevail – Assessment of each appellant on the basis
of the role attributed, the nature of material relied upon, and the
stage of the proceedings, strictly within the limited compass of
adjudication for grant of bail – Prosecution material, taken at
face value, discloses a prima facie attribution of a central and
formative role by the appellants-Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam
in the alleged conspiracy – Material suggests involvement at the
level of planning, mobilisation, and strategic direction, extending
beyond episodic or localised acts – Statutory threshold u/s.43D(5)
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 611

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

attracted qua these appellants – While the period of incarceration
undergone by these appellants is substantial and, the Court not
persuaded that, the continued detention has crossed the threshold
of constitutional impermissibility so as to override the statutory
embargo – Complexity of the prosecution, the nature of evidence
relied upon, and the stage of the proceedings do not justify their
enlargement on bail – On the completion of the examination of
the protected witnesses or upon the expiry of a period of one year
from the date of this order, whichever is earlier, the appellants at
liberty to renew their prayer for grant of bail – This would give
effect to the statutory discipline embodied in s.43D(5) of UAPA
while ensuring that constitutional guarantee u/Art.21 operates as
a continuing check against continued incarceration without there
being any substantial progress of the trial – However, bail granted
in respect of Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman,
Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed having regard to the
role attributed, acted as a local-level facilitator, the nature of the
material relied upon, and the present stage of the proceedings,
continued incarceration is not shown to be indispensable to the
conduct of a fair trial, provided strict safeguards are imposed –
Grant of bail in their favour does not reflect any dilution of the
seriousness of the allegations, nor does it amount to a finding on
guilt – It represents a calibrated exercise of constitutional discretion,
structured to preserve both liberty of the individual and security
of the nation – Appellants granted bail to be released subject to
the conditions, imposed not as matters of form, but as substantive
safeguards in the interest of national security, public order, and the
integrity of the trial process – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.120B, 109,
114, 124A, 147, 148, 149, 153A, 186, 201, 212, 295, 302, 307,
341, 353, 395, 420, 427, 435, 436, 452, 454, 468, 471, 34 – Arms
Act – ss.25, 27 – Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act,
1984 – ss.3, 4. [Paras 169-171, 173, 243, 244, 272, 273, 275,
280, 313-316, 319, 321, 352, 353, 359, 382, 383, 388, 390, 416,
418, 419, 424, 426-434]

Constitution of India – Art.21 – Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967 – s.43D(5) – Prosecution under the UAPA – Invocation
of delay and prolonged incarceration as grounds for bail –
Principled approach by which a constitutional court to
examine such plea – Delay simpliciter, if eclipses a statutory
regime enacted by Parliament to address offences of a special
category:
612 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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Held: In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the
sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not
operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory
restraint – Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened
judicial scrutiny – Outcome of such scrutiny must be determined
by a proportional and contextual balancing of legally relevant
considerations, including the gravity and statutory character of the
offence alleged, the role attributed to the accused within the alleged
design or conspiracy, the strength of the prima facie case as it
emerges at the limited threshold contemplated under the special
statute, and the extent to which continued incarceration, viewed
cumulatively has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to
offend the guarantee of personal liberty u/Art.21 – Thus, when
the composite evaluation yields a clear conclusion that continued
detention has crossed the bounds of constitutional permissibility
that the Court may justifiably intervene notwithstanding statutory
restrictions – To read Najeeb’s case as mandating bail solely on
account of prolonged incarceration, irrespective of the statutory
context or the nature of the allegations, would be to attribute to the
decision a consequence it neither intended nor supports – Such a
construction would also lead to an interpretive absurdity, whereby
a special statute enacted by Parliament to address offences
implicating the sovereignty, integrity, and security of the State would
stand effectively neutralised by the mere passage of time, even
at a pre-trial stage – Such an outcome cannot be countenanced
in constitutional adjudication. [Paras 56, 57, 61]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Statutory Scheme –
Explanation:
Held: Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, is a special
statute enacted to address forms of criminal conduct which, by
their very nature, transcend ordinary breaches of penal law and
implicate the sovereignty, integrity, and security of the State –
Parliament, in framing the Act and in subsequently strengthening
its provisions, has proceeded on the legislative understanding that
such offences are rarely confined to isolated acts, but are more
often the culmination of organised, sustained, and conspiratorial
activity unfolding over time – Statutory scheme of the Act reflects
this understanding – Chapters IV and VI do not confine criminal
liability to the final execution of a terrorist act alone – They extend
culpability to preparatory conduct, facilitation, abetment, and
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 613

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

conspiracy, recognising that the threat sought to be addressed by
the statute often materialises long before any overt act of violence
is committed – Law thus proceeds on a process-based conception
of criminality rather than an event-based one. [Paras 65, 66]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.43D(5) – Scope
and content – Scope of judicial inquiry at the bail stage –
Expression “prima facie true” – Meaning of :
Held: s.43D(5) constitutes a conscious departure from the
general principles governing the grant of bail under the Code of
Criminal Procedure – Provision embodies a deliberate legislative
departure from ordinary bail jurisprudence, premised upon the
distinctive nature of offences under Chapters IV and VI of the
Act – Expression “prima facie true” mandates a threshold judicial
inquiry which is neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory, requiring the
Court to examine whether the prosecution material, taken at face
value, discloses the essential statutory ingredients of the alleged
offence – Inquiry is necessarily accused specific, directed to the role
and attribution qua the individual, and does not admit of collective
or undifferentiated treatment merely because allegations arise from
a common transaction or conspiracy – Bail stage u/s.43D(5) is not
a forum for evaluating defences, weighing evidence, or conducting
a minitrial; judicial restraint at this stage is not an abdication of duty
but a fulfilment of the statutory mandate – These propositions, read
together, define the contours of judicial power and responsibility
under the provision – s.43D(5) thus, demands judicial restraint,
not judicial abstention, at the pre-trial stage – Cumulative effect of
the statutory scheme is that s.43D(5) operates as a gatekeeping
provision – It requires the Court to undertake a focused, accused-
specific, and legally disciplined inquiry, confined to determining
whether the prosecution material, taken at its highest, satisfies the
statutory threshold of prima facie truth. [Paras 67-80]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.43D(5) –
Application of – Structured inquiry to be held by courts:
Held: Correct application of s.43D(5), requires the Court to
undertake a structured inquiry as regards whether the prosecution
material, accepted as it stands, discloses a prima facie case
satisfying the statutory ingredients of the offence alleged; whether
the role attributed to the accused reflects a real and meaningful
614 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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nexus to the unlawful activity or terrorist activity proscribed under
the Act, as distinguished from mere association or peripheral
presence; and whether the statutory threshold is crossed qua
the individual accused, without embarking upon an assessment
reserved after full-fledged trial – Where the requirements are met,
statutory restraint on the grant of bail must operate with full force;
where they are not, the embargo stands lifted – This approach
preserves the legislative purpose of the Act, and ensures that the
exceptional nature of the bail regime u/s.43D(5) is neither diluted by
overreach nor distorted by mechanical application. [Paras 81, 82]

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.15 – Scope of
“Terrorist Act” under and the statutory context:
Held: s.15 defines what constitutes a “terrorist act” for the purposes
of the statute – Definition is structured around two essential
elements, first, the act must be done with intent to threaten, or be
likely to threaten, the unity, integrity, security, including economic
security, or sovereignty of India, or with intent to strike terror in
the people or any section thereof, and second, the act must be of
such a nature as to cause, or be likely to cause, the consequences
enumerated in the provision – Means by which such acts may
be committed are not confined to the use of bombs, explosives,
firearms, or other conventional weapons alone – Parliament has
consciously employed the expression “by any other means of
whatever nature”, which expression cannot be rendered otiose –
Statutory emphasis is thus not solely on the instrumentality
employed, but on the design, intent, and effect of the act – To
construe s.15 as limited only to conventional modes of violence
would be to unduly narrow the provision, contrary to its plain
language – Consequences contemplated u/s. 15 further illuminate
the legislative understanding of terrorism – Apart from death or
destruction of property, the provision expressly encompasses
acts which disrupt supplies or services essential to the life of the
community, as well as acts which threaten the economic security
of the nation – This reflects Parliament’s recognition that threats to
sovereignty and security may arise through conduct that destabilises
civic life or societal functioning, even in the absence of immediate
physical violence. [Paras 86-88]

Constitution of India – Art.21 – 2020 Delhi riots case – Right
to life and personal liberty vis-a-vis security of the society:
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 615

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

Held: Constitution guarantees personal liberty, but it does not
conceive liberty as an isolated or absolute entitlement, detached
from the security of the society in which it operates – Sovereignty,
integrity, and security of the nation, as well as the preservation of
public order, are not abstract concerns rather they are constitutional
values which Parliament is entitled to protect through law – Where a
special statutory framework has been enacted to address offences
perceived to strike at these foundations, courts are duty-bound
to give effect to that framework, subject always to constitutional
discipline – In the application of such law, the Court does not
proceed on identity, ideology, belief, or association – It proceeds on
role, material, and the statutory threshold governing the exercise
of jurisdiction – Criminal law does not mandate identical outcomes
merely because allegations arise from the same transaction – Those
alleged to have conceived, directed, or steered unlawful activity or
terrorist activity stand on a different legal footing from those whose
alleged involvement is confined to facilitation or participation at a
different level – To disregard such distinctions would itself result
in arbitrariness – Decision of 2020 Delhi riots case reflects this
constitutional method – It neither endorses the prosecution case
nor prejudges the guilt of any accused – It applies the law as it
stands, recognising that individual liberty must be protected, but that
it must also withstand the legitimate demands of national security
and collective safety – This balance is not a matter of preference
rather it is a matter of constitutional duty. [Paras 436-438]

Case Law Cited
Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [2021] 1 SCR 443 : (2021) 3 SCC
713; Union of India v. Saleem Khan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1754;
Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2024] 2 SCR 134 : 2024
SCC Online SC 109; CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato, 2025 INSC 1418;
National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [2019]
5 SCR 1060 : (2019) 5 SCC 1; Vernon v. State of Maharashtra
[2023] 10 SCR 867: (2023) 8 SCC 1; Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of
Maharashtra [2024] 4 SCR 270 : (2024) 6 SCC 591; Athar Parwez
v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 995 : [2024] 12 SCR 1093; Jalaluddin
Khan v. Union of India [2024] 8 SCR 633 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
1945; Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India [2021] 8 SCR 797 : (2022)
14 SCC 766; Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [2002]
1 SCR 7: (2002) 2 SCC 135 – referred to.
Tasleem Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine Del
3472 – referred to.
616 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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List of Acts
Constitution of India; Penal Code, 1860; Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967; Arms Act 1959; Prevention of Damage
to Public Property Act, 1984; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;
Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019.

List of Keywords
Art. 21 Constitutional Plea; Prolonged Incarceration; Scope of
Terrorist Act; Delhi Riots 2020; Chakka Jam Strategy; Larger
Conspiracy Narrative; Differentiated Role Attribution; Ideological
Drivers vs Local Facilitators; Pre-planned Criminal Conspiracy;
Mobilisation and Radicalisation; Protected Witness Statements;
Choking Essential Services; CCTV Dislocation and Neutralisation;
Doctrine of Parity in UAPA; Financial and Logistical Facilitation;
Procedural Stagnation; Communal Skirmish Intent; Non-Violent
Disavowal vs Private Preparation; Shaheen Bagh Protest Mode;
Triple Test for Bail; Bail; Enactment of the Citizenship Amendment
Act, 2019; Proposed NRC; Conspiracy; Widespread communal
violence; Harm to public order, social harmony and the nation
at large; Pendency of trial; Right to life and personal liberty;
Security of the society; Structured inquiry to be held by courts;
Judicial inquiry at bail stage; Expression “prima facie true”; Delay
simpliciter, if eclipses statutory regime enacted by Parliament to
address offences of a special category.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
11 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.09.2025 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No. 211 of 2022
With
Criminal Appeal No(s). 16, 12, 17, 13, 14, and 15 of 2026

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Siddharth Luthra, Kartik Murukutla, Salman Khurshid, Kapil Sibal,
C. U. Singh, Trideep Pais, Siddharth Aggarwal, Dr. Abhishek Manu
Singhvi, Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Advs., Farrukh Rasheed, Shivam
Sharma, Ms. Deeksha Dwivedi, Rahul Dev, Ms. Shifa, Gautam
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 617

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

Khazanchi, Vaibhav Dubey, Bilal Mansoor, Ms. Aishwarya Singh,
Ms. Pooja Deepak, Ms. Anshala Verma, Mansoor Ali, Shivansh
Sharma, Ms. Rubina Jawed, Ms. Saima Jawed, Bilal Anwar Khan,
Ms. Anshu Kapoor, Ms. Sidra Khan, Ms. Mariya Mansuri, Varun
Bhati, Ankit Singh, Shashank Singh, Ms. Sanya Kumar, Sahil Ghai,
N. Sai Vinod, Ms. Aparajita Jamwal, Nikhil Pahwa, Ms. Saloni
Ambastha, Ms. Sakshi Jain, Abhik Chimni, Ms. Bidya Mohanty,
Ms. Katyayani Suhrud, Abhishek Kalaiyarsan, Aekansh Agarwal,
Ms. Kanu Garg, Shri Singh, Faraz Maqbool, Kumar Vaibhaw,
Ms. Sana Juneja, Ms. A. Sahitya Veena, Ms. Deepshikha,
Ms. Arunima Nair, Vismita Diwan, Ms. Arshiya Ghosh, Sidhant
Saraswat, Ms. Somaya Gupta, Ms. Devina Sehgal, Ms. Chinmayi
Chatterjee, Ms. Swati Khanna, Sarim Naved, Harsh Bora,
Ms. Maulshree Pathak, Shahid Nadeem, Amit Bhandari, Muhammad
Ali Khan, Omar Hoda, Ms. Eesha Bakshi, Ms. Namrah Nasir, Uday
Bhatia, Siddharth Srivastava, Surya Kiran, Ms. Fauzia Shakil,
Talib Mustafa, Ahmad Ibrahim, Ms. Tasmiya Taleha, Ms. Alekhya
Shastry, Ms. Raksha Agrawal, Ms. Ayesha Zaidi, Abhishek Singh,
Kartik Venu, Jeet Chakrabarti, Sourav Verma.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Suryaprakash V. Raju, ASG, Mukesh Kumar Maroria.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Aravind Kumar, J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS*

1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 4
1.1. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE ............................ 5
1.2. CASE OF PROSECTION AS PROPOUNDED UNDER
FIR NO. 59 OF 2020 ........................................................... 6
1.3. CHARGESHEET: ............................................................... 8
2. CONSIDERATION OF PROLONGED INCARCERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PLEA UNDER ARTICLE 21. ............. 10
3. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 43D(5) AND THE
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY AT THE BAIL STAGE ........... 21

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
618 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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4. SCOPE OF “TERRORIST ACT” UNDER SECTION 15 AND
THE STATUTORY CONTEXT ..................................................... 26
5. INDUVIDUALISED ROLE AND DIFFERNTIATION IN TREATMENT
OF THE PRIME CONSPIRATORS WITH OTHERS. .................. 30
6. SHARJEEL IMAM – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) NO. 14030
OF 2025 ....................................................................................... 35
6.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: ............... 35
6.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ... 37
6.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: .................................. 41
6.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ................................... 42
6.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ....................... 43
7. UMAR KHALID – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14165 OF 2025: ... 54
7.1. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: ................. 54
7.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ........... 56
7.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: .................................. 59
7.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ................................... 60
7.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ....................... 61
8. SHIFA UR REHMAN – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14859 OF
2025 .............................................................................................. 76
8.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: ...... 76
8.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ... 78
8.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: .................................. 80
8.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT .................................... 82
8.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ....................... 82
9. SALEEM KHAN – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) NO.
15335/2025 ................................................................................... 87
9.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: ....... 87
9.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: .... 89
9.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: .................................. 92
9.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ................................... 94
9.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ....................... 95
10. MEERAN HAIDER – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) 14132 OF
2025 ............................................................................................. 100
10.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: ............. 100
10.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: .... 103
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 619

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

10.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ................................ 105
10.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ................................. 107
10.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ..................... 108
11. SHADAB AHMED - APPELLANT IN SLP(CRL.) NO.
17055/2025 .................................................................................. 113
11.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: ............ 113
11.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: .... 114
11.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ............................... 116
11.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ................................. 117
11.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ..................... 118
12. GULFISHA FATIMA – SLP (CRL.) NO. 13988/2025 .................. 123
12.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: .... 123
12.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT: ... 125
12.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: ................................ 127
12.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT: ................................. 128
12.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS: ..................... 129
13. FINAL CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS ........... 134
13.1. A C C U S E D I N R E S P E C T O F W H O M B A I L I S
DECLINED ........................................................................ 136
13.2. A C C U S E D I N R E S P E C T O F W H O M B A I L I S
GRANTED ........................................................................ 137
13.3. CONDITIONS GOVERNING RELEASE ON BAIL ......... 138
13.4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION ....................................... 140

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Heard. Leave Granted.
2. These appeals arise out of a common judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 184 of 2022 and
connected matters, by which the High Court affirmed the rejection
of bail applications filed by the appellants. The appellants stand
arraigned as accused in FIR No. 59 of 2020 registered by the Crime
Branch, Delhi, arising out of the incidents that occurred in several
parts of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (hereinafter referred
to as “Delhi Riots”) in February 2020.
620 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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3. At the inception, the appellants were booked under Sections 147,
148, 149 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Upon completion of
investigation, a charge-sheet came to be filed alleging offences under
Sections 120B read with Sections 109, 114, 124A, 147, 148, 149,
153A, 186, 201, 212, 295, 302, 307, 341, 353, 395, 420, 427, 435,
436, 452, 454, 468, 471 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as also
under Sections 13, 16, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, and Sections 3 and
4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.
4. The appellants before this Court are Sharjeel Imam [SLP (Crl.) No.
14030 of 2025], Umar Khalid [SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025], Shifa Ur
Rehman [SLP (Crl.) No. 14859 of 2025], Mohd. Saleem Khan [SLP
(Crl.) No. 15335 of 2025], Meeran Haider [SLP (Crl.) No. 14132 of
2025], Shadab Ahmed [SLP (Crl.) No. 17055 of 2025], and Gulfisha
Fatima [SLP (Crl.) No. 13988 of 2025].
5. The prosecution case, as placed before the Court, proceeds on the
footing that the incidents of violence were not isolated or spontaneous,
but were the outcome of a larger conspiracy in which several accused
persons are alleged to have participated at different stages and in
different capacities. While the FIR and the impugned judgment are
common, the role attributed to each appellant, the nature of the
allegations, and the material relied upon by the prosecution are not
uniform.
6. Before this Court, certain submissions have been advanced which are
common to all the appeals, particularly on the question of prolonged
incarceration and the plea founded on Article 21 of the Constitution.
At the same time, each appeal also raises issues which are specific
to the appellant concerned and which turn on the role attributed, the
prosecution material relied upon, and the findings recorded by the
courts below.
7. The judgment, therefore, first notices the broad factual background
of the case and the prosecution narrative as emerging from FIR
No. 59 of 2020 and the charge-sheets filed pursuant thereto. It
then considers the plea of prolonged incarceration and the statutory
framework governing the grant of bail under Section 43D (5) of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The scope of a “terrorist
act” under Section 15 of the Act is also examined, to the extent it
bears upon the submissions advanced.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 621

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

8. Thereafter, the appeals are taken up one by one. In each case, the
submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and the response
of the prosecution are noticed, followed by the findings of the Trial
Court and the High Court. The role attributed to the appellant is
then considered in the light of the statutory requirements and the
principles governing the grant of bail under the UAPA.
9. It is in this manner that the present batch of appeals falls for
consideration.

1.1. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
10. FIR No. 59 of 2020 is one of the FIR’s registered for the cause
of the riots that took place in Delhi NCR in the month of February
2020. The prosecution story reveals how the riots were allegedly
orchestrated and executed by the Appellants herein.
11. The prosecution case is founded on allegations of a pre-planned
criminal conspiracy involving several accused persons, including the
present appellants. It is alleged that the conspiracy was hatched with
the object of orchestrating riots in the National Capital Territory of
Delhi as a form of protest against the enactment of the Citizenship
Amendment Act, 2019 and the proposed National Register of Citizens.
12. According to the prosecution, the conspiracy culminated in the
deliberate incitement of widespread communal violence on and around
22nd, 23rd, and 24th February 2020. The acts allegedly committed
during this period were not spontaneous but were the outcome of
coordinated efforts to inflame tensions, mobilise crowds, and execute
violent actions across various parts of Delhi.
13. The riots are stated to have resulted in grave consequences,
including the loss of 54 lives, among them a senior police officer
and an Intelligence Bureau official, as well as grievous injuries to
several police personnel and civilians. In addition, extensive damage
was caused to over 1,500 public and private properties, alongside
substantial intangible harm to public order, social harmony, and the
nation at large.
14. Before proceeding to the further analysis of the matter, it would be
apposite to advert to the contents of First Information Report No.
59 of 2020 (hereinafter referred to as “the FIR”), as well as the
622 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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contents of the charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheets
filed by the Investigating Officer before the competent Court, which
are discussed in the succeeding section.

1.2. CASE OF PROSECTION AS PROPOUNDED UNDER FIR
No. 59 of 2020
15. First Information Report No. 59 of 2020 constitutes the genesis of
the present case and sets out the allegations of conspiracy attributed
to the appellants herein, which are stated to have culminated in the
riots that occurred on 23rd, 24th, and 25th February 2020. Before
proceeding further with the analysis, it is necessary to reproduce
the contents of the said FIR.
16. FIR 59 of 2020 was registered by the PS, Crime Branch New Delhi
on 06.03.2020. Sub-Inspector Shri. Arvind Kumar, posted with the
Crime Branch, Delhi claims to have received information from an
informant regarding the communal riots that occurred in Delhi on
23rd, 24th and 25th February 2020. According to the information
so received, the riots were allegedly the outcome of a pre-planned
conspiracy orchestrated by the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU
‘for short’) student Umar Khalid along with his associates, who were
stated to be affiliated with different organisations.
17. It is alleged that, as part of the said conspiracy, Umar Khalid delivered
provocative speeches calling upon people to come out on the streets
and block roads during the visit of the then President of the United
States of America, Mr. Donald Trump, on 24th and 25th February
2020. The alleged objective of such actions was to internationalise a
narrative that minorities in India were being ill-treated and tortured. It
is further alleged that women and children were deliberately mobilised
to come out on the streets in various localities of Delhi to escalate
tensions and precipitate communal violence.
18. The FIR further reveals that, in several areas including Maujpur,
Kardampuri, Jafrabad, Chand Bagh, Gokulpuri, Shiv Vihar and
adjoining localities, weapons and incendiary materials such as
firearms, petrol bombs, acid bottles, stones, slingshots and other
dangerous substances were allegedly stockpiled in homes in advance.
It is alleged that the task of mobilising people from different places
to participate in the riots was assigned to one Danish, resident of
Bhajanpura, Delhi. Specific reference is made to 23rd February
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 623

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

2020, when women and children allegedly blocked the road under
the Jafrabad Metro Station to create public disruption, and to the
pre-planned evacuation of children from minority schools in the
concerned areas.
19. On the basis of the aforesaid information, a daily diary entry bearing
DD No. 03 was made. Thereafter, an FIR was registered under
Sections 147, 148, 149 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Pursuant
to the directions of the senior officer, a copy of the FIR was forwarded
to the Police Station, Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, for investigation.
20. Subsequent to the registration of the FIR, the appellants herein
were apprehended on different dates in connection with FIR No. 59
of 2020. The dates on which the appellants were apprehended in
relation to the present FIR are set out hereunder:

SL. SLP. (Crl.) Name Of Appellant Date of Arrest
No. No.
1. 13988/2025 Gulfisha Fatima 11.04.2020
2. 14030/2025 Sharjeel Imam 28.01.2020
3. 14132/2025 Meeran Haider 01.04.2020
4. 14165/2025 Umar Khalid 01.10.2020
5. 14859/2025 Shifa Ur Rehman 26.04.2020
6. 15335/2025 Mohd Saleem Khan 25.06.2020
7. 17055/2025 Shadab Ahmed 20.05.2020

1.3. CHARGESHEET:
21. Upon registration of the FIR, the Crime Branch undertook investigation
and filed the main charge-sheet on 16.09.2020 against fifteen
accused persons, which included some of the appellants herein,
namely Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa Ur Rehman, Mohd.
Saleem Khan, and Shadab Ahmed. The main charge-sheet alleged
that the said accused persons were part of a larger conspiracy
which culminated in the riots that took place on 23rd, 24th, and
25th February 2020 in Delhi. It was alleged therein that the accused
had committed offences punishable under Sections 120B read with
Sections 109, 114, 124A, 147, 148, 149, 153A, 186, 201, 212, 295,
302, 307, 341, 353, 395, 420, 427, 435, 436, 452, 454, 468, 471,
and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under Sections 13, 16,
624 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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17, and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short,
“UAPA”), Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, and Sections 3 and 4
of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (for short,
“PDPP Act”). Upon filing of the main charge-sheet, the learned Trial
Court1 took cognizance of the offences against the accused named
therein. Thereafter, the State filed its first supplementary charge-
sheet on 22.11.2020, arraying three additional accused persons,
including the remaining two appellants herein, namely Umar Khalid
and Sharjeel Imam, and the Court, vide order dated 22.11.2020,
took cognizance of the offences against them as well. The State
subsequently filed three further supplementary charge-sheets on
23.02.2021, 02.03.2022, and 07.06.2023.
22. The charge-sheets filed by the State disclose the alleged role
attributed to each of the accused/appellants and the contours of the
larger conspiracy purportedly orchestrated by them, commencing from
the period immediately after the Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019
(for short, “CAB”) was passed by the Central Cabinet on 04.12.2019,
and culminating in the riots that occurred in various parts of Delhi and
the National Capital Region on 23rd, 24th, and 25th February 2020.
23. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to notice the principal
submission urged on behalf of all the appellants at the threshold.
The submission rests on the length of custody undergone and the
plea that continued incarceration, in the absence of early conclusion
of trial, offends the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of
the Constitution. It is this submission which the Court proposes to
examine first.

2. CONSIDERATION OF PROLONGED INCARCERATION AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PLEA UNDER ARTICLE 21.
24. During the course of arguments advanced before this Court, a
fervent plea was addressed on behalf of the appellants resting
on constitutional grounds. It was primarily urged that prolonged
incarceration, coupled with the absence of any realistic prospect of
early conclusion of trial, rendered continued detention constitutionally
impermissible and mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution is at peril.

1 Additional Sessions Judge -03, (Shahdara), Karkardooma Court, Delhi
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 625

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

At the outset, it was repeatedly stated that the appellants did not seek
an examination of the merits of the prosecution case, and that the
consideration ought to remain confined to the issue of delay alone.
25. It was submitted that the appellants had been in custody for a
substantial length of time; that the progress of trial had been slow;
and that the complexity of the prosecution rendered the likelihood
of its early conclusion uncertain. Reliance was placed on decisions
of this Court recognising that personal liberty cannot be sacrificed
at the altar of procedural stagnation, and that prolonged pre-
trial incarceration may, in appropriate cases, justify constitutional
intervention notwithstanding statutory restrictions on bail. These
submissions, though pressed individually, were broadly common in
substance.
26. As the hearing progressed, however, it became evident that the
plea of delay could not be examined in abstraction. In the course of
submissions and rejoinder, reference was necessarily made to the
nature of the allegations, the statutory framework invoked, and the
role attributed to individual appellants. This was not a departure from
the original submission, but a reflection of the legal reality that the
constitutional question of delay does not arise in a vacuum. To allay
the concern expressed that the appeals would be decided without
adequate delineation of governing principles, this Court considers
it appropriate to set out the framework within which the issues are
addressed.
27. Accordingly, before turning to the case of each appellant, it becomes
necessary to first address certain questions of general application.
These include the manner in which pleas founded on delay are to be
assessed in prosecutions under special statutes, the contours of the
statutory restraint embodied in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967, and the principles governing the formation of prima
facie satisfaction under Section 43D(5) of the Act. This exercise is
intended to provide the legal setting within which individual roles
and allegations are thereafter examined.
28. At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify the legal contours within
which the plea of delay operates in prosecutions under the UAPA.
Delay engages Article 21 at two distinct constitutional planes. First,
delay may be of such magnitude and character that continued
detention becomes per se unconstitutional, irrespective of the
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strength of the prosecution case. Second, delay may be pressed
as a circumstance to contend that the statutory satisfaction under
Section 43D(5) stands diluted or displaced. The present case, on an
examination of the record, does not meet either threshold. The inquiry
that follows is therefore confined to whether the delay alleged is of
such a nature as to constitutionally eclipse the statutory embargo,
and not whether delay exists in the abstract.
29. We may at the outset clarify the limited compass of the present
discussion. This Court is not engaged in any abstract comparison
between the Constitution and a statute, nor in declaring that delay
must invariably prevail over statutory restrictions, or that delay can
never warrant constitutional relief. The question is more precise:
in prosecutions under the UAPA, when delay and prolonged
incarceration are invoked as grounds for bail, what is the principled
approach by which a constitutional court is to examine such a plea.
30. Article 21 occupies a central place in the constitutional scheme. The
right to life and personal liberty, and the insistence that any deprivation
must conform to procedure established by law, are foundational
guarantees. The right to a speedy trial has been recognised as an
important facet of this guarantee. It follows that pre-trial incarceration
cannot, by the mere passage of time, be permitted to assume the
character of punishment.
31. At the same time, Article 21 has never been understood as operating
in isolation from law. The constitutional promise is not that liberty will
be unregulated, but that deprivations of liberty will not be arbitrary,
unconscionable, or unfair. The expression “procedure established by
law” reflects that balance. The UAPA, as a special statute enacted
to address offences alleged to affect the security of the State and
the stability of civic life, represents a legislative judgment as to the
conditions under which bail may be granted at the pre-trial stage.
Section 43D(5) of UAPA embodies the exercise of that judgment.
32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb 2, this Court recognised a
constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions
cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of personal liberty
illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence

2 (2021) 3 SCC 713
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 627

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

or conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts retain
the jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints.
The decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable
detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying down a
mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time becomes
determinative in every case arising under a special statute. The
jurisprudence of this Court does not support a construction whereby
delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by Parliament
to address offences of a special category.
34. The constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt. It is
an inquiry into whether continued detention remains constitutionally
permissible in the circumstances of the case. That inquiry is
necessarily contextual. Context includes the nature of the allegation,
the statutory field, the stage of the proceedings, the realistic trajectory
of the trial, the causes contributing to delay, and the risks attendant
upon release. Delay cannot be detached from these considerations
and treated as a solitary determinant.
35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether Article 21
is superior to Section 43D (5). The proper question is how Article 21
is to be applied where Parliament has expressly conditioned the grant
of bail in relation to offences alleged to implicate national security.
The law does not contemplate an either-or approach. Nor does it
contemplate an unstructured blending of statutory and constitutional
considerations. What is required is disciplined judicial scrutiny that
gives due regard to both.
36. The appellants have urged that their continued incarceration over
a prolonged period, coupled with the pace at which the trial has
progressed, warrants their enlargement on bail notwithstanding the
statutory embargo contained in Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Prolonged custody undoubtedly
implicates the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution, and such a plea cannot be rejected
on the basis of duration alone without a careful and fact-sensitive
examination. At the same time, the Court is required to examine
whether the narrative of delay, as projected, is borne out by the
record, and whether such delay is of a nature that constitutionally
displaces the statutory mandate.
628 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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37. The present prosecution arises out of FIR No. 59 of 2020 and involves
multiple accused persons, voluminous documentary and electronic
evidence, and allegations of a structured and continuing conspiracy.
The record reflects that compliance under Section 207 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was completed only on 05.08.2023, after which
the Trial Court directed that arguments on charge would commence
on a day-to-day basis from 11.09.2023 onwards. The nature of the
prosecution, the number of accused, and the breadth of material
necessarily render the proceedings complex and time-consuming.
The mere passage of time, therefore, cannot be viewed in isolation.
38. What assumes significance is that the procedural history and order
sheets do not support the assertion that the delay is attributable
to prosecutorial inaction or judicial inaction. The common counter
affidavit and the Trial Court’s orders record that, at various stages,
the prosecution expressed readiness to proceed, including readiness
to commence arguments on charge, while objections, requests for
deferment, and issues relating to sequencing of arguments were
raised on behalf of the accused. At the stage of compliance under
Section 207 CrPC itself, the Trial Court noted that despite repeated
directions, certain accused declined to receive copies of the charge-
sheet in the manner directed, insisted on alternate modes of supply,
or filed successive applications, necessitating further procedural
orders and contributing to delay at the pre-charge stage. These
aspects emerge from the record and are not matters of conjecture.
39. The plea of delay has also undergone judicial scrutiny in respect of a
co-accused arising out of the very same FIR. In Tasleem Ahmed v.
State (NCT of Delhi)3, the High Court of Delhi undertook a detailed
examination of the Trial Court order-sheets and, after tabulating the
procedural history, recorded categorical findings that the alleged
inordinate delay could not be attributed either to the prosecution or to
the Trial Court. The High Court noted repeated adjournments sought
on behalf of the accused, reluctance to commence arguments on
charge despite directions for day-to-day hearing and recorded the
Trial Court’s expression of distress at the inability to move forward
notwithstanding consensus schedules arrived at amongst the defence.
The High Court expressly rejected the contention that bail under
Section 43D (5) of the UAPA could be granted solely on the ground

3 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3472
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 629

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

of delay in such circumstances, holding that the statutory embargo
cannot be permitted to be circumvented by delay attributable, at
least in part, to the manner in which the defence conducted the
proceedings.
40. This Court is conscious that the appellants in the present appeal may
not stand on identical factual footing in all respects with the co-accused
whose appeal was considered by the High Court. Nevertheless, the
findings recorded therein are relevant insofar as they arise from the
same trial, the same order-sheets, and the same procedural milieu.
They negate the overarching portrayal that the appellants have
remained in custody solely on account of prosecutorial inertia or a
dormant trial.
41. At the same time, the Court does not proceed on the assumption
that the entire delay can be laid at the door of the accused, nor does
it characterise the proceedings as free from institutional or systemic
constraints. This is not a casual prosecution, nor one involving a
narrow factual canvas. The law has taken its course, albeit at a pace
dictated by the complexity of the case, the number of accused, and
the nature of issues raised. The constitutional concern arising from
prolonged custody is therefore acknowledged, but it does not, on
the present record, translate into a finding that continued detention
has become punitive or unconscionable solely by reason of delay.
42. The approach of addressing delay-related concerns through calibrated
judicial supervision, rather than automatic enlargement on bail,
stands reinforced by the decision of this Court in Union of India v.
Saleem Khan.4 In that case, despite the accused having remained
in custody for over five years and the trial not having commenced,
this Court declined to interfere with the rejection of bail qua one
accused, while upholding bail granted to another, thereby reiterating
that delay-based pleas must necessarily be adjudicated on an
accused-specific footing. Significantly, even while acknowledging the
constitutional imperative of a speedy trial, the Court did not eclipse
the statutory rigour under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA but instead
directed expeditious conclusion of the trial and cautioned against
any conduct on the part of the accused that may further protract the
proceedings. The decision thus affirms that prolonged custody, though

4 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1754
630 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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a matter of concern, does not operate as an automatic ground for
grant of bail where the statutory threshold continues to be attracted.
43. Viewed cumulatively, the record does not support the absolute
proposition that the appellants have remained “innocently incarcerated”
without any contribution to delay, nor does it disclose a situation
where the delay is so wholly unjustified as to override the statutory
embargo contained in Section 43D(5). The appropriate constitutional
response, at this stage, lies in ensuring vigilant oversight of the trial
and its expeditious progression, rather than in eclipsing the statutory
mandate governing bail in offences of the present nature. The plea of
delay in the facts of the particular case, therefore, does not warrant
enlargement on bail, though it justifies continued judicial emphasis
on the timely conduct of the proceedings.
44. It is in this sense that the plea of delay must first be examined to see
whether it arises in a manner that warrants constitutional scrutiny of
continued custody. Broadly stated, the Court must consider whether
the custody undergone is substantial, whether the proceedings
have made meaningful progress, and whether there exists a
realistic prospect of conclusion of trial within a reasonable period.
The Court must also take note of the causes contributing to delay,
including whether delay is attributable to the inherent complexity of
the prosecution or to the conduct of parties, including the accused.
45. A finding that these circumstances exist does not, by itself, compel
bail. It merely calls for the next level of constitutional consideration. At
that stage, the Court is required to examine whether, notwithstanding
delay, continued detention remains constitutionally justified having
regard to the statutory context and the facts of the case. This
examination is not a free-ranging balancing exercise; it is structured
by legally relevant considerations.
46. One such consideration is the gravity of the alleged offence in its
statutory setting. Under the UAPA, Parliament has legislatively
characterised certain conduct as implicating the security of the State
and the peace of society. That legislative characterisation does not
conclude the judicial inquiry, but it is not constitutionally irrelevant. It
forms part of the context in which the Article 21 claim is assessed.
47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the accused.
Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying degrees of
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 631

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

participation, ranging from peripheral acts to strategic, organisational,
or ideological centrality. The constitutional significance of prolonged
incarceration cannot be assessed uniformly for all accused regardless
of role. Where the attribution suggests a central or organising role in
the alleged design, the need for circumspection before constitutional
intervention displaces a statutory embargo is correspondingly greater.
Conversely, where the role is peripheral or episodic, prolonged
incarceration may more readily assume a punitive character.
48. Another consideration is the prima facie strength of the accusation at
the limited threshold contemplated by Section 43D(5). At this stage,
the Court does not weigh evidence, test defences, or conduct a mini
trial. Yet, the constitutional inquiry cannot proceed as if all allegations
are identically situated. Whether the prosecution material, taken at its
highest, discloses a prima facie nexus between the accused and the
statutory ingredients is a circumstance that informs the assessment
of continued detention.
49. Consideration must also be given to the integrity of the trial
process and the risks associated with release. Depending on the
nature of the case, these may include the possibility of influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence, or undermining the fairness
of the proceedings. In prosecutions alleging organised activity, the
assessment of such risks may differ from that in ordinary criminal
cases. This is not to presume guilt, but to recognise that bail decisions
are necessarily forward-looking in terms of ensuring an effective trial.
50. The Court must also bear in mind that it is not confined to a binary
choice between continued custody and unconditional release. Where
delay becomes a matter of constitutional concern, appropriate
directions for expeditious trial, prioritisation of witnesses, or periodic
review of progress may be issued. Such measures are constitutionally
significant responses that address the vice of delay while respecting
the statutory framework. The liberty to renew a prayer for bail upon
continued stagnation may also be preserved.
51. There is a further constitutional aspect that warrants articulation.
Article 21 protects individual liberty. It also, within the same guarantee
of life, reflects the State’s obligation to protect the life and security of
the community. In prosecutions alleging threats to public order and
national security, the Court cannot be unmindful that both dimensions
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are engaged. The constitutional order is not served by an approach
that treats liberty as the sole value and societal security as peripheral.
Both must be accommodated through reasoned adjudication.
52. The consequence of the above is that Najeeb(supra) must be
understood as a principled safeguard against unconscionable
detention. Prolonged incarceration is a matter of serious constitutional
concern and carries great weight. It is not, however, the sole
determinant. The Court must consider, in totality, whether continued
detention has become constitutionally unjustifiable, having regard
to the role attributed, the statutory context, the limited prima facie
material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes of delay, and the
availability of intermediate remedies.
53. This approach does not dilute Article 21. It gives Article 21 structured
content in a field where the Constitution itself recognises competing
interests. Nor does it render Section 43D(5) absolute. It recognises
that statutory restraint must yield in an appropriate case where
detention becomes punitive by reason of unreasonable and unjustified
delay. What it excludes is a mechanical override based on time alone,
divorced from legal context.
54. Having set out the above governing approach, this Court, in the later
part of this judgment would apply these principles in a calibrated
manner viz. to the claim of each of the appellants. The Court will
examine, in relation to each appellant, the role attributed and whether
the statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) is attracted on the
prosecution material taken at its highest. Thereafter, where the plea of
delay and prolonged incarceration is pressed, the Court will consider
whether the circumstances warrant constitutional intervention in terms
of the principles noticed above, or whether appropriate directions for
expeditious trial would adequately address the concern expressed
under Article 21.
55. It is in this disciplined manner, and in faithful regard to both statutory
design and constitutional principle, that the present appeals are
proposed to be adjudicated.
56. It therefore becomes necessary to state, with clarity, the governing
approach. In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the
sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate
as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 633

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The
outcome of such scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and
contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i)
the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role
attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy,
(iii) the strength of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited
threshold contemplated under the special statute, and (iv) the extent
to which continued incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of
the case, has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend
the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.
57. Thus, when the composite evaluation yields a clear conclusion
that continued detention has crossed the bounds of constitutional
permissibility that the Court may justifiably intervene notwithstanding
statutory restrictions.
58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab5, this Court expressly
cautioned against the mechanical invocation of prolonged
incarceration as a ground for bail in cases involving serious offences
under special enactments. The judgment reiterates that the gravity of
the offence, the legislative context, and the prima facie material on
record cannot be eclipsed merely because the trial has taken time.
59. This Court in CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato 6reiterated that while Article
21 remains paramount, it does not operate in a vacuum divorced
from competing constitutional interests. The Court emphasized that
claims to liberty must be examined in the totality of circumstances,
particularly where allegations implicate organised criminality or
matters of public interest. Delay, though undoubtedly significant,
was held not to assume the character of an absolute or solitary
determinant. The emphasis, once again, was on structured judicial
reasoning rather than on formulaic outcomes.
60. Read together, these decisions do not dilute the constitutional
guarantee of personal liberty; they explain the manner in which
it is to be applied. They do not support an approach of automatic
displacement of statutory restraint, but instead emphasise a contextual
and measured exercise of judicial scrutiny.

5 (2024) 6 SCC 1
6 2025 INSC 1418
634 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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61. To read Najeeb (supra) as mandating bail solely on account of
prolonged incarceration, irrespective of the statutory context or the
nature of the allegations, would be to attribute to the decision a
consequence it neither intended nor supports. Such a construction
would also lead to an interpretive absurdity, whereby a special statute
enacted by Parliament to address offences implicating the sovereignty,
integrity, and security of the State would stand effectively neutralised
by the mere passage of time, even at a pre-trial stage. Such an
outcome cannot be countenanced in constitutional adjudication.
Accordingly, the finding in Najeeb(supra) is properly situated as a
constitutional safeguard to be invoked in appropriate cases, and not
as a mathematical formula of universal application.
62. Before parting with the discussion on delay, it is clarified that
the observations herein are confined to the present stage of the
proceedings. The constitutional concern arising from prolonged
custody has been duly considered on the basis of the record as
it presently stands. In the event of continued and unexplained
stagnation of the trial, it shall remain open to the appellants to avail
such remedies as are permissible in law. The Trial Court is expected
to accord due priority to the matter and ensure that the proceedings
are carried forward with reasonable expedition.
63. The discussion thus far has been confined to the constitutional plea
founded on delay and prolonged incarceration. That inquiry, though
necessary, does not conclude the consideration of the present
appeals. The question that now arises is the manner in which the
prayer for bail is to be examined where the prosecution is governed
by a special statutory regime.

3. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 43D(5) AND THE
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY AT THE BAIL STAGE
64. The issues arising before this Court at the stage of consideration of
bail engage multiple facets of law, including the nature of the statutory
framework, the limits of judicial scrutiny at the pre-trial stage, and the
manner in which allegations under a special enactment are required
to be assessed. In order to address these aspects in a structured and
principled manner, it becomes necessary to examine the scheme of
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and in particular the
scope and content of Section 43D(5), which regulates the exercise of
judicial discretion in such matters. An understanding of this framework
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provides the necessary foundation for evaluating the material placed on
record and the role attributed to each accused in accordance with law.
65. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, is a special statute
enacted to address forms of criminal conduct which, by their very
nature, transcend ordinary breaches of penal law and implicate
the sovereignty, integrity, and security of the State. Parliament, in
framing the Act and in subsequently strengthening its provisions, has
proceeded on the legislative understanding that such offences are
rarely confined to isolated acts, but are more often the culmination of
organised, sustained, and conspiratorial activity unfolding over time.
66. The statutory scheme of the Act reflects this understanding. Chapters IV
and VI do not confine criminal liability to the final execution of a terrorist
act alone. They extend culpability to preparatory conduct, facilitation,
abetment, and conspiracy, recognising that the threat sought to be
addressed by the statute often materialises long before any overt act
of violence is committed. The law thus proceeds on a process-based
conception of criminality rather than an event-based one.
67. It is within this legislative backdrop that Section 43D(5) assumes
significance. The provision constitutes a conscious departure from
the general principles governing the grant of bail under the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Parliament has imposed a calibrated restriction on
the power of courts to grant bail in respect of offences under Chapters
IV and VI, reflecting its assessment that the ordinary presumption
in favour of pre-trial liberty requires modification where allegations
pertain to activities threatening the foundations of the State.
68. At the same time, Section 43D(5) does not exclude judicial scrutiny.
Nor does it mandate denial of bail by default. The restriction operates
only upon the Court being satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie
true. The provision thus preserves the judicial function, while carefully
defining its contours at the pre-trial stage.
69. This Court has, on several occasions, examined the scope and
application of Section 43D(5) in diverse factual settings. Decisions
such as National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali7, Vernon v. State of Maharashtra8, Shoma Kanti Sen v. State

7 (2019) 5 SCC 1
8 (2023) 8 SCC 1
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of Maharashtra9, Athar Parwez v. Union of India10, and Jalaluddin
Khan v. Union of India11 disclose a consistent judicial approach
to the provision, notwithstanding variations in factual context. The
present analysis seeks not to restate those authorities individually,
but to distil the governing principles that emerge from them and to
apply those principles in a structured and coherent manner.
70. The expression “prima facie true”, which lies at the heart of Section
43D(5), does not invite a detailed examination of evidence, nor does
it require the Court to assess the probability of conviction. Equally,
it does not reduce the judicial role to a mechanical acceptance of
the prosecution’s assertions. The statutory standard contemplates
a threshold inquiry of limited but real content.
71. At this stage, the Court is required to examine whether the material
relied upon by the prosecution, taken at face value and without
rebuttal, discloses the essential ingredients of the offences alleged
against the accused. The inquiry is one of statutory plausibility, not
evidentiary sufficiency. The Court tests the allegations against the
legal ingredients of the offence, not against possible defences or
competing factual narratives.
72. The discipline imposed by Section 43D(5) necessarily circumscribes
the nature of judicial scrutiny permissible at the bail stage. The
Court is not called upon to weigh the probative value of evidence,
to assess its admissibility, or to determine whether the prosecution
version will ultimately withstand trial. Any exercise approximating
a mini-trial at this stage would transgress the statutory boundary
deliberately drawn by Parliament.
73. Such premature adjudication is not merely procedurally inappropriate;
it carries institutional consequences. It risks prejudging issues
reserved for trial, distorting the adversarial process, and undermining
the legislative intent underlying the special bail regime. Section
43D(5) therefore demands judicial restraint, not judicial abstention,
at the pre-trial stage.
74. A salient feature of Section 43D(5) is its express reference to “such
person”. The statutory text mandates an inquiry that is accused-

9 (2021) 16 SCC 720
10 2024 SCC OnLine SC 124
11 2024 SCC OnLine SC 742
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specific rather than case-centric. The provision does not permit a
collective or undifferentiated approach to bail merely because multiple
accused are arraigned in the same prosecution or alleged conspiracy.
75. The Court is thus required to examine the role attributed to the
individual accused, as emerging from the prosecution material, and
to determine whether such attribution bears a prima facie nexus to
the offences under Chapters IV or VI. This inquiry does not involve
ranking degrees of culpability or pronouncing upon guilt. It serves
the limited purpose of determining whether the statutory threshold
is crossed qua the accused before the Court.
76. In cases alleging conspiratorial conduct, it becomes necessary to
distinguish between the existence of a conspiracy and the position
occupied by an accused within the alleged framework. While
conspiracy may supply the overarching context, Section 43D(5)
requires attention to the nature, extent, and character of participation
attributed to the individual.
77. At the threshold stage, the inquiry is directed towards whether the
prosecution material suggests conspiratorial centrality or merely
conspiratorial association. Conduct which, on the prosecution’s
own showing, reflects conceptualisation, direction, orchestration,
or mobilisation of unlawful activity or terrorist activity, stands on a
different footing from conduct alleged to be episodic, peripheral, or
substitutable. This distinction does not determine guilt; it informs
the statutory assessment of whether continued restraint on liberty
is justified at the pre-trial stage.
78. The cumulative effect of the statutory scheme and the jurisprudence
of this Court is that Section 43D(5) operates as a gatekeeping
provision. It requires the Court to undertake a focused, accused-
specific, and legally disciplined inquiry, confined to determining
whether the prosecution material, taken at its highest, satisfies the
statutory threshold of prima facie truth.
79. Any departure from this calibrated approach, whether by converting
the bail stage into a forum for adjudicating defences or by treating the
invocation of the statute as determinative of the outcome, would unsettle
the careful balance struck by Parliament. The provision demands
neither mechanical denial nor casual grant of bail, but a principled
application of the statutory standard within its clearly defined limits.
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80. From the foregoing discussion, certain propositions governing
the application of Section 43D(5) emerge with clarity. First, the
provision embodies a deliberate legislative departure from ordinary
bail jurisprudence, premised upon the distinctive nature of offences
under Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Second, the expression
“prima facie true” mandates a threshold judicial inquiry which is
neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory, requiring the Court to examine
whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses
the essential statutory ingredients of the alleged offence. Third,
the inquiry is necessarily accused-specific, directed to the role and
attribution qua the individual, and does not admit of collective or
undifferentiated treatment merely because allegations arise from
a common transaction or conspiracy. Fourth, the bail stage under
Section 43D(5) is not a forum for evaluating defences, weighing
evidence, or conducting a mini-trial; judicial restraint at this stage is
not an abdication of duty but a fulfilment of the statutory mandate.
These propositions, read together, define the contours of judicial
power and responsibility under the provision.
81. The correct application of Section 43D(5), therefore, requires the
Court to undertake a structured inquiry confined to the following:
i. whether the prosecution material, accepted as it stands,
discloses a prima facie case satisfying the statutory ingredients
of the offence alleged;
ii. whether the role attributed to the accused reflects a real and
meaningful nexus to the unlawful activity or terrorist activity
proscribed under the Act, as distinguished from mere association
or peripheral presence; and
iii. whether the statutory threshold is crossed qua the individual
accused, without embarking upon an assessment reserved
after full-fledged trial.
82. Where these requirements are met, the statutory restraint on the grant
of bail must operate with full force; where they are not, the embargo
stands lifted. This approach preserves the legislative purpose of
the Act, and ensures that the exceptional nature of the bail regime
under Section 43D(5) is neither diluted by overreach nor distorted
by mechanical application.
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Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

83. The discussion thus far has been directed to the manner in which
the statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) is to be applied at the
stage of bail. That inquiry sets out how the Court is to examine the
prayer for bail under a special enactment. The inquiry must now turn
to what the accusation is that is sought to be tested against that
threshold. This necessarily requires an examination of the statutory
meaning and scope of a “terrorist act” under the Act.

4. SCOPE OF “TERRORIST ACT” UNDER SECTION 15 AND
THE STATUTORY CONTEXT
84. During the course of arguments, a fervent and sustained debate
emerged not merely on the threshold under Section 43D(5), but
on a more foundational premise, namely, what the statute itself
comprehends as a “terrorist act” and, correspondingly, the legal
character of the allegations sought to be brought within Chapters
IV and VI of the Act. On behalf of the appellants, it was urged that
the prosecution narrative, even if taken at its highest, discloses at
best a situation of public disorder, and that the invocation of the
UAPA proceeds on an overstretched understanding of terrorism.
The prosecution, on the other hand, contended that the statutory
definition is not confined to conventional forms of violence, and
that Parliament has consciously employed a broader formulation to
capture conduct which threatens the unity, integrity, security, including
economic security, or sovereignty of India, and which disrupts civic
life in the manner contemplated by the Act. The submissions, in
substance, invited the Court either to proceed on assumed notions
of what constitutes terrorism, or to anchor its analysis firmly in the
legislative definition enacted by Parliament.
85. In this backdrop, and before proceeding to an accused-specific
evaluation of the material on record, it becomes necessary to
clarify the statutory meaning and setting of Section 15. The prima
facie satisfaction contemplated by Section 43D(5) is not a matter of
impression or gravity alone; it is a satisfaction referable to defined
statutory ingredients. Unless the legal contours of the offence alleged
are first identified, the subsequent assessment of individual role risks
proceeding without a clear statutory reference point, and may result in
either an unduly restrictive or an unduly expansive application of the
threshold. It is for this reason that the Court considers it appropriate
to briefly notice the scope of Section 15, and its inter-relationship with
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allied provisions, so that the analysis which follows proceeds on a
clear legal foundation and is thereafter applied, with the necessary
care and precision, to each appellant individually.
86. Section 15 of the Act defines what constitutes a “terrorist act” for
the purposes of the statute. The definition is structured around
two essential elements. First, the act must be done with intent to
threaten, or be likely to threaten, the unity, integrity, security, including
economic security, or sovereignty of India, or with intent to strike
terror in the people or any section thereof. Second, the act must be
of such a nature as to cause, or be likely to cause, the consequences
enumerated in the provision.
87. The means by which such acts may be committed are not confined
to the use of bombs, explosives, firearms, or other conventional
weapons alone. Parliament has consciously employed the expression
“by any other means of whatever nature”, which expression cannot
be rendered otiose. The statutory emphasis is thus not solely on the
instrumentality employed, but on the design, intent, and effect of the
act. To construe Section 15 as limited only to conventional modes
of violence would be to unduly narrow the provision, contrary to its
plain language.
88. The consequences contemplated under Section 15 further illuminate
the legislative understanding of terrorism. Apart from death or
destruction of property, the provision expressly encompasses
acts which disrupt supplies or services essential to the life of the
community, as well as acts which threaten the economic security
of the nation. This reflects Parliament’s recognition that threats to
sovereignty and security may arise through conduct that destabilises
civic life or societal functioning, even in the absence of immediate
physical violence.
89. The Act further recognises that such acts may be the result of collective
and coordinated effort. Section 18 makes punishable conspiracy,
attempt, abetment, advice, incitement, and knowing facilitation of a
terrorist act, as also acts preparatory to its commission. The statutory
scheme thus contemplates that terrorist activity may involve multiple
actors performing different roles towards a common unlawful objective.
90. Read together, Sections 15 and 18 disclose a legislative design
wherein Section 15 defines the nature of acts which Parliament has
characterised as terrorist acts, while Section 18 ensures that criminal
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liability is not confined only to the final execution, but extends to those
who contribute to the commission of such acts through planning,
coordination, mobilisation, or other forms of concerted action. Whether
particular conduct ultimately attracts Section 15 directly, or Section
18 read with Section 15, depends upon the role attributed and the
statutory ingredients alleged to be satisfied.
91. At the stage of consideration under Section 43D(5), the Court is
not required to finally classify the conduct or determine the precise
provision under which liability would ultimately arise. The inquiry is
confined to whether, on the prosecution material taken at face value,
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused’s conduct
bears a prima facie nexus to a terrorist act as defined under the
Act, whether as a direct participant or as a conspirator or facilitator.
92. In light of the foregoing discussion, the plea of delay stands addressed
at a general level. The consideration that follows is therefore confined
to the individual role attributed to each appellant and the prima
facie satisfaction recorded against them under Section 43D(5) of
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, without reopening the
issue of delay except to the extent it bears upon individual attribution.
93. The Court has thus traversed the submissions on prolonged
incarceration and the constitutional framework within which such
pleas are to be examined in prosecutions under a special statute.
The contours of the statutory restraint contained in Section 43D(5)
have been delineated, and the scope and meaning of a “terrorist
act” under Section 15 of the Act, read with the allied provisions,
have also been clarified.
94. The arguments before us made it evident that while certain submissions
were urged on common grounds, the ultimate determination cannot
rest on general propositions alone. The application of the law must
necessarily turn on the role attributed to each accused, the nature of
the material relied upon, and the manner in which the courts below
have appreciated the same.
95. It therefore becomes necessary to examine each appeal independently,
bearing in mind the statutory framework already discussed, and to
assess whether the threshold contemplated under Section 43D(5) is
attracted in the case of each appellant and, if so, whether the facts of
the individual appeal warrant any departure on constitutional grounds.
It is this exercise that the Court would now propose to undertake.
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5. INDUVIDUALISED ROLE AND DIFFERNTIATION IN
TREATMENT OF THE PRIME CONSPIRATORS WITH
OTHERS.
96. Before we proceed to individually analyse each of the role attributed
to each of the accused, we would like to reiterate the obvious but
very important distinction while considering the bail applications in
general and under special statutes like UAPA.
97. The record discloses that all the appellants do not stand on an equal
footing as regards culpability. The allegations against the principal
accused indicate a central and directive role in conceptualising,
planning, and coordinating the alleged terrorist act, whereas the
material against certain co-accused reflects conduct of a subsidiary
or facilitative nature. The hierarchy of participation, emerging from the
prosecution’s case itself, requires the Court to assess each application
individually, rather than proceed on the premise of equivalence.
Such differentiation is intrinsic to criminal adjudication and operates
irrespective of the uniformity of charges framed.
98. In the case of the alleged masterminds i.e., Sharjeel Imam and Umar
Khalid, the prosecution material comprises direct, corroborative,
and contemporaneous evidence, including recoveries, digital
communication trails, and statements indicative of managerial
responsibility. In contrast, the involvement of others is sought to
be established mainly through associative or peripheral conduct.
The Court cannot ignore that where evidentiary strength varies
materially between accused persons, the need for continued detention
likewise varies. Detention that remains necessary to secure ongoing
prosecutorial objectives for the principal offenders may not retain the
same necessity for those of limited attribution.
99. The alleged masterminds are stated to have exercised command
authority and to possess the ability to mobilise or influence individuals
within and outside their immediate circle. Such allegations, when
supported by preliminary material, compel heightened caution
regarding the possibility of interference with witnesses or reactivation
of dormant networks. As against this, co-accused with no independent
capacity to mobilise resources or exert organisational leverage do
not present the same systemic risk. The logic of detention cannot
be applied homogenously where the risk profiles of the accused are
markedly dissimilar.
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Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

100. The gravity of the alleged act is unquestionably serious however,
public interest and national security concerns may be engaged to a
materially different degree depending on the role of each accused.
The continued detention of those alleged to be the architects of
the conspiracy may be required to safeguard broader security
interests and deter future acts, whereas the rationale for continued
incarceration of minor participants is comparatively attenuated
once the investigative purpose is exhausted. The Court is therefore
justified in calibrating its approach, ensuring that the pursuit of
security does not eclipse the principle of proportionality.
101. It is well recognised that Article 21 rights, though not absolute,
require the State and the Court to justify continued custody with
reference to the specific individual before it. Treating all accused
identically irrespective of their roles would risk transforming pre-
trial detention into a punitive mechanism divorced from individual
circumstances. The constitutional mandate demands a differentiated
inquiry: where prolonged custody disproportionately burdens those
whose roles are limited, the balance between individual liberty and
collective security may call for conditional release, while the same
balance may tilt differently for those alleged to have orchestrated
the offence.
102. The statutory restrictions under special enactments do not preclude
the Court from recognising distinctions between accused persons
based on the quality of material, the nature of involvement, and
the necessity of further detention.
103. At this stage, the Court must be careful not to confuse two distinct
legal exercises. One is the determination of criminal liability, which
belongs to trial. The other is the regulation of personal liberty pending
trial, which is the limited concern of bail. The law of conspiracy
explains how several persons, acting at different levels and at
different points of time, may be bound together by a common design.
That doctrine answers the question of liability. It does not answer,
by itself, the separate question of how long and on what basis the
liberty of each individual may be restrained before guilt is proved.
Bail adjudication therefore necessarily proceeds on a different plane.
It requires the Court to look at what is attributed to each accused,
how that attribution fits within the statutory ingredients, and whether
continued detention, at that stage, serves a legitimate purpose
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recognised by law. This exercise does not dismantle the prosecution
case of conspiracy, nor does it rank culpability. It merely ensures
that pre-trial detention does not become indiscriminate or automatic,
and that statutory restraint operates with reason, proportion, and
fidelity to individual attribution. Seen thus, differentiation is not an
exception to conspiracy law, but a constitutional discipline imposed
upon the exercise of bail jurisdiction.
104. A cumulative and comparative reading of the FIR and the successive
charge-sheets discloses a discernible differentiation in the nature,
scope, and hierarchy of roles attributed to the accused persons.
The prosecution narrative itself delineates Umar Khalid and Sharjeel
Imam as occupying a position distinct from the remaining accused,
both in terms of conceptual involvement and command over the
alleged conspiracy.
105. At the outset, Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam are prima facie
attributed a central role and alleged to be ideological drivers of
the alleged conspiracy. The material relied upon against them
is predominantly in the nature of speeches, meetings, digital
communications, and alleged strategic deliberations, commencing
immediately after the passage of the CAB/CAA. The charge-
sheets attribute to them the role of formulating the protest strategy,
including the alleged transition from sit-in demonstrations to chakka
jams, selection of locations, and articulation of the broader political
objective sought to be advanced. Their alleged acts are thus
situated at the planning and preparatory stage, extending over a
prolonged period.
106. In contradistinction, the remaining accused namely Gulfisha Fatima,
Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, Shadab
Ahmad, Athar Khan, and others are consistently described as
local-level facilitators. Their alleged involvement is site-specific and
operational, confined to particular localities such as Seelampur,
Jafrabad, Chand Bagh, Jamia, and Shaheen Bagh. The allegations
against them relate primarily to on-ground mobilisation, logistical
coordination, funding at the local level, stockpiling of materials, and
execution of directions allegedly received from above, rather than
formulation of the overarching strategy.
107. The charge-sheets further reveal a vertical chain of command,
wherein conspiratorial - level decisions and strategic directions are
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alleged to have emanated from the top, while implementation was
carried out through intermediaries such as DPSG members, JCC
coordinators, and protest site organisers. This internal structuring of
the prosecution case itself negates any suggestion of homogeneous
or indivisible culpability among all accused. The distinction between
those alleged to have exercised centralised command and control
and those alleged to have acted as field-level operatives is repeatedly
emphasised through the attribution of roles, reliance on different
categories of evidence, and the geographical confinement of acts.
108. Even in the narrative concerning escalation into violence, the
role attributed to the remaining accused is largely proximate and
reactive, arising from developments at specific protest sites. Umar
Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, on the other hand, are alleged to have
operated remotely away from the sites of violence, with no direct
attribution of participation in acts of arson, assault, or destruction
of property. The prosecution case thus proceeds on the footing
that the former category of accused were involved in facilitating
execution, whereas the latter were involved in conceptualisation
and supervision.
109. This differentiation assumes critical legal significance. Once the
prosecution itself projects varying degrees of proximity, control, and
participation, the law mandates an individualised assessment of
culpability, particularly in the context of stringent penal provisions.
The alleged role of an accused at the level of ideological articulation
or protest coordination cannot, without a demonstrable and
proximate nexus to acts of violence, be equated with the role of
those alleged to have engaged in facilitation of riots or violent acts.
110. Accordingly, the material placed on record, when examined in its
entirety, establishes that Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam stand on
a qualitatively different footing from the remaining accused, both in
the prosecution narrative and in the evidentiary basis relied upon.
This structural distinction cannot be ignored and must inform any
judicial determination relating to culpability, parity, or the applicability
of penal provisions requiring a heightened threshold of intent and
participation. Having thus delineated the structural and evidentiary
differentiation emerging from the prosecution case itself, it becomes
necessary for the Court to examine the bail pleas in an accused-
specific manner. The exercise that follows is not one of adjudicating
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culpability, which lies exclusively within the domain of trial, but of
assessing whether the statutory threshold governing pre-trial liberty
is attracted qua each appellant. It is in this limited but essential
context that the Court now proceeds to consider the submissions
advanced on behalf of each accused individually, bearing in mind
the role attributed, the nature of material relied upon, and the stage
of the proceedings.

6. SHARJEEL IMAM – APPELLANT IN SLP (Crl.) NO. 14030
of 2025

6.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:
111. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant Sri Siddhartha Dave
submits that the appellant is a final year Ph.D. scholar of Jawaharlal
Nehru University, with an established academic background
including B.Tech and M.Tech degrees, Masters in Modern History
and Philosophy, and having cleared the National Eligibility Test. It
is urged that the appellant had no criminal antecedents whatsoever
prior to 2020, and that his involvement in the present set of cases
stems solely from speeches and protest-related activities undertaken
during the anti-CAA movement.
112. It is submitted that the present proceedings arise out of FIR No.
59 of 2020, pertaining to an alleged conspiracy relating to the
incidents in North-East Delhi in February 2020. The FIR was initially
registered under IPC provisions alone, and only subsequently were
offences under Chapters III, IV and VI of the UAPA, along with
serious IPC offences, added. It is pointed out that at the inception
of the FIR, only one individual was named, and the appellant was
not among them.
113. Learned Senior Counsel emphasized that, as a matter of record,
the appellant was not in Delhi after the second week of January
2020, and had already been taken into custody on 28 January 2020
in another case. Despite this admitted position, the appellant was
arrayed as an accused in the present FIR through a supplementary
charge sheet and was arrested on 25 August 2020, nearly six
months after registration of the FIR.
114. It is submitted that the prosecution case against the appellant in
the present FIR is founded entirely on material recovered in FIR
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No. 22 of 2020, namely four speeches delivered at different places,
the formation of a WhatsApp group titled “Muslim Students of JNU”,
alleged involvement in the Shaheen Bagh protest, and pamphlets
opposing the Citizenship Amendment Act. These very acts, it is
urged, already form the subject matter of a separate prosecution,
in which the appellant has been granted bail, and in respect of
which judicial findings exist that the speeches do not contain any
call for violence.
115. Learned Senior counsel submitted that even on the prosecution’s
own showing, there is no allegation against the appellant of having
participated in any meeting where violence was planned, of having
discussed use of arms, of any recovery of weapons or incriminating
material from him, or of his presence at any site of violence in
North-East Delhi. It is further submitted that there is no allegation
of any communication or connectivity between the appellant and
the other accused persons, including participation in WhatsApp
groups such as DPSG, Pinjra Tod or JCC.
116. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the
record demonstrates that the appellant repeatedly spoke against
violence as a means of protest, that he was already in custody
well before the incidents of February 2020, and that even the
prosecution witnesses do not place him at Shaheen Bagh or any
protest site after the first week of January. It is further pointed out
that the WhatsApp group “Muslim Students of JNU” is stated to have
become inoperative after mid-January 2020, and that the appellant
is not an accused in any FIR relating to the actual incidents of
rioting or violence.
117. Learned Senior Counsel submits that, in these circumstances, the
statutory threshold under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is not met. It is
urged that protest-related speech, pamphleteering, and mobilisation
for non-violent demonstrations, even if assumed to be politically
charged, do not by themselves disclose offences under Chapters
IV or VI of the UAPA, absent any proximate intent, preparation, or
nexus to violence as contemplated under Section 15 of the Act.
118. It is further submitted that the scale of the prosecution itself
demonstrates the oppressive nature of continued incarceration.
The prosecution has filed multiple charge sheets, the case involves
twenty accused persons, proposes to examine more than nine
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hundred witnesses, and relies upon voluminous documentary
material. The matter remains at the stage of arguments on charge,
and there is no proximate progression to trial in the conventional
sense.
119. Learned Senior Counsel then places reliance on the principle of
parity. It is pointed out that several co-accused in the same FIR,
including Natasha Narwal, Devangana Kalita, Asif Iqbal Tanha,
Safoora Zargar, Faizan Khan and Ishrat Jahan, have already been
granted bail, some on merits. It is submitted that challenges to
these bail orders have been dismissed by this Court, and it has
been clarified that co-accused are entitled to rely on parity.
120. It is urged that the appellant stands on a better footing than those
already on bail. Unlike them, the appellant is not alleged to have
been present in Delhi during the relevant period, not alleged to
be present near the sites of violence, not shown to be connected
with any of the co-accused through calls or messages, and not
alleged to have participated in any meeting where violence was
discussed. Even the solitary meeting attributed to him is stated, on
the prosecution’s own material, to have been confined to mobilisation
for chakka jam and not violence.
121. Learned Senior counsel therefore submits that continued
incarceration of the appellant, despite the absence of allegations
of violence-related conspiracy, lack of proximity to the incidents
in question, and parity with co-accused already on bail, cannot
be sustained either on the statutory framework of the UAPA or on
constitutional principles. It is urged that the impugned judgment
proceeds on an impermissible conflation of dissent and protest
with terrorist activity, warranting interference.

6.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
122. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju appearing for the Respondent submitted
that the appellant is not sought to be prosecuted merely for
participation in protests or expression of dissent, but for his distinct
and foundational role in the genesis, planning and execution of a
larger criminal conspiracy which ultimately culminated in widespread
violence in Delhi. It is urged that the prosecution material, as
analysed in detail by the High Court, clearly establishes that the
conspiracy did not originate in February 2020 as a spontaneous
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 649

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

reaction, but was set in motion in a calibrated and phased manner
from early December 2019 onwards, with the appellant being one
of its principal architects from the inception itself.
123. It is submitted that the appellant’s role is traceable to the first
phase of the conspiracy, which involved deliberate mobilisation,
radicalisation and preparation of ground conditions through
organised chakka jams, blockage of arterial roads, and disruption
of essential services. The High Court has noted that this phase
was not spontaneous, but involved prior planning, coordination
and dissemination of instructions, and that the appellant played a
central role in conceptualising and operationalising this strategy
through meetings, digital platforms and public speeches.
124. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the prosecution relies
upon contemporaneous electronic evidence, including WhatsApp
chats recovered from the appellant’s device, which demonstrate
that the appellant created and administered the WhatsApp group
“Muslim Students of JNU”. This group, as recorded by the High
Court, functioned as a coordinating mechanism for mobilisation,
identification of protest sites, dissemination of protest strategy and
synchronisation of chakka jams across locations. The appellant’s
leadership role in this group is corroborated by witness statements
and digital footprints forming part of the charge-sheet material.
125. It was further submitted that the appellant was involved in the
drafting, printing and circulation of pamphlets in early December
2019, which deliberately invoked communally sensitive themes
such as Babri Masjid, Kashmir and alleged existential threats to
the Muslim community. The High Court has relied upon statements
of the printer and other witnesses who have attributed authorship
and coordination of these pamphlets to the appellant. It is urged
that these pamphlets were not neutral political literature but were
designed to mobilise crowds through emotive and incendiary
narratives, thereby laying the foundation for mass unrest.
126. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the appellant’s speeches
form a crucial link in the chain of conspiracy. In particular, the High
Court has noted that in his speech at Jamia Millia Islamia on 13
December 2019, delivered shortly before violence erupted in the
area, the appellant articulated a strategy of choking Delhi through
organised chakka jams, including blocking roads and disrupting
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essential supplies such as water and milk. It is urged that the
speech reflects conscious awareness that such disruption would
inevitably escalate into violence, and that the appellant framed
such escalation as an acceptable and necessary consequence of
the agitation.
127. It was submitted that the appellant’s repeated assertion of opposing
violence cannot be examined in isolation. The High Court has
correctly observed that conspiracy is to be inferred from cumulative
conduct, and that a conspirator may outwardly disavow violence
while simultaneously engaging in acts designed to create conditions
where violence becomes unavoidable. The appellant’s conduct in
planning road blockades, paralysing public movement and provoking
confrontation with law enforcement must therefore be viewed
cumulatively and not in a compartmentalised manner.
128. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju further submitted that the appellant
attended and participated in conspiratorial meetings at Jangpura
and within the JNU ecosystem, where the strategy of chakka jam
and escalation of protests was discussed. The High Court has
relied upon witness statements, photographic material and call-
detail and location evidence to record the appellant’s presence
and participation in these meetings. It is urged that following these
meetings, further coordination groups were created, evidencing a
clear progression from planning to execution.
129. It was submitted that the appellant’s role was not geographically
confined to Delhi. Acting as a mobiliser and ideologue, the appellant
travelled to Aligarh and other locations to replicate and export
the protest model, aligning regional protests with the broader
Delhi-centric strategy. The High Court notes that this was done
in coordination with other conspirators, demonstrating that the
conspiracy was pan-regional in conception and execution, and not
localised or spontaneous.
130. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the appellant played a
decisive role in the creation and sustenance of the Shaheen Bagh
protest site, which evolved into a prolonged 24x7 blockade of a
major arterial road. The High Court records that the appellant issued
instructions, addressed gatherings, and consciously distinguished
between symbolic protest and disruptive blockade, opting for the
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Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

latter. It is urged that the sustained nature of the blockade evidences
intentional paralysis of civic life, squarely attracting the mischief
contemplated under Chapter IV of the UAPA.
131. It was submitted that the argument of the appellant’s absence from
Delhi during February 2020 does not exculpate him at the bail stage.
The High Court has correctly noted that the appellant’s role was
foundational and preparatory, and that liability for conspiracy does
not require physical presence at the scene of violence once the
plan has been set in motion. The riots, it is urged, were the logical
culmination of the earlier phases of mobilisation and disruption in
which the appellant played a central role.
132. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the statutory threshold
under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is clearly satisfied. When the
prosecution material is taken at face value, as mandated at the bail
stage, it discloses acts intended to threaten the unity, integrity and
security of the nation by paralysing the National Capital through
orchestrated disruption and violence. The High Court’s finding that
the appellant’s role is grave and foundational cannot be characterised
as speculative or perverse at this stage.
133. It was further submitted that the plea of parity is misconceived.
The High Court has distinguished the appellant’s role from that of
other accused who have been granted bail, noting that the appellant
stands apart as a planner, mobiliser and ideological driver whose
actions pre-date and shape the later stages of the conspiracy.
Parity cannot be invoked mechanically to neutralise a qualitatively
distinct and graver role.
134. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju finally submitted that the prosecution
material, taken cumulatively, satisfies the “prima facie true” test under
Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, and that this is not a fit case for grant
of bail. The State accordingly prays that the appeal be dismissed.

6.3. Findings of the Trial Court:
135. The Trial Court vide order dated 11.04.2022, passed in IA. No.
81/2021 in SC 163/2020 dismissed the bail application filed by the
Appellant. The Court held that the material on record disclosed
prima facie involvement of the appellant in a deep-rooted and well-
orchestrated criminal conspiracy relating to the North-East Delhi riots
of February 2020. On a cumulative reading of the charge-sheet,
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witness statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., WhatsApp
chats of coordinated groups, and other documentary and electronic
evidence, the Court found that the protests were not spontaneous
but were deliberately planned, escalated into chakka-jam, and
thereafter converted into targeted violence, including attacks on
police and destruction of public and private property. At the stage
of bail, the Court emphasized that it was sufficient if the prosecution
material, taken at face value, disclosed the appellant’s complicity in
the conspiracy, without a detailed appreciation of evidence.
136. A decisive ground for rejection of bail was the statutory embargo
under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967. Applying the principles laid down in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad
Shah Watali (supra), the Trial Court held that once there exist
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie
true, bail must be refused. The Court recorded that the prosecution
material satisfied this threshold, showing the appellant’s role in
initiating, shaping, and sustaining the conspiracy, and therefore the
bar under Section 43D(5) squarely applied. This embargo, read with
the seriousness of the offences alleged, disentitled the appellant
to the discretionary relief of bail.
137. The Trial Court also rejected the defence submissions that the
appellant’s acts were protected speech or mere calls for peaceful
protest. It held that speech, meetings, and mobilization efforts cannot
be examined in isolation, and must be assessed in the context of
the entire chain of events and the object of the conspiracy. The
prosecution case, at this stage, showed that calls for chakka-
jam were not benign but were strategically designed to create
confrontation, paralyse civic life, provoke law-and-order breakdown,
and culminate in communal violence, thereby attracting offences
under UAPA and the IPC. Issues relating to intent, interpretation
of speeches, admissibility of evidence, and alleged exaggeration
were held to be matters for trial, not bail.
138. Lastly, the Trial Court noted that the gravity of the offences, the
manner of execution of the conspiracy, the scale of violence, and
the societal impact weighed heavily against the grant of bail. It
reiterated that at the bail stage, the Trial Court is not required to test
the prosecution case for proof beyond reasonable doubt, but only to
see whether a prima facie case exists. Finding that the accusations
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 653

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

against the appellant were supported by substantial material and
that the statutory restrictions under UAPA were attracted, the Court
concluded that the appellant was not entitled to bail, and accordingly
dismissed the bail application.

6.4. Findings of the High Court:
139. The High Court in the impugned order held that the material on
record prima facie showed Sharjeel Imam as one of the principal
ideologues and early architects of the conspiracy, who allegedly
set the process of mobilisation in motion immediately after the
CAB/CAA developments. It was noted that he was attributed the
role of creating and administering WhatsApp groups, printing and
circulating large numbers of pamphlets with communal overtones,
and delivering speeches across multiple locations calling for
disruptive chakka-jaams and paralysing essential services. The High
Court found that these acts, when read together with subsequent
events, demonstrated planning, preparation, and incitement, and
that conspiracy liability does not depend on physical presence at
riot sites once foundational planning and instigation are prima facie
established.
140. Invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the High Court Court held
that the accusations against Sharjeel Imam crossed the threshold
of prima facie truth, thereby statutorily barring bail. The argument
that his conduct amounted at best to an offence under Section
13 UAPA, or that his speeches were protected expression, was
rejected at the bail stage. The High Court further held that his judicial
custody prior to the actual riots did not dilute his alleged role, since
the prosecution case was that the conspiracy had already been
conceptualised and operationalised by then. Pleas of parity, delay in
trial, and evidentiary weaknesses were found insufficient to override
the statutory embargo, resulting in dismissal of his bail appeal.

6.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
141. On 04.12.2019, immediately after the Cabinet Committee accorded
approval to the Citizenship Amendment Bill, 2019 (for short, “CAB”),
a WhatsApp group by the name Muslim Students of JNU (MSJ)
was created. The charge-sheet discloses that the formation of
the said group was the “brainchild” of accused Sharjeel Imam. It
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is further alleged that, in his chats with Arshad Warsi, a student
of Jamia Millia Islamia University (JMI), Sharjeel Imam indicated
that he was in contact with a radical communal group known as
Students of Jamia (SOJ). According to the charge-sheet, the said
group was engaged in distributing pamphlets in various mosques
in Delhi against the verdict of this Court in the Babri Masjid matter,
which pamphlets were allegedly aimed at mobilising students of
Jamia Millia Islamia University to participate in a protest proposed
to be held on 06.12.2019 at 4:30 p.m. at the Polytechnic Lawn,
JMI, against the introduction of the CAB.
142. The charge-sheet further reveals that on 06.12.2019, pamphlets
were distributed in the areas of Jama Masjid and Nizamuddin by
Sharjeel Imam along with members of SOJ, which, according to the
prosecution, allegedly contained content capable of creating fear
and insecurity among the Muslim community. The pamphlets also
carried a call to join a protest organised by United Against Hate
(UAH) on 07.12.2019 at Jantar Mantar. Chats exchanged between
Sharjeel Imam and Arshad Warsi allegedly indicate Sharjeel Imam’s
intention to participate in the Jantar Mantar protest and his plan
to mobilise students from Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) and
Delhi University (DU) with the assistance of MSJ. The chats of the
“Core Members of MSJ” further reveal that on 08.12.2019, Sharjeel
Imam was invited to a meeting organised by Yogendra Yadav at
the basement of premises bearing No. 6/6, Jangpura Extension,
Delhi. The said meeting was allegedly convened with the objective
of conspiring to incite a “Chakka Jam”, and Umar Khalid is stated
to have attended the said meeting. The charge-sheet further states
that on 10.12.2019, upon the CAB being passed by the Lok Sabha
and becoming law, members of MSJ burnt a copy of the Citizenship
Amendment Act (CAA) within the JNU campus. Another WhatsApp
group titled “CAB TEAM” was formed on 08.12.2019, and chats
exchanged therein allegedly disclose a conspiracy to organise
protests on 10.12.2019 at Jantar Mantar against the CAA. The said
protest allegedly drew significant attention and was attended by
several students, including Umar Khalid. On 10.12.2019, Nadeem
Khan (one of the top conspirators and a close associate of Umar
Khalid,who is also a mentor of Sharjeel Imam) directed Sharjeel
Imam to visit Aligarh Muslim University to mobilize the students
for the protest.
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Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

143. On 10.12.2019, Nadeem Khan, stated to be a close associate of
Umar Khalid and a mentor to Sharjeel Imam, allegedly directed
Sharjeel Imam to visit Aligarh Muslim University for mobilising
students for the protests. On 11.12.2019, Sharjeel Imam allegedly
reached Aligarh. As per the charge-sheet, on 12.12.2019, in
furtherance of the alleged common conspiracy, Asif Iqbal Tanha,
an accused in the case and a prominent member of the Student
Islamic Organisation of India (SIO), issued a call for a protest march
to Parliament from JMI against the CAA, scheduled for 13.12.2019.
Pursuant thereto, a new WhatsApp group titled Muslim Students of
JNU_1 was created at the behest of Sharjeel Imam. It is alleged that
on 13.12.2019, members of MSJ were directed by Sharjeel Imam
to reach Jamia Millia Islamia University, following which protests
took place at the said campus. Call Detail Record (CDR) analysis
is stated to reveal Sharjeel Imam’s presence at Jamia Millia Islamia
University on the said date.
144. On 13.12.2019, Sharjeel Imam is alleged to have distributed
pamphlets and delivered a provocative speech. The charge-sheet
reproduces certain portions of the speech, which, according to the
prosecution, instigated the gathering, and reads as follows:

“हमाारीी ख्वााहि�श और हमाारीी आरजूू यह हैै कीी दि�ल्लीी मेंं
चक्काा जााम होो ““यह तोो आज हुुआ हैै, यह चिं�ंगाारीी थीी इसमेंं
4000 लोोग-3000 लोोग थेे । अगर organised way मेंं होो,
और लोोग आएिं�गें ”े
“(देेश कीी रााजधाानीी हैै) जोो लोोग गुमरा
ु ाह कर रहेे हैंं, अरेे येे दि�ल्लीी हैै भााई । येे
flyover गि�र जराा, पूूरीी दुुनि�याा कोो खबर होोगीी । समझ रहेे हैंं नाा ?”

“यह चिं�ंगाारीी कहाा जााएगीी ?आग कैै सेे लगेेगीी ?”
“लेेकि�न goal क्याा हैै ?हमेंं चक्काा जााम करनाा चााहतेे हैंं ।
हि�ल्लीी केे मोोहल्लोो मेंं दूूध बंंद करनाा चााहतेे हैंं, पाानीी बंंद करनाा चााहतेे हैंं ।
खुुलकर बोोहलए याार (बि�लकुुल) ।”

145. The charge-sheet further alleges that riots occurred on 13.12.2019
at Jamia Gate No. 7, during which civilians and approximately 20
police personnel sustained injuries, public and private property
was damaged, and essential services were disrupted. FIR No.
296/2019 was registered in respect of the said incident. In relation
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to the speech delivered at Jamia Millia Islamia University, FIR
No. 22/2020 was also registered against Sharjeel Imam at Police
Station Crime Branch.
146. It is further alleged that on 15.12.2019, Sharjeel Imam convened
a meeting of the MSJ Core Committee at Teflas, a dhaba located
within the JNU campus, where further plans of action were
discussed. The charge-sheet alleges that Sharjeel Imam sought
to involve organisations such as the Popular Front of India (PFI),
Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), SIO, and other groups in furtherance
of the conspiracy. On the same date, violent protests allegedly
took place in Jamia Nagar and New Friends Colony, resulting in
injuries to 45 police personnel and 95 civilians. Two police booths
were allegedly burnt, three police motorcycles and one QRT Gypsy
were damaged, and three DTC buses along with eight private
buses were also damaged. CDR analysis is stated to show the
presence of Sharjeel Imam at the site of the protests. FIR No.
242/2019 was registered at Police Station New Friends Colony
and FIR No. 298/2019 at Police Station Jamia in relation thereto.
The charge-sheet further alleges that Sharjeel Imam, along with
members of SOJ, facilitated the establishment of a 24x7 protest
site at Shaheen Bagh, allegedly at his behest, despite opposition
from local residents. This is stated to mark the conclusion of the
first phase of the alleged conspiracy.
147. The second phase of the alleged conspiracy is stated to have
commenced on 02.01.2020, when Sharjeel Imam allegedly posted
content on his Facebook page advocating a “Chakka Jam”. On
09.01.2020, he is alleged to have conspired with Afreen Fatima
to organise a meeting at Teflas, JNU, on 10.01.2020, aimed at
mobilising crowds from JNU, Jamia, Old Delhi, and Seelampur to
establish protest sites similar to Shaheen Bagh. The stated objectives
of these protest sites were allegedly to enforce chakka jams and
engineer riots. On 13.01.2020, Nadeem Khan is alleged to have
sent Saiful Islam and Asif Iqbal Tanha to meet Sharjeel Imam at
Jamia Millia Islamia University. CDR analysis is stated to confirm
Sharjeel Imam’s presence at JMI at the relevant time. It is further
alleged that Sharjeel Imam facilitated Nadeem Khan in raising and
securing the Khureji protest site.
148. On 16.01.2020, Sharjeel Imam is alleged to have delivered another
provocative speech, portions of which have been extracted in the
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Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

charge-sheet, wherein he purportedly referred to blocking access
to the North-East and advocated organised action through chakka
jams.
“येे मैंं पहलेे भीी शाायद अर्जज कर चूूकाा हूँँ � केे 5 लााख लोोग हमाारेे पाास होो
organised तोो हम हिं�ंदुुस्ताान और नॉॉर्थथ ईस्ट कोो permanently
cut कर सकतेे हैंं,”
“असम कोो कााटनाा हमाारीी जि�म्मेेदाारीी हैै असम और
इंंडि�याा कााट कर अलग होो जाायेंं, तभीी येे हमाारीी बाात सुनेंु ंगे”े
अगर हमेंं असम कीी मदद करनीी हैै, तोो हमेंं असम काा
राास्ताा बंंद करनाा होोगाा, फ़ौौज केे हलए, समझ रहेे हैंं ? फ़ौौज
केे लि�ए और जीीतनेे भीी जोो भीी यहाा सेे सप्लााई जाा रहाा हैै
बंंद करोो और वोो बंंद कर सकतेे हैै क्योोहिं�ंक chicken neck
मुसु लमाानोो काा हैै, वोो जोो इलााकाा हैै वोो मुस्लि�िम
ु अकसररयत हैै”

149. The charge-sheet further alleges that Sharjeel Imam delivered similar
speeches at Asonal and Chakand on 22.01.2020 and 23.01.2020,
respectively, wherein he is stated to have provoked sections of
the Muslim population by inciting them to participate in disruptive
chakka jams.
150. According to the prosecution, these speeches, taken cumulatively,
led to the establishment of the Shaheen Bagh protest site, which
is alleged to be the first successful model of a “Chakka Jam”.
Thereafter, several such protest sites were allegedly created in parts
of North-East Delhi. In furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, riots
are stated to have occurred in North-East Delhi in the last week of
February 2020. The charge-sheet thus attributes responsibility to
Sharjeel Imam, Umar Khalid, and their associates for the protests and
consequential riots that occurred on 23rd, 24th, and 25th February
2020, resulting in loss of life and damage to public property.
151. The Court is conscious that the present appeal is argued at length on
the theme that the appellant is sought to be prosecuted for speeches
and protest mobilisation, and that continued incarceration, in the
teeth of delay and the scale of the trial, would be oppressive. At the
same time, the Court cannot lose sight of the limits of the bail stage
enquiry under a special statute. The task is neither to decide guilt
nor to pronounce upon the correctness of competing interpretations
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of evidence. The enquiry is confined to determining whether, on
the prosecution material as it stands and taken at face value,
there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations
against the appellant are prima facie true, thereby attracting the
statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967.
152. The appellant has urged, broadly, that he was not in Delhi after the
second week of January 2020, that he was already in custody from
28.01.2020 in another case, that he was not present at the sites of
the February 2020 riots, that no weapons were recovered from him,
that he did not participate in meetings where violence was planned,
and that the prosecution against him is substantially founded on
speeches, pamphlets and a WhatsApp group which, according to
him, are already the subject matter of a separate FIR wherein bail
has been granted with observations that the speeches do not contain
a call for violence. These submissions are supplemented by a plea
of parity with several co-accused who have been enlarged on bail.
153. The State, on the other hand, has consistently urged that the
appellant is not being prosecuted for dissent or protest as such, but
for a distinct and foundational role in what is alleged as a calibrated
conspiracy, which commenced in the first week of December 2019
and progressed through identifiable phases. The prosecution theory,
at least at this stage, does not treat the riots of February 2020 as a
sudden eruption. It treats them as the culmination of earlier phases
of mobilisation, blockade and disruption, in which the appellant is
alleged to have acted as an organiser and ideational driver.
154. In considering these rival positions, the Court must keep in view
two controlling principles already delineated earlier in the judgment.
First, the prosecution material must be read cumulatively, in its
total setting, and not in isolated fragments. Second, the Court does
not, at this stage, reject prosecution material by adopting defence
explanations or by testing reliability, admissibility or credibility as
though conducting a trial. Those aspects remain within the province
of final adjudication.
155. The role attributed to the appellant in the charge-sheet narrative is
not episodic. The prosecution seeks to place him at the inception
of a mobilisation strategy and traces a continuing course of conduct
from early December 2019 through January 2020. The charge-sheet
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Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

refers, inter alia, to the creation of the WhatsApp group “Muslim
Students of JNU” and its “core members”, to mobilisation through
pamphlets distributed in specific localities, to participation in meetings,
to the delivery of speeches at multiple places, and to efforts aimed
at establishing or sustaining blockade style protest sites.
156. The High Court’s individual role note also proceeds on the basis that
the appellant engineered the first phase of events from 13.12.2019
to 20.12.2019, and relies upon contemporaneous electronic records
in WhatsApp groups and chats as part of the material pointing
towards planning and mobilisation. The same note refers to chats
dated 07.12.2019 suggesting planning for mass mobilisation and
links that planning to the commencement of the first phase of
events on 13.12.2019.
157. At this stage, the Court is not called upon to finally pronounce on the
evidentiary worth of each digital artefact. Yet, where the prosecution
places reliance on contemporaneous electronic communications to
attribute a coordination and mobilisation role, the Court cannot treat
such material as irrelevant merely because the defence disputes
its ultimate probative value.
158. The appellant has attempted to frame the allegation as one
resting solely on speech. The record, at least as placed by the
prosecution, does not permit such reduction. The prosecution
case is of a chain comprising: (i) creation and administration of
mobilisation platforms; (ii) dissemination of written material intended
to galvanise participation; (iii) meetings and coordination; and (iv)
public exhortations articulating a strategy of disruption. At the bail
stage, the Court is concerned with whether this chain, taken at
face value, is coherent and whether it reflects a real nexus to the
offences alleged.
159. A significant part of the material relied upon relates to 13.12.2019
at Jamia Millia Islamia. The High Court records that the presence
of the appellant in Jamia Millia Islamia is reflected by CDR location
of his mobile number. It further records that the appellant organised
a “chakka jam” and that this chakka jam was differentiated from
a “dharna”, as reflected in the statement of a protected witness.
160. The statement of the protected witness under Section 164 Cr.P.C.,
as reproduced in the High Court note, attributes to Umar Khalid
the act of explaining the difference between “chakka jam” and
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“dharna”, and issuing directions to the appellant to start “chakka
jam” at Shaheen Bagh on a 24x7 basis, with an expressed intent
to commence similar activity in other areas at the “right time”.
This material, if accepted at face value as the bail stage requires,
supports the prosecution’s contention that the conduct alleged is
not ordinary protest, but a planned and differentiated method of
blockade and disruption.
161. The same note records, with reference to the main charge-sheet
pages, that the appellant’s speech of 13.12.2019 targeted Delhi
as the capital, used the illustration of a flyover collapse drawing
worldwide attention, and exhorted Jamia and JNU students to
execute disruptive chakka jam to such an extent that essential
services like milk and water would be paralysed or choked.
162. The defence has urged that the speech contains no direct incitement
to violence and is protected. That contention cannot be adjudicated
in the manner the defence invites at this stage. The statutory
enquiry is not whether the Court, after a full trial, would accept the
prosecution’s interpretation. The enquiry is whether the prosecution’s
reading is prima facie plausible on the face of the material and
whether, read cumulatively with the other links, it contributes to a
coherent narrative of planned disruption.
163. The Court is also mindful of the appellant’s reliance on the assertion
that he opposed violence. Such an assertion does not, at the
bail stage, neutralise an allegation of conspiracy and preparatory
orchestration. A conspirator may outwardly couch the conduct in
the language of non-violence while engaging in acts intended to
create conditions of confrontation and escalation. The prosecution
case is that sustained blockade, choking of essential supplies, and
deliberate paralysis of civic life are not benign political acts but
steps in a planned trajectory, which then culminated in violence.
164. The appellant’s absence from Delhi after the second week of January
2020 and his custody from 28.01.2020 are not ignored. However,
these facts do not conclude the matter in a prosecution founded on
conspiracy and preparatory roles. The prosecution case, as analysed
by the courts below, is that the appellant’s role is foundational,
operating at the stage of mobilisation, organisation and strategy,
and that physical presence at the scene of the final violence is not
a condition precedent for attributing conspiracy liability.
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Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

165. At the present stage, therefore, the absence argument cannot be
treated as exculpatory. It is a matter to be tested at trial in the light
of complete evidence. The bail stage enquiry cannot be converted
into a determination that once the appellant is not physically present
during the February riots, his earlier attributed role becomes legally
irrelevant.
166. The appellant has urged that the case against him is built entirely on
speech, pamphlets and protest related activity. The Court does not
accept that characterisation as complete. The prosecution material,
as presently placed, alleges a combination of organisational acts,
coordination through digital groups, meetings and differentiated
strategy of chakka jam and blockade.
167. Further, even within the speech related material, the prosecution
emphasis is not on ideological disagreement with the State or
on political criticism. The emphasis is on a proposed method of
paralysing civic life and choking essential supplies, articulated as
a deliberate strategy and linked to a wider mobilisation narrative.
Whether this ultimately crosses the final line from protected
expression to criminal conduct, and whether the prosecution’s
interpretation withstands trial scrutiny, are matters for final
adjudication. They cannot be conclusively decided at the bail stage
without trespassing into forbidden terrain.
168. It is necessary to record expressly that issues such as: (i) admissibility
of electronic material; (ii) compliance with procedural requirements;
(iii) reliability of witness statements; (iv) interpretative nuances of
speeches; and (v) whether any part of the prosecution case is
overstated, are all matters to be addressed at trial. At the stage of
Section 43D(5), the Court proceeds on the material as it stands.
169. When the structured inquiry delineated earlier in the judgment is
applied to the appellant, the following features assume significance.
First, the prosecution material, taken at face value, does not depict
the appellant as an accidental or peripheral participant. It depicts
him as a coordinator and mobiliser at the inception and in the first
phase. Second, there is specific material placing him at Jamia on
13.12.2019 through CDR location. Third, there is a protected witness
statement relied upon by the prosecution, attributing directions to
the appellant to commence a differentiated chakka jam at Shaheen
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Bagh on a 24x7 basis, with a plan to expand to other areas at the
right time. Fo urth, the prosecution relies on the appellant’s speech
exhorting disruptive chakka jam and choking of essential services.
170. Taken cumulatively, these elements reflect a role attribution which
is not of mere association, presence, or protest participation. The
allegation is of deliberate mobilisation, planned blockade strategy,
and intentional disruption of civic life. On the prosecution’s case,
such conduct is relied upon as having a direct nexus to the
unlawful activity alleged under the Act, whether as preparatory
acts, facilitation, or conspiracy.
171. Once the prosecution material, taken as it stands, crosses that
threshold, the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) operates
with full force. The Court cannot then enlarge the appellant on
bail by proceeding as though the statutory restraint were a matter
of discretionary balancing. The statutory design, as already noted
earlier in the judgment, requires the Court to refuse bail where
there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
is prima facie true.
172. The plea of parity, though pressed with emphasis, cannot override the
statutory conclusion. Parity is not applied by numerical comparison.
It is applied by similarity of role, similarity of attribution, and similarity
of the material relied upon. The courts below have treated the
appellant’s role as qualitatively distinct, and the material noticed
above indicates why the prosecution alleges a foundational role at
the early stage. In such circumstances, parity cannot be invoked
mechanically to dilute the statutory embargo.
173. The plea of delay has already been addressed at a general level
in the earlier portion of the judgment. In the appellant’s case, the
Court remains mindful of the scale of the trial. Yet, once the prima
facie threshold is crossed, the appropriate judicial response is to
ensure prioritisation and expedition, not to grant bail in disregard of
the statutory mandate. The remedy for stagnation lies in calibrated
judicial supervision and directions for expeditious progress, not
enlargement on bail where the embargo is attracted.
174. The Court accordingly finds that the prosecution material, read
cumulatively and taken at face value, discloses reasonable grounds
for believing that the accusations against the appellant are prima
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 663

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

facie true. The material relied upon is not confined to abstract
ideology. It comprises digital coordination, attribution of planning and
mobilisation, presence supported by location records, a protected
witness statement describing differentiated chakka jam strategy,
and speech material exhorting disruption and choking of essential
services.
175. In view of this prima facie satisfaction, the statutory embargo under
Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
stands attracted. The Court is therefore left with no lawful option
but to decline the prayer for bail.
176. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal preferred by Sharjeel Imam
arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025 is dismissed. The prayer
for bail is rejected.
177. It is clarified that the observations herein are confined to the present
stage of consideration under Section 43D(5) of the Act and shall
not be construed as an expression on the merits at trial. The Trial
Court shall accord due priority to the matter and ensure that the
proceedings are carried forward with reasonable expedition.

7. UMAR KHALID – APPELLANT IN SLP (Crl.) 14165 of 2025:

7.1. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:
178. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Kapil Sibal, appearing on behalf of
the appellant, Umar Khalid, submitted that the prosecution record
does not attribute any overt act of violence to the appellant in
relation to the incidents that occurred in North-East Delhi between
22.02.2020 and 25.02.2020. It was pointed out that, as borne out
from the charge-sheet itself, the appellant was not present in North-
East Delhi during the period when violence ensued and, on certain
crucial dates, was not even in Delhi. No witness statement places
the appellant at the site of any rioting, arson, assault, or destruction
of public or private property during the relevant period, nor is any
FIR relied upon to attribute such acts to him.
179. It was further submitted that no recoveries whatsoever have been
effected from the appellant or at his instance. The record does not
disclose recovery of any weapons, arms, ammunition, explosives,
inflammable substances, funds, or other incriminating articles. No
physical, forensic, or electronic evidence connects the appellant
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with any violent act. Despite registration of a large number of FIRs
in connection with the riots, the prosecution has not relied upon any
recovery or witness statement from those FIRs to link the appellant
with actual violence. Apart from the present FIR, the appellant was
arraigned in only one other FIR arising from the same period, in
which he was granted bail and subsequently discharged.
180. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the prosecution alleges
criminal conspiracy primarily on the basis of the appellant’s alleged
participation in meetings and protests and his alleged association
with certain WhatsApp groups. It was pointed out that the appellant
neither created nor administered the WhatsApp groups relied upon
by the prosecution and was not a member of some of the principal
groups alleged to have been used for coordination. The record
indicates that the appellant did not send any message calling for
violence, arson, or unlawful acts. The messages attributed to him are
confined to sharing location pins of protest sites on dates when no
violence occurred and to communications relating to a call received
from a police official. No material on record demonstrates that any
decision to commit violence was taken, conveyed, or implemented
at the instance of the appellant through such groups.
181. It was further submitted that the prosecution relies upon the alleged
presence of the appellant at various meetings and protests held
between December 2019 and February 2020. For several such
meetings, no supporting witness is cited; for others, the statements
relied upon are hearsay in nature or contradicted by the appellant’s
call detail records. Photographs relied upon by the prosecution show
the presence of several persons who have not been arraigned as
accused. The record does not disclose any material to show that
these meetings involved planning, preparation, or execution of
violence or that the appellant exercised any command, control, or
direction over participants.
182. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the only overt act specifically
attributed to the appellant is a public speech delivered by him at
Amravati on 17.02.2020. The transcript of the speech, as placed
on record, contains repeated references to non-violence, civil
disobedience, non-cooperation, constitutional methods of protest,
and Gandhian principles. The speech does not exhort violence,
destruction of property, or unlawful action. The prosecution record
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 665

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

does not disclose any material establishing a proximate or causal
nexus between the said speech and the incidents of violence that
occurred in Delhi several days later.
183. It was lastly submitted that, on facts, the prosecution seeks to invoke
Sections 15, 16 and 18 of the UAPA by treating the appellant’s
speech, meeting participation, and protest activity as constituting a
“terrorist act”, without alleging use of bombs, explosives, firearms,
hazardous substances, or any other lethal means enumerated in
Section 15. The record reflects that the prosecution relies solely on
the residual expression “by any other means of whatever nature”
to bring the appellant’s acts within the definition of a terrorist act.
No factual material is placed on record to show that the appellant
caused, attempted to cause, or intended to cause death, injuries,
destruction of property, or disruption of essential services by any
violent or hazardous means. Apart from speech, association, and
alleged presence, no factual act is attributed to the appellant to
demonstrate commission of offences under Chapter IV of the UAPA.

7.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:
184. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju appearing for the respondent submitted
that the prosecution case, read as a whole, discloses the active
and central role of the appellant, Umar Khalid, in a larger criminal
conspiracy which culminated in widespread violence, disruption
of essential services, and communal riots in North-East Delhi. It
was contended that the case against the appellant does not rest
on isolated incidents or stray speeches, but on a continuous and
coordinated course of conduct beginning from December 2019,
involving meetings, organisational planning, mobilisation, and
execution of a strategy of “chakka jam” distinct from peaceful protest,
with the deliberate object of escalating tensions and paralysing
the city.
185. It was submitted that the appellant was not a peripheral participant
but an ideologue and organiser who conceptualised and propagated
the strategy of “chakka jam”, differentiating it from a conventional
dharna. Reliance was placed on statements of protected witnesses
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., electronic records, photographs,
and call detail records, which prima facie show that the appellant
directed and guided co-accused persons including Sharjeel
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Imam, Asif Iqbal Tanha and Saiful Islam. The State submitted that
meetings held at Jangpura, Jamia, Shaheen Bagh, Indian Social
Institute, Gandhi Peace Foundation and Seelampur demonstrate
sustained involvement of the appellant in planning and coordination,
including the creation of protest committees, WhatsApp groups,
and mobilisation teams operating across multiple locations in Delhi.
186. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju further submitted that the appellant’s role
extended beyond ideological advocacy to operational coordination.
The prosecution relies upon evidence indicating that protest sites
were deliberately expanded, made permanent on a 24x7 basis, and
strategically located at arterial roads and sensitive areas. It was
contended that WhatsApp groups such as DPSG, JCC, and Jamia
Awareness Campaign Team were used to disseminate instructions,
coordinate sites, and ensure uniform execution of decisions taken
at higher levels. The appellant, it was submitted, was a member of,
and exercised influence over, these groups, with witnesses stating
that decisions were taken at his instance and subsequently ratified
by ground-level organisers.
187. The State submitted that the appellant’s presence at Jamia on
13.12.2019 and 15.12.2019 coincided with incidents of violence
resulting in injuries to police personnel and civilians and damage
to public and private property. Call detail records were relied
upon to establish his presence in the area at relevant times. It
was contended that witness statements attribute to the appellant
directions to initiate chakka jam at Jamia Gate No. 7 and Shaheen
Bagh, and to expand such activity to other Muslim-dominated areas.
The prosecution further relies upon meetings at Shaheen Bagh and
Seelampur where, according to protected witnesses, instructions
were issued to mobilise women, stockpile materials such as stones,
bottles, acids and chilli powder, and prepare for escalation at an
opportune moment.
188. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the appellant’s speech
delivered at Amravati on 17.02.2020 forms part of this larger factual
matrix. The State contended that the speech cannot be viewed
in isolation, but must be read in conjunction with prior meetings,
subsequent coordination, and the timing of events. It was urged
that the speech, delivered without requisite permission, called
for nationwide disruption, invocation of civil disobedience, and
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 667

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

collective defiance, which, when coupled with the contemporaneous
conspiracy and subsequent violence, prima facie establishes
intentional incitement and preparation. The State submitted that the
speech reinforced the operational strategy already put in motion.
189. It was further submitted that the offences invoked under Sections
15, 16 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act are
attracted not merely by use of weapons or explosives, but also by
acts intended to threaten the unity, integrity, security and economic
stability of the nation, including by disruption of essential services
and creation of widespread fear. The prosecution contended that
the deliberate blocking of roads, mobilisation at sensitive sites,
coordination across districts, and incitement to escalate protests
into violent confrontation constitute, at the prima facie stage, acts
falling within the expansive definition of a terrorist act under Section
15, particularly when read with the expression “by any other means
of whatever nature”.
190. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju lastly submitted that the appellant’s role
cannot be assessed in isolation from the collective conduct of the
conspiracy. It was urged that absence of direct recovery or individual
acts of violence is not determinative at this stage, as conspiracy
by its very nature operates through division of roles. The State
contended that the prosecution material, when taken cumulatively
and at face value, discloses reasonable grounds for believing that
the accusations against the appellant are prima facie true, and that
the statutory bar under Section 43D(5) stands attracted.

7.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
191. The Trial Court vide order dated 28.05.2024, rejected the second
bail application (IA No. Bail Application Registration No. 441/2024
in SC No. 163/2020) filed by the appellant primarily on the ground
that no genuine change in circumstances had been shown since the
rejection of the first bail application vide order dated: 24.03.2022,
I.A. No. 92/2021 in SC No. 163/2020. Although the appellant
asserted change in circumstances, the Court noted that none were
specifically pleaded or substantiated. Withdrawal of the SLP before
the Supreme Court on the ground of “change in circumstances”
did not, by itself, create a fresh cause for reconsideration of bail,
especially when earlier findings had attained finality.
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192. The plea of delay in trial and prolonged incarceration was also
rejected. The Court found that there was no delay attributable to the
prosecution rather, proceedings were held up due to objections and
applications moved by the accused persons themselves. Relying
on recent Supreme Court precedent, the Court held that in cases
under the UAPA, delay alone cannot justify grant of bail considering
the gravity of the offences and the restrictive statutory framework.
193. The Court further held that reliance on Vernon v. State of
Maharashtra did not advance the appellant’s case. It observed
that the judgment did not dilute the embargo under Section 43D(5)
UAPA and that the Delhi High Court, while dismissing the earlier
appeal, had already carried out the required “surface analysis” of
the probative value of evidence and concluded that the accusations
against the appellant were prima facie true. Subsequent Supreme
Court judgments had reaffirmed the law laid down in Watali and
Gurvinder Singh.
194. Finally, the Court held that it was bound by the concurrent findings
of the Trial Court and the Delhi High Court rejecting bail, which
had attained finality after withdrawal of proceedings before the
Supreme Court. The plea of parity with co-accused was rejected,
as the appellant’s role had already been independently examined
and distinguished. In view of the statutory bar under Section 43D(5)
UAPA and the prima facie findings on record, the Court found no
merit in the application and dismissed it.

7.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
195. The Court held that the prosecution material, taken cumulatively,
disclosed prima facie involvement of Umar Khalid as a key
conspirator and mobiliser in the larger conspiracy that culminated in
the February 2020 Delhi riots. It was noted that he allegedly played
a central role in conceptualising and directing mass mobilisation
against the CAA/NRC through coordinated meetings, formation and
control of multiple WhatsApp groups (including JCC and DPSG),
and delivery of speeches at various locations. The Court found
that the prosecution narrative attributed to him a leadership role
in escalating protests into disruptive chakka-jaams and, thereafter,
into violence, including alleged directions to intensify agitation
during strategically sensitive periods. At the bail stage, the Court
emphasised that conspiracy must be assessed holistically and not
by isolating individual acts or speeches.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 669

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

196. Applying the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA,
the Court held that there were reasonable grounds for believing that
the accusations against Umar Khalid were prima facie true, thereby
barring the grant of bail. The pleas of protected speech, absence
from riot sites, lack of recoveries, parity with co-accused, change
in circumstances, and prolonged incarceration were rejected. The
Court clarified that the bail orders granted to other co-accused
were expressly directed by the Supreme Court not to operate as
precedents and that Umar Khalid’s alleged role was qualitatively
graver. Issues relating to credibility of witnesses, admissibility of
evidence, and interpretation of speeches were held to be matters
for trial, leading to dismissal of the bail appeal.

7.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
197. Umar Khalid is described in the FIR as the principal conspirator
behind the larger conspiracy which, according to the prosecution,
culminated in the riots during the last week of February 2020. The
charge-sheet alleges that Umar Khalid progressed from being a
propagator of the slogan “Bharat Tere Tukde Honge, Insha Allah
Insha Allah” to playing a central role in the formulation and execution
of the present criminal conspiracy, which is alleged to constitute
a terrorist act. The first overt act attributed to Umar Khalid, as per
the charge-sheet, is stated to have occurred on 05.12.2019, when,
acting on his directions, Sharjeel Imam created the WhatsApp
group Muslim Students of JNU (MSJ). It is further alleged that
Umar Khalid participated in the protest held on 07.12.2019 at
Jantar Mantar, where he, along with Yogendra Yadav and Sharjeel
Imam, purportedly agreed to utilise social media as a platform for
large-scale indoctrination and mobilisation of youth for the purpose
of enforcing a “Chakka Jam” as a mode of protest against the
Citizenship Amendment Act.
198. On 08.12.2019, Umar Khalid is alleged to have attended a meeting
held at premises bearing No. 6/6, Jangpura Extension, Delhi.
The said meeting, which was led by Yogendra Yadav, is stated
in the charge-sheet to have resulted in a decision to further the
alleged conspiracy of enforcing “Chakka Jams” with the objective
of engineering riots. The charge-sheet is stated to contain a
photograph of the meeting attended by Umar Khalid on 08.12.2019
at the aforesaid premises. After the conclusion of the meeting, a
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WhatsApp group titled “CAB Team” was allegedly created for the
purpose of organising anti-CAA protests and for mass mobilisation
of the Muslim community. In furtherance of the discussions held in
the said group, a protest is stated to have taken place on 10.12.2019
at Jantar Mantar, Delhi, which was also attended by Umar Khalid.
199. On 13.12.2019, in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, Sharjeel
Imam is stated to have been introduced by Umar Khalid to students
of Jamia Millia Islamia University. It is further alleged that Umar
Khalid stated that he had explained to Sharjeel Imam the distinction
between a dharna and a chakka jam, and that, at the relevant point
of time, they were planning to enforce chakka jams across Delhi
with the stated objective of overthrowing the Government, which,
according to the prosecution, was described by them as a “Hindu
Government” acting against the Muslim community. Umar Khalid is
further alleged to have directed Sharjeel Imam, Saif-ul-Islam, and
Asif Iqbal Tanha to initiate a chakka jam at Gate No. 7 of Jamia
Millia Islamia University and to have instructed Sharjeel Imam to
commence a chakka jam at Shaheen Bagh.
200. On 15.12.2019, Umar Khalid is alleged to have visited Jamia Millia
Islamia University in furtherance of the common conspiracy. At Jamia,
he is stated to have instigated a gathering of local students, which
allegedly culminated in rioting. Thereafter, Sharjeel Imam, acting on
the directions of Umar Khalid, is alleged to have moved to Shaheen
Bagh and blocked Road No. 13 at Shaheen Bagh. On 16.12.2019,
Umar Khalid is further alleged to have directed Asif Iqbal Tanha and
Saif-ul-Islam to constitute a student body for organising anti-CAA/
NRC protests at Jamia in a planned and organised manner. On
17.12.2019, in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy and on the
directions of Umar Khalid, students of Jamia Millia Islamia University,
including other appellants herein, namely Shifa-ur-Rehman and
Meeran Haider, are stated to have gathered at Gate No. 7 of the
University. On further directions of Umar Khalid and Nadeem Khan,
the Jamia Coordination Committee (JCC) is alleged to have been
formed by Asif Iqbal Tanha and Saiful Islam. The charge-sheet
describes the JCC as the brainchild of Umar Khalid and Nadeem
Khan, allegedly created to mobilise a larger number of students for
the protests. On 19.12.2019, a protest march organised by “Hum
Bharat Ke Log” (Swaraj Abhiyan and United Against Hate) from
the Red Fort to Shaheed Park, ITO, and a separate protest march
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 671

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

organised by Left parties at Mandi House, allegedly took place.
Despite denial of permission and imposition of prohibitory orders
under Section 144 CrPC in the area, Umar Khalid, Yogendra Yadav,
and others are stated to have participated in the protest march and
were detained along with 293 other persons.
201. On 20.12.2019, Saif-ul-Islam and Asif Iqbal Tanha are alleged to
have constituted another committee, namely the Jamia Awareness
Campaign Team (JACT), on the directions of Umar Khalid, with the
stated objective of maximising mobilisation of the Muslim population
in Muslim-dominated areas of Delhi for establishing 24×7 protest
sites aimed at enforcing “Chakka Jams”. As per the statements of
protected witnesses, Umar Khalid, along with Nadeem Khan, is
alleged to have directed one Amanullah to visit Muslim-dominated
localities and mobilise residents for the protests, while also
encouraging greater participation of women and children, with the
purported intent that the presence of women and children would deter
the police from dismantling the protest sites. It is further alleged that
on 26.12.2019, a meeting was held at the Indian Social Institute,
Lodhi Colony, which was attended by Umar Khalid and others, in
continuation of the alleged conspiracy. Subsequently, on 28.12.2019,
another WhatsApp group titled Delhi Protest Support Group (DPSG)
was created for the purpose of disseminating decisions taken by its
members among organisers of various protest sites for execution
of the alleged conspiracy. Umar Khalid is stated to have been a
member of the said group.
202. On 02.01.2020, a meeting was convened by the administrator of
the DPSG, namely Rahul Roy, at the Gandhi Peace Foundation,
which was attended by Umar Khalid. As per the charge-sheet, it
was reiterated in the said meeting that more protest sites, similar
to Shaheen Bagh, be established, with women and children placed
at the forefront so as to avoid police action. On 08.01.2020, Khalid
Saifi, associated with DPSG and United Against Hate (UAH), is
alleged to have organised a meeting at the office of the Popular
Front of India (PFI) at Shaheen Bagh, which was attended by Umar
Khalid and Tahir Hussain. The charge-sheet relies upon chats dated
20.01.2020 and 21.01.2020 exchanged in the DPSG group, which
are stated to have led to the creation of three 24×7 sitting protest
sites, with Umar Khalid and Nadeem Khan allegedly exercising
control over the said sites. On 23.01.2020 and 24.01.2020, in
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furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, Umar Khalid is stated to have
visited the Seelampur protest site and addressed the gathering
assembled there. Thereafter, he is alleged to have held a clandestine
meeting with Natasha Narwal, Devangana Kalita, Tasleem, and
others, during which, according to the prosecution, Umar Khalid
instigated local women of Seelampur to stockpile knives, bottles,
acid, stones, chilli powder, and other dangerous articles with the
intent to engineer riots. Statements of protected witnesses have
been relied upon in the charge-sheet in respect of the meeting
allegedly held on 23.01.2020.
203. The charge-sheet further alleges that Umar Khalid attended a
meeting organised by the Welfare Party of India (WPI) at Jantar
Mantar, Delhi, on 10.02.2019. In the said meeting, Umar Khalid
is alleged to have instructed residents of Jahangirpuri to instigate
illegal Bangladeshi residents of the area to participate in the activities
forming part of the alleged conspiracy.
204. On 17.02.2020, Umar Khalid is alleged, as per the charge-sheet,
to have delivered a provocative speech at Amaravati, Maharashtra.
It is stated that although he was not among the persons permitted
to address the gathering, he nevertheless made a speech. In the
said speech, he is alleged to have exhorted people to take to the
streets and to demonstrate, during the visit of the then President of
the United States of America, Donald Trump, what was portrayed
as the ill-treatment of minorities by the Government of India.
205. The charge-sheet further alleges that on 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020,
acting upon the speeches of Umar Khalid and in accordance with
the directions issued by him and other alleged executors of the
conspiracy, protesters under the guise of women-led 24×7 sit-in
protests near Madina Masjid, Seelampur, moved and occupied
the 66 Foot Road near Jafrabad Metro Station, thereby completely
blocking traffic, constituting a “Chakka Jam”. Thereafter, in pursuance
of and in furtherance of the common conspiracy, on 23.02.2020,
protesters from other protest sites in North-East Delhi and other
parts of the city are alleged to have moved from their respective
sites to pre-decided points on major roads and blocked, or attempted
to block, traffic entirely, thereby enforcing coordinated chakka
jams. The charge-sheet states that these blockade points were
strategically selected so as to effect a simultaneous and coordinated
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Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

traffic paralysis across large parts of the city. According to the
prosecution, the intent behind these blockades “was not to create
traffic chaos but to ensure communal skirmish, as is evident from
the movement from predominantly minority clusters, where 24×7
sit-in dharnas were being held, to areas of mixed population for
causing the chakka jam.”
206. On 23.02.2020, it is alleged in the charge-sheet that protesters from
various sites moved in a coordinated manner to pre-designated
locations to block traffic across the city. In furtherance of the common
conspiracy, and subsequent to the enforcement of the chakka jams,
the conspirators are alleged to have launched attacks on police
personnel and non-Muslims, and to have caused extensive damage
to government and private property through arson, vandalism,
and other violent acts, thereby engineering large-scale riots. The
charge-sheet alleges that firearms, petrol bombs, acid, sharp-edged
weapons, iron rods, sticks, stones hurled through pre-fabricated
large-sized slingshots, and other means were employed to attack
and kill police personnel, government employees, and members of
the public. It is further alleged that a petrol pump was set ablaze
in an attempt to cause a large-scale explosion, which could have
resulted in mass casualties and created widespread terror. Access
to essential services, including hospitals, medical stores, the Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), other public transport systems,
schools, colleges, and universities, is stated to have been severely
disrupted, leading to the postponement of board examinations and
deprivation of essential supplies to the general public.
207. The charge-sheet further states that on 24.02.2020, disillusioned
by the scale and magnitude of the violence unleashed by the key
conspirators, certain members of the DPSG WhatsApp group
threatened to expose all those responsible for the riots. According
to the prosecution, several telephonic conversations took place
between Umar Khalid and Nadeem Khan during this period. Among
these, reliance is placed on a call between Jahanvi Mittal and
Tabrez, wherein Jahanvi Mittal is alleged to have warned Tabrez
who had allegedly arranged the presence of approximately 300
women protesters to maintain silence regarding the transportation of
women from Jahangirpuri to Seelampur–Jafrabad and their alleged
participation in the riots on the previous day. The cumulative effect of
these communications, as per the charge-sheet, is stated to indicate
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that the conspirators, having panicked due to the conduct of certain
members of their group, decided to adopt what is described as an
“ultimate guerrilla strategy” of attributing the violence and resultant
carnage to law enforcement agencies.
208. The charge-sheet ultimately attributes the orchestration of the
protests and the resultant riots to Umar Khalid, describing him as
the principal architect of the events that unfolded.
209. The appellant presses, in substance, three propositions: first, that
no overt act of violence is attributed to him and no recoveries have
been effected; second, that his alleged presence in meetings,
association with groups, and a speech at Amravati cannot be
transmuted into offences under Chapters IV and VI of the UAPA;
and third, that the prosecution case is an impermissible conflation
of protest with terrorism. These submissions are framed with care.
Yet they must be tested against the only inquiry open to this Court
at this stage: whether the prosecution material, taken as it stands
and read cumulatively, furnishes reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusations against the appellant are prima facie true,
thereby attracting the statutory restraint under Section 43D(5).
210. Two foundational clarifications are necessary. One, the Court is
not assessing whether the prosecution will ultimately succeed; it
is assessing whether the prosecution case, as presented, crosses
the statutory threshold at the bail stage. Two, conspiracy cases,
particularly those alleged to unfold in phases, do not disclose
themselves through a single piece of evidence; they are built through
a chain of circumstances, organisational decisions, communications,
and role allocation. The law does not demand that every conspirator
execute the terminal act; it demands a prima facie nexus between the
accused and the unlawful design, inferred from cumulative conduct.
211. The prosecution narrative, as pleaded, is not episodic. It is
architectural. It asserts a phased progression: mobilisation and
indoctrination; institutionalisation through committees and digital
platforms; expansion of protest sites into permanent blockades;
preparation for escalation; and culmination in coordinated chakka
jams and widespread violence. The role attributed to Umar Khalid
is not of a late entrant nor of a peripheral sympathiser. It is that of
an organiser and coordinator who, according to the prosecution,
supplied the “method”, the “timing”, and the “linkage” between
dispersed sites and actors.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 675

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

212. The factual record placed by the prosecution repeatedly returns to
a distinction that is central to the case: the differentiation between
a conventional dharna and a chakka jam. This is not treated as
semantics. It is treated as strategy. A dharna may be expressive;
a chakka jam, as alleged, is disruptive by design. The prosecution
case is that the sustained choking of arterial roads, replication of
blockade sites, and the movement of crowds from minority clusters
into mixed-population areas were not accidental expressions
of dissent, but calibrated acts meant to generate confrontation,
overwhelm law enforcement, and create conditions for violence.
213. It is in this backdrop that the material regarding 13.12.2019 at Jamia
is relied upon. The prosecution relies upon a protected witness
statement that the appellant explained the distinction between
dharna and chakka jam, projected certain co-accused as his “team”,
and issued directions for initiation of chakka jam at Gate No. 7 of
Jamia and at Shaheen Bagh, with an express reference to expansion
“at the right time”. At this stage, the Court does not test whether the
witness is truthful; it tests whether, if the statement is taken at face
value, it links the appellant to the alleged design in a meaningful
manner. It does. It is not a statement of mere association; it is a
statement of direction and role allocation.
214. The appellant urges that he was not present at riot sites in the
critical period. That submission, even if assumed correct, does
not answer the prosecution case, because the prosecution does
not pitch him as an executor of the terminal violence; it pitches
him as a person involved in shaping the method and seeding the
strategy earlier. In a phased conspiracy, physical absence at the final
scene is not the end of the inquiry; it may, at best, shift the inquiry
upstream, to see whether the accused is linked to the preparatory
and coordinating stages.
215. The appellant emphasises lack of recoveries, absence of weapons,
and absence of forensic linkage. In ordinary IPC bail jurisprudence,
these factors often have weight. Under a special statute alleging a
wider conspiracy with distributed roles, these factors cannot be made
decisive. A conspiracy organiser may leave no recoveries because
the organisers do not carry the instruments that the executors use.
If recoveries were treated as a universal requirement, conspiracy
cases would be structurally immunised at the bail stage for those
who organise rather than execute. The statute does not contemplate
such a result.
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216. The law does not require the prosecution to demonstrate, at the bail
stage, that the accused personally caused death or destruction, or
personally stocked explosives, before Section 43D(5) can apply. It
requires the Court to see whether the material discloses a prima
facie case of involvement in the unlawful activity alleged. Here, the
prosecution material is pressed to show that the appellant’s role
is traced through meetings, committees, instructions, coordination
mechanisms, and alleged preparation for escalation. If that chain
is prima facie visible, the absence of recoveries does not break it.
217. The appellant’s submissions treat meetings as innocuous, and
committees as routine protest organisation. The prosecution case
treats them as the infrastructure of the conspiracy. The Court must
therefore ask: does the material suggest continuity of role across
time, rather than episodic presence? The charge-sheet material, as
summarised in the accused-wise narrative already set out, places
the appellant at repeated decision points: the Jangpura meeting of
08.12.2019; the Jamia phase of mid-December; the formation and
functioning of JCC/JACT as mobilisation structures; the creation and
operation of DPSG as a dissemination mechanism; the meetings at
ISI, Gandhi Peace Foundation and Shaheen Bagh; and the January
Seelampur phase alleged to involve preparation for escalation.
218. At this stage, the Court does not decide whether each meeting
was conspiratorial. But where multiple meetings across weeks and
months are alleged, and where witness material and electronic
records are pressed to place the same accused at several of these
junctures, the Court is entitled to view continuity itself as a relevant
circumstance. Continuity is the difference between a participant and
an organiser in the prosecution narrative.
219. The appellant says he did not create certain WhatsApp groups.
That may be ultimately matter of trial. At the bail stage, it is not
determinative. The prosecution does not allege that guilt arises from
creating a group; it alleges that groups functioned as coordination
platforms through which decisions taken at higher level were
transmitted to multiple sites for execution. Membership, participation,
and the alleged influence exercised through or around such platforms
is what the prosecution presses.
220. The record, as placed, indicates that the appellant is shown as a
member of DPSG and that protected witness material speaks to
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 677

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

the coordinating character of such groups. Whether the appellant
sent incriminating messages is not the only relevant factor. In a
coordination structure, some speak, others steer. A conspirator’s
role may be inferred from where he is placed in the architecture,
not only from what he typed in a chat window.
221. The appellant places heavy reliance on the Amravati speech, urging
that it repeatedly invokes non-violence and constitutional protest.
The prosecution urges that the speech forms part of a larger
matrix of mobilisation and was delivered in temporal proximity to
the culminating phase. At this stage, the Court must resist from
committing two errors. The first is to criminalise speech merely
because it is politically charged. The second is to immunise a
continuing course of conduct merely because it contains language
of non-violence.
222. In conspiracy jurisprudence, outward disavowal and inward design
may co-exist; public caution does not necessarily negate private
preparation. That is why the law insists on cumulative assessment.
The speech, in isolation, cannot decide the case. Equally, the speech
cannot be extracted from the timeline and used as a complete
answer to allegations of meetings, directions, and preparatory acts
alleged over months. The Court therefore treats the speech as one
circumstance in a chain, to be evaluated with other material, not
as a standalone verdict of innocence or guilt.
223. The prosecution case places emphasis on “timing” and “trigger”. It
alleges that sustained blockades were designed to mature into a
coordinated paralysis across the city, and that the Jafrabad blockade
and movement to strategic points occurred on 22–23 February in
a synchronised manner. It further alleges that the escalation into
violence was not incidental but contemplated. The appellant’s
absence from the riot scene therefore does not end the inquiry; the
inquiry shifts to whether the prosecution material prima facie links
him to the strategy that was executed when the “right time” arrived.
224. At this stage, the charge-sheet narrative and the protected witness
statements relied upon are pressed to show that the appellant was
engaged at earlier phases in shaping the method and expanding
the sites, and that preparatory discussions in January included
alleged directions for stockpiling and readiness for escalation. The
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Court cannot pronounce on their truth. It can, however, record that
such material, if accepted as the prosecution places it, links the
appellant to the alleged design and the timing of its culmination.
225. The appellant urges that continued incarceration is oppressive.
This Court has already addressed delay as a constitutional concern
and has indicated that the remedy for stagnation lies in judicial
supervision and expedition, not automatic enlargement on bail. In
the case of the present appellant, the record also discloses that
his earlier bail rejection has been subjected to judicial scrutiny
and has not been displaced by any subsequent event affecting
the prosecution’s core attribution. When a statute imposes a
high threshold and the case is conspiracy-centric, repeated bail
reconsideration on the same material is not the norm. A meaningful
change in circumstances must be shown. Save delay, which has
been addressed separately, none is shown.
226. Delay can warrant a more searching constitutional scrutiny. But it
does not authorise the Court to dilute the statutory threshold by
undertaking credibility findings. The balance must be maintained:
constitutional concern is real, but statutory restraint is equally real.
Where the prima facie threshold continues to be crossed, delay
is met through expeditious trial directions and continued judicial
monitoring, not by negating Section 43D(5).
227. It is necessary, at this juncture, to clarify the juridical distinction
between ordinary public disorder, which may arise even in the
course of legitimate protest, and the prosecution’s pleaded case
of systemic disruption. Not every disruption of traffic, not every
blockade, and not every law-and-order incident engages the statutory
framework of the UAPA. The statute is attracted only where the
conduct alleged, taken cumulatively, is capable of being understood
as threatening the unity, integrity, security, or sovereignty of the
nation, or as creating a climate of fear and paralysis transcending
ordinary disorder.
228. The prosecution case, as placed before this Court, does not proceed
on the footing that the protests merely inconvenienced commuters
or strained policing resources. It proceeds on the footing that a
deliberate method of agitation was conceived and executed, namely
sustained and replicated “chakka jams” at strategically selected
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 679

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

arterial locations, with the object of choking movement across the
National Capital, disrupting essential services, and overwhelming
the administrative capacity of the State.
229. The factual narrative placed on record repeatedly emphasises that
the blockade points were not randomly selected. The prosecution
alleges that they were deliberately located so as to (i) cut off major
transit routes, (ii) bring protest activity from minority-dominated
clusters into areas of mixed population, and (iii) ensure that
disruption was not localised but city-wide. The pleaded movement
of protesters from established sit-in sites to pre-designated choke
points across North-East Delhi on 22nd and 23rd February 2020
is pressed as evidence of this systemic design.
230. At the bail stage, the Court does not pronounce on whether this
design is ultimately proved. It asks whether the prosecution material,
taken at face value, supports the allegation that the disruption
was not episodic, but coordinated, sustained, and scalable. When
viewed through that lens, the allegations of meetings, directions,
replication of protest sites, and synchronised movement across
locations assume a significance distinct from ordinary protest activity.
231. The Court is therefore unable, at this stage, to accept the
characterisation of the events as mere public disorder incidental
to protest. The prosecution case, as pleaded, is that the blockade
strategy itself was the instrument of coercion, designed to paralyse
civic life and generate confrontation. That distinction is material at
the stage of applying Section 43D(5).
232. A further dimension of the prosecution case concerns communal
harmony, which lies at the heart of public order in a plural society.
The prosecution does not merely allege that violence occurred in
areas of mixed population. It alleges that the movement of protest
activity into such areas was itself deliberate, with the intent to trigger
confrontation and skirmish.
233. The factual narrative already set out records the prosecution’s
assertion that protesters moved from predominantly minority clusters,
where 24×7 sit-in protests were being held, into mixed-population
areas at pre-selected times and locations. This movement is
alleged to have been accompanied by stockpiling of potentially
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harmful materials, as per protected witness statements, and by
preparations to escalate confrontation when police intervention or
counter-mobilisation occurred.
234. At the bail stage, the Court cannot test whether the protected
witness statements regarding stockpiling or inducement of local
residents will ultimately withstand scrutiny. What the Court can do
is to examine whether, if those statements are accepted as they
stand, they support an allegation that the agitation was not confined
to symbolic protest, but contemplated engineered confrontation
along communal fault lines.
235. The prosecution case, taken cumulatively, pleads precisely this: that
the blockade strategy was designed not merely to inconvenience,
but to provoke, to polarise, and to create a breakdown of communal
peace. Where such an allegation is supported, at least prima facie,
by statements, chronology, and alleged coordination, the Court
cannot trivialise it as an inevitable by-product of protest.
236. It is this pleaded design to fracture communal harmony, rather than
the expression of dissent per se, which distinguishes the prosecution
case from a narrative of innocent protest. Whether that design is
ultimately proved is a matter for trial. Its prima facie articulation is
sufficient to inform the bail-stage inquiry.
237. The prosecution further places the events within a broader security
context. It alleges that the sustained and coordinated disruption of
major arterial routes, combined with the timing of escalation, was
intended to create a perception of instability in the National Capital,
impair the functioning of essential services, and project an image
of administrative paralysis.
238. The factual narrative records allegations of disruption to transport
networks, obstruction of access to hospitals and medical facilities,
interruption of public transport services including the metro, and
interference with the normal functioning of civic institutions. The
prosecution also alleges that the timing of escalation was calibrated
to coincide with a period of heightened international attention,
thereby magnifying the impact of the disruption.
239. At the bail stage, the Court does not determine whether these
allegations ultimately satisfy the ingredients of a “terrorist act” under
Section 15. What the Court examines is whether the prosecution
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 681

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

has pleaded a case that goes beyond localised violence or protest-
related disorder, and whether the alleged acts are capable, at
least prima facie, of engaging the statutory conception of threats
to security and public order at a national level.
240. When sustained blockades are alleged to be executed across
multiple locations, when essential civic life is alleged to be paralysed,
and when violence is alleged to erupt in a coordinated manner
following such blockades, the Court cannot, at this stage, rule out
the applicability of the statutory framework merely because the acts
are couched in the language of protest.
241. The appellant has urged that his conduct must be viewed through
the prism of political dissent and constitutional protest. This Court
reiterates that dissent and protest occupy a protected space in
a constitutional democracy. That protection, however, does not
extend to a pleaded design which, if accepted as true, involves
systemic disruption, engineered confrontation, and preparatory
steps towards violence.
242. The prosecution does not rely on a single speech, a single meeting,
or a single blockade. It relies on a course of conduct, spread over
weeks, involving repeated meetings, formation of coordinating
bodies, issuance of directions, and alleged preparations for
escalation. The Court cannot, at the bail stage, segregate this
course of conduct into isolated benign fragments and assess each
in abstraction.
243. To do so would amount to substituting a compartmentalised analysis
for the cumulative approach mandated by law in conspiracy cases,
particularly under a special statute. The correct inquiry is whether
the material, taken as a whole, discloses a prima facie case that
the accused was part of an agreement or design to engage in
unlawful activity of the nature alleged. On the prosecution material
placed before us, that inquiry must be answered in the affirmative.
244. Having regard to the prosecution material as placed, including the
chronology of meetings, the alleged articulation and propagation of
the chakka jam strategy, the operation of coordinating committees
and groups, the protected witness statements alleging preparatory
and escalation-related discussions, the pleaded movement of protest
activity into mixed-population zones, and the alleged systemic
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disruption of civic life in the National Capital, this Court is satisfied
that reasonable grounds exist for believing that the accusations
against Umar Khalid are prima facie true.
245. The defence submissions, though weighty and articulated with
care, would require this Court to adjudicate upon credibility, resolve
factual disputes, and choose between competing inferences. That
exercise lies beyond the permissible limits of a bail inquiry under
Section 43D(5).
246. The statutory embargo is therefore attracted. The appeal filed by
Umar Khalid in SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 is dismissed. The
prayer for bail is rejected.
247. It is clarified that the observations herein are confined to the
consideration of bail and shall not influence the Trial Court in the
adjudication of the matter on merits. The Trial Court shall endeavour
to proceed with the trial expeditiously.

8. SHIFA UR REHMAN – APPELLANT IN SLP (Crl.) 14859
of 2025

8.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
248. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Salman Khurshid for the appellant
submitted that the impugned judgment dated 02.09.2025, whereby
the High Court declined to enlarge the appellant on bail, suffers from
a fundamental infirmity inasmuch as it overlooks the undisputed fact
that the appellant has been in continuous custody since 26.04.2020.
It was urged that the appellant has already undergone more than
five years and six months of pre-trial incarceration, while the trial
has not progressed beyond the stage of framing of charges. Learned
senior counsel submitted that the prosecution case rests on an
extraordinarily voluminous record, consisting of a main charge-sheet
and two supplementary charge-sheets running into more than twenty
thousand pages, with several hundred witnesses cited, rendering
the likelihood of an early conclusion of trial wholly illusory. It was
contended that the prolonged incarceration of the appellant, in
such circumstances, assumes a punitive character and offends the
guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
249. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the appellant is a
person of clean antecedents and has never misused the liberty
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 683

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

granted to him. Attention was invited to the fact that the appellant
was granted interim bail on two occasions by the Special Court, on
25.11.2023 and 11.11.2024, and on both occasions he surrendered
within time and strictly complied with all conditions imposed. It
was emphasized that there is not even an allegation that the
appellant attempted to abscond, tamper with evidence, or influence
witnesses. Learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant did
not contribute to the delay in the proceedings, having concluded
his arguments on charge in a single sitting and having not sought
unrelied documents, and therefore, continued detention cannot be
justified on grounds traditionally recognised in bail jurisprudence.
250. It was then submitted that even on a prima facie appreciation of the
prosecution material, the essential ingredients of the offences under
Sections 2(o) and 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act are
not made out qua the appellant. Learned senior counsel submitted
that the appellant is not a member of the DPSG WhatsApp group,
which forms the fulcrum of the alleged conspiracy. His inclusion
in one JCC group was, at best, incidental and subject to a clear
restriction that alumni members would neither chair meetings nor
speak. It was contended that there is no material to indicate that
the appellant incited violence, facilitated riots, or indulged in any act
intended to threaten the unity, integrity, or sovereignty of the nation,
and that participation in protests against a parliamentary enactment,
by itself, cannot be elevated to the level of terrorist activity.
251. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the prosecution
seeks to sustain continued incarceration of the appellant on the
basis of statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC and certain
call detail records, which, at this stage, do not constitute substantive
evidence. It was urged that even the statements of protected
witnesses, read in their entirety, do not attribute any specific overt
act of violence, financing, or conspiratorial role to the appellant.
With regard to the allegation of a meeting dated 22.02.2020 at the
AAJMI office, learned senior counsel submitted that the material
does not establish either the presence or the participation of the
appellant, as the statements refer generally to “office bearers”
without singling him out.
252. It was lastly submitted that the principle of parity has been completely
overlooked by the High Court. Learned senior counsel pointed
out that co-accused, against whom allegations of equal or greater
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gravity were levelled, have been enlarged on bail, and that the role
attributed to the appellant is neither distinguishable nor more serious
so as to warrant continued detention. It was urged that denial of bail
to the appellant alone, despite prolonged incarceration and parity
with similarly placed co-accused, results in manifest inequality and
is contrary to the settled principles governing bail under Article 21.
253. In conclusion, learned Senior Counsel submitted that statutory
rigours cannot be permitted to eclipse constitutional guarantees,
particularly where incarceration has become unduly long and the
conclusion of trial is not foreseeable in the near future. It was urged
that the appellant is the sole breadwinner of his family, comprising
his elderly mother, wife, and two young children, and that continued
detention would cause irreparable hardship without advancing the
ends of justice. Learned Senior Counsel therefore prayed that this
Court may be pleased to interfere with the impugned order and
enlarge the appellant on bail on such terms and conditions as may
be deemed appropriate.

8.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
254. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju for the State submitted that the present
case does not concern a mere protest or dissent, but a carefully
planned and executed criminal conspiracy which culminated in
large-scale violence, arson, and loss of life during the North-East
Delhi riots of February 2020. It was urged that the appellant,
Shifa-ur-Rehman, was not a peripheral or incidental participant,
but played a significant and decisive role in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The State submitted that the impugned order correctly
appreciates the gravity of the offences, the nature of the allegations,
and the material collected during investigation, and therefore does
not warrant interference.
255. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju further submitted that the appellant,
being the President of the Alumni Association of Jamia Millia Islamia
and a member of the Jamia Coordination Committee, functioned
as a key financier and logistic facilitator of the protest sites which
were subsequently escalated into violent “Chakka Jaam” and riot
situations. Statements of several protected witnesses recorded under
Section 164 CrPC consistently disclose that the appellant collected
funds in cash, distributed money to organisers and participants,
arranged daily wages, and ensured uninterrupted functioning of
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 685

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

multiple protest sites across Delhi. These acts were not isolated but
formed part of a concerted design to sustain and escalate unrest.
256. It was then submitted that the appellant was in continuous
coordination with the principal conspirators, including Umar Khalid
and other co-accused, during the relevant period. Call detail records
and WhatsApp communications placed on record demonstrate
sustained contact between the appellant and other conspirators at
crucial stages. Learned counsel submitted that secret meetings were
held at the AAJMI office, including the meeting dated 22.02.2020,
where decisions were taken to intensify protests and trigger violence
in North-East Delhi. The appellant’s presence and role in these
meetings is supported by sworn statements of protected witnesses
and corroborative electronic material.
257. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju for the State further submitted that the
plea of prolonged incarceration cannot be considered divorced
from the seriousness of the offences and the statutory embargo
under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.
At the stage of bail, the Court is only required to assess whether
the accusations are prima facie true and not to conduct a detailed
evaluation of evidence. The material on record, including witness
statements, documentary evidence, recoveries, seizure of fake bills,
and evidence of cash transactions routed through the appellant,
clearly satisfies the threshold of prima facie involvement. The delay
in trial, it was urged, is attributable to the magnitude and complexity
of the case involving multiple accused, voluminous records, and
hundreds of witnesses.
258. It was also submitted that the plea of parity is misconceived and
unsustainable. Bail jurisprudence mandates an assessment of
individual role, and parity cannot be claimed mechanically. The
appellant’s role as the financial backbone of the conspiracy, ensuring
funds and logistics for sustained protest and eventual violence,
places him in a distinct and graver category. The State submitted
that the appellant cannot equate himself with other accused who
may have been granted bail on different factual considerations and
on materially different roles.
259. Lastly, learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the offences alleged
strike at the very foundations of public order and societal peace.
The riots were not spontaneous but the outcome of a calibrated plan
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executed under the guise of protest, resulting in loss of innocent
lives, injuries to police personnel, and widespread destruction of
property. Grant of bail in such circumstances would undermine
the statutory object of the special enactment and erode public
confidence in the administration of justice. The State, therefore,
prayed that the appeal be dismissed and the impugned order
refusing bail be upheld.

8.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
260. The Trial Court vide order dated 07.04.2022, passed in IA. No.
73/2021 in SC 163/2020 dismissed the bail application filed by
the Appellant. The Court found that the material placed on record,
including the charge-sheet, statements of witnesses recorded under
Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., electronic evidence, and WhatsApp
chats of coordinated groups, disclosed prima facie involvement
of the accused in a deep-rooted and well-orchestrated criminal
conspiracy relating to the North-East Delhi riots of February 2020.
On a cumulative reading of the prosecution material, the Court
held that the protests were not spontaneous but were deliberately
planned, escalated into chakka-jam, and thereafter converted into
organised violence, including attacks on police personnel and
destruction of public and private property.
261. The Trial Court emphasised that at the stage of bail it was not
required to undertake a meticulous examination of evidence or
conduct a mini-trial. Applying the settled principles governing bail
in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, the Court
held that the prosecution material must be taken at face value
and assessed in its totality. On such assessment, the Court was
satisfied that there existed reasonable grounds for believing that
the accusations against the accused were prima facie true, thereby
attracting the statutory restrictions on grant of bail.
262. The Trial Court rejected the submissions of the accused based on
parity, absence of direct overt acts, and alleged exercise of the right
to protest. It held that in a case of conspiracy, individual roles are
not to be viewed in isolation and that it is sufficient if the material
indicates conscious participation in the common design. The Court
further held that claims of peaceful protest and lack of direct violence
did not neutralise the prima facie case of involvement in a larger
conspiratorial framework leading to riots.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 687

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

263. A decisive ground for rejection of bail was the statutory embargo
under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, read with the restrictions under Section 437 Cr.P.C. In
light of the gravity of the offences, the nature and scale of the
alleged conspiracy, and the prima facie satisfaction regarding the
accusations, the Trial Court held that it was legally barred from
granting bail and accordingly dismissed the bail application.

8.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT
264. The High Court in the impugned order held that the prosecution
material, taken cumulatively, disclosed prima facie involvement of
Shifa-ur-Rehman as a key financier and organiser in the execution
of the larger criminal conspiracy culminating in the North-East Delhi
riots. Being the President of AAJMI, he was alleged to have misused
his position to facilitate and sustain multiple protest sites across
Delhi by raising and disbursing funds, including cash transactions,
and by allowing AAJMI premises to be used for JCC meetings,
planning, and logistical coordination. Witness statements, recoveries
of documents, and bank and cash-trail material were held to prima
facie indicate that funds were mobilised not merely for peaceful
protest but for sustaining chakka-jaams and their escalation. At the
bail stage, the Court found that his role as a financial enabler and
organiser was integral to the operationalisation of the conspiracy.
265. Applying the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA,
the Court held that there were reasonable grounds to believe that
the accusations against Shifa-ur-Rehman were prima facie true,
thereby barring bail. The pleas that AAJMI was a lawful organisation,
that the funds were used only for legitimate protest expenses, that
there was no direct incitement, and that parity existed with co-
accused released on bail were rejected. The Court clarified that the
role attributed to Shifa-ur-Rehman as a fundraiser and coordinator
was qualitatively distinct and more serious, and that questions
regarding source, quantum, and use of funds are matters for trial.
Consequently, the bail appeal was dismissed.

8.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
266. According to the charge-sheet, Shifa-ur-Rehman, stated to be the
President of the Alumni Association of Jamia Millia Islamia (AAJMI),
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is alleged to have played an active role in the funding and execution
of the riots in Delhi. The charge-sheet alleges that Shifa-ur-Rehman
was entrusted with significant responsibilities in furtherance of the
alleged conspiracy hatched by Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. It is
further alleged that he collected funds and distributed the amounts
so collected for the purpose of engaging women, children, and girls
to assemble at protest sites, with the intent that the presence of
such groups would deter the police from taking stringent action at
the protest locations.
267. The charge-sheet further alleges that Shifa-ur-Rehman was closely
associated with Umar Khalid, described as the principal conspirator,
and that he remained in constant contact with him. It is alleged that
Shifa-ur-Rehman also attended secret conspiratorial meetings. The
charge-sheet records several instances of fund-raising activities
conducted at the office of AAJMI in connection with the protests.
268. It is further alleged that Shifa-ur-Rehman, along with other co-
accused, was instrumental in the establishment of 24×7 protest
sites. According to the charge-sheet, he regularly visited these
protest sites and instigated participants to organise chakka jams
under the guise of peaceful protests. Call Detail Records (CDRs)
are relied upon to assert his frequent presence at the protest sites.
269. Statements of protected witnesses “Alpha”, “Bond”, “James”, and
“Hector” are relied upon to allege that, in his capacity as President
of AAJMI, Shifa-ur-Rehman was responsible for raising substantial
funds to finance the protests. The charge-sheet further alleges that,
in order to avoid detection and to leave no financial trail, Shifa-ur-
Rehman fabricated false bills of expenditure in the name of AAJMI.
Copies of the purportedly fabricated bills have been produced along
with the charge-sheet. It is alleged that Shifa-ur-Rehman collected
a minimum amount of Rs. 7–8 lakhs, the majority of which was
received in cash.
270. The charge-sheet further alleges that Shifa-ur-Rehman was among
the principal individuals responsible for sourcing and sustaining the
protests. Apart from his alleged role in funding, it is stated that he
participated in a conspiratorial meeting held on 22.02.2020, wherein
it was purportedly agreed that the protests should be escalated to the
next stage by enforcing chakka jams and engineering violent riots.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 689

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

271. According to the prosecution, the primary role attributed to Shifa-
ur-Rehman was to provide financial and logistical support to all
protest sites. The charge-sheet asserts that the funding and logistical
assistance allegedly provided by him played an instrumental role in
the riots that occurred in Delhi between 23.02.2020 and 26.02.2020,
under the ostensible cover of protests against the CAA/NRC.
272. Upon a prima facie consideration of the material presently relied
upon by the prosecution, the role attributed to Shifa-ur-Rehman
does not disclose participation at the level of conceptualisation
or strategic command of the alleged conspiracy. The allegations
principally pertain to logistical facilitation, fund-raising, and
coordination at identified protest sites, premised upon directions
purportedly originating from persons situating themselves above him
in the asserted hierarchy. In the absence of demonstrable material
suggesting that he exercised autonomous decision-making authority
over the alleged broader design, his continued incarceration as a
pre-trial measure does not presently appear warranted.
273. The prosecution asserts that Shifa-ur-Rehman was associated
with fund-raising activities and implementation of protest-site
requirements however, the evidentiary material does not indicate
that he retained control over the deployment of such funds, nor that
he exercised selective discretion over strategic decisions concerning
escalation. The record discloses that the appellant’s actions were
derivative in nature, aligned to instructions transmitted by others,
and largely confined to sustaining logistics rather than shaping the
trajectory of the protests. Such attribution, while relevant to trial,
does not justify indefinite pre-trial detention when weighed against
the limited and executory nature of his alleged role.
274. The State’s apprehension that the appellant may re-establish
operational linkages or interfere with witnesses must be evaluated in
light of present circumstances. There is no material to demonstrate
that the appellant retains any functional capacity to mobilise
resources or coordinate activities independent of the structures
that, according to the prosecution itself, acted under higher-level
guidance and have since ceased to exist in the form alleged. The
risks articulated by the State can be effectively neutralised through
conditions restricting public engagement pertaining to the case,
prohibiting contact with witnesses, and mandating regular court
attendance.
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275. While the seriousness of the events culminating in violence during
the relevant period cannot be discounted, this Court is mindful
that gravity alone cannot eclipse the constitutional requirement of
individualized examination of the necessity of pre-trial detention. The
appellant’s role, as narrated, is not linked to instigation of violence,
procurement of weapons, or direct involvement in acts of physical
aggression. In the absence of a proximate and continuing nexus
between the appellant and the capacity to compromise the integrity
of the proceedings, further incarceration would assume a punitive
character incompatible with settled constitutional jurisprudence
under Article 21.
276. The Court is also conscious that pre-trial detention serves limited
and clearly defined purposes securing the presence of the accused,
preventing obstruction of justice, and safeguarding public interest
where demonstrable risk persists. In the present case, none of
these objectives appear incapable of being achieved through
calibrated restrictions short of incarceration. The absence of material
suggesting an enduring organisational infrastructure capable of
being reactivated through the appellant’s efforts weighs significantly
against the necessity of continued custody.
277. It is further noted that the prosecution’s submissions rely substantially
on the appellant’s positional proximity to individuals alleged to
have played a strategic role. Mere associative proximity, without
corresponding evidence demonstrating capacity to exert influence or
direction, does not satisfy the threshold required to curtail liberty at
the post-investigative stage. The appellant’s purported involvement
in facilitative tasks, while forming part of the evidentiary matrix to
be assessed at trial, cannot be a standalone basis for extending
pre-trial detention where imposition of protective conditions offers
an adequate safeguard.
278. Where the prosecution narrative itself draws a distinction between
strategic architects and operational facilitators, judicial scrutiny at
the bail stage must remain attentive to proportionality in attribution.
The material presently relied upon depicts the appellant as a
conduit within a hierarchically structured mobilisation, rather than
as a node of independent initiative. Elevating such a role to one
warranting prolonged custodial deprivation would risk diluting the
constitutionally embedded principle that pre-trial restraint must
correlate to demonstrated necessity rather than inferred association.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 691

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

279. Finally, while the evidentiary record merits thorough adjudication
at trial, the Constitution mandates that liberty be curtailed only
where compelling grounds grounded in present necessity exist.
The prosecutorial hypothesis of a broader conspiracy, though
serious, cannot become a charter for undifferentiated incarceration
of all alleged participants irrespective of their individual function or
continuing capacity. In the circumstances disclosed, and given the
availability of stringent safeguards to address the apprehensions
raised, the balance of constitutional considerations favours the
appellant’s release on terms ensuring non-interference with the
proceedings and adherence to all conditions imposed by the Court.
280. Having regard to the differentiated standing that the prosecution
narrative itself assigns to the appellant, particularly when contrasted
with the alleged principal conspirators Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam,
and in view of the absence of any present investigative requirement
necessitating custodial detention, this Court finds that pre-trial liberty
can be secured without prejudicing the administration of justice.
Accordingly, subject to conditions designed to ensure his availability
for trial, prevent any contact with prosecution witnesses, and restrain
public commentary bearing upon the merits, the appellant is held
entitled to be enlarged on bail. It is clarified that the observations herein
are confined to the determination of bail and shall not be construed
as expressing a view on the merits of the prosecution’s case.

9. SALEEM KHAN – APPELLANT IN SLP (CRL.) NO.
15335/2025

9.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
281. Learned Counsel Sri Gautam Khazanchi appearing for the appellant
submitted that the appellant, Mohd. Saleem Khan, aged about 54
years, is a permanent resident of Chand Bagh, Delhi, carrying on
business, with deep roots in society, and has been in continuous
judicial custody for over five years in FIR No. 59 of 2020 registered
by the Crime Branch, Delhi, arising out of the North-East Delhi
riots of February 2020 . It was submitted that the appellant has
no criminal antecedents except three FIRs arising out of the same
incident, and in two of those FIRs, namely FIR No. 60 of 2020
and FIR No. 136 of 2020, the appellant has already been granted
regular bail by competent courts, on substantially the same material
relied upon by the prosecution.
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282. He further submitted that the gravamen of the allegation against the
appellant in the present FIR is one of conspiracy under the UAPA,
without any allegation of commission of a terrorist act, use of arms
or weapons, funding of violence, delivery of inflammatory or hate
speeches, or direct participation in acts of arson or rioting. Learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the prosecution case itself records
that the appellant is not a member of any of the WhatsApp groups
such as JCC, DPSG, MSJ or SOJ, which form the backbone of the
alleged conspiracy narrative, and that the appellant has not sent a
single message, directly or indirectly, in any of those groups . It was
urged that there is no documentary evidence whatsoever in the form
of messages, emails or call records to show any communication
between the appellant and the so-called principal conspirators.
283. Learned Counsel submitted that the allegation of the appellant
having attended so-called “secret meetings” is founded entirely on
belatedly recorded statements of witnesses, recorded months, and
in some instances nearly a year, after the arrest of the appellant. It
was submitted that even these allegations are contradicted by the
prosecution’s own material, including CCTV footage, which does
not show the presence of the appellant at the alleged meetings on
crucial dates. These aspects, it was urged, are matters for trial and
cannot be treated as conclusive at the stage of bail, particularly to
justify prolonged incarceration.
284. He further submitted that the only overt allegation sought to be
pressed against the appellant is that he allegedly turned away or
dislocated a CCTV camera with the aid of a wiper. Learned Senior
Counsel submitted that this very allegation formed part of FIR No.
60 of 2020, in which the appellant was granted regular bail by
the High Court after a detailed consideration, holding that such
footage by itself was insufficient to prolong incarceration and that
the extent of conspiracy, if any, could only be determined at trial .
It was submitted that the prosecution cannot be permitted to rely
upon the same material repeatedly to justify continued detention
of the appellant in multiple proceedings.
285. Learned Counsel further submitted that the appellant’s conduct
throughout has been exemplary. The appellant has been granted
interim bail on six occasions by the Trial Court and the High Court
for various humanitarian and family reasons, including medical
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 693

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

needs of his children and family obligations. On each occasion,
the appellant surrendered punctually, without seeking extension,
and there is not a single allegation of misuse of liberty, tampering
with evidence, influencing witnesses, or attempting to evade the
process of law. It was submitted that the appellant, therefore, fully
satisfies the triple test governing grant of bail .
286. On the aspect of delay, learned Counsel submitted, briefly, that
despite filing of the main charge-sheet and four supplementary
charge-sheets, charges have not yet been framed, the prosecution
proposes to examine more than 850 witnesses, and the trial is
at the stage of arguments on charge, rendering early conclusion
wholly illusory.
287. He lastly submitted that the principle of parity has been completely
overlooked. Co-accused Devangana Kalita, Natasha Narwal and Asif
Iqbal Tanha, against whom far graver and more direct allegations
of conspiracy, mobilisation and instigation were levelled, have been
granted bail by the High Court, which orders have been affirmed by
this Hon’ble Court. The appellant, whose alleged role is demonstrably
peripheral and significantly weaker, continues to remain incarcerated,
resulting in manifest arbitrariness and unequal treatment.
288. Learned Counsel, therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased
to enlarge the appellant on bail on such terms and conditions as
may be deemed fit, in the interest of justice, liberty and parity.

9.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
289. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju appearing on behalf of the respondent
submitted that the present case is not one of mere presence at a
protest or passive association, but of deep and active participation
in a well-orchestrated criminal conspiracy which culminated in large-
scale violence, arson, destruction of public and private property, and
loss of multiple innocent lives during the North-East Delhi riots of
February 2020. It was submitted that the appellant, Mohd. Saleem
Khan (Accused No. 14), played a pivotal local role in executing the
conspiracy at Chand Bagh and adjoining areas, acting in coordination
with members of the DPSG and other key conspirators.
290. It was submitted that the material on record, clearly establishes that
the appellant was not a peripheral actor but an integral ground-
level executor of the conspiracy. Protected witnesses VENUS and
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GOLD have categorically deposed that the appellant was one of
the initiators and organisers of the Chand Bagh protest site from
mid-January 2020 onwards, along with other accused persons,
and that he actively participated in mobilising crowds, delivering
inflammatory speeches, and sustaining the protest infrastructure,
including arrangements for food, shelter and logistics.
291. Learned ASG further submitted that on the intervening night of 16–17
February 2020, at around 2:00 AM, a secret conspiratorial meeting
was held at the Chand Bagh protest site, which was attended by
the appellant along with other key accused including Athar, Shadab,
Saleem Malik @ Munna, Gulfisha Fatima, Devangana Kalita and
others. In this meeting, the roadmap for escalating peaceful sit-ins
into disruptive chakka-jam at strategically chosen arterial roads
was finalised, with the express objective of provoking confrontation
with police and engineering riots. This meeting is corroborated by
multiple protected witnesses including BRAVO, JOHNY and KILO,
whose statements consistently name the appellant as a participant
in the deliberations.
292. It was submitted that in furtherance of the conspiracy, another
meeting was held in the intervening night of 20–21 February 2020
at Ayaz’s office in Chand Bagh, which the appellant attended along
with DPSG members. Protected witness PLUTO has deposed that
during this meeting, explicit exhortations were made to “set Delhi
on fire”, that weapons, petrol and finances were ready, and that
violence on a large scale was inevitable unless roads were blocked
and clashes ensued. The appellant’s presence and participation in
this meeting are specifically spoken to by PLUTO in his statement
under Section 164 CrPC.
293. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the conspiracy moved
from planning to execution on 22 February 2020, when, pursuant
to these meetings, chakka-jam was first enforced at Jafrabad Metro
Station by mobilising crowds from Chand Bagh and Seelampur. This
was followed by meetings convened and attended by the appellant
on the night of 22 February 2020 at Ayaz’s basement, where
organisers of various protest sites were informed that chakka-jam
had been successfully executed at Jafrabad and were directed to
replicate the same in their respective areas. CCTV footage and
witness testimonies establish the appellant’s role in convening and
attending these meetings.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 695

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

294. It was further submitted that on 23 February 2020, the appellant,
along with Athar, Shadab and Saleem Malik @ Munna, physically
shifted the Chand Bagh protest from a side location to the main
Wazirabad–Ghaziabad road, thereby enforcing chakka-jam at a
critical arterial road and deliberately moving protests from Muslim-
majority lanes to mixed-population areas to maximise confrontation.
Protected witnesses BRAVO and HECTOR have deposed that this
coordinated action directly led to escalation of violence, stone-
pelting, arson and attacks on police personnel and civilians.
295. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju emphasised that when the conspirators
realised that the scale of violence was being curtailed due to CCTV
surveillance, another conspiratorial meeting was held on the night
of 23 February 2020, wherein it was decided that CCTV cameras
must be destroyed or disabled. Witness RADIUM has categorically
stated that Athar informed the group that the task of breaking CCTV
cameras had been assigned to the appellant and Saleem Malik @
Munna. In pursuance thereof, CCTV footage demonstrates that
on 24 February 2020, multiple CCTV cameras in the area were
systematically dislocated or covered, including one instance where
the appellant himself is seen dislocating a CCTV camera.
296. It was submitted that once CCTV surveillance was neutralised,
large-scale violence erupted on 24 February 2020, resulting in
brutal attacks on police personnel, including the killing of Head
Constable Ratan Lal, grievous injuries to senior police officers, and
the murder of Intelligence Bureau officer Ankit Sharma, besides
widespread arson and destruction. The State submitted that the
appellant is not only charged in the present conspiracy case but is
also an accused in connected cases relating to murder and rioting,
reflecting the gravity and continuity of his role.
297. On the issue of parity, learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that
parity cannot be claimed in abstract, divorced from individual
role. The appellant’s role, as borne out from multiple independent
protected witnesses, electronic evidence, CCTV footage and chain-
of-command analysis, is materially distinct and far more direct
than those accused who have been granted bail. The appellant
functioned as a key local executor translating strategic conspiracy
into physical action on the ground.
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298. On delay, learned ASG submitted briefly that the complexity of the
case, the multiplicity of accused, the scale of violence, and the
volume of evidence, including hundreds of witnesses and electronic
records, necessarily require time, and such delay cannot be used
to dilute the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA
where a strong prima facie case exists.
299. Learned ASG therefore submitted that, on a cumulative assessment
of the material, there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accusations against the appellant are prima facie true, that his
release would pose a serious threat to public order and the integrity
of the trial, and that the present case does not warrant exercise
of discretion in favour of bail. The State accordingly prayed for
dismissal of the appeal.

9.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
300. The Trial Court vide order dated 22.03.2022, passed in IA. No.
96/2021 in SC 163/2020 dismissed the bail application filed by
the Appellant. The Trial Court found that the prosecution material
disclosed prima facie involvement of the appellant in a large-scale,
deep-rooted criminal conspiracy connected with the North-East
Delhi riots of February 2020. On a holistic reading of the charge-
sheet, supplementary charge-sheets, CCTV analysis, witness
statements (including protected witnesses), and WhatsApp group
communications (DPSG/JCC), the Court held that the riots were not
spontaneous but were systematically planned to escalate protests
into chakka-jam and thereafter into organised violence, including
attacks on police, destruction of CCTV cameras, arson, and use
of deadly weapons. At the stage of bail, the Court emphasised that
the individual role of the accused cannot be viewed in isolation and
must be assessed in the context of the entire chain of conspiracy.
301. A decisive reason for rejection of bail was the statutory bar under
Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,
read with the additional restriction under Section 437 Cr.P.C. The
Court applied the principles laid down in NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad
Shah Watali (supra) and Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (supra),
holding that if, on a perusal of the charge-sheet and case diary,
there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations
are prima facie true, the accused cannot be released on bail. The
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 697

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

Court recorded that the prosecution material, taken at face value,
crossed this statutory threshold, thereby attracting the embargo
on bail.
302. The Trial Court rejected the defence contentions relating to delay in
arrest, clean antecedents, alleged absence of independent public
witnesses, and claims that the accused was merely a spectator or a
peaceful protester. It held that criminal conspiracy is rarely proved by
direct evidence and is ordinarily established through circumstantial
evidence, conduct of the accused, and the cumulative effect of
surrounding circumstances. Alleged contradictions in witness
statements, admissibility of evidence, and the defence plea that
the accused was not part of WhatsApp groups or meetings were
held to be matters for trial, not for determination at the bail stage.
303. Finally, the Trial Court underscored the gravity and societal impact
of the offences, noting the loss of life, large-scale damage to public
and private property, and serious threat to public order. It reiterated
that at the bail stage, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-
trial or weigh evidence meticulously, but only to assess broad
probabilities. Taking a cumulative view of the prosecution material
and the statutory restrictions under UAPA and Cr.P.C., the Court
concluded that the appellant had failed to dislodge the prima facie
case against him, and consequently held that he was not entitled
to bail, leading to dismissal of the bail application.

9.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
304. The High Court in the impugned order found that the prosecution
material prima facie established Mohd. Saleem Khan’s role as a
local executor of the conspiracy, particularly in relation to events
at Chand Bagh during 23–24 February 2020. He was alleged to
have participated in secret meetings where plans were discussed
to escalate protests into violence and, significantly, to have acted
upon instructions to disable government-installed CCTV cameras.
The Court noted that CCTV footage and witness statements prima
facie showed Saleem Khan physically dislocating CCTV cameras,
which was considered a crucial preparatory act enabling rioters to
operate with impunity. His role was thus viewed as facilitating the
transition from protest to large-scale violence, including the attacks
that resulted in deaths and grievous injuries to police personnel.
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305. Invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the Court held that the
accusations against Saleem Khan met the threshold of prima facie
truth, creating a statutory bar to bail. The arguments that he was
not a member of major WhatsApp groups, that he had already
been granted bail in other FIRs (including one relating to CCTV
damage), or that the evidence was insufficient, were rejected. The
Court clarified that the present proceedings concerned a larger
conspiracy FIR under the UAPA, and that acts such as disabling
CCTV cameras assumed grave significance in that context. Issues
relating to overlap of FIRs, alleged double jeopardy, and evidentiary
weaknesses were held to be matters for trial, leading to dismissal
of his bail appeal.

9.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
306. Mohd. Saleem Khan is alleged by the prosecution to be one of the
principal local actors who actively participated in the conspiracy
and the violent protests that took place during the last week of
February 2020.
307. According to the charge-sheet, Mohd. Saleem Khan was part of
the group that established a 24×7 protest site at Chand Bagh. The
members associated with the said protest site are alleged to have
played a significant role in instigating and engineering the riots that
occurred during the last week of February 2020. The statements
of protected witnesses “VENUS” and “GOLD” are relied upon to
disclose and corroborate the role attributed to Mohd. Saleem Khan
in the orchestration of the riots.
308. It is further alleged that on 17.02.2020, Mohd. Saleem Khan
attended a meeting held during the night hours at the Chand Bagh
protest site, which was attended by members of the Delhi Protest
Support Group (DPSG). As per the charge-sheet, approximately
twenty persons attended the said meeting, including Saleem Khan.
During the meeting, a roadmap for the execution of the final phase
of the alleged conspiracy namely, the escalation of chakka jams
into disruptive chakka jams and the organisation of violence and
riots was purportedly outlined by co-accused Athar Khan.
309. According to the prosecution, there was a clear and cogent
understanding among the key participants who attended the said
meeting that the protest sites, then located on side lanes in Muslim-
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 699

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

dominated areas, were required to be shifted and converted into
chakka jams at carefully selected locations on arterial and busy
roads situated in proximity to areas of mixed population. The
stated objective of such relocation was to engineer riots and to
paralyse the normal movement of traffic and the flow of public life.
It is further alleged that the enforcement of chakka jams, which
would inevitably necessitate police intervention, was intended to be
followed by confrontation with, and attacks upon, police personnel
and members of the public, as well as damage to and destruction
of public property through the use of firearms, deadly weapons,
arson, and other means during the engineered riots. In support of
these allegations, reliance is placed on the statement of protected
witness “BRAVO”.
310. The prosecution further alleges that Mohd. Saleem Khan attended
another meeting held during the intervening night of 20/21.02.2020
at the office of one Ayaz in Chand Bagh, Delhi. According to the
prosecution, the plan allegedly conspired by the participants of
the meetings held on 17.02.2020 and between 20.02.2020 and
22.02.2020 was executed by protesters from Chand Bagh, including
Mohd. Saleem Khan, when they moved from the protest site to the
Jafrabad Metro Station on the evening of 22.02.2020. Statements
of protected witnesses are relied upon to assert the presence
of Saleem Khan at the protest held at Jafrabad Metro Station. It
is further alleged that Saleem Khan invited persons to attend a
conspiratorial meeting held at Chand Bagh on 22.02.2020, which
allegedly culminated in the protest of 23.02.2020 on the main
road near the Mazar and the enforcement of a chakka jam on the
Wazirabad–Ghaziabad Road.
311. It is further alleged that on the night of 23.02.2020, after riots had
erupted in North-East Delhi but were perceived to have fallen
short of the intended scale of violence, a conspiratorial meeting
was convened at the residence of one Mukhtyar in Chand Bagh
by DPSG members Athar and Shadab Ahmad. The meeting is
stated to have been attended by absconding accused Suleman
Siddiqui and Ayub. During the said meeting, Athar is alleged to
have conveyed that Nadeem Khan was dissatisfied with the limited
escalation of violence due to the presence of CCTV cameras and
had instructed that the cameras be covered and destroyed. It is
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alleged that Athar thereafter assigned Saleem Khan and Salim
Malik alias Munna the task of damaging the CCTV cameras,
while Shadab Ahmad stated that similar acts would be carried out
through his own team.
312. The charge-sheet further relies upon reverse mapping of accused
persons arrested for grave offences committed during the North-East
Delhi riots, which is stated to trace their actions back to a clandestine
conspiratorial meeting held at Chand Bagh on the intervening night of
16/17.02.2020, thereby revealing a clear chain of command. Several
accused persons involved in offences of murder, rioting, arson, and
attempts to murder, including those linked to the killings of Head
Constable Ratan Lal, Rahul Solanki, and Ankit Sharma,are stated to
have either attended the said meeting or remained in regular contact
with its participants, particularly DPSG members Athar Khan, Shadab
Ahmad, Gulfisha Fatima, and Khalid Saifi. The mapping is relied upon
to demonstrate coordinated roles, including the destruction of CCTV
cameras, assignment of specific targets, financing of weapons and
ammunition, and operational execution, culminating in the framing
of charges against key conspirators in multiple FIRs pertaining to
mass violence and attacks on police personnel.
313. At the present stage of consideration, the allegations against Mohd.
Saleem Khan primarily situate him as a local operative associated
with meetings at the Chand Bagh protest site, allegedly tasked with
site-level mobilisation in furtherance of directions issued by others.
The record does not prima facie disclose autonomous authority
over the larger conspiracy, nor any material to suggest that he
occupied a position from which strategic escalation or coordination
across protest sites could be directed. In view of the differentiated
role attributed to him, this Court finds that his continued pre-trial
detention requires a more narrowly tailored justification than what
is presently demonstrated.
314. While the prosecution places reliance on his alleged attendance
at meetings preceding the escalation of protests into chakka jams,
the material does not disclose that Saleem exercised control
over either the initiation of such meetings or formulation of their
outcomes. The attribution is largely derivative, reflecting execution
of tasks discussed by others and limited to coordination within the
Chand Bagh–Jafrabad cluster. The evidentiary foundation relied
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 701

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

upon, even if taken at its highest, does not presently establish that
Saleem possessed independent command capacity or strategic
discretion warranting ongoing incarceration solely on the basis of
his associative presence at key locations.
315. The assertion that Saleem participated in the destruction of CCTV
cameras and in facilitating the movement of protestors to designated
sites raises matters for trial, however, pre-trial detention cannot be
perpetuated merely because violent acts are alleged in proximity
to his presence, unless a direct and continuing ability to influence
or repeat such conduct is shown. There is no material before this
Court indicating that he presently retains access to organisational
resources, communication networks, or mobilising power that could
enable interference with the administration of justice. The legitimate
concerns of the State can be sufficiently guarded by supervision
and tailored restrictions.
316. It is settled that the seriousness of the alleged acts, while relevant,
does not displace the constitutional requirement that pre-trial
detention serve a demonstrable and continuing necessity. In the
absence of any plea or evidence that Saleem’s custodial presence
is required for further investigation, and given that the prosecution
narrative itself delineates him as an executor rather than an originator
or planner of the alleged conspiracy, this Court is unable to conclude
that the threshold of necessity under Article 21 remains satisfied. The
balance between individual liberty and collective security therefore
tilts in favour of conditional release.
317. The Court is cognisant that the architecture of the prosecution
case relies on a theory of layered participation, wherein actions
undertaken at individual protest sites are said to feed into a broader
conspiratorial framework. Even assuming this structure to be correct
for the limited purpose of bail, the role attributed to Saleem does
not presently transcend the operational. His alleged activities do
not indicate that he functioned as a conduit between the principal
architects and secondary actors beyond his immediate geographical
sphere. In the absence of such interlinking conduct, imputing to
him a continuing capacity to destabilise public order would be
speculative rather than evidentiary.
318. Furthermore, the prosecution has not demonstrated that witnesses
associated with the Chand Bagh protest remain vulnerable to
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intimidation or inducement at the hands of Saleem. In these
circumstances, the apprehension of evidence tampering must be
founded on concrete risks rather than on the mere gravity of the
offences alleged.
319. The Court also notes that prolonged incarceration without
demonstrable necessity risks conflating punitive detention with
preventive detention, contrary to the settled constitutional position
that the former cannot be imposed before conviction save to
secure legitimate trial-related objectives. A restrictive reading of
personal liberty is impermissible where targeted conditions could
be imposed. The imposition of such calibrated measures achieves
the dual purpose of safeguarding societal interests and upholding
constitutional fidelity.
320. Lastly, the overarching narrative advanced by the prosecution
emphasises the systemic nature of the alleged conspiracy.
However, systemic allegations require systemic evidence an
associative presence or execution of logistical tasks, without more,
does not justify a presumption of continuing threat in the post-
investigative stage. Judicial scrutiny at the bail stage must remain
sensitive to the distinction between contextual participation and
autonomous agency. In the present facts, this distinction militates
against further curtailment of Saleem’s liberty, and reinforces the
principle that deprivation of liberty cannot be sustained without
distinct and ongoing justification anchored in necessity rather
than inference.
321. Having considered the differentiated attribution of roles among the
accused, this Court notes that the prosecution places Umar Khalid
and Sharjeel Imam at the apex of the alleged conspiracy, whereas
Saleem is projected as a site-level participant whose presence and
conduct derive meaning primarily from directives purportedly issued
by others. This structural distinction, coupled with the absence of
ongoing investigative necessity and the availability of strict conditions
to minimise any risk to the proceedings, persuades the Court that
continued incarceration of Saleem would not be proportionate.
Accordingly, he is held entitled to be released on bail subject to
conditions enumerated below. Nothing herein shall be construed
as an opinion on guilt or innocence.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 703

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

10. MEERAN HAIDER – APPELLANT IN SLP (Crl.) 14132 of 2025

10.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:
322. Learned Senior counsel Sri Siddharth Aggarwal for the Appellant
submits that the Appellant has been in continuous judicial custody
since 01.04.2020 and has, as on date, undergone incarceration of
over five years and five months as an under-trial prisoner in the
present case. It is urged that investigation qua the Appellant stands
concluded, as admitted by the prosecution before the Trial Court in
August 2024, and that he is not required for any further custodial
interrogation. It is contended that despite filing of multiple charge-
sheets over a period of more than four years, the trial has not
commenced and there is no realistic likelihood of its conclusion in
the near future, particularly in view of the initially cited 960 witnesses
and over 1200 relied-upon documents, even if the prosecution now
claims that the witness list would be pruned.
323. It is further urged that the Appellant has been arrested exclusively
in the present FIR and is not in custody in any other case. Learned
counsel submits that the Appellant is a well-educated individual,
aged about 34 years, having completed B-Tech, MBA and M-Phil,
and has continued his academic pursuits even while in custody. It
is contended that the Appellant satisfies the triple test for grant of
bail, inasmuch as he is not a flight risk, has deep roots in society,
has cooperated with the investigation throughout, and there is no
allegation of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.
Reliance is placed on the fact that when interim bail was granted
for a short duration in August 2024, the Appellant strictly complied
with all conditions.
324. On the aspect of parity, learned Senior Counsel submitted that
several co-accused who were allegedly part of the core conspiracy,
including those who were members of the principal WhatsApp groups
relied upon by the prosecution, present in alleged secret meetings,
or physically present at riot-affected areas, have been granted bail.
It is argued that the Appellant stands on a better footing, as he is
not alleged to have participated in any of the two secret meetings
relied upon by the prosecution, was not present at any riot site,
and there is no CCTV footage, recovery of weapons, or physical
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evidence connecting him to acts of violence. It is contended that
parity is pressed strictly on factual comparison and not on any
alleged dilution of statutory standards under the UAPA.
325. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even according
to the prosecution’s own case, as reflected in the charge-sheet,
the Appellant has been categorised as having a comparatively
lesser role, being placed in the third category out of four classes
of accused. It is urged that this categorisation itself contradicts
the finding in the impugned judgment that the Appellant played
a “significant role” in the alleged conspiracy. It is argued that the
High Court failed to reconcile this internal inconsistency in the
prosecution’s own material.
326. On merits, it was submitted that the principal allegation against the
Appellant relates to financing. Learned Senior Counsel contended
that even as per the prosecution, the alleged contribution attributed
to the Appellant is between Rs.2.33 lakhs and Rs.2.86 lakhs, out
of an alleged total expenditure of approximately Rs.1.60 crores,
constituting less than two percent of the total. It was urged that
notwithstanding this, the Appellant has been described as a “key
fundraiser”, which is wholly disproportionate and unsupported by
evidence. It is further submitted that the Appellant has furnished
a detailed explanation for the small sums reflected in the diary/
register seized from him, stating that the amounts pertained to his
proposed election campaign, personal expenses following the death
of his mother and his father’s medical treatment, and for providing
food and water at protest sites. It is contended that no finding has
been returned on this explanation.
327. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Appellant is not alleged
to have been a member of the principal WhatsApp groups such as
DPSG or MSJ, which are claimed by the prosecution to be central
to the alleged conspiracy. It is urged that no incriminating message
authored by the Appellant has been placed on record, read out,
or relied upon. It is further submitted that mere membership of
WhatsApp groups, absent any unlawful object or inciting content,
cannot attract liability under the UAPA.
328. It was also submitted that none of the speeches attributed to the
Appellant are provocative or inciteful. Learned Senior Counsel
contended that the transcripts placed on record show that the
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 705

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

speeches emphasise constitutional values, secularism, democracy
and peaceful protest. It is urged that the specific allegation that
the Appellant delivered a provocative speech on 22.02.2020 at
Nizamuddin is demonstrably false, as no transcript of such speech
has been placed on record by the investigating agency.
329. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the Appellant was not
present at any of the riot-affected sites, was not part of the alleged
meetings at Chandbagh or Seelampur, and that there is no CCTV
footage, still photograph, or recovery linking him to acts of violence.
It is urged that statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164
CrPC do not disclose any overt act attributable to the Appellant
that would constitute offences under the UAPA.
330. It was contended that the prolonged incarceration of the Appellant
violates his right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution, particularly when he has already undergone more
than half of the maximum sentence prescribed for several of the
alleged offences. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that continued
detention in the face of an indeterminate trial timeline amounts to
punitive incarceration without adjudication of guilt.
331. On the embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, it was urged
that the prosecution material, even if taken at face value, does
not disclose a prima facie case of the Appellant’s involvement in
terrorist acts or conspiracy, and therefore the statutory bar is not
attracted. It was submitted that the High Court has mechanically
applied the embargo without undertaking the requisite prima facie
evaluation of the material specific to the Appellant.
332. In conclusion, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the cumulative
effect of prolonged custody, completion of investigation, absence
of direct evidence, comparative parity with co-accused on bail,
and lack of any likelihood of early trial, warrants grant of bail to
the Appellant, and that denial thereof would result in grave and
irreparable prejudice.

10.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
333. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju for the State submits that the present
case does not arise from an isolated incident or a spontaneous
law-and-order situation, but from a deep-rooted, premeditated
706 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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and carefully orchestrated criminal conspiracy which culminated
in large-scale violence in North-East Delhi in February 2020. The
investigation in FIR No. 59 of 2020 has revealed that the conspiracy
was executed in a phased manner beginning from December 2019,
with the deliberate objective of converting protests into permanent
sit-in sites, escalating them into disruptive chakka-jam, and thereafter
triggering targeted violence. It is submitted that the acts forming part
of this conspiracy were intended to create widespread fear, disrupt
normal civic life and destabilise public order, thereby attracting the
stringent provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
334. It was urged that the Appellant, Meeran Haider, Accused No. 3, was
not a marginal or passive participant but an active conspirator from
the inception. His involvement surfaces even during the first phase
of riots in December 2019, prior to the February 2020 violence,
and thus demonstrates continuity and depth of participation. The
State submits that the material on record clearly establishes that
the Appellant was embedded within the organisational framework
executing the conspiracy. He was a member of United Against Hate,
a component of the Delhi Protest Support Group, and also a core
member of the Jamia Coordination Committee, which functioned
as the operational arm of the conspiracy. Statements of protected
witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC name the Appellant
as a regular participant in daily meetings and secret meetings
concerning protest sites, mobilisation and logistics, thereby prima
facie establishing his knowing and voluntary involvement.
335. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the role of the Appellant
was operational, supervisory and managerial in nature. He functioned
as an organiser and administrator of multiple permanent protest
sites, entrusted with their maintenance, coordination and continuity
in furtherance of the common design. Electronic material recovered
during investigation, including chats from the Appellant’s own device,
shows him identifying protest locations, assigning responsibilities
and coordinating personnel across sites. It is further submitted that
the Appellant actively participated in mobilisation and escalation,
exhorting protestors to engage in chakka-jam and to confront
police personnel, thereby facilitating the transition from protest to
violence. These acts, it is urged, were integral to the execution of
the conspiracy and cannot be characterised as protected dissent
or lawful protest.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 707

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

336. On the issue of financing and strategy, learned counsel submits
that the Appellant actively collected, handled and channelled funds
meant for sustaining protest sites and riot-related activities. Multiple
witnesses examined under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC have stated
that they handed over money to the Appellant during the relevant
period, and cash recoveries were effected from concealed locations
within his residence. The State submits that the explanation now
sought to be offered regarding the source and purpose of these
funds raises disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated
at the stage of bail. It is further urged that the Appellant was privy to
core strategic decisions of the conspirators, including internal role
allocation and narrative management, and that he remained in real-
time communication with key conspirators and foot-soldiers during
the critical period of 22–24 February 2020, monitoring execution
and participating in coordinated attempts to shift blame and public
perception once violence had erupted.
337. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju finally submited that the absence of the
Appellant from the physical site of rioting or the lack of recovery of
weapons is immaterial in a conspiracy of this nature, where roles
are distributed and liability attaches equally to planners, organisers,
financiers and supervisors. The plea of parity is misconceived, as
the Appellant is not similarly situated to co-accused who have been
granted bail, his role being distinct in nature and gravity. It was urged
that prolonged incarceration by itself cannot override the statutory
embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA once the accusations
are prima facie true. At the stage of bail, the Court is not required
to conduct a detailed evaluation of defence explanations. Learned
ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the material on record clearly
discloses the Appellant’s active and central involvement in the
conspiracy, attracting the statutory bar to bail, and that any grant
of bail at this stage would defeat the object of the special statute
and undermine the administration of justice.

10.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
338. The Trial Court vide order dated 04.12.2024 in IA. No. 208/2024
in S.C. 163 of 2020, rejected the second bail application filed by
the Appellant on the ground that, the order dated 05.04.2022 in IA
No. 94/2021, dismissing the applicant’s first bail application was
passed after a detailed consideration of the facts and merits, wherein
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the Court, upon perusal of the charge sheet and accompanying
documents, found the allegations against the applicant to be prima
facie true. The Court also rejected the contention that prolonged
trial by itself warranted bail, held that the statutory embargo under
Section 43(D) of the UAPA as well as Section 437 Cr.P.C. was
applicable, and consequently found the applicant not entitled to bail.
Since the said dismissal occurred after filing of the charge sheet
and the stage of the case remains unchanged, the Court holds
that entertaining the present bail application on the same grounds,
notwithstanding submissions regarding changed circumstances and
reliance on judgments, would amount to an impermissible review of
the earlier order dated 05.04.2022. having noted the order of the
trial court rejecting 2nd bail application, it becomes imperative for
us to set out the reasons for dismissal of the 1st bail application of
the appellant which is given in the subsequent paragraphs.
339. The Trial Court held that the material placed on record disclosed
prima facie involvement of the appellant in a large-scale, deep-
rooted and well-orchestrated criminal conspiracy culminating in the
North-East Delhi riots of February 2020. On a holistic reading of the
charge-sheet, its annexures, case diary, witness statements under
Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., WhatsApp chats (including DPSG/
JCC), speeches, and other documentary and electronic material, the
Court found that the protests against CAA/NRC were not organic
but were strategically planned to escalate into chakka-jam and
thereafter into widespread violence, targeting police, public order,
and property. At the bail stage, the Court emphasized that it was
not required to conduct a detailed trial-like evaluation, and that the
prosecution material, taken at face value, sufficiently connected the
appellant to the conspiracy.
340. A decisive ground for rejection was the statutory embargo under
Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,
read with Section 437 Cr.P.C. Relying extensively on NIA v. Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watalli (supra) and Thwaha Fasal v. Union of
India12, the Court reiterated that if, upon perusal of the charge-sheet
and case diary, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusations are prima facie true, bail must be refused. Applying

12 (2022) 14 SCC 766.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 709

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

this standard, the Court concluded that the prosecution material
crossed the statutory threshold and therefore the bar under Section
43D(5) squarely operated against the appellant.
341. The Trial Court rejected the defence contention that the appellant’s
acts were protected by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the
Constitution as peaceful protest or dissent. It held that while the
right to protest is sacrosanct, the charge-sheet portrays a conspiracy
under the guise of protest, aimed at paralysing civic life, blocking
arterial roads, provoking confrontation, and ultimately triggering
communal violence. The Court further held that issues relating to
interpretation of speeches, credibility of witnesses, admissibility of
documents, alleged absence from riot sites, and claimed lack of
direct overt acts are matters for trial, and cannot dilute the prima
facie satisfaction required at the bail stage in a UAPA case.
342. Lastly, the Trial Court noted the gravity and societal impact of the
offences, the scale of violence, loss of life, and damage to public
and private property, and reiterated that conspiracy is seldom proved
by direct evidence and must be assessed cumulatively. Taking a
holistic view of the material, the Trial Court held that the appellant’s
role could not be examined in isolation and that the prosecution
had established reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations
were prima facie true. In view of the statutory restrictions under
UAPA and the additional bar under Section 437 Cr.P.C., the Court
concluded that the appellant was not entitled to bail, and accordingly
dismissed the bail application.

10.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
343. The High Court in the impugned order found that the prosecution
material prima facie established Meeran Haider’s role as an active
executor and fundraiser within the conspiracy, closely working with
other conspirators and alleged masterminds. He was alleged to be
a core JCC member, part of multiple WhatsApp groups receiving
directions from DPSG, and to have played a key role in mobilising
protestors, managing protest sites, and raising and disbursing funds.
The Court noted recoveries of cash, registers recording monetary
transactions, bank-account analysis, call-detail records, and witness
statements suggesting that funds were received and utilised for
sustaining protests and for escalating chakka-jaams into violence.
710 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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He was also alleged to have exhorted protestors to collect weapons
and intensify confrontations with police, which, at the bail stage,
was sufficient to connect him to the execution of the conspiracy.
344. Invoking Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the High Court held that
the accusations against Meeran Haider met the threshold of prima
facie truth, creating a statutory bar to bail. The arguments based
on completion of investigation, alleged change in circumstances,
long incarceration, parity with co-accused granted bail, and claimed
benign use of funds were rejected. The Court emphasised that
funding and mobilisation form a critical preparatory stage of a
conspiracy, and that the role attributed to Meeran Haider was distinct
from those released on bail. Holding that evidentiary assessment
and credibility issues must be tested at trial, the Court concluded
that no case for bail was made out and dismissed the appeal.

10.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
345. As per the charge-sheet, Meeran Haider, stated to be a member
of United Against Hate (UAH), along with students of Jamia Millia
Islamia University, is alleged to have played a significant role in
the implementation of the protests that ultimately culminated in
violence. The charge-sheet alleges that Meeran Haider was one of
the core members of the Jamia Coordination Committee (JCC) and
that he participated in clandestine meetings convened in relation to
the establishment and management of protest sites. According to
the charge-sheet and the statement of protected witness “Bond”,
Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Arib Hassan, Asif Iqbal Tanha,
Saiful Islam, and Safoora Zargar were the principal members of
the JCC.
346. The charge-sheet further alleges that Meeran Haider acted as
an organiser of several protest sites. Chats exchanged between
Meeran Haider and Tasleem, dated 20.01.2020, are relied upon
to show that Meeran Haider was responsible for managing eight
protest sites as part of the alleged conspiracy. It is further alleged
that he instigated participants at these sites to enforce chakka jams
and thereafter to escalate the same into violent riots by attacking
members of the general public and police personnel.
347. Statements of witnesses Akib Aman and “Platinum” are relied
upon to allege that Meeran Haider collected funds for organising
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 711

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

the protests that took place during the first two months of 2020.
According to protected witness “Robert”, Meeran Haider collected
funds and contributed the same to the corpus of AAJMI through
its General Secretary, Areeb, for the purpose of facilitating riots.
348. The charge-sheet further records the recovery of an amount of
₹1,45,000 allegedly belonging to Meeran Haider, which is stated
to have been kept by his sister, Shahjeen Khatoon, at his behest.
Witness Shahjeen Khatoon is stated to have testified that the said
amount was recovered upon the arrest of Meeran Haider. It is further
alleged that Meeran Haider acted directly under the directions of
Sharjeel Imam.
349. It is further alleged that on 22.02.2020 at approximately 22:17
hours, Tasleem Ahmed sent a message from Jafrabad to Meeran
Haider reporting the commencement of a chakka jam. According to
the charge-sheet, this communication indicates that Meeran Haider
was responsible for coordinating certain protest sites.
350. On the night intervening 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020, during the
occurrence of the riots, Meeran Haider is alleged to have ensured
the participation of Jamia students in the protests by circulating
messages on WhatsApp groups. It is further alleged that after each
chakka jam was executed, Meeran Haider would receive reports
confirming the success of the particular blockade.
351. On 24.02.2020, following alleged threats by certain members of the
DPSG to expose those responsible for the violence, the charge-
sheet states that Umar Khalid called Meeran Haider to inform him
about the next course of action.
352. A prima facie appraisal of the prosecution material indicates that
the role ascribed to Meeran Haider is fundamentally that of an
organiser and coordinator of designated protest sites within the
Jamia network, acting largely upon instructions communicated
through alleged higher-level actors. The record does not presently
disclose that he possessed autonomous decision-making authority
over the alleged overarching design, nor that he exercised strategic
control over the escalation of protests. His alleged participation
does not, on its face value, justify the continued curtailment of his
liberty at the pre-trial stage.
712 [2026] 1 S.C.R.

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353. The allegation that Meeran Haider coordinated protest sites and
facilitated participation of students, including the organisation of
resources, is materially distinct from assertions of conceptual
leadership or command. Insofar as the evidentiary substratum does
not presently establish that he exercised meaningful discretion over
the initiation of violence or the transition of protests into chakka
jams, this Court is unable to hold that prolonged incarceration is
necessary solely to reflect the gravity of the charge.
354. The apprehensions expressed by the State regarding the possibility
of Meeran Haider re-mobilising student populations or exerting
influence over former protest networks cannot be accepted in
the abstract. No material has been placed to show that such
organisational structures continue to operate or that the appellant
retains access to resources or networks capable of compromising
the integrity of the proceedings. The risks invoked by the prosecution
can be effectively mitigated through stringent conditions prohibiting
contact with prosecution witnesses, restricting participation in public
assemblies touching the subject matter, and securing regular
attendance before the trial court.
355. It is a settled principle that the seriousness of the allegations,
though relevant, does not obviate the constitutional requirement that
deprivation of liberty must be necessary for legitimate investigative
or trial-related objectives. The prosecution does not assert that
custodial interrogation of Meeran Haider is required at this stage,
nor that his continued detention is indispensable for securing
further evidence. Absent such necessity, the Court must ensure
that preventive detention does not incrementally assume a punitive
character, particularly where the role attributed to the appellant is
situational and derivative rather than originating or directive.
356. The Court further recognises that the evidentiary framework
relied upon does not, at this stage, attribute to the appellant any
independent role in securing financial resources or channelling
funds towards the alleged conspiracy beyond logistical facilitation
incidental to protest management. The distinction between episodic
facilitation and sustained financial stewardship bears directly on the
question of continuing necessity, for it is only the latter that might
prima facie justify custodial restraint on the ground of potential
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 713

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

resource-based reactivation. In the absence of such linkage, the
appellant’s liberty cannot be curtailed merely on apprehensions
rooted in past associations.
357. Moreover, the records placed before the Court indicate that
critical electronic communications, organisational documents, and
statements of witnesses forming the backbone of the prosecution
narrative have already been secured. No plea has been advanced
asserting that further custodial presence of the appellant is necessary
to extract residual evidence or confront him with newly discovered
material. Where the investigatory stage has effectively matured
and the appellant’s participation appears circumscribed by directive
structures no longer demonstrably operational, the constitutional
presumption of liberty must regain primacy.
358. The Court also takes note that the prosecutorial depiction of a
multi-layered mobilisation architecture requires careful calibration
when translated into determinations of pre-trial necessity. If layered
participation is accepted as the structural premise, proportionality
requires that liberty restrictions correspond to the specific layer
of agency attributed to the appellant. To conflate operational
responsibility with command responsibility at the bail stage would risk
imposing a regime of undifferentiated incarceration antithetical to the
principle that liberty may only be withheld where contemporaneous
and individualised grounds compel such curtailment.
359. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the objectives of securing
the integrity of the trial, preventing witness influence, and guarding
against re-mobilisation can be achieved through targeted restrictions
rather than continued custody. Conditions such as periodic reporting,
prohibition on participation in assemblies relating to the subject
matter, and restraints on electronic communication with identified
individuals are proportionate safeguards that align constitutional
fidelity with legitimate State interests. Accordingly, subject to the
imposition of such conditions, the balance of considerations favours
enlargement on bail, without this Court expressing any view on the
ultimate culpability of the appellant.
360. In light of the differentiated hierarchy of roles disclosed by the
prosecution narrative wherein Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam are
alleged to occupy a central, directive position, and Meeran Haider
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is alleged to have acted within an executory framework shaped by
their directions this Court is persuaded that continued incarceration
of the appellant is not proportionate to the limited attribution
presently established. Accordingly, subject to conditions ensuring
his presence during trial, non-interference with witnesses, and a
restraint on public commentary touching the merits of the case, the
appellant is held entitled to be enlarged on bail. It is clarified that
the observations herein are limited to the determination of bail and
shall not prejudice the trial in any manner.

11. SHADAB AHMED - APPELLANT IN SLP(CRL.) NO.
17055/2025

11.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT:
361. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Siddharth Luthra for the appellant
submitted that the appellant has been in continuous custody since
20.05.2020 in FIR No. 59 of 2020, Police Station Crime Branch,
arising out of the alleged larger conspiracy relating to the North-
East Delhi riots. It was urged that the appellant has undergone
incarceration for more than five years and six months, while the
case has not progressed beyond the stage of arguments on charge.
The prosecution has cited about 835 witnesses and placed over
1,000 documents on record, apart from filing four supplementary
charge-sheets, and the delay in commencement of trial is wholly
unrelated to the conduct of the appellant.
362. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the appellant’s implication
in the present FIR is founded primarily on FIR No. 60 of 2020,
Police Station Dayalpur, relating to the death of Head Constable
Rattan Lal, and FIR No. 136 of 2020, Police Station Dayalpur,
relating to the burning of a Maruti showroom. It was pointed out
that the appellant has already been granted bail in both these
cases, the High Court having granted bail in FIR No. 60 of 2020 on
03.09.2021 and the Trial Court having granted bail in FIR No. 136
of 2020 on 21.12.2020, and therefore the continued incarceration
of the appellant in the present case, which substantially rests on
the same factual foundation, is wholly unjustified.
363. It was further submitted that even as per the prosecution case, the
alleged mobilisation and violence at Chand Bagh occurred between
noon and about 1:00 PM on 24.02.2020. The appellant’s Call Detail
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 715

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

Records, which form part of the charge-sheet, conclusively establish
that the appellant was present at his residence in Jagatpuri till 12:19
PM and reached the vicinity of the alleged place of occurrence only
at 1:13 PM, after the incident had concluded. In the absence of any
CCTV footage, video recording or independent electronic material
showing the appellant’s presence or participation, the belated witness
statements alleging instigation or violence are generic and omnibus
and stand contradicted by the electronic evidence.
364. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the prosecution has
repeatedly shifted its stand to fill lacunae, initially alleging physical
presence and instigation on 24.02.2020 and subsequently
introducing a theory of an alleged meeting on 23.02.2020, sought
to be supported by statements recorded more than a year after the
incident. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Dilawar
Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135, to submit
that such delayed and shifting versions erode the credibility of the
prosecution case. It was lastly urged that the appellant is entitled
to bail on the ground of parity, as similarly situated co-accused,
namely Asif Iqbal Tanha, Natasha Narwal and Devangana Kalita,
have already been granted bail, and that continued detention of the
appellant would be wholly disproportionate and unjustified.

11.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
365. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju for the State submitted that the appellant is
a key conspirator and local executor of the larger criminal conspiracy
which culminated in the organised and targeted violence in North
East Delhi in February 2020. The material on record establishes
that the appellant was an active member of the DPSG network
and worked in concert with other core conspirators to escalate
protests into disruptive chakka-jaam and thereafter into violent riots,
particularly at Chand Bagh, pursuant to conspiratorial directions
issued through meetings and coordinated communications.
366. It was submitted that the prosecution has placed cogent and
consistent material showing the appellant’s participation in a
series of conspiratorial meetings, including meetings at the Indian
Social Institute, Lodhi Road, and secret night meetings held on
16/17 February, 20/21 February and 23 February 2020 at Chand
Bagh. These meetings were convened to finalise the roadmap for
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converting sit-in protests into disruptive chakka-jaam on arterial
roads and thereafter engineering violence. Protected witnesses,
including Jupiter, Silver, Gold, Bravo and Johny, have deposed that
the appellant attended these meetings, issued directions to protest
organisers, delivered inflammatory speeches and coordinated
execution at the Chand Bagh protest site.
367. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the reliance placed
on Call Detail Records is wholly misconceived and ignores the
settled law governing criminal conspiracy. Physical presence at
the precise moment of violence is not determinative where the
material establishes planning, coordination and assignment of roles.
The evidence on record shows that in the conspiratorial meeting
held on the night of 23.02.2020, the appellant undertook to get
CCTV cameras covered or destroyed through his team. This is
corroborated by protected witness Radium and supported by CCTV
footage and forensic analysis showing systematic dislocation and
covering of government cameras between 12:05 PM and 12:45
PM on 24.02.2020, immediately preceding the coordinated attack
on the police at about 1:00 PM.
368. It was lastly submitted that the gravity of the offences, including
murder of Head Constable Ratan Lal, brutal attacks on police
officers, large-scale arson and destruction of public property, coupled
with the appellant’s central and operational role in the conspiracy,
disentitle him to the discretionary relief of bail. The plea of parity
is untenable, as the appellant’s role is distinct and supported by
a continuous chain of prima facie evidence. The State therefore
prayed that the application for bail be rejected.

11.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
369. The Trial Court vide order dated 13.10.2022, passed in IA. No. 101/2022
in SC 163/2020 rejected the bail application filed by the Appellant.
The Trial Court held that the charge-sheet and accompanying material
disclosed prima facie involvement of the appellant in a large-scale,
deep-rooted and meticulously planned criminal conspiracy which
culminated in the North-East Delhi riots of February 2020. On a holistic
assessment of the prosecution case, including witness statements,
protected witness testimonies, WhatsApp chats of DPSG/JCC, and
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 717

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

CCTV analysis, the Court found that the protests were not organic
or spontaneous but were strategically designed to escalate into
chakka-jam and thereafter into organised communal violence. The
appellant’s role was not to be viewed in isolation, and his participation
in key meetings and coordination with other conspirators formed part
of the larger conspiracy.
370. A decisive reason for rejection of bail was the statutory embargo
under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, read with the additional restriction under Section 437 Cr.P.C.
Relying extensively on NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra)
and Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (supra), the Court reiterated
that at the bail stage, it is sufficient if there are reasonable grounds
for believing that the accusation is prima facie true, and that the
degree of satisfaction required is lighter than at the stage of trial
or discharge. Applying this standard, the Court concluded that
the prosecution material, taken at face value, clearly crossed the
statutory threshold, thereby barring the grant of bail.
371. The Court rejected the defence submissions that the appellant
was merely a volunteer at a peaceful protest site, that DPSG was
not a banned organisation, or that there was no direct evidence
such as CCTV footage showing him committing violent acts. It held
that criminal conspiracy is rarely proved by direct evidence and is
ordinarily established through circumstantial evidence, conduct,
and the cumulative effect of surrounding circumstances. Alleged
inconsistencies in witness statements, delay in recording statements,
admissibility of electronic evidence, and claims of false implication
were held to be matters for trial, and could not be examined in
depth at the bail stage.
372. Finally, the Court underscored the gravity, scale, and societal impact
of the offences, noting the loss of lives, including that of a police
officer, grievous injuries to several public servants, and extensive
damage to public and private property. It reiterated that conspiracy
cases require a holistic view of the entire chain of events, and that
the appellant had failed to dislodge the prima facie case established
by the prosecution. In view of the statutory restrictions under UAPA
and Cr.P.C., and the serious nature of the allegations, the Court
held that the appellant was not entitled to bail and accordingly
dismissed the bail application.
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11.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
373. The High Court in the impugned order held that the prosecution
material, when assessed cumulatively, disclosed prima facie
involvement of Shadab Ahmed as an active participant in the
execution phase of the larger criminal conspiracy culminating in the
North-East Delhi riots. He was alleged to be a member of the DPSG
WhatsApp group, a regular attendee of key conspiratorial meetings
(including those held at Chand Bagh in February 2020), and one of
the organisers managing the Chand Bagh–Mustafabad protest site.
The Court noted that witness statements and electronic evidence
prima facie indicated his role in mobilising protestors, coordinating
chakka-jaams, and concurring with plans to escalate protests into
violence, including discussions relating to arson, attacks on police,
and destruction of public property. His role, though not that of a
mastermind, was held to be integral to the operationalisation of
the conspiracy.
374. Applying the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA,
the Court held that there were reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusations against Shadab Ahmed were prima facie true,
thereby barring the grant of bail. The Court rejected pleas based
on lack of direct overt acts, alleged contradictions in protected
witness statements, parity with co-accused enlarged on bail, and
the fact that he had been granted bail in other FIRs arising out of
the riots. It was clarified that the present case related to a larger
conspiracy under the UAPA, distinct from other FIRs, and that
evidentiary inconsistencies and credibility issues are matters for
trial. Consequently, the bail appeal was dismissed.

11.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
375. It was alleged that accused Shadab Ahmad and Athar Khan, both
stated to be members of the Delhi Protest Support Group (DPSG)
and participants in the DPSG WhatsApp group, functioned as local
operatives executing the larger conspiracy allegedly orchestrated
by the principal conspirators to engineer riots under the guise of
protests. According to the prosecution, the plan involved a calibrated
escalation of peaceful sit-ins into chakka jams, which were thereafter
intensified into disruptive blockades accompanied by violence. It is
further alleged that both Shadab Ahmad and Athar Khan regularly
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 719

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

attended DPSG meetings held at the Indian Social Institute, along
with members of the Jamia Coordination Committee (JCC) and
leaders of various protest sites across Delhi. At these meetings, the
progress of the alleged conspiracy was reviewed and operational
directions were issued, including through the DPSG WhatsApp
group. Documentary material relied upon by the prosecution is
stated to indicate that twelve such meetings were held between
December 2019 and February 2020.
376. Shadab Ahmad and Athar Khan are further alleged to have played
an active role in executing the protest plan at Chand Bagh as
devised by DPSG members. Statements of protected witnesses
“Silver”, “Gold”, “Venus”, and “Saturn” are relied upon to support
the prosecution case regarding the execution of the plan and the
specific role attributed to Shadab Ahmad therein.
377. It is further alleged that Shadab Ahmad was present at a meeting
held at the Chand Bagh protest site at approximately 02:00 a.m.
on 17.02.2020. According to the prosecution, this meeting played
an instrumental role in shaping the protests that occurred between
22.02.2020 and 24.02.2020. Call Detail Record (CDR) analysis is
relied upon to place Shadab Ahmad at the said meeting. Statements
of protected witnesses “Bravo”, “Johnny”, “Lambda”, and “Kilo” are
also relied upon to describe the planning undertaken at, and the
participation of Shadab Ahmad in, the meeting held on 17.02.2020.
378. The charge-sheet further alleges that Shadab Ahmad also
participated in another meeting held during the intervening night of
20.02.2020 and 21.02.2020. As noted hereinabove, the said meeting
is alleged to have played a significant role in the protests and
incidents of violence that took place on 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020.
379. According to the prosecution, the aforesaid meetings of 17.02.2020
and 20/21.02.2020 were crucial in the execution of the protests that
culminated in violence on 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020. Pursuant
to these meetings, protesters are alleged to have carried out
violent acts at the Jafrabad Metro Station. Statements of protected
witnesses “Echo” and “Sodium” are relied upon to corroborate the
occurrence of, and deliberations at, the conspiratorial meeting held
on 20.02.2020 and 21.02.2020.
380. It is further alleged that on the night of 22.02.2020, DPSG members
Shadab Ahmad and Athar Khan convened a meeting at the basement
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of one Ayaz in Chand Bagh, which was attended by organisers of
various protest sites in North-East Delhi as well as persons who
were later arrested in connection with riot-related cases. At the
said meeting, it is alleged that they informed the attendees that the
Jafrabad chakka jam had been successfully executed in furtherance
of the conspiracy and directed them to replicate the same in their
respective areas to trigger riots. Thereafter, on 23.02.2020, Shadab
Ahmad, Athar Khan, and others are alleged to have shifted the
Chand Bagh protest to the main Wazirabad–Ghaziabad Road,
resulting in a disruptive chakka jam, attacks on police personnel and
civilians, and extensive damage to public and private property. As
the violence allegedly did not escalate to the desired level, another
conspiratorial meeting is stated to have been held that night at the
residence of one Mukhtyar, where it was decided to destroy CCTV
cameras to facilitate further violence. Specific tasks for disabling the
cameras were allegedly assigned to identified members, with CCTV
footage relied upon to corroborate the presence and coordination
of the accused.
381. The charge-sheet further relies upon reverse mapping of persons
arrested for grave offences committed during the North-East
Delhi riots, which is stated to trace a clear chain of command to a
clandestine meeting held at Chand Bagh at around 02:00 a.m. on
17.02.2020. According to the prosecution, several key perpetrators
of murders, rioting, arson, and other serious offences were either
present at the said meeting or remained in regular contact with its
participants, particularly DPSG members Shadab Ahmad, Athar
Khan, Gulfisha Fatima, and Khalid Saifi. The mapping is relied
upon to allege coordinated roles in the commission of murders,
acts of rioting and arson, destruction of CCTV cameras, assignment
of specific targets, and financing of weapons and ammunition,
culminating in the framing of charges against core conspirators in
FIR No. 60/2020 relating to mass violence and the killing of Head
Constable Ratan Lal. It is further alleged that, after the alleged role
of DPSG in the riots came to light, members were instructed to
delete WhatsApp chats, following which Shadab Ahmad and Athar
Khan were removed from the DPSG group after executing their
purported roles in organising the riots in North-East Delhi.
382. Upon a prima facie assessment of the material relied upon by
the prosecution, the role attributed to Shadab Ahmad appears
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 721

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

to be that of a site-level executor associated with Chand Bagh
and related protest clusters, whose presence at certain meetings
is alleged to have facilitated operational coordination following
directions emanating from others. The evidence presently placed on
record does not disclose that he occupied an authoritative position
in conceptualising the alleged conspiracy or that he exercised
independent control over its strategic formulation. His alleged
association with chakka jam planning, while relevant to trial, does
not by itself sustain the continued deprivation of liberty at the pre-trial
stage in the absence of material showing autonomous command
or unilateral decision-making authority.
383. The prosecution narrative stresses Shadab’s attendance at late-
night meetings and his participation in conveying instructions to
organisers of protest sites. However, even taken at its highest, this
depiction situates him as a conduit for information and coordination
rather than as an architect of escalation. The allegations neither
establish that he devised the strategy to engineer violence nor that
he exercised discretion over the location, timing, or modality of
the alleged unlawful acts. The attributed conduct is derivative and
execution-centred, and the evidentiary record does not presently
disclose that he shaped or altered the trajectory of the protests in
a manner warranting further custodial curtailment.
384. The State expresses apprehension that Shadab’s enlargement on
bail may enable reactivation of dormant networks or interference
with witnesses. However, there is no cogent material to suggest
that he presently retains the organisational capacity or influence
necessary to mobilise individuals or resources independent of the
structures that, by the prosecution’s own account, operated under
a hierarchical command led by others. The risks articulated can
be effectively addressed by imposing conditions restraining his
interaction with co-accused and witnesses, restricting participation
in assemblies concerning the subject matter, and ensuring regular
attendance before the trial court.
385. The Court remains mindful that the alleged acts culminated in
serious violence yet, the gravity of the incident cannot be the sole
criterion to perpetuate detention when the individual’s attributed
role is operational rather than directive. The prosecution has not
demonstrated that Shadab’s custodial presence is required for
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ongoing investigation or that further evidence is contingent upon
his continued incarceration. In the absence of such necessity,
indefinite pre-trial detention would assume a punitive character
inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of personal liberty under
Article 21, particularly where the alleged conduct is neither shown
to be ongoing nor presently repeatable in a manner jeopardising
the proceedings.
386. The Court further notes that the documentary and electronic evidence
forming the backbone of the prosecution case has already been
secured and subjected to forensic processes, and no submission
has been advanced suggesting that Shadab’s custodial presence
is indispensable for recovery of additional material. The absence of
any pending investigative step requiring his confrontation or custodial
interrogation weighs significantly against continued deprivation of
liberty, for pre-trial detention cannot be justified merely to await
the vicissitudes of trial when the evidentiary record is substantially
crystallised.
387. Moreover, while the prosecution advances the thesis of layered
participation culminating in coordinated disruptions across multiple
sites, it is incumbent upon the Court to maintain proportionality
between the attributed layer of involvement and the nature of
liberty restriction imposed. Insofar as Shadab is alleged to have
functioned at an executory tier without demonstrated autonomy
over escalation or violence, extending pre-trial detention would risk
conflating operational participation with strategic authorship, contrary
to the requirement that liberty be curtailed only upon individualised
and contemporaneous necessity.
388. The Court is also persuaded that calibrated conditions can adequately
address the State’s concerns regarding potential interference with the
administration of justice. In the absence of material demonstrating
that measures would be insufficient, continued incarceration cannot
be sustained.
389. In these circumstances and bearing in mind that the constitutional
presumption favours liberty unless its curtailment is demonstrably
necessary for legitimate and current purposes of investigation or
trial, the Court finds no compelling grounds to justify the further
confinement of Shadab Ahmad. The differentiated hierarchy of
roles articulated by the prosecution underscores that his alleged
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 723

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

conduct, while forming part of the evidentiary matrix for trial, does
not presently establish a continuing threat warranting custodial
restraint. Subject to strict compliance with conditions imposed by
the Court, enlargement on bail remains the proportionate course.
390. Having regard to the differentiated nature of involvement disclosed
by the prosecution itself where Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam
are alleged to have conceptualised and directed the overarching
plan, whereas Shadab Ahmad is alleged to have acted as a local-
level facilitator of decisions taken elsewhere. This Court finds that
the threshold of necessity for continued detention is not fulfilled in
his case. Conditional release can sufficiently secure the interests
of justice. Accordingly, subject to stringent conditions as imposed
below, the appellant is held entitled to be enlarged on bail. These
observations are confined to the adjudication of bail and shall not
be construed as expressing a view on the merits.

12. GULFISHA FATIMA – SLP (Crl.) No. 13988/2025

12.1. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
391. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Abhishek Manu Singhvi for the Appellant
submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court declining
bail suffers from a fundamental error in approach, inasmuch as
it proceeds on broad generalisations about the nature of the
alleged conspiracy while completely losing sight of the specific role
attributed to the present Appellant. It was urged that the Appellant
has remained in custody since April 2020, now for more than five
and a half years, without charges even being framed, and that the
denial of bail in such circumstances amounts to a punitive pre-trial
incarceration wholly alien to settled constitutional principles.
392. He further submitted that on a plain reading of the charge sheets and
the material relied upon by the prosecution, no overt act of violence
is attributed to the Appellant at any protest site. The allegations, at
the highest, pertain to participation in and organisation of protests in
the Seelampur–Jafrabad area, which, as borne out from the record
itself, remained peaceful, with no recoveries, no injuries, no MLCs
and no contemporaneous evidence of rioting or use of weapons. It
was emphasised that the Appellant was not a member of the alleged
conspiratorial WhatsApp groups such as DPSG, which the prosecution
itself projects as the backbone of the conspiracy narrative.
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393. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the High Court has gravely
erred in rejecting the Appellant’s claim of parity. Co-accused
Devangana Kalita and Natasha Narwal, who are alleged to have
played a more proximate role in the supposed conspiracy and were
admittedly members of DPSG, have been on bail since June 2021,
which bail was affirmed by this Hon’ble Court. The role attributed
to the Appellant is not only similar but demonstrably lesser, and
yet she continues to remain incarcerated. The finding that parity
is unavailable is thus unsupported by the record and internally
inconsistent with the prosecution’s own case.
394. He further submitted that the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5)
of the UAPA cannot be read in isolation or as a charter for indefinite
detention. This Hon’ble Court has repeatedly held that where there
is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable time,
constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene to protect personal
liberty. In the present case, with nearly a thousand witnesses cited,
voluminous documentary material, and arguments on charge still
pending, there is no realistic prospect of trial commencing, let alone
concluding, in the near future.
395. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the impugned
judgment proceeds on conjectures rather than evidence, particularly
while relying on belated and uncorroborated statements of
protected witnesses, recorded months after the alleged events,
without independent support from call records, recoveries, or
contemporaneous material. The High Court, it was urged, has
selectively relied upon incriminatory fragments while ignoring
exculpatory material, thereby falling into a clear error of law at the
stage of bail.
396. He lastly submitted that the continued incarceration of the Appellant,
a young woman, despite the absence of any direct allegation of
violence, despite clear parity with co-accused already enlarged on
bail, and despite extraordinary delay in the progress of the case,
results in a manifest violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. It
was therefore prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to set
aside the impugned judgment and enlarge the Appellant on bail,
on such terms and conditions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit
in the interests of justice.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 725

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

12.2. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
397. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that the role of Gulfisha
Fatima, Accused No. 5, is clearly delineated in the charge sheets
and supporting material, which establish her as a key local executor
of the larger criminal conspiracy. She was not a passive protestor
but was entrusted with operational responsibility of the Seelampur–
Jafrabad protest site, owing to her status as a local resident with deep
community access. The prosecution case is that directions issued
by principal conspirators were channelled through Gulfisha Fatima
for on-ground execution at this site, making her an indispensable
link in the conspiracy chain.
398. It was further submitted that Gulfisha Fatima actively participated in
conspiratorial meetings, including the meeting held on 23.01.2020
at Yameen House, Seelampur, attended by Umar Khalid, Natasha
Narwal and Devangana Kalita, where instructions were issued for
stockpiling red chilli powder, acid, bottles and sticks. Witnesses
examined under Section 164 CrPC have specifically named Gulfisha
Fatima as being present in this meeting. Her presence is not
incidental but forms part of the preparatory stage of the conspiracy,
preceding the escalation of protests into violence.
399. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju submitted that Gulfisha Fatima also
attended the clandestine meeting held in the intervening night
of 16/17.02.2020 at Chand Bagh, where the final roadmap for
escalating chakka-jam into violent riots was discussed. Witnesses
have deposed that representatives of North-East Delhi protest sites,
including Gulfisha Fatima, were present and agreed to intensify road
blockades and orchestrate violence. This meeting constitutes the
immediate precursor to the events of 22.02.2020 and 23.02.2020
and directly links Gulfisha Fatima to the execution phase of the
conspiracy.
400. It was further submitted that pursuant to these meetings, Gulfisha
Fatima actively mobilised women protestors, used coded language to
communicate instructions, and facilitated distribution of stones, chilli
powder and other material at the Jafrabad protest site. Statements
of witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC specifically attribute
to her the act of instigating women protestors and providing them
with materials used to attack police personnel and civilians. These
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acts are not symbolic or peripheral but constitute direct participation
in chakka-jam and the subsequent violent riots on 22.02.2020 and
23.02.2020, leading to registration of FIRs for serious offences
including attempt to murder and murder.
401. Learned ASG Sri S.V. Raju further submitted that Gulfisha Fatima
remained in continuous contact with other co-accused persons,
including Athar Khan, Natasha Narwal, Devangana Kalita and
Tasleem Ahmad, and that real-time updates from the Seelampur–
Jafrabad site were communicated to principal conspirators. The
prosecution has also relied upon witness statements indicating
that Gulfisha Fatima received funds from co-accused Tahir Hussain
for utilisation in riots. At the stage of bail, these materials clearly
satisfy the threshold of “prima facie true” under Section 43D(5) of
the UAPA.
402. He lastly submitted that the plea of parity raised by Gulfisha Fatima is
wholly misconceived, as her role as a local executor and facilitator at
a critical protest site distinguishes her from other accused who have
been granted bail. The gravity of her specific acts, her proximity to
the execution of violence, and the statutory embargo under Section
43D(5) of the UAPA disentitle her from any discretionary relief. It
was therefore prayed that the appeal filed by Gulfisha Fatima be
dismissed and the order declining bail be affirmed.

12.3. FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:
403. The Trial Court vide order dated 16.03.2022 passed in IA. No.
72/2021 in SC 163/2020 dismissed the bail application filed by
the Appellant. The Trial Court held that the allegations against the
appellant disclosed prima facie involvement in a large-scale and
deep-rooted criminal conspiracy culminating in the North-East
Delhi riots of February 2020. On a holistic reading of the charge-
sheet, case diary, witness statements, and electronic material, the
Court found sufficient material indicating that the protests were
not spontaneous but were engineered, escalated into chakka-
jam, and thereafter into targeted violence, with prior meetings,
coordinated roles, and preparatory acts. At the stage of bail, the
Court emphasized that it was not required to conduct a meticulous
appreciation of evidence, and that the prosecution material, taken
at face value, revealed the appellant’s complicity in the conspiracy.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 727

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

404. A central reason for rejection was the statutory bar under Section
43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Applying
the law laid down in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watalli (supra), the Court held that once there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie
true, bail must be refused. The Court found that the material collected
by the investigating agency satisfied this threshold, and therefore
the embargo under Section 43D(5) squarely operated against the
appellant, in addition to the rigour of Section 437 Cr.P.C. applicable
to serious offences.
405. The Court also rejected the appellant’s arguments seeking bail on
parity with co-accused who had been granted bail by the High Court.
It held that parity cannot be claimed mechanically, particularly in
conspiracy cases where roles may differ, and when the statutory bar
under UAPA applies. The Court further noted that the High Court
orders relied upon by the appellant did not dilute the obligation of
the trial court to independently assess whether the accusations
against the present appellant were prima facie true under Section
43D(5). Consequently, parity was held to be inapplicable.
406. Lastly, the Trial Court found no merit in the defence contentions
regarding alleged infirmities in witness statements, admissibility
of electronic evidence, or claims of false implication. Relying on
settled law, it held that questions of admissibility, credibility, and
contradictions are matters for trial, not for determination at the
bail stage. Considering the gravity of offences, the nature of the
conspiracy, the material indicating coordinated violence, and the
statutory restrictions on grant of bail, the Court concluded that the
appellant was not entitled to bail, and accordingly dismissed the
bail application.

12.4. FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT:
407. The High Court in the impugned order held that the prosecution
material, when viewed cumulatively, disclosed prima facie
involvement of Gulfisha Fatima in the execution of the larger criminal
conspiracy culminating in the North-East Delhi riots of February
2020. She was alleged to have actively managed and guided
multiple protest sites in the Seelampur–Jafrabad area, including
the creation of a 24×7 sit-in at Madina Masjid, Seelampur, and the
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establishment of additional local protest points. The Court noted
material indicating her participation in conspiratorial meetings, her
role in mobilising women protestors, creation and administration
of WhatsApp groups for coordination, use of code words to signal
chakka-jaams, and alleged involvement in stockpiling materials for
violence. These acts, assessed on broad probabilities, were held
sufficient at the bail stage to connect her to the execution of the
conspiracy rather than mere presence at protests.
408. Applying the rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the Court held
that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations
against Gulfisha Fatima were prima facie true, thereby creating a
statutory bar to bail. The pleas of parity with co-accused granted
bail, absence of recoveries, alleged lack of direct incitement, and
prolonged incarceration were rejected. The Court clarified that her
role, particularly in local mobilisation, coordination of protest sites, and
alleged instigation of violence, was distinct from that of the co-accused
released on bail, and that issues of credibility and evidentiary weight
must be tested at trial. In view of the seriousness of the allegations
and the statutory embargo, the bail appeal was dismissed.

12.5. DISCUSSION ON ROLE AND FINDINGS:
409. Gulfisha Fatima, stated to be a member of the organisation Pinjra
Tod, is a local resident of Seelampur and, as per the charge-sheet,
is alleged to have been one of the principal executors of the plan
purportedly hatched by Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam. The protest
site at the 66 Foot Road, Seelampur, is stated to have been assigned
to Gulfisha Fatima along with Natasha Narwal and Devangana Kalita,
both of whom are alleged members of the Delhi Protest Support
Group (DPSG) and its associated WhatsApp group. Gulfisha Fatima
is alleged to have been responsible for coordinating the Seelampur/
Jafrabad protest site. It is further alleged that directions issued
by DPSG were conveyed to Gulfisha Fatima by Natasha Narwal
and Devangana Kalita for implementation at the ground level.
Being a resident of the locality, Gulfisha Fatima is stated to have
facilitated access to the area and to have instigated local residents
to participate in the protests. The charge-sheet further alleges that
on 26.12.2019, Gulfisha Fatima created a WhatsApp group titled
“Warriors” for the purpose of mobilising women and inciting them
to engage in violence.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 729

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

410. On 15.01.2020, Gulfisha Fatima is alleged to have been among the
key individuals who initiated a women- and child-centric protest site
at Seelampur near Madina Masjid, in accordance with the alleged
plan of the conspirators. She, along with Devangana Kalita, is stated
to have attended a conspiratorial meeting convened by Umar Khalid
on 23.01.2020 at a purportedly secret office located at Yameen
House, Seelampur. As noted hereinabove, in the said meeting, Umar
Khalid is alleged to have issued directions for stockpiling red chilli
powder, acid, bottles, and sticks. It is further alleged that pursuant to
the said meeting, Gulfisha Fatima stockpiled chilli powder, wooden
sticks (dandas), acid, bottles, and other materials, and that she
used coded language to transmit directions of the conspirators to
the protesters. Statements of protected witness “Echo” are relied
upon in the charge-sheet in support of these allegations.
411. On 17.02.2020, Gulfisha Fatima is alleged to have attended a
meeting held at the Chand Bagh protest site during the night hours,
which is stated to have been attended by members of DPSG.
According to the charge-sheet, approximately twenty persons
attended the said meeting, including Gulfisha Fatima. At the said
meeting, a roadmap for execution of the final phase of the alleged
conspiracy namely, escalation of chakka jams into disruptive chakka
jams and the organisation of violence and riots- is stated to have
been outlined by co-accused Athar Khan. The charge-sheet relies
upon electronic evidence to assert the presence of Gulfisha Fatima
at the said meeting.
412. The charge-sheet further alleges that on 22.02.2020, Gulfisha
Fatima not only instigated women to participate in the protests but
also actively participated in the protest held at the Jafrabad Metro
Station. In connection with the riots that occurred at the said location,
FIR No. 48/2020 is stated to have been registered.
413. It is further alleged that on 23.02.2020, in furtherance of the
conspiracy, approximately 300 women from the Jahangirpuri area
were first transported to Shaheen Bagh and thereafter taken to the
Jafrabad chakka jam site, where DPSG members, namely Natasha
Narwal, Devangana Kalita, and Gulfisha Fatima, are alleged to have
supplied stones and red chilli powder to them for use in attacks
on police personnel and non-Muslims, thereby instigating violence.
The charge-sheet further alleges that leaders of the Pinjra Tod
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group associated with the Chand Bagh protest site were actively
orchestrating the riots. Statements of protected witnesses “Helium”
and “Sierra” are relied upon to substantiate the alleged role of
Gulfisha Fatima in the incidents of violence.
414. According to the charge-sheet, Gulfisha Fatima is alleged to have
been one of the leading executors of the orchestrated violence that
occurred on 23.02.2020, which is stated to have resulted in loss of
innocent lives and extensive damage to public property.
415. The charge-sheet further alleges that Gulfisha Fatima was financially
supported by co-accused Tahir Hussain in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy.
416. At this stage, a prima facie evaluation of the material placed on
record indicates that Gulfisha Fatima’s alleged role, though not
insignificant, is confined to the operational execution of directions
purportedly transmitted through other actors. The prosecution
narrative does not attribute to her any determinative authority in
conceptualising or directing the alleged conspiracy; rather, she is
projected as a ground-level facilitator at Seelampur/Jafrabad. Where
the evidentiary foundation itself distinguishes between those who are
alleged to have architected the larger design and those alleged to
have acted upon instructions, this Court is persuaded that her role
remains materially distinct from that of the principal conspirators.
417. The allegation that Gulfisha Fatima mobilised local women and
coordinated protest-site logistics, though relevant to the prosecution’s
case, does not presently disclose that she exercised independent
command, resource control, or strategic oversight over multiple
protest sites. The prosecution itself asserts that directions were
conveyed to her by others higher in the asserted hierarchy. In
these circumstances, this Court finds that the level of attributed
agency and control does not justify continued incarceration once
the investigative purpose stands substantially fulfilled.
418. The apprehension that her release may lead to interference
with witnesses or revival of the alleged operational network is
considerably attenuated by the absence of material suggesting
that she retains any autonomous capacity to mobilise persons or
resources in the current circumstances. It is undisputed that the
structures relied upon by the prosecution both formal or informal no
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 731

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

longer exist in their asserted form, and the appellant’s present ability
to exert influence is neither pleaded with specificity nor supported
by contemporaneous material. The imposition of stringent conditions
can sufficiently safeguard against any residual risk.
419. It bears reiteration that the gravity of the incidents in question,
though serious, cannot eclipse the constitutional demand for
individualized assessment of necessity in pre-trial detention.
Prolonged incarceration premised solely on the seriousness of
allegations, absent a proximate and continuing nexus between the
appellant and present threats to the administration of justice, would
amount to a punitive measure inconsistent with settled principles.
In view of her alleged executory role and absence of demonstrable
present capacity to influence proceedings, continued custody does
not meet the threshold of necessity.
420. This Court is cognisant of the appellant’s status as a woman and
the settled principle that gender, while not conferring immunity
from criminal law, remains a relevant consideration in determining
the necessity of continued pre-trial detention. The appellant has
remained in custody for a substantial period, and there is no material
to indicate that her release would pose an irremediable risk that
cannot be addressed by restrictive conditions. The law does not
envisage incarceration as a measure of deterrence at the pre-trial
stage, particularly where the individual concerned is a woman with
no prior criminal antecedents and whose alleged actions stem from
a ground-level facilitating role.
421. The allegations attributed to the Appellant i.e. assignment of protest
sites, coordination of local mobilisation, participation in meetings of
DPSG members, and logistical execution of protest activities are
substantially identical to the allegations against co-accused Natasha
Narwal and Devangana Kalita, who allegedly conveyed DPSG
directions to the Appellant and jointly coordinated the Seelampur/
Jafrabad protest sites.
422. Once bail has been granted to co-accused who stand on the
same factual and legal footing in terms of alleged roles, meetings,
communications, and purported execution on the ground, continued
incarceration of the Appellant violates the settled principle of parity.
423. The prosecution’s evidentiary foundation against the Appellant
including statements of protected witnesses, alleged electronic
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presence in meetings, reliance on WhatsApp groups, and alleged
mobilisation of women mirrors the nature and quality of evidence
relied upon against co-accused Natasha Narwal and Devangana
Kalita, who were enlarged on bail despite similar reliance on
anonymous witness testimony, electronic traces of presence, and
allegations of mobilisation and logistical facilitation.
424. In the absence of any distinguishing material against the Appellant,
denial of bail would constitute hostile discrimination vis-à-vis similarly
situated co-accused, offending Article 14 and the doctrine of parity.
Accordingly, and keeping in view the differentiated footing on which
the prosecution itself places Gulfisha Fatima as compared to the
alleged masterminds Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, this Court is
of the considered view that further detention is not warranted at this
stage. Subject to conditions ensuring regular attendance before the
trial court, restrictions on contact with prosecution witnesses, and
abstention from public commentary relating to the case and further
conditions enumerated hereinbelow., the appellant is held entitled
to be enlarged on bail. Nothing stated herein shall be treated as
an expression on merits or an assessment of guilt.
425. The appellant’s continued detention must also be weighed against
the constitutional imperative to ensure that the administration of
criminal justice does not operate in a manner that disproportionately
burdens women, especially where the investigative agency has
concluded its inquiry against her and no custodial interrogation is
sought. While gender alone cannot dictate the outcome, it forms
a legitimate factor in the proportionality assessment under Article
21, and in the present factual matrix where the appellant’s alleged
participation lacks the strategic centrality attributed to the principal
conspirators this consideration reinforces the conclusion that her
pre-trial liberty can be secured through appropriate conditions rather
than prolonged incarceration.

13. FINAL CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
426. The present batch of appeals has required the Court to engage with
questions that lie at the intersection of personal liberty and collective
security. The guarantee of liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution is of foundational importance, and no constitutional
court can be unmindful of the gravity of restraining liberty before
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 733

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

guilt is adjudicated. At the same time, the Constitution does not
conceive liberty in isolation. The security of the community, the
integrity of the trial process, and the preservation of public order
are equally legitimate constitutional concerns. When bail is sought
in prosecutions governed by a special statute, the Court is required
to undertake a difficult and sensitive balancing exercise, conscious
that neither liberty nor security admits of absolutism.
427. While undertaking this exercise, the Court cannot proceed on any
consideration except restricting the contours of inquiry confining to
law. Where Parliament has prescribed a distinct statutory threshold
for the grant of bail, and where the prosecution places prima facie
material suggesting organised and deliberate activity affecting public
order and security of the Nation, the Court cannot turn a Nelson’s eye
to such material merely because incarceration is prolonged or liberty
is invoked in the abstract. Equally, where continued detention is not
shown to be necessary to serve a legitimate purpose recognised
by law, the Court must not hesitate to restore liberty, subject to
stringent conditions that safeguard the larger public interest.
428. The position of law that emerges may be stated with clarity. The
right to personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 is of seminal
importance, and prolonged pre-trial incarceration is a matter of
serious constitutional concern. At the same time, where Parliament
has, in the context of a special statute, conditioned the grant of bail
upon the satisfaction of a defined statutory threshold, a constitutional
court cannot treat such restraint as avoidable. Section 43D(5) of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, represents a legislative
judgment that offences alleged to implicate the security of the
State warrant a distinct bail regime. The constitutional role of the
Court, therefore, is neither to mechanically enforce the statutory
embargo nor to neutralise it by invocation of liberty as straight-
jacket formula, but to apply it with disciplined scrutiny. Where the
prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses reasonable
grounds for believing the accusation to be prima facie true, the
statutory restraint must ordinarily operate. Where it does not, liberty
must prevail. Article 21 thus commands the manner of application
of the statute; it does not dissolve the statutory condition itself.
429. It is in this constitutional and statutory framework that the individual
appeals have been examined based on facts obtained. The Court
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has consciously avoided a collective or uniform approach. Each
appellant has been assessed on the basis of the role attributed, the
nature of material relied upon, and the stage of the proceedings,
strictly within the limited compass of adjudication for grant of bail.

13.1. ACCUSED IN RESPECT OF WHOM BAIL IS DECLINED
430. This Court is satisfied that the prosecution material, taken at face
value as required at this stage, discloses a prima facie attribution of
a central and formative role by the appellants in appeals arising out
of SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of 2025
i.e., Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the alleged conspiracy. The
material suggests involvement at the level of planning, mobilisation,
and strategic direction, extending beyond episodic or localised
acts. The statutory threshold under Section 43D (5) of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, therefore stands attracted qua
these appellants.
431. While the period of incarceration undergone by these appellants is
substantial and has been duly considered, the Court is not persuaded
that, on the present record, continued detention has crossed the
threshold of constitutional impermissibility so as to override the
statutory embargo. The complexity of the prosecution, the nature
of evidence relied upon, and the stage of the proceedings do not
justify their enlargement on bail at this juncture as noticed in detail
in the discussion made hereinabove. Hence, the appeals arising
out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of 2025 and SLP (Crl.) No. 14030 of
2025 stands rejected.
432. We reiterate that courts are under a constitutional obligation to ensure
that criminal proceedings, particularly those involving prolonged pre-
trial incarceration, should progress with utmost expedition and the
accused are not left to languish in jail. At the same time, the Court
is mindful that pre-trial detention, even when justified by statute,
cannot be permitted to continue without regard to the progress of
the trial. The restraint on liberty contemplated by law must proceed
alongside a meaningful advancement of the prosecution. In the
present case, having regard to the reliance placed upon protected
witnesses, this Court considers it appropriate to provide a defined
point for consideration of their prayer for grant of bail. We are of the
opinion that on the completion of the examination of the protected
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 735

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

witnesses relied upon by the prosecution, or upon the expiry of a
period of one year from the date of this order, whichever is earlier,
these two appellants would be at liberty to renew their prayer for
grant of bail before the jurisdictional Court. In the event of such
prayer being made it shall be considered on its own merits, having
regard to the stage then reached in the proceedings before the Trial
Court, and without being influenced by the impugned orders or the
present order. This course gives effect to the statutory discipline
embodied in Section 43D(5) of UAPA while ensuring that the
constitutional guarantee under Article 21 operates as a continuing
check against continued incarceration without there being any
substantial progress of the trial.

13.2. ACCUSED IN RESPECT OF WHOM BAIL IS GRANTED
433. The appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13988 of 2025 (Gulfisha
Fatima), SLP (Crl.) No. 14132 of 2025 (Meeran Haider), SLP (Crl.)
No. 14859 of 2025 (Shifa-ur-Rehman), SLP (Crl.) No. 15335 of 2025
(Mohd. Saleem Khan), and SLP (Crl.) No. 17055 of 2025 (Shadab
Ahmed) are allowed as the Court is of the view that, having regard
to the role attributed, the nature of the material relied upon, and
the present stage of the proceedings, continued incarceration is not
shown to be indispensable to the conduct of a fair trial, provided
strict safeguards are imposed. The grant of bail in their favour
does not reflect any dilution of the seriousness of the allegations,
nor does it amount to a finding on guilt. It represents a calibrated
exercise of constitutional discretion, structured to preserve both
liberty of the individual and security of the nation.

13.3. CONDITIONS GOVERNING RELEASE ON BAIL
434. The appellants granted bail shall be released subject to the following
conditions, which are imposed not as matters of form, but as
substantive safeguards in the interest of national security, public
order, and the integrity of the trial process.
i. Each of the appellants shall execute a personal bond in the
sum of ₹2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only) with two local
sureties of the like sum to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
ii. The appellants shall remain within the National Capital Territory
of Delhi and shall not leave its territorial limits without prior
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permission of the Trial Court. Any request for travel shall
disclose reasons and such prayer/request shall be considered
by the Trial Court strictly on its merits
iii. The appellants shall surrender their passports, if any, before
the Trial Court. Where no passport exists, an affidavit to that
effect shall be filed. We direct the respondent to intimate all
the immigration authorities in the country not to permit their exit
from the country in any manner whatsoever, without express
permission from the Trial Court.
iv. The appellants shall furnish their current residential addresses,
contact numbers, and e-mail addresses to the Investigating
Officer as well as to the Trial Court. The appellants shall not
change their place of residence or contact particulars without
giving at least seven days’ prior written intimation to the
Investigating Officer and the Trial Court.
v. Each of the appellants, namely Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran
Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan, and Shadab
Ahmed, shall personally appear twice a week, that is on
Monday and Thursday between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon,
before the Station House Officer, Police Station Crime Branch,
Delhi Police, Office of the Commissioner of Police, Police
Headquarters, Jai Singh Marg, New Delhi – 110001 and mark
their attendance. The Station House Officer shall maintain a
separate register of attendance in respect of each of these
appellants and shall furnish a monthly compliance report to
the Trial Court, which shall be placed on the main record of
the case.
vi. The abovenamed appellants shall not directly or indirectly
contact, influence, intimidate or attempt to contact any witness
or any person connected with the proceedings, nor shall they
associate with or participate in the activities of any group or
organization linked to the subject matter of the present FIR/
final report.
vii. The appellants shall not make or publish or disseminate
any information, statement, article or post whether in print,
electronic or social media concerning the present case or its
participants till conclusion of the trial.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 737

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

viii. The appellants shall not participate in any programme or
address or attend any gathering, rally or meeting, whether
physically or virtually till conclusion of the trial.
ix. The appellants shall not circulate any post either in electronic
form or physical form or circulate any hand bills, posters,
banners, etc in any form whatsoever.
x. The appellants shall fully cooperate with the trial and shall
appear on every date of hearing unless exempted for reasons
to be recorded by the Trial Court to its satisfaction and they
shall not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of delaying
the proceedings.
xi. The appellants shall maintain peace and good behaviour
throughout and in the event of any offence committed during
the pendency of the trial, the prosecution would be at liberty to
seek for revocation of the bail granted by filing such application
before the Trial Court and in the event of such application
being filed the Trial Court shall consider it on its own merits.
435. In case of breach of any of the afore-stated conditions imposed
or in the event of appellants having misused the liberty granted, it
shall be open to the Trial Court to cancel the bail which would be
necessarily after affording opportunity of hearing to the appellants.

13.4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
436. Before we conclude, it bears reiteration that a principle lies at the
heart of constitutional adjudication in matters of this nature. The
Constitution guarantees personal liberty, but it does not conceive
liberty as an isolated or absolute entitlement, detached from the
security of the society in which it operates. The sovereignty, integrity,
and security of the nation, as well as the preservation of public
order, are not abstract concerns rather they are constitutional values
which Parliament is entitled to protect through law. Where a special
statutory framework has been enacted to address offences perceived
to strike at these foundations, courts are duty-bound to give effect
to that framework, subject always to constitutional discipline.
437. In the application of such law, the Court does not proceed on identity,
ideology, belief, or association. It proceeds on role, material, and the
statutory threshold governing the exercise of jurisdiction. Criminal law
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does not mandate identical outcomes merely because allegations
arise from the same transaction. Those alleged to have conceived,
directed, or steered unlawful activity or terrorist activity stand on
a different legal footing from those whose alleged involvement is
confined to facilitation or participation at a different level. To disregard
such distinctions would itself result in arbitrariness.
438. The present decision reflects this constitutional method. It neither
endorses the prosecution case nor prejudges the guilt of any
accused. It applies the law as it stands, recognising that individual
liberty must be protected, but that it must also withstand the legitimate
demands of national security and collective safety. This balance is
not a matter of preference rather it is a matter of constitutional duty.
439. Before parting, it is necessary to reiterate the limited nature of the
present determination. The Court has not examined the merits of
the prosecution case beyond the confines mandated at the stage
of consideration of an application seeking bail, nor has it expressed
any opinion on the ultimate culpability of any of the accused. All
observations are confined to the material presently on record and
to the statutory and constitutional standards governing pre-trial
liberty under a special enactment.
440. Having regard to the nature of the prosecution and the period of
incarceration already undergone, it is considered appropriate to
direct that the Trial Court shall proceed with the matter with due
expedition and shall endeavour to ensure that the examination of
witnesses, particularly the protected witnesses relied upon by the
prosecution, is taken up and carried forward without delay.
441. The prosecution shall take all necessary steps to secure the
presence of its witnesses on the dates fixed and the parties shall
refrain from seeking adjournments except for reasons which are
unavoidable. The Trial Court shall be at liberty to regulate the
proceedings in accordance with law so as to ensure that the trial is
not unnecessarily prolonged, while at the same time safeguarding
the rights of all parties.
442. It is clarified that these directions are issued in furtherance of the
obligation to ensure a fair and timely trial and shall not be construed
either as an expression on the merits of the prosecution case or
as a constraint on the discretion of the Trial Court in the conduct
of the proceedings.
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 739

Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

443. The Trial Court shall remain free to adopt such measures as are
permissible in law to ensure that the trial proceeds with continuity
and at a reasonable pace, consistent with the requirement of fairness
and the orderly administration of criminal justice.
444. There would be something amiss in this judgment, if we do not
place on record the able and arduous assistance rendered by
learned Senior Counsels led by Shriyuths Kapil Sibal, Abhishek
Manu Singhvi, Salman Khurshid, Siddharth Luthra, Siddhartha
Dave, Siddharth Aggarwal and learned Advocate Gautam Khazanchi
and their team of lawyers appearing for appellants including the
painstaking efforts put in by Sri. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor
General of India and Sri. S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor
General of India and their team appearing for respondent – State,
the Law Clerks-cum-Research Associates for assisting this Court
in rendering this judgment expeditiously in the background of
voluminous records, lengthy arguments and catena of judgments
relied upon.

Result of the case: Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 14165 of
2025 (Umar Khalid) and SLP (Crl.) No. 14030
of 2025 (Sharjeel Imam) dismissed.
Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13988 of
2025 (Gulfisha Fatima), SLP (Crl.) No. 14132 of
2025 (Meeran Haider), SLP (Crl.) No. 14859 of
2025 (Shifa-ur-Rehman), SLP (Crl.) No. 15335
of 2025 (Mohd. Saleem Khan), and SLP (Crl.)
No. 17055 of 2025 (Shadab Ahmed) allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain