Supreme Court of India
IN RE: RECRUITMENT OF VISUALLY IMPAIRED IN JUDICIAL SERVICES versus
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 300
- Decided
- 2 March 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service and the exclusionary provisions of Rule 6A and the additional requirements of Rule 7 are unconstitutional as they violate substantive equality and the principle of reasonable accommodation.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined whether visually impaired candidates are suitable for judicial service and whether recent amendments to the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules (Rule 6A and the proviso to Rule 7) violated constitutional equality and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The Court held that visual impairment does not render a candidate unsuitable, that the exclusionary provisions in Rule 6A and the additional requirements in Rule 7 constitute indirect discrimination and breach the principle of reasonable accommodation. It further ruled that relaxation of eligibility criteria and a separate cut‑off for PwD candidates are permissible and required to ensure substantive equality. Consequently, the impugned provisions were struck down, and the authorities were directed to conduct selection with appropriate relaxations and separate merit lists for PwD candidates. All pending petitions were disposed of with directions for compliance within three months.
Issues considered
- Whether visually impaired candidates can be said to be ‘not suitable’ for judicial service
- Whether the amendment made in Rule 6A of Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 falls foul of the Constitution
- Whether the proviso to Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994 violates the equality doctrine and the principle of reasonable accommodation
- Whether relaxation can be done in assessing the suitability of candidates when adequate PwD candidates are not available after selection in their respective category
- Whether a separate cut‑off is to be maintained and selection conducted accordingly for visually impaired candidates
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. 15, s. 16, s. 21, s. 253, s. 41, s. Articles 14
- Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970
- Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service (2nd amendment) Rules, 2016
- Himachal Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 2004
- Madhya Pradesh District Court Establishment (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2016
- Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2017
- Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Amendment) Act, 2023
- Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994s. Rule 19, s. Rule 6A, s. Rule 7
- Madhya Pradesh Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017
- Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995
- Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010s. rr.10, s. rr.41, s. Rule 10, s. Rule 41
- Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016s. 12, s. 16, s. 20(1), s. 20(2), s. 20(3), s. 21, s. 24, s. 2(c), s. 3, s. 32, s. 3(2)(3), s. 33, s. 34, s. 3(5), s. 6
- Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and Recruitment) Rules, 2007
Subjects
Visually impaired candidatesAppointment in judicial serviceJudicial service examinationExclusion of blind persons from judiciaryDisability rightsPersons with Disabilities (PwD)Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD)Reasonable accommodationSubstantive equalityIndirect discriminationReservation for PwDSeparate cut‑offRelaxation of marksArticle 21Article 14Article 15Article 16Article 41RPwD Act, 2016UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 222 : 2025 INSC 300
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
(Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2 of 2024)
03 March 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether visually impaired candidates can be said to be ‘not
suitable’ for judicial service; Whether the amendment made in
Rule 6A of Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 falls foul of the constitution;
Whether proviso to Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service
(Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 violates the
equality doctrine and the principle of reasonable accommodation;
Whether relaxation can be done in assessing the suitability of
candidates when adequate PwD candidates are not available,
after selection in their respective category; Whether a separate
cut-off is to be maintained and selection conducted accordingly
for visually impaired candidates.
Headnotes†
Judicial Services – Judicial Services Examination – Visually
impaired candidates, eligible to participate – Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of
Service) Rules, 1994 – 2023 amendment – r.6A – Rajasthan
Judicial Service Rules, 2010 – Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Act, 2016 – Challenge to amendment in r.6A, MP Judicial
Service Rules, 1994 excluding visually impaired and low vision
candidates from appointment in judicial service – Suo moto
cognizance of letter petitions – Amendment, if falls foul of the
constitution – Visually impaired candidates, if ‘not suitable’ for
judicial service:
Held: Visually impaired candidates cannot be said to be ‘not suitable’
for judicial service – They are eligible to participate in selection for
posts in judicial service – Amendment made in r.6A of the 1994
Rules falls foul of the Constitution, hence, struck down to the extent
it does not include visually impaired persons who are educationally
qualified for the post to apply therefor – r.6A is against the guarantee
of substantive equality embodied in the RPwD Act, 2016 and the
principle of reasonable accommodation therein – The impugned rule
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 223
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
based on the medical report of a doctor cannot have any place in
the disability jurisprudence that is ever evolving – Such conclusions
based merely on a clinical assessment of disability, innocent of the
principle of reasonable accommodation are not a fair and proper
assessment of the capability of judicial officers with disabilities while
participating in the selection to the post of judicial officers – Once
a person has been permitted to the degree of law course, all other
opportunities, whether in the form of practice as well as appointments,
assignments whether public or private, would automatically make
them eligible to participate for selection to the same – The principle
of legitimate expectation also stands attracted to this case as part
of the aspect of non-arbitrariness while furthering the equality
doctrine – India is a signatory to United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and hence, under an obligation
to fulfil this object of inclusive equality. [Paras 42, 68(i)]
Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 – 2023 Amendment – r.7 –
Principle of indirect discrimination – The amendment proposed
to substitute r.7 prescribing the additional requirement, to
appear in the preliminary examination of the MP Judicial Service
examination, of either a three-year practice period or securing
an aggregate score of 70% in the first attempt – Challenge
to the amendment and the consequential advertisement
dtd.17.11.2023 issued by the High Court of MP – Proviso to r.7,
if violates the equality doctrine and the principle of reasonable
accommodation:
Held: r.7 to the extent of prescribing additional requirement of either
a three-year practice period or securing an aggregate score of 70%
in the first attempt violates the equality doctrine and the principle
of reasonable accommodation – It is struck down in its application
to differently abled persons who have the requisite educational
qualifications for applying to the posts under judicial service – Applying
the test of indirect discrimination, the ease of practice as well as
the securing of marks cannot be said to be an equal condition to
both classes of citizens, viz., disabled and able-bodied lawyers as
the atmosphere in which they operate are not the same – r.7 will
be applicable to the PwD candidates insofar as it prescribes the
educational and other qualifications as eligibility criteria including
the minimum aggregate score of 70% (with relaxation as may be
determined like in the case of SC/ST candidates), but without the
requirement of either that it should be in the first attempt or that they
should have three years’ practice – Impugned order dtd. 01.04.2024
224 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
passed by the High Court and the consequential notification
dtd.17.11.2023 issued by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
set aside as against the PwD candidates – The appellant-‘AY’ in
SLP (C) No.12179 of 2024 and similarly placed persons are entitled
to be considered for participating in the selection process in the light
of this decision. [Paras 46, 67.1(iii), 68(ii)]
Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 – 2023 Amendment –
r.19 – Relaxation in cut-off marks – Relaxation in assessing the
suitability of PwD candidates when adequate PwD candidates
are not available, after selection in their respective category –
Permissibility:
Held: Relaxation of minimum marks is permissible in law – PwDs are
to be identified as a separate class in itself and therefore, some kind
of benefits has to be extended to them with respect to eligibility which
was extended similarly to other vertical reserved class – Relaxation
in marks can be given to PwD candidates – This relaxation in
minimum marks does not dilute the efficiency in administration – In
view of this and the 1994 Rules as amended on 22.06.2023 which
empowers the High Court with the power to relax, relaxation of
marks in interview is possible for PwD candidates – Furthermore,
the Office Memorandum No. 36035/02/2017-Estt (Res) [Reservation
for Persons with Benchmark Disabilities] dated 15.01.2018 issued
by Ministry of Personal, Public Grievances & Pensions, Department
of Personnel & Training also provides for relaxation in standards
of suitability – Therefore, relaxation in minimum cut-off marks is
permissible, especially when there is a specific power of relaxation
available to the appointing authority – Relaxation can be done
in assessing suitability of candidates when enough PwD are not
available after selection in their respective category, in the light of
existing Rules and Official Circulars and executive orders in this
regard, as in the present case. [Paras 52, 59, 62, 67.1(iv)]
Judicial Services – Judicial Services Examination –
Visually-impaired candidates – Separate cut-off for – Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Rajasthan Judicial Service
Rules, 2010 – rr.10, 41:
Held: A separate cut-off is to be maintained and selection made
accordingly for visually-impaired candidates – Further, maintaining
and operating a separate cut-off list is mandatory for each category,
which includes PwD category as well – When the Rules considered
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 225
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
the PwD as a separate category and provided them with reservations,
it is indispensable on the part of the authorities concerned to declare
separate cut-off marks for PwD category at each stage to ensure
that those similarly placed candidates are adequately represented in
the service fulfilling the very purpose of reservation – Non-disclosure
of cut-off marks leads to a situation where such candidates may not
be adequately represented in the judicial service, which is against
the provisions of the RPwD Act, 2016 – Writ petitioners in WP (C)
Nos. 484 and 494 of 2024 contending that separate cut-off was not
applied in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Preliminary Examinations
and consequently were not selected for the main examination, are
entitled to be considered in the light of this decision in the next
recruitment, if they so apply to the post notified along with the
post unfilled now and carried forward to the next recruitment by
maintaining a separate cut off and merit list for PwDs – Madhya
Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment and Conditions
of Service) Rules, 1994. [Paras 63.3, 67.1(v), (vi), 68(iv)].
Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark
Disabilities (PwBD), if distinct:
Held: For the purpose of rights and entitlements of persons with
disabilities, particularly in employment and more specifically in
respect of the issues covered in the present judgment, there is no
distinction between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons
with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) – Madhya Pradesh Judicial
Service Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
1994 – Judicial Services. [Paras 63.3, 67.1(v), (vi)].
Disability Rights – Constitution of India – Articles 21, 41 – Right to
dignity u/Article 21 – Principle of reasonable accommodation –
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Rights-based
approach – Role of Constitutional Courts:
Held: Reasonable accommodation is not a discretionary measure
but a fundamental right integral to achieving substantive equality for
PwD, forming part of the right to dignity as guaranteed u/Article 21 of
the Constitution – The 73rd and 74th Amendments of the Constitution
of India made it a Constitutional obligation for the State to make
provisions for safeguarding the interest of the weaker section of the
society, including ‘handicapped and mentally retarded’ – State has
an obligation to apply the Directive Principles of securing a social
order in promotion of the welfare of the people – Article 41 of the
Constitution is in the nature of a Directive Principle and it imposes
226 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
a duty on the State to make an effective provision, inter alia, for
public assistance to disabled persons – RPwD Act, 2016 reveals
that the principle of reasonable accommodation is a concept that
not only relates to affording equal opportunity to the PwD but also
it goes further as to ensuring the dignity of the individual by driving
home the message that the assessment of a person’s suitability,
capacity and capability is not to be tested and measured by medical
or clinical assessment of the same but must be assessed after
providing reasonable accommodation and an enabling atmosphere –
Significance of judgement in Vikash Kumar case, stated – Constitution
of India is blind to the differences between able-bodied and differently
abled citizens in matters of providing equal opportunity to all citizens
in all spheres of life, including employment, and envisages equality
and non-discrimination – This principle is to be enforced by the
Constitutional Courts by adopting a rights-based approach providing
an enabling environment and atmosphere and ensuring that PwD
are provided with equal opportunities, and accommodation that
they need and deserve in order to make sure that they can lead
their lives with dignity, realising their fullest potential without facing
discrimination. [Paras 3, 40, 41]
Disability Rights – Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016,
a ‘super-statute’ – Scheme, discussed – Elevating right against
disability based discrimination to a fundamental right – Need for:
Held: RPwD Act, 2016 has acquired the status equal to that
of a ‘super-statute’ and hence, contains the ingredients of a
quasi-constitutional law – The RPwD Act, 2016 marks a significant
legislative shift by expanding the rights of PwDs and broadening
the recognized categories of disabilities – It ensures equality and
non-discrimination, mandates reasonable accommodation, and
prohibits barriers to community life, education, employment, and
access to justice – It also provides for social security measures,
inclusive education, reservations in higher education and
employment, and protection from cruelty and exploitation – It also
imposes clear responsibilities on the State and other stakeholders
in this regard – The right against disability-based discrimination, as
recognized in the RPwD Act 2016, needs to be seen of the same
stature as a fundamental right, ensuring that no candidate is denied
consideration solely on account of their disability. [Paras 36, 67]
Judicial Services – Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act,
2016 – Principle of reasonable accommodation – Substantive
equality:
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 227
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
Held: The principle of reasonable accommodation as enshrined
in international conventions, established jurisprudence, and the
RPwD Act, 2016, mandate that accommodations be provided to
PwDs as a prerequisite to assessing their eligibility – Any indirect
discrimination resulting in the exclusion of PwDs, whether through
rigid cut-offs or procedural barriers, must be interfered with in order
to uphold substantive equality – The commitment to ensuring equal
opportunity necessitates a structured and inclusive approach, where
merit is evaluated with due regard to the reasonable accommodations
required, fostering judicial appointments that truly reflect the principles
of fairness and justice – Disability Rights – International Disability
Jurisprudence/International Conventions. [Para 67]
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – s.34 – Challenge
to the notification dtd.18.02.2023 in so far as it related to
non-selection of the appellant in SLP(C) No.7683 of 2024 on
the vacant post of Physically Handicapped Quota under the
Unreserved category on the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division
(Entry Level) – High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that
the benefit u/s.34 and Clause 11 of the Office Memorandum dated
15.01.2018 cannot be granted to the appellant – Correctness:
Held: Impugned order and the notification dated 18.02.2023 are set
aside as far as the appellant ‘AS’ and similarly placed persons are
concerned – Thus, the appellant and similarly placed persons who
had participated in the selection process are entitled to be considered
in the light of this decision and they may be appointed, if otherwise
eligible in the vacant posts after applying applicable relaxation as
provided for in the executive orders. [Para 68 (iii)]
Constitution of India – Article 15 – United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – Rights of Persons
with Disabilities Act, 2016 – ss.32, 34:
Held: While Article 15 of the Constitution bars the State from
discriminating against any citizen of India on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them, the specific
ground of ‘disability’ is conspicuous by its absence – The fact that
‘disability’ as a ground is not specifically stated under Article 15 of
the Constitution, would not mean that the same is not part of the
constitutional obligations of the State – ss.32 and section 34, RPwD
Act, 2016 indicates that similar to the State’s obligations to provide
for special protection including in the form of reservation for socially
and educationally backward classes in educational institutions
228 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
as well as in employment as stated in Articles 15 and 16 of the
Constitution, the State has taken up the obligation of providing similar
protection including reservation in respect of PwD – However, now an
anti-discrimination clause ought to be included in the Constitution
with a specific provision that the State shall not discriminate on the
grounds of mental or physical disability in line with the principles
as stated in the RPwD Act, 2016 – Disability Rights. [Paras 34, 35]
Disability Rights – International Disability Jurisprudence –
Discussed – United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, 2007. [Paras 37, 38]
Disability Rights – Judicial Services – Distinguished/
accomplished lawyers and judges with disabilities – Exemplary
achievements of, enumerated – Reasonable accommodations
for PwD, necessity. [Para 65]
Case Law Cited
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [1992] Supp. 2 SCR 454 : (1992)
Supp. 3 SCC 217 – followed.
Union of India v. National Federalism of the Blind [2013] 9 SCR
1023 : (2013) 10 SCC 772; Jeeja Ghosh and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors. [2016] 4 SCR 638: (2016) 7 SCC 761; Vikash
Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission and Others [2021]
12 SCR 311: (2021) 5 SCC 370; Col. Nitisha v. Union of India
[2021] 4 SCR 633: 2021 SCC online SC 261; Taniya Malik v. High
Court of Delhi [2018] 10 SCR 348 : (2018) 14 SCC 129; Justice
Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India [2014] 4 SCR
113 : (2014) 14 SCC 383; Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator
Union Territory of Delhi & Ors. [1981] 2 SCR 516 : (1981) 1 SCC
608; Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, AIR Online 2018 SC 544;
Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India [2021] 13 SCR 823 :
(2023) 2 SCC 209 – relied on.
Jacob M. Puthuparambil & Others v. Kerala Water Authority and
Others [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 562 : AIR 1990 SC 2228; V. Surendra
Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu [2019] 1 SCR 954 : (2019) 4 SCC
237; Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and
Ors. [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Aryan Raj v. State
(UT) of Chandigarh (2021) 19 SCC 813; Haridas Parsedia v.
Urmila Shakya [1999] Supp. 4 SCR 476 : (2000) 1 SCC 81; Om
Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 SCC Online
SC 3130; Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India [2007] 12 SCR
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 229
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
991 : (2008) 3 SCC 1; Dr. Kavita Khamboj v. High Court of Punjab
and Haryana and others [2024] 2 SCR 1136 : (2024) 7 SCC 103;
Abhimeet Sinha and Others v. High Court of Judicature at Patna
and others [2024] 6 SCR 530 : (2024) 7 SCC 262 – referred to.
Rashmi Thakur v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and Others, AIR
Online 2018 MP 551; V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu
(2015) 4 Madras Law Journal 513; Madhu v. Northern Railway,
Order dated 17.01.2018 in LPA.640/2017; M. Sameeha Barvin v.
Government of India (2021) 1 Madras Law Journal 466; Neetu
Devi Singh v. High Court of Allahabad, 2008 (2) AWC 1541;
Rajinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2012 SCC Online
P&H 2017; Anamol Bhandari v. Delhi Technological University
2012 SCC Online Del 4788 – referred to.
Walter E. Washington, etc., et. al. v. Alfred E. Davis et al. 426
U.S. 229; S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, European
Court Reports 2008 1-05603; City Council of Pretoria v. Walker
SACC-1998 (2) SA 363; Mahlangu v. Minister of Labour [2020]
ZACC 24; Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons – Sears
“Ontario HRC”, MANU/SCCN/0009/1985; Orsus v. Croatia [2010]
ECHR 337; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom
[1985] ECHR 7; National Capital Alliance on Race Relations v.
Canada (Health and Welfare), 1997 28 C.H.R.R.D / 179 (Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal); Van Raalte v. The Netherlands [1997]
ECHR 6; Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian National Railway
Company [1987] 1 SCR 1114 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
William N. Eskridge Jr and John A. Ferejohn, super-statutes, 50
Duke Law Journal 1215-1276 (2001); Sandra Fredman, “substantive
Equality Revisited” Vol.14(3)., International journal of constitutional
law (2016) 712-738 – referred to.
List of Acts
Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules 1994; Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Act, 2016; Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010; Constitution of
India; Madhya Pradesh Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules,
2017; Madhya Pradesh District Court Establishment (Recruitment
and Conditions of Service) Rules 2016; Madhya Pradesh Higher
Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
230 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
2017; Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Amendment)
Act, 2023; Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970; Himachal Pradesh
Judicial Services Rules, 2004; Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service
(2nd amendment) Rules, 2016; Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service
(Cadre and Recruitment) Rules, 2007; Persons with Disabilities
(Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)
Act, 1995.
List of Keywords
Visually impaired candidates; Appointment in judicial service;
Judicial service examination; Exclusion of blind persons from
judiciary; Exclusion of visually impaired, low vision candidates
from appointment in judicial service; Suo-moto cognizance;
Letter petitions; Disability rights; Persons with Disabilities
(PwD); Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD); Deafness;
Cerebral palsy; Autism; Intellectual disability; Specific learning
disability; Mental illness; Relaxation in assessing the suitability
of PwD candidates; Separate cut-off; Non-declaration of cut-off
marks; Test of indirect discrimination; Principle of reasonable
accommodation; Reservation of posts for PwD; Transparency;
Fairness; Equal opportunity; Dignified life; Fundamental rights;
Principle of legitimate expectation; Right against disability based
discrimination; Mandamus; Non-discrimination; Doctrine of
equality; Equality for PwD; Right to dignity; Safeguarding interest
of weaker section of society; Medical or clinical assessment;
Inclusivity; Non-arbitrariness; Eligibility criteria; Separate class;
Minimum qualifying marks; Public employment; Relaxation in
minimum marks; PH category; Unreserved category; Preliminary
examination; Horizontal reservation; Main examination; General
category; Fully-abled candidates; Recruitment process; Unreserved
category of the physically handicapped quota; Art.14 of the
Constitution; Art.15 of the Constitution; Art.16 of the Constitution;
Art.19 of the Constitution; Art.21 of the Constitution; Art.253 of
the Constitution; Rights-based model of disability; United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2007;
International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice for
Persons with Disabilities 2019; Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, 1969; United Nations Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities; Proclamation on the Full Participation
and Equality of the People with Disabilities in the Asian and
Pacific Region; Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 231
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
1993-2002; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
Pacific; International human rights law; UNCRPD Committee;
Ontario Human Rights Code; European Court of Human Rights;
Human Rights Tribunal of Canada; Department of Empowerment
of Persons with Disabilities (Divyangjan).
Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 2 of 2024
(Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
In Re: Recruitment Of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services
With
Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 6 of 2024, Civil Appeal Nos. 3496
and 3497 of 2025 and Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 484 and 494 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
By Courts Motion.
Gaurav Agrawal, Sr. Adv./Amicus Curiae.
Advs. for the Petitioners:
Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Sr. Adv., Nishit Agrawal, Ms. Kanishka
Mittal, Siddhartha Iyer, Utkarsh Sonkar, Shrey Kapoor, Ms.
Upasna Agrawal, Ms. Aparna Mehrotra, Jabar Singh, Prmoad
Kumar, Apoorva Srivastava, Vishvajeet Vijaykumar Shinde,
M/s. V. Maheshwari & Co., Ravi Raghunath, Manan Daga, Nakul
Patwardhan, Karan Singh, Ms. Kaarunya Lakshmi, Ms. Sejal Jain.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, A.S.G., Harmeet Singh Ruprah, D.A.G.,
S.K. Rungta, Sr. Adv., Arjun Garg, Ms. Kriti Gupta, Ponnam Mahesh
Babu, Brahma Prakash Soni, Mukul Kumar, Sunny Choudhary,
Sarad Kumar Singhania, Ms. Vijaya Singh, Alabhya Dhamija,
Bhuvan Kapoor, Madhav Sinhal, Dr. N. Visakamurthy, Shyam
Gopal, Sameer Shrivastava, Prashant Singh, D.K. Garg, Abhishek
Garg, Dhananjay Garg, Ms. Enakshi Mukhopadhyay Siddhanta,
Ravi Kumar S., Ms. Susmita Lal, Kamakhya Srivastava, Gautam
Narayan, Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Nishant Sharma,
Savadikar Ankur Shirish, G. Sivabalamurugan, Selvaraj Mahendran,
C.Adhikesavan, Harikrishnan P.V., C. Kavin Ananth.
232 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted. This judgment is organized under the following heads
for easy reference and understanding:
SL. HEADS PARAGRAPHS
NO.
I INTRODUCTION 02 – 03
II RELIEFS PRAYED FOR 04 – 8.1
III SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS & SUBMISSIONS 09 – 28
OF LEARNED COUNSELS
A SUO MOTU W.P. (CIVIL) NO.2 OF 2024 09 – 12.5
[IN RE: RECRUITMENT OF VISUALLY
IMPAIRED IN JUDICIAL SERVICES VS. THE
REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH & ORS]
A.1 SUBMISSIONS OF DR. SANJAY JAIN – 13 – 13.11
INTERVENOR
B SUO MOTU W.P. (CIVIL) NO.6 OF 2024 14 – 16
[IN RE: RECRUITMENT OF PERSONS
WITH DISABILITIES’ CANDIDATES IN
RAJASTHAN JUDICIAL SERVICES VS.
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS]
C AYUSH YARDI VS. STATE OF M.P. AND 17 – 21
ANOTHER [SLP(C) NO.12179 OF 2024]
D ALOK SINGH VS. STATE OF M.P. [SLP(C) 22 – 24.2
NO.7683 OF 2024]
E MANVENDRA SINGH RATHORE & ORS. 25 – 28
ALISHA KHAN VS. HIGH COURT OF
RAJASTHAN & ORS. [W.P.(C) NOS.484
AND 494 OF 2024]
IV ISSUES THAT ARISE FOR CONSIDERATION 29 – 29.1
V DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 30 – 66
A EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 33 – 36
& NEED FOR ELEVATING RIGHT AGAINST
DISABILITY - BASED DISCRIMINATION TO
A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 233
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
B I N T E R N AT I O N A L D I S A B I L I T Y 37 – 38
JURISPRUDENCE, DOCUMENTS AND
COMMITMENT
C RPwD ACT - PROVISIONS AND 39
GUARANTEES
D JUDICIAL APPROACH - PROGRESS MADE 40
THUS FAR
E RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH 41 – 42
F INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 43 – 46
G RELAXATION IN SELECTION CRITERIA 47 – 62
& SEPARATE CUT-OFF FOR DISABLED
CANDIDATES - WHETHER PERMISSIBLE
H SHINING EXAMPLES TO SHOW- ‘IT CAN 65 – 66
BE DONE’
VI CONCLUSION 67 – 67.1
VII RESULT 68 – 69
I. INTRODUCTION
2. January 4, 2019 was chosen as the World Braille Day by the United
Nations to commemorate the birthday of Louis Braille and to remember
him as the man who invented the system ‘Braille’ in 1829, which is
used by the visually impaired for reading and writing, till date. Louis
Braille who became completely blind in both eyes by the age of five,
had developed this system by himself at the age of 20 inspired by
the communication system devised by Captain Charles Barbier of
the French Army, and offered professorship at the National Institute
for Blind Youth, Paris, where he taught history, geometry and algebra
while also having an ear for music. Almost two centuries ago from
now, Louis Braille had understood that what the visually impaired
needed was not pity or sympathy but accommodation and an enabling
atmosphere in which communication played an important role. In his
own words, “access to communication in the widest sense is access
to knowledge, and that is vitally important for us if we (the Blind) are
not to go on being despised or patronized by condescending sighted
people. We do not need pity, nor do we need to be reminded we
are vulnerable. We must be treated as equals and communication
is the way this can be brought about.” His words are a poignant
234 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and resounding reminder of the fervent appeal of Persons with
Disabilities1 to be afforded equal opportunities so as to enable them
to enjoy a life of dignity and progress in all spheres on par with their
able-bodied counterparts.
3. “Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before
the law.” This prophetic dissenting opinion of Justice John Marshall
Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) can well be said to capture
the spirit of what we are called upon to decide today. To draw a
parallel, the Constitution of India is blind to the differences between
able-bodied and differently abled citizens in matters of providing equal
opportunity to all citizens in all spheres of life, including employment,
and envisages equality and non-discrimination. This principle is to
be enforced by the Constitutional Courts, by adopting a rights-based
approach, providing an enabling environment and atmosphere,
and ensuring that PwD are provided with equal opportunities, and
accommodation that they need and deserve in order to make sure
that they can lead their lives with dignity, realising their fullest potential
without facing discrimination. Holding this concept of equality and
non-discrimination as the basic foundation on which all issues arising
from the cases on hand are to be decided, we proceed further to
deal with them.
II. RELIEFS PRAYED FOR
Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 2/2024
4. On 07.03.2024,2 this Court has taken suo motu cognizance of a letter
petition dated 15.01.2024, which was addressed to the Hon’ble Chief
Justice of India, by the mother of a judicial aspirant who is a visually
1 For short, “PwD”
2 1. The Madhya Pradesh Judicial Services Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules
1994 have been amended, as a consequence of which, Rule 6A excludes visually impaired and low
vision candidates from appointment in the judicial service.
2. A letter petition has been converted into a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
3. We direct issuance of notice, returnable in two weeks to:
(i) The Registrar General of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh;
(ii) The State of Madhya Pradesh; and
(iii) The Union of India.
4. We request Mr Gaurav Agarwal, senior counsel to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae in the matter. At
this request, Mr Ravi Raghunath, counsel shall stand nominated as Advocate-on-Record to assist him.
5. List the Petition on 1 April 2024.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 235
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
impaired candidate, challenging the legality of the Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Service)
Rules 1994, as amended on 23.06.2023, whereby Rule 6A excludes
visually impaired and low vision candidates from appointment in
the judicial service. According to the letter petitioner, the action of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court is arbitrary, discriminatory, unjust
and violative of the spirit of the Constitution. Hence, she requested
this court to examine the matter and protect the interests of visually
impaired candidates ensuring their right to equal opportunity and a
dignified life, as per the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20163.
Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 6/2024
5. This case arises from a letter petition sent by a visually impaired
law student to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, requesting to
take necessary steps to ensure transparency, fairness and equal
opportunity for persons with disabilities candidates in judicial service
examinations in Rajasthan.
Appeal arising from SLP(C) No.12179/2024
6. Challenge is to the final order dated 01.04.2024 passed by the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in W.P. No. 30465 of 2023,
whereby, the High Court rejected the challenge to the amendment
in Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 and the consequential notification
dated 17.11.2023 issued by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh as
they do not provide a specific exemption for persons with disabilities,
and consequential direction to the respondent authorities to give
relaxation of Rule 7 to the appellant herein.
Appeal arising from SLP(C) No.7683 of 2024
7. Challenge is to the order dated 11.01.2024 passed by the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No.11175/2023.
The said writ petition was filed by the appellant (i) to set aside the
notification dated 18.02.2023 as far as it relates to non-selection of
the appellant on the vacant post of Physically Handicapped Quota
under the Unreserved category on the post of Civil Judge, Junior
3 For short, “the RPwD Act, 2016”
236 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Division (Entry Level), and (ii)to direct the respondent authorities to
grant appointment to the appellant on the post of Civil Judge, Junior
Division (Entry Level) under Physically Handicapped candidate under
the Unreserved category along with all consequential benefits. By
the order impugned herein, the High Court dismissed the writ petition
by observing that the benefit under Section 34 of the RPwD Act,
2016 and Clause 11 of the Office Memorandum dated 15.01.2018,
cannot be granted to the appellant herein.
W.P. (C) Nos. 484 and 494 of 2024
8. To issue a writ of Mandamus directing the High Court of Rajasthan,
to publish separately and declare the results and cut off marks for
persons with benchmark disabilities4 category for the Rajasthan
Judicial Service Examinations at every stage viz., Preliminary, Mains,
Interviews and final result.
I.A.No.242002 of 2024 in W.P(C) No. 494 of 2024
8.1. In addition to the above reliefs, the petitioner sought the following
prayers, by way of this amendment application:
(i) To issue a declaration that the Rajasthan Judicial Service
Rules, 2010 are violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the
Constitution of India insofar as they do not provide for
the declaration of a separate merit list and/or cut-off for
persons with benchmark disabilities’ candidates despite
the candidates constituting a separate class of candidates
competing amongst themselves;
(ii) To issue a Mandamus directing the Respondent No.1
to amend the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 to
bring them in accordance with Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act, 2016 and Office Memorandum issued
by the Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry
of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Govt.
of India time and again to include specific provisions for
the declaration of a separate merit list for Persons with
Benchmark Disabilities;
4 For short, “PwBD”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 237
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
(iii) To issue a Mandamus directing the Respondent No.1 to
hold the separate main examinations for the candidates
of persons with benchmark disabilities category including
the petitioner herein, for selection in the Rajasthan Judicial
Service Examination, 2024;
(iv) To issue a Mandamus directing the Respondent No.1
to declare the results for the candidates of persons with
benchmark disabilities category separately for each stage
of shortlisting for the purposes of selection in the Rajasthan
Judicial Service Examination, 2024.
III. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS & SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED
COUNSELS
A. IN RE: RECRUITMENT OF VISUALLY IMPAIRED IN JUDICIAL
SERVICES VS. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS [SUO MOTU WRIT
PETITION (CIVIL) NO.2 OF 2024]
9. Based on the letter petition dated 15.01.2024 given by the mother
of a visually impaired candidate to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of
India, challenging the amendment made in Rule 6A of the Madhya
Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service)
Rules, 1994, whereby reservation granted in favour of blind and
low vision persons, was withdrawn, this Court has registered the
captioned suo motu Writ Petition.
10. The respondents in this suo motu writ petition are the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh, Government of Madhya Pradesh and Union of
India. Vide order dated 15.04.2024, this Court impleaded one Dr.
Sanjay S. Jain, a professor of Law at the National Law School of
India University, Bangalore, with over 25 years of teaching experience
and totally blind since birth, as an intervenor, to assist the Court in
connection with the present issue concerning the appointment of
visually impaired persons as Judges in District Judiciary.
Submissions of the Letter Petitioner
11. According to the letter petitioner, Rule 12(1)(a) of the Madhya
Pradesh Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017 framed by
the Madhya Pradesh Government in exercise of power conferred
238 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
under Article 101 of the RPwD Act, 2016 provides for reservation
in favour of blind and low vision persons. In light of the judgment in
Rashmi Thakur v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and others5 and
the Madhya Pradesh District Court Establishment (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules 2016, reservation was given to visually
impaired persons. Other States, such as Haryana, Delhi, etc., also
provide reservation for the same category. Hence, the amendment
made in Rule 6A of Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994, is in violation of Articles
14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was also stated in
the said letter petition that the Madhya Pradesh High Court granted
reservation for blind and low vision candidates in the Judicial service
vacancies of 2021 and therefore, removing such reservation for
the present would amount to unjust discrimination between those
selected in the same category before 2023 and those after. Stating
so, the letter petitioner requested this Court to consider the issue
and protect the interests of the visually impaired candidates.
Submissions on the side of High Court of Madhya Pradesh
12. It was submitted that the impugned rule viz., clause 6A of the Madhya
Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service)
Rules, 1994 deals with reservation of posts for PwD in recruitment to
the post of Civil Judge (Entry Level) and the same reads as under:
“6A. 6% posts shall be horizontally reserved, only at
the time of initial recruitment of persons suffering from
locomotor disability including leprosy cured, dwarfism,
muscular dystrophy and acid attack victims, excluding
cerebral palsy, as specified under S.34 of the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (49 of 2016).
Provided that if such reserved posts or any of them are not
filled in a given recruitment year due to non-availability of
suitable students, such vacancy shall be carried forward
into the succeeding recruitment year and if no suitable
candidate is available, then they shall be treated as
unreserved posts.”
5 AIR ONLINE 2018 MP 551
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 239
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
When the Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 20176 were being framed, an opinion
was sought from the then Dean, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose
Medical College & Hospital, Jabalpur, (An Autonomous Government
Medical College) District Jabalpur (M.P.) on the suitability of PwD as
stipulated in the RPwD Act, 2016 for the post of District Judge (Entry
Level). The Dean, vide letter no. 6417 dated 04.10.2017 opined that
a person suffering from certain disabilities, such as, being blind or
having low vision, deafness or hard of hearing, cerebral palsy, autism,
intellectual disability, specific learning disability and mental illness and
multiple disabilities under clauses (a) to (d) of the RPwD Act, 2016
cannot perform the duties of a Judge in the Higher Judicial Service.
In light of the opinion given by the Dean, the provision providing for
2% reservation to persons suffering from disabilities mentioned in
Cl (a), (b), (c - cerebral palsy only), (d) and (e) of the RPwD Act,
2016 was proposed to be removed from the MPHJS Rules, 2017.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Commissioner, Disabilities
in terms of the second proviso to Section 34 of the RPwD Act, 2016
and as per the exemption given by the State Government, Department
of Social Justice and Disabilities Welfare Department, the MPHJS
Rules, 2017 were published and made applicable with effect from
13.03.2018. Thus, there is full compliance with the requirements of
Section 34 of the RPwD Act, 2016.
12.1. According to the learned counsel, the terminology used in
second proviso to Section 34 is ‘regard to the type of work
carried out in any Government Establishment’. The type of
work performed by a member of the Higher Judicial Service
(Entry Level) is identical to that carried out by a Civil Judge
(Entry Level). Therefore, it was informed orally by the State
authorities that there was no necessity to obtain separate
permission seeking exemption for the establishment of High
Court/District Courts as mere change in nomenclature of the
post does not require separate notification, given that the
nature of work and the establishment remain the same. In
view of the said fact that an exemption has already been
granted in favour of the establishment of District Judiciary
by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh in terms of the
6 For short, “the MPHJS Rules, 2017”
240 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
provisions contained in Section 34 of the RPwD Act, 2016,
without challenging the vires of the Rules, the letter petition
is thus not maintainable.
12.2. The learned counsel further submitted that the High Court in
its letter dated 23.02.2023 had approved the amendment to
increase the reservation for PwD from 4% to 6% in light of Rule
12 of the Madhya Pradesh Rights of Persons with Disability
Rules, 2017 and the said amendment as approved by the
State of Madhya Pradesh, was published in the Government
gazette on 23.06.2023.
12.3. Thus, according to the learned counsel, there is no restriction
of any nature on visually impaired persons to participate in
the recruitment examinations for judicial service. However,
the opinion of the medical expert i.e., Dean of Netaji Subhash
Chandra Bose Medical College & Hospital, Jabalpur District,
reflects that a person suffering from the disability stated in
clause (a), (b), (c - cerebral palsy only), (d) and (e) of the
RPwD Act, 2016, would not be able to perform the duties
expected of a judge, viz., going through pleadings of parties,
reading case documents, recording oral evidence, assessing
the demeanour of witnesses, facilitating compromise between
parties, reading judicial pronouncements, conducting court
proceedings, delivering judgments, and handling administrative
responsibilities. In view of the same, it was felt that a person
with blindness or low vision, deafness and hard of hearing,
autism, cerebral palsy, intellectual disability, specific learning
disability, mental illness, multiple disabilities would not be able
to fulfil the duties and responsibilities required of a judge.
Therefore, the action of the High Court is pursuant to the
exemption granted by the State Government, in accordance
with second proviso to section 34(1) of the RPwD Act, 2016;
and the amendment in Rule 6A has a reasonable nexus with
the object sought to be achieved, and is neither discriminatory
nor arbitrary in any manner.
12.4. It was submitted by the learned counsel that pursuant to the
interim order of this Court dated 21.03.2024, all visually impaired
candidates, who secured the minimum qualifying marks in their
respective categories at the preliminary examination, were
permitted to participate in the main examinations conducted on
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 241
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
30.03.2024 and 31.03.2024. That apart, this Court, in its order
dated 07.11.2024 in S.M.W.(C)No.2 of 2024, issued guidelines
to be followed by the High Courts for the selection of candidates
belonging to PwD to the District Judiciary across the country.
In compliance with the same, a proposal was placed before
the Rule Making Committee to align the MPJS Rules, 1994.
12.5. Stating so, the learned counsel submitted that this Court may
consider issuing necessary directions to the respondents
permitting individuals with low vision or visual impairment
to avail the benefits of the RPwD Act, 2016, provided that a
medical assessment confirms the fact that their condition is
unlikely to lead to blindness or significant vision loss within a
reasonable time frame - typically 25 to 30 years from the time
of recruitment - so as to ensure that they can work without
difficulty throughout their tenure.
A.1 SUBMISSIONS OF DR. SANJAY JAIN – INTERVENOR
13. According to the learned counsel appearing for the intervenor, the
Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination (Amendment) Act,
2023 violates the right of the visually impaired persons to participate
in the Judicial Service Examinations. Through various documents filed
along with the intervening application, the learned counsel invited
our attention to the recruitment rules for appointment of Judges
from among PwDs prevailing across India. The learned counsel
submitted that out of the 25 High Courts in India, only a few have
made provisions for the reservation of PwDs, which are as follows:
(a) As far as the High Court of Delhi is concerned, the recruitment
is governed by Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970. Rule 22
substituted in 2019 reads as under:
“22. Recruitment made to the service by direct
recruitment shall be subject to provisions regarding
reservation and other concessions (except age
relaxation) for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and Persons with Disability candidates
[suffering from any of the disabilities mentioned in sub
section (1) of Section 34 of the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act, 2016] as provided by law or orders
issued by the Central Government from time to time.”
242 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(b) As far as High Court of Madhya Pradesh is concerned, the
MPHJS Rules, 2017 was enacted in supersession of the earlier
rules governing the field. Rule 6(2) provides for 2% reservation in
favour of persons suffering from locomotor disabilities excluding
those suffering from cerebral palsy. Apart from reservation in
appointments, the High Courts of Delhi and Madhya Pradesh
provide for partial fee concessions and scribe facilities to
candidates.
(c) Rule 5 of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 2004,
as amended by the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service (2nd
amendment) Rules, 2016 provides for a 3% reservation for
PwDs, for the posts of Additional District Judge and Civil Judge.
(d) In Andhra Pradesh, the reservation for PwDs is quantified such
that out of every 100 posts, 54 are to be made on the basis of
open competition, and 3 are to be earmarked for direct recruitment
of physically handicapped persons. Apart from that, upper age limit
for Persons with Locomotor Disability is determined as 45 years.
(e) In Telangana, the quantum of reservation is same as followed
in Andhra Pradesh and the same is provided only to persons
who are Orthopaedically Handicapped, with no upper age
relaxation provided.
(f) The Orissa High Court also restricts reservation to Orthopaedically
Handicapped persons however the percentage of reservation
is only 1%.
(g) The Chhattisgarh High Court adopts a superimposed
conception of disability by providing that 2% of the posts shall
be reserved for the physically handicapped persons having
orthopaedic disabilities subject to a sub-rule stating that ‘the
person has good character and is of sound health and mind
and is free from any disability which renders him unfit for
such appointment’.
(h) In the State of Rajasthan, blind candidates are extended the
benefit of reservation under the Rajasthan Judicial Services
Rules, 2010. Rule 36 of the Rajasthan Employment of Disabled
Persons Rules, 2000 mandates 3% reservation for disabled
persons, out of which, 1% must be reserved for persons with
low vision/blindness, hearing impairment or locomotor disability.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 243
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
(i) The High Court of Madras vide Tamil Nadu State Judicial
Service (Cadre and Recruitment) Rules, 2007 follows the PwD
Act 1995 by providing 1% in each category separately reserved
for blind, deaf and orthopaedically handicapped candidates and
the appointment are made in turn and in the order of rotation
as specified in Schedule III-A. The recruitment rules further
stipulate that if no qualified and suitable candidate is available
in a particular disability category, the vacancy may be filled by
candidates from other disability categories. The Government
of Tamil Nadu vide Instructions to The Candidates Applying for
The Post of District Judge (Entry Level) By Direct Recruitment
in The Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service dated 01.07.2023
has set out a comprehensive reservation policy for PwDs.
The High Court also provides a complete fee waiver for the
examination however, the notification is silent on the provision
of a scribe facility. It explicitly denies upper age relaxation to
PwDs. While recognising the post of District Judge to be one of
the identified posts for PwDs, the recruitment notification adopts
a superimposed conception of disability. The post of District
Judge (Entry Level) has been identified as suitable for Hard
of Hearing / One Arm / One Leg / Both Legs / Leprosy cured
/ Dwarfism / Acid Attack Victims (without the assistance of the
scribe and with the assistive device) categories of Differently
Abled Persons as per the Rules. The candidates who are able
to perform the following physical activities alone are eligible as
per Rule 10 of Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service (Cadre and
Recruitment) Rules, 2007, as amended in G.O.(Ms) No.234,
Home (Courts-I) Department, dated 03.04.2018:
(a) Work performed by Sitting – S
(b) Work performed by Standing - ST
(c) Work performed by Walking – W
(d) Work performed by Seeing – SE
(e) Work performed by Hearing - H
(f) Work performed by Reading and Writing – RW
(g) Communicating (Including verbal or nonverbal
communication).
244 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(j) As many as 11 High Courts viz., Jammu and Kashmir, Calcutta,
Jharkhand, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Manipur, Meghalaya,
Allahabad, Karnataka, Bombay and Tripura do not provide
for any reservation or concession to PwDs in the recruitment
of Judges.
13.1. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 32 of
the erstwhile Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities,
Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995,
corresponding to Section 33 of the RPwD Act 2016, required
the State to identify posts in establishments that could be
reserved for PwDs. Accordingly, an Expert Committee was set
up on 30.12.2010 under the Chairmanship of the Additional
Secretary, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment,
Government of India to identify these posts. The Committee
submitted its report in 2012, and the list of posts identified for
them under Section 32 of the PwD Act, was published vide
notification dated 29.07.2013. The notification groups various
posts into 4 different categories with the post of Judges and
Magistrates, specifically identified under serial number 466
in Group A.
13.2. It was also submitted that a Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court by order dated 23.08.2006 in W.P.No.9840 of 2006,
expressly considered the inclusion of blind persons for the
post of Judges. In view of the same, persons with blind/
low vision were made eligible for reservation to the posts of
Judges/Magistrates in the Delhi Judicial Service. Subsequently,
another Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in W.P No.983
of 2014 titled ‘Nishant S. Diwan v. High Court of Delhi’ decided
on 25.03.2014, extended the benefit of Section 32 of the PwD
Act, 1995, to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service also.
13.3. It was further submitted that the RPwD Act, 2016 replaced the
PwD Act, 1995 with effect from 19.04.2017. Section 3(3) of
the RPwD Act, 2016 prohibits discrimination on the ground of
disability, while Section 20 specifically prohibits discrimination
in matters of public employment. Furthermore, the RPwD Act,
2016 casts a duty on the State to “appoint” not less than 4 per
cent of the total number of vacancies in the cadre strength
in each group of posts from PwD. Commenting upon the sea
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 245
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
change brought about by the RPwD Act, 2016, this Court in
Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India vide
order dated 25.04.2017 in I.A. No. 10 of 2015 in W.P. No.110
of 1998, made several observations relating to the PwD. Thus,
according to the learned counsel, while right to live with dignity
has been recognized as an integral facet of the right to life
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, non-adherence
to the commitment of the State to protect the dignity of PwD
under Section 3 of the RPwD Act, 2016 constitutes a serious
violation of Fundamental Rights.
13.4. The learned counsel submitted that the impugned Rule i.e.,
clause 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994, creates a stereotype-
based classification between persons with blindness and
low vision and “persons with locomotor disability including
leprosy cured, dwarfism, muscular dystrophy and acid attack
victims” entitling the latter to the benefit of reservation and
not the former. Similar to the provision at issue in Anuj Garg
v. Hotel Association of India7 which created a classification
between women and men, and this Court declared the same
as unconstitutional, after having pointed out that ‘the impugned
legislation suffers from incurable fixations of stereotype morality
and conception of sexual role; the perspective thus arrived at is
outmoded in content and shifting in means.’ Thus, according to
the learned counsel, Clause 6A proceeds on the stereotypical
assumption that the loss of sight cannot be offset by a PwD
consequently perpetuating their oppression.
13.5. It was further submitted that the impugned rule is indicative of
the ignorance to what the disabled, when provided appropriate
support, could accomplish. Such ignorance cannot serve as a
valid legal basis for sustaining the impugned rule. Moreover,
even if the argument that a blind or low vision judicial officer in
the Madhya Pradesh Judiciary would be unable to effectively
discharge judicial functions, is accepted, the responsibility
for this lies with the High Court administration itself. Rather
than outrightly excluding an entire class of citizens from the
7 (2008) 3 SCC 1
246 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
reservation to which they are statutorily entitled, the appropriate
response should have been to identify and address the specific
challenges that hinder their full participation. Such an approach
would encourage constructive solutions to remove or mitigate
these barriers, paving the way for greater inclusivity in the
future. In keeping with the shift from the medical model of
disability to the social model, which this Court has repeatedly
recognized, the focus must not be on how the disability itself
creates obstacles but rather on how the societal / institutional
barriers prevent full and equal participation of PwDs and how
these barriers can be effectively dismantled.
13.6. The learned counsel also contended that the very same
argument which is now being advanced by the Madhya
Pradesh High Court was accepted by a Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil
Nadu,8 which was also affirmed by this Court in V. Surendra
Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu.9 However, in Vikash Kumar
v. Union Public Service Commission and others,10 this Court
overruled its previous judgment in Surendra Mohan (supra),
wherein, the issue was relating to the decision of the Tamil
Nadu Public Service Commission (“TNPSC”) in imposing a
ceiling of 40-50% visual/hearing impairment as the eligibility
criterion for appointment as a Civil Judge (Junior Division);
the Appellant therein, who had visual impairment of 70%, was
rendered ineligible by virtue of this ceiling; the Madras High
Court had upheld this ceiling. When the matter was taken up
by this Court, a two-judge bench affirmed the Madras High
Court’s view by holding that a judicial officer in a State has to
possess reasonable faculties of hearing, sight and speech in
order to hear cases and write judgments and therefore, the
impugned ceiling created a legitimate restriction. However, in
the later judgment in Vikash Kumar (supra), this Court held that
the ratio in Surendra Mohan was flawed as the said judgment
had been delivered after India became a party to the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
8 (2015) 4 Madras Law Journal 513
9 (2019) 4 SCC 237
10 (2021) 5 SCC 370
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 247
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
(UNCRPD) and enacted the RPwD Act, 2016, both of which
recognize the principle of Reasonable Accommodation (“RA”).
This Court further held that the view in Surendra Mohan
(supra) had failed to consider, whether the appellant would
have been able to discharge the duties of a Civil Judge (Junior
Division), after being provided the reasonable accommodation
necessitated by his disability. This Court further held that RA,
by definition, has an “exhortatory dimension” and requires
going the extra mile to accommodate PwDs and an institution
cannot refuse to provide RA on the ground that providing the
same would cause avoidable complications. This Court also
held that an RA analysis required “a consideration of the
specific accommodations needed, the cost of providing them,
reference to the efficacy with which other Judges with more
than 40- 50% visual/hearing impairment in India and abroad
can discharge judicial duties after being provided the necessary
accommodations, amongst other factors”. Furthermore, in
Jeeja Ghosh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,11 this Court
recognized the principle of reasonable accommodation as
being a component of the constitutional equality guarantee.
Thus, according to the learned counsel, the impugned rule is
violative of the principle of RA.
13.7. The learned counsel also pointed out that able-bodied judges
routinely resort to the support of staff members to perform
their obligations effectively. This includes court masters/
stenographers, to whom judges dictate their orders and
judgments. It also includes secretarial staff and judicial law
clerks, who are responsible for assisting the judge with tasks
such as management of files, making synoptic notes of the
cases in that judge’s court and research assistance. At the
highest, all that can be said is that a judge with a disability
will need some extra human support. However, that does
not, ipso facto, translate into greater loss of secrecy. Judges
with disabilities must be trusted with the ability to exercise
their discretion, to determine how they can discharge their
functions in a way that helps preserve secrecy. Human
support, coupled with technological solutions, can facilitate
11 (2016) 7 SCC 761
248 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the effective participation of blind and low vision judges in
our judicial system. Therefore, the notion that these judges
cannot be effectively accommodated stems more from the
mental block that this is beyond the realm of possibility than
from the logistical challenges in getting this done.
13.8. Furthermore, the learned counsel submitted an interview
series titled ‘It Can Be Done’ featuring 21 interviews of legal
professionals with disabilities from six jurisdictions, published
by Rahul Bajaj, Anusha Reddy and Madhavi Singh, discussing
RA for PwDs. Additionally, he also cited real world examples of
successful judges with disabilities, few of whom are as follows:
(i) T. Chakkaravarthy from Tamil Nadu, who was appointed
as III Additional District Munsif in Coimbatore in the year
2009, lost his eyesight due to smallpox at age 4.
(ii) Brahmananda Sharma, who in 2013 secured rank 83
in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examinations and is
presently working as a Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate
of Sarwar in the city of Ajmer District, lost his eyesight
due to glaucoma at the age of 22.
(iii) Ms. Helen Keller, the deaf-blind disability rights activist,
was appointed for a nine-year term as a judge of the
European Court of Human Rights in 2011. Since 2020, she
has held the esteemed position of an international judge
at the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Despite their respective disabilities, there was no evidence to
suggest that they were unable to perform their judicial duties
effectively.
13.9. By way of reply to the submissions made on the side of
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the learned counsel
submitted that the approach of the High Court in seeking
the opinion of the Dean Medical College, Jabalpur, reflects a
closed-minded stance and an inherent bias against individuals
who are blind or have low vision, are deaf or hard of hearing,
or have cerebral palsy, autism, intellectual disabilities, specific
learning disabilities, mental illness, or multiple disabilities. The
learned counsel argued that the High Court, in effect, framed
a leading question to elicit a predetermined response from
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 249
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
the Dean. Consequently, the Dean rendered his opinion in a
non-speaking order, devoid of any legally tenable rationale
or justification. The assumption that blindness necessarily
impairs the performance of judicial duties is rooted in
the outdated Medical Model of disability, which conflates
impairment with disability. While impairment pertains to a
bodily or mental condition, disability arises from the interaction
of impairment with external barriers, be they physical,
socio-economic, political, or cultural. The denial or failure
to provide reasonable accommodation effectively deprives
individuals of an appropriate environment, amounting to a
violation of Sections 3(2)(3), and (5) of the RPwD Act 2016 read
with Articles 5(3) and 2 of UNCRPD. Exclusion of Blind Persons
from Judiciary amounts to both de jure and de facto equality
as the exclusion is not in furtherance of any legitimate State
interest, rather it amounts to denial of representation of Blind
persons in the Judiciary without following due process of Law.
13.10. The learned counsel further submitted that both Rule 6 A and
the exemption sought by the High Court are unconstitutional
as they violate Articles 14 and 16(1) read with Section 3
of the RPwD Act 2016. Rule 6 A is unconstitutional as it is
innocent to the principle of RA and the exemption is vitiated
as the State Commissioner for Disability has mechanically
adopted the opinion of the Dean, Medical College Jabalpur,
which did not account for and rather overlooks the decision of
the Union Government through notification dated 04.01.2021
which identifies ‘Posts of judges, Magistrates subordinate
judiciary’ as suitable for PwD including Blind Persons. This said
classification is not based on intelligible differentia and does
not have any nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved
by the High Court. Besides, Rule 6 A is also in violation of
International Principles and Guidelines on Access to Justice
for Persons with Disabilities 2019. Para 7.1 of these guidelines
reads, “The right to equal access to justice requires that
persons with disabilities have the opportunity to participate
directly in adjudicative processes and be involved in various
roles in the administration of justice on an equal basis with
others. States should ensure that persons with disabilities
are able to act as judges, lawyers, prosecutors, witnesses,
250 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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jurors, experts and court officials in the justice system without
discrimination.” In this connection, para 7.2(b) also reads,
“Remove all disability-related barriers, including laws, that
prevent persons with disabilities from being judges or jurors
or serving in any other justice related positions”. The learned
counsel submitted that these guidelines are in direct response
to and serve as a catalyst for Article 13 of the UNCRPD, which
guarantees the right of PwDs to access justice. The learned
counsel also invited the attention of this Court to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (VCLT), which has
assumed the status of customary law thereby, restraining
the State from exercising power in contravention of its treaty
obligations.
13.11. Finally, the learned counsel submitted that in order to foster
justice for PwDs, Society must abandon negative ontology of
disability. The quest for epistemology to eliminate inequality
and to ameliorate the overall state of PwDs must be driven
by the virtue of respect for difference. Besides, criteria for
assessment of competence should not be influenced by Ableist
and paternalistic considerations. To combat injustice and to
promote inclusivity for PwDs, the idea of ‘Nothing about us
without us’ has to be countenanced by assigning appropriate
value to lived experiences of PwDs.
B. IN RE: RECRUITMENT OF PwD CANDIDATES IN RAJASTHAN
JUDICIAL SERVICE [S.M.W.(CIVIL) No.6 of 2024]
14. This suo motu writ petition arises from a letter sent by a visually
challenged law student to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India,
complaining about lack of transparency in Judicial Service
Examinations for PwD candidates in Rajasthan. According to
him, while the Rajasthan Public Service Commission consistently
mentions reserved posts for PwD in its examination notifications
as mandated by Rule 10 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules,
2010, the final results published by the High Court of Rajasthan
fail to reflect any such reservations. It was further stated that the
High Court of Rajasthan justifies this practice by citing ‘horizontal’
reservation for PwD candidates and claiming that separate cut-offs
are unnecessary. However, it was submitted that reservations for
women, widows, divorcees among others, which are horizontal
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 251
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
reservations, are provided with separate cut-off marks. Therefore, the
letter petitioner has requested this court to intervene in this matter
and uphold justice and equality.
15. The respondents are the High Court of Rajasthan and the Government
authorities. During the pendency of the aforesaid suo motu writ
petition, one Rekha Sharma filed an application seeking permission
of this Court to intervene in this matter. In her affidavit, she stated
that on 09.04.2024 the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur issued
an advertisement for Civil Judge Cadre, wherein out of the total
222 vacancies, 9 posts were reserved for PwBD candidates. The
applicant, who has a 40% permanent physical disability in her eyes,
appeared in the preliminary examination and qualified for main
examination under the category of PwBD. In the main examination,
the applicant secured 109 marks out of 300, which is about 36.3%
of the total marks and 40.5 marks out of 100 in Law Paper-I and II,
which is about 40.5%.
16. The applicant further stated that as per Clause 23 of the advertisement,
a PwBD candidate would be deemed to be eligible for the interview,
if he has obtained minimum 30% marks in each Law Papers and
35% marks in aggregate in the Main Examination. In the case of the
applicant, she had secured more than 30% marks in each Law Paper
and 35% marks in aggregate in the Main Examination, however,
she was not called for the interview. In the said circumstances, the
applicant submitted that she is a necessary party and would be
affected by the order, if any, passed in this case. Therefore, she has
filed the present application.
C. AYUSH YARDI VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND
OTHERS [SLP (C) No.12179 of 2024]
17. According to the appellant, he is a person with Benchmark Disability
and suffers from Thalassemia, which results in physical weakness
and fatigue and requires regular blood transfusions among other
challenges. He, along with other candidates, challenged the
amendment to the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 dated 23.06.2023 as well
as the consequential advertisement dated 17.11.2023 issued by
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The amendment proposed to
substitute Rule 7, which prescribes the eligibility criteria to appear
in the preliminary examination of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial
252 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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Service examination i.e., in addition to basic requirements, such
as citizenship of India, L.L.B. Degree etc., a candidate must also
meet the requirement of 3 years of practice at the bar or pass in
all examinations in the first attempt, with an aggregate score of at
least 70% in case of general and other backward class categories
and 50% in case of SC/ ST categories. Further, the advertisement
dated 17.11.2023 clarified that to qualify for the exemption from
the 3-year practice requirement, a candidate must have passed all
examinations without appearing in a supplementary examination or
availing of the Allowed to Keep Terms (ATKT) provision.
18. The appellant secured an aggregate of 67% in his L.L.B. degree,
but was unable to clear his first semester on the first attempt due
to his disability, and as a result of the same, he had to appear
for a supplementary examination under ATKT. Consequently, the
amendment rendered him ineligible to participate in the judicial
service examination. Therefore, he filed W.P.No.30465 of 2023 to
set aside the said amendment and advertisement, insofar as it fails
to provide any relaxation of the rules for PwD candidates. The High
Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant as well as other
writ petitions, by order dated 01.04.2024 which is impugned herein.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant
19. The learned counsel submitted that in order to be eligible to write
the exam, a candidate must have either completed three years of
practice or obtained more than 70% marks in the first attempt while
doing their law course, in which case, they are exempt from the three
compulsory years of practice. While this rule has been relaxed for
candidates belonging to the SC and ST Category, no such relaxation
has been given to the persons with disabilities. Resultantly, the
appellant, who obtained an aggregate of 67% and suffers from 40%
disability, is no longer eligible to participate in the selection process.
Hence, the appellant challenged the amended rule on the ground
that specially-abled candidates ought to have been given relaxation.
However, the High Court upheld the amended rule and dismissed the
batch of writ petitions. In doing so, it failed to examine the amendment
in the context of persons with disabilities and treated the appellant’s
challenge on par with that of fully abled candidates.
19.1. According to the learned counsel, the uniform application of a
cut-off rule of 70% marks in the first attempt to all candidates
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 253
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
is arbitrary and irrational. Different colleges and universities
have different marking schemes. Even the highest scoring
candidates from top law schools, such as, Faculty of Law, Delhi
University and National School of India University, Bengaluru,
might not be able to meet this criterion. Applying this criterion
to all candidates including persons with disabilities is unfair and
arbitrary. As far as fully abled candidates are concerned, the
consequence of not meeting this eligibility criterion is that they
can acquire eligibility to participate in the selection process after
completing three years of practice at the bar. However, this
may not be a viable option for persons with disabilities. Most
public places, including Court rooms and Court complexes are
not disabled friendly, lacking infrastructural facilities making
it difficult for persons with disabilities, particularly those with
visual impairments, mobility impairments or other benchmark
disabilities, to practice.
19.2. It was further submitted that for the appellant, who suffers
from Thalassemia, practicing in Courts would be physically
strenuous and extremely challenging and therefore both limbs
of the proviso to the eligibility criteria, i.e., passing all papers
on the first attempt or securing an aggregate score of 70%,
should not be made applicable to persons with disabilities.
A physically disabled candidate may not be able to cope up
with the physical levels of activity required by an advocate,
such as walking, climbing stairs, carrying heavy files etc., but
may still have the mental ability to perform judicial duties,
which do not require the same level of physical exertion.
In the circumstances, the learned counsel submitted that
insisting on 3-year practice is unfair in respect of candidates
with benchmark disability, who may not have secured 70%
in aggregate, or had to take a supplementary examination,
especially if the latter resulted from their disability. The proviso
is therefore discriminatory and arbitrary as it treats the unequals
equally thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
19.3. Therefore, it was contended that the amended Rule 7 and the
consequential advertisement dated 17.11.2023 are arbitrary,
unconstitutional and liable to be set aside, insofar as they do not
provide a specific exemption for persons with disabilities and all
persons with disabilities, who are otherwise qualified (such as,
254 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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possessing L.L.B., etc.) should be permitted to appear in the
preliminary examination, without insisting on the requirements
of the proviso to Rule 7 of Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service
(Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994.
Submissions of the learned counsel for High Court of Madhya Pradesh
20. According to the learned counsel, the Special Leave Petitions viz.,
SLP(C) No.9570 of 2024 titled ‘Garima Khare v. High Court of Madhya
Pradesh’ and SLP (C) No.9885 of 2024 titled ‘Tejas Tripathi v. State
of Madhya Pradesh’ filed against the same order impugned herein,
have been dismissed by this Court vide Orders dated 26.04.2024
and 03.05.2024 respectively.
21. As far as the present appellant is concerned, the learned counsel
submitted that the appellant participated in the selection process
for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) for the year 2023,
pursuant to the order of this Court dated 15.12.2023 in SLP(C)
No.27337 of 2024 and cleared the preliminary examination.
Thereafter, pursuant to the interim order dated 21.03.2024 passed
by this court in S.M.W.(C) No.2 of 2024, the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh vide order dated 21.03.2024 in WP (C) No.7452 of 2024
permitted all persons with disabilities candidates to participate
in the main examination, provided they secured the minimum
qualifying marks / minimum benchmark in their respective categories.
Consequently, out of 35 PwD candidates, 31 candidates including
the appellant herein, appeared in the main written examinations
held on 30.03.2024 and 31.03.2024; and the result of the same
for Civil Judge Junior Division (Entry Level), 2022, was declared
on 10.05.2024. While so, this court by order dated 21.05.2024 in
SMW(C) No.2 of 2024, directed that if any of these 31 candidates
had secured the requisite minimum marks prescribed for reserved
(SC/ST) candidates, they shall be called for interview, subject to the
outcome of the proceedings. Accordingly, only one candidate, out
of 31, became eligible for the interview, in terms of the order dated
21.05.2024. The appellant did not obtain the minimum benchmark
for SC/ST category i.e., securing 45 marks in each paper, and thus
was not called for interview. However, this court vide order dated
28.05.2024 in SLP(C) No.12179/2024, directed the appellant to
appear for the interview for selection of Civil Judge (Jr. Division).
Following this, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh preferred an
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 255
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
application being I.A.No.135745 of 2024 seeking clarification of
the order dated 28.05.2024 stating that the appellant could have
been permitted to participate in the interview only if he had secured
the minimum qualifying marks for reserved (SC/ST) candidates in
the main examination i.e., 45% marks in each paper; there was
no specific direction in the order dated 28.05.2024 with respect to
minimum qualifying marks, except referring to its earlier order dated
21.05.2024 passed in S.M.W.(C).No.2 of 2024, and the application
is pending consideration before this court. Thus, according to the
learned counsel, since the appellant has not secured the aforesaid
benchmark, allowing him to participate in interview will cause
prejudice to other remaining specially- abled candidates and is
also likely to cause anomaly for future selection.
D. ALOK SINGH VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND
OTHERS [SLP(C)No.7683 of 2024]
22. According to the appellant, he is a person with disability having
40% permanent low vision. It is his grievance that despite securing
higher aggregate marks (written examination and interview) than two
other selected candidates in the Physically handicapped category,
the appellant was not selected for recruitment to the post of Civil
Judge, Junior Division (Entry Level) in the 2021 Examination
conducted by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, since in the interview
he secured slightly lower qualifying marks. According to him, the
requisite relaxations as mandated under the RPwD Act, 2016 were
not applied, leading to the carrying forward of vacant seats for the
persons with disabilities year after year, denying the appellant his
rightful selection and also defeating the purpose of the RPwD Act,
2016. Therefore, he preferred W.P.No.11175 of 2023 assailing the
final result dated 18.02.2023 of the Government of Madhya Pradesh
insofar as it relates to his non-selection to the vacant post under
the Unreserved Category of the Physically Handicapped Quota
for the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division (Entry Level). The High
Court dismissed the said writ petition, by judgment and order dated
11.01.2024 impugned herein.
Submissions of the counsel for the appellant:
23. The learned counsel submitted that the advertisement issued by
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for recruitment to the post of
256 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Civil Judge, Junior Division (Entry level) provided for a 4 percent
quota for PwD under Section 34 of the RPwD Act, 2016. The
appellant applied for the said post and having qualified in both the
preliminary and main examinations, proceeded for the interview
process. However, his name did not find place in the final result of
the Notification dated 18.02.2023, despite the availability of vacant
posts under the Physically Handicapped (PH) quota. According to
the learned counsel, Section 34 of the RPwD Act, 2016 stipulates
that vacant posts reserved for PwDs can be carried forward or filled
by candidates from other categories in case of backlog only when
no eligible PwD candidate is available. In the present case, the
appellant secured 18.1 marks out of 50 in the interview – falling short
by less than 2 marks from the minimum qualifying requirement of
20 marks (i.e., 40% of 50 marks). Therefore, it was submitted that
the appellant should have been accommodated for appointment by
respondent Nos.3 and 4, rather than the post being left vacant and
carried forward.
23.1. The learned counsel further contended that in light of section
34 of the RPwD Act, 2016, the Central Government, vide
its office memorandum dated 15.01.2018 issued directions
for relaxation of standards of suitability in the case of PwBD
candidates. Further, clause 11 of the said Office Memorandum
reinforces this by stating that there should be relaxation of
standards of suitability where sufficient number of candidates
from benchmark disabilities are not available. In Union of India
v. National Federalism of the Blind,12 this Court in paragraphs
51, 52 and 54 observed that the State Governments as well
as the Union Territories have a categorical obligation under
the Constitution of India and under various International
Treaties relating to human rights in general and treaties
for disabled persons in particular, to protect the rights of
disabled persons. Further, this Court directed the authorities
to issue orders modifying the Office Memorandum impugned
therein and the subsequent Memorandums to compute the
number of vacancies available for the disabled persons within
a stipulated time and also directed implementation of the
directions issued therein. It was further observed that non-
12 (2013) 10 SCC 772
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 257
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
compliance with the reservation scheme for persons with
disabilities should be treated as an act of non-obedience, and
the Nodal Officer of the concerned Department, Public Sector
Undertaking, or Government Company is responsible for its
strict implementation. In the present case, out of 7 seats,
only 2 were filled. Therefore, the standards should have been
relaxed to accommodate the appellant considering his disability
and eligibility, and the action of the fourth respondent denying
appointment to the appellant for the post of Civil Judge, Junior
Division (Entry Level) based on the criteria of minimum cut-off
marks in the interview under the PH quota under Unreserved
Category, despite there being vacant posts, is perverse and
arbitrary. It was specifically submitted that even though the
appellant secured 237.85 marks eligible for selection, he
was not selected, rather a candidate securing 218.78 marks
(bearing Roll No.1028) was selected. If the appellant is not
granted the benefit of relaxed standard, it would only be a
sheer violation of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of
India and would also defeat the purpose of RPwD Act, 2016
as the office memorandum was drafted only to meet the ends
of the RPwD Act, 2016.
23.2. The learned counsel submitted that the impugned High Court
order dated 11.01.2024 ought to have been set aside for failing
to consider the entitlements under the RPwD Act, 2016. It
was contended that the 2021 recruitment process violated the
RPwD Act, 2016 and did not adequately provide for persons
with disabilities. The impugned order, at paragraph 8, states
that the appellant cannot avail the benefit of the RPwD Act,
2016 as his disability—low vision—would have no bearing
on the interview, since he was merely required to answer
questions. The learned counsel refuted this reasoning, relying
on the decision in Vikash Kumar (supra), wherein this Court
held that Persons with disabilities can effectively discharge
their duties if reasonable accommodations are made for them.
The said judgment further emphasized the State’s obligation
to ensure their full and effective participation in society. Thus,
it was argued that the High Court erred in holding that the
appellant’s disability had no impact on the interview and that
he was not entitled to any relaxation.
258 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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23.3. It was further submitted that the minimum qualifying marks
should not be imposed in viva voce examination for entry
level selection, such as, the post of Civil Judge. In support
of the same, he placed reliance on the decisions of this
Court in (i) Dr.Kavita Khamboj v. High Court of Punjab and
Haryana and others,13 in which it was stated that ‘viva voce
examination may not apply for entry-level junior officers’ and
(ii)Abhimeet Sinha and Others v. High Court of Judicature at
Patna and others,14 wherein, while upholding the distinction
between recruitment at the entry-level and higher level, it was
pointed out that ‘interview or viva voce examination alone
may not be a holistic criteria to gauge eligibility’. Since the
present recruitment pertains to Civil Judge, Junior Division
(Entry Level), prescribing a minimum viva voce cut-off unfairly
disadvantage candidates, leading to anomalies, such as, the
appellant’s case, where despite a higher aggregate score, he
was not selected. It was also submitted by the learned counsel
that before 2018, there was no prescription of minimum marks
for the viva voce component of the recruitment, which would
indicate that due consideration was given to the perils of
prescribing such stringent criteria for entry-level recruitment in
the subordinate judiciary, particularly after the candidates have
cleared the stages of the preliminary and written examinations
only to falter at the last stage of viva.
23.4. It was ultimately submitted that presently, there are 6 seats
from the PH category that have been carried forward from the
2021 recruitment and recruitment for the 2022 year has not
been completed. In the 2022 main examination declared on
10.05.2024, no eligible candidate in PH category could secure
qualifying marks to appear in the interview. Thus, the unfilled
PH seats for the 2022 selection and those carried forward,
will again be carried forward to the next year. Therefore, the
appellant being entitled to the relaxation and fully meritorious,
ought to be accommodated against these available PH seats
as a Civil Judge.
13 (2024) 7 SCC 103 (3 Judge Bench)
14 (2024) 7 SCC 262
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 259
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
Submissions of the learned counsel for High Court of Madhya Pradesh
24. According to the learned counsel, totally four posts were reserved
for physically handicapped persons under the unreserved category.
The appellant got qualified in the preliminary examination and was
also successful in the main examinations. As per the selection criteria
in the advertisement dated 21.12.2021, there was a requirement
to secure minimum 40% marks in the interview to be eligible for
consideration. Accordingly, a candidate securing 20 or more marks
in the interview was alone eligible for consideration for appointment.
Since the appellant secured 18.1 marks out of 50 in the interview,
and thus was not considered for appointment.
24.1. It was further submitted that the contention of the appellant
that he is entitled to the benefit of Section 34 of the RPwD Act,
2016 and also for relaxation in standard of suitability in terms of
Clause 11 of the office memorandum dated 15.01.2018 issued
by DoPT, was rejected by the High Court on the ground that
the appellant failed to achieve the minimum qualifying marks
in the interview; and that, he was well aware of the criteria
for the process of selection before participation and hence,
cannot be permitted to challenge the same, having remained
unsuccessful. It was also submitted that fixation of minimum
marks in the interview for a judicial officer has been upheld
by this Court in Kavita Kamboj (supra) and Abhimeet Sinha
(supra) and therefore, the only issue to be decided in this
matter is, whether the appellant is entitled for relaxation of
standards in suitability and if so, to what extent.
24.2. Referring to Section 34 of the RPwD Act, 2016 and Clause
11 of DoPT Circular dated 15.01.2018, the learned counsel
submitted that firstly, the Office Memorandum is applicable only
qua the posts and services of the Central Government and
thus, not applicable in the present case and secondly, what is
required to be borne in mind is that in any selection process
there may be two benchmarks, first to become eligible for
selection, and second would be a cut off arrived at based on
the performance of the candidates. For selection, a candidate
must not only secure the minimum marks, making him eligible
for selection, but should also be above the cut off. In the case
on hand, the appellant did not secure the required 20 marks
260 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in the interview for becoming eligible for selection and hence,
his candidature cannot be considered for selection although he
may have secured more marks than the selected candidates in
the main examinations. The learned counsel also submitted that
1 candidate with locomotor disability and 1 candidate with low
vision disability, i.e., total 2 candidates with disabilities in the
unreserved category secured more than the minimum marks in
the interview and were duly selected in the 2021 examination.
Hence, the reliance placed by the appellant on Section 34
(2) of the RPwD Act, 2016 is also misplaced, inasmuch as
mere availability of the appellant was not sufficient, and he
was not eligible for selection, since he had not secured the
minimum marks in the interview. Since other candidates with
benchmark disabilities (including a candidate with low vision)
were duly selected in the selection process, the appellant
cannot claim any violation of Articles 14, 16 & 21. That apart,
no separate cut-off/relaxation for PwBD candidates or any
other class of candidates has been provided in the original
advertisement dated 21.12.2021 or any of the circulars issued
by the High Court with regard to selection procedure for Civil
Judge, Junior Division (Entry Level). Even this Court, in its
order dated 07.11.2024 passed in S.M.W (C) No.2 of 2024,
issued guidelines to be followed by the High Courts for the
selection of PwBD candidates to the District Judiciary across
the country. Notably, even within these guidelines, this Court did
not mandate the selection committee to lay down a separate
benchmark or minimum cut-off for persons with disabilities’
candidates at the interview stage. Therefore, the High Court
has not committed any error in passing the impugned judgment
which need not be interfered by this court.
E. MANVENDRA SINGH RATHORE AND ORS. VS. HIGH COURT
OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS. [W.P.(C) No.484 OF 2024] &
ALISHA KHAN VS. HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN AND
ORS [W.P(C) No.494 of 2024]
25. The Petitioners in the present set of writ petitions were candidates in
the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examination, 2024. The Respondent
No.1 vide notification dated 09.04.2024 announced the Civil Judge
Cadre Direct Recruitment Examination, 2024, specifying 222
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 261
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
vacancies across the years, i.e., 83 posts in 2022, 57 posts in
2023, and 82 posts in 2024 and a total of 9 posts were reserved for
PwBD i.e., Blindness and Low Vision – 2 seats, Deaf and Hard of
Hearing – 3 seats, Locomotor – 2 seats and Autism – 2 seats with
horizontal reservation across total vacancies. Further, persons with
disabilities’ candidates needed to secure a minimum of 40% marks
in the Preliminary Examination to qualify for the Main Examination.
Clause 23(ii) of the notification stated that the number of candidates
admitted to the Main Examination would be fifteen times the total
vacancies (category-wise), ensuring that all candidates securing the
same percentage as the last cut-off would be included. Therefore,
applying the same, a total number of 135 PwD candidates across
all vertical classifications ought to have been selected for the main
examination. However, only 11 PwD candidates were selected for
the main examinations. Moreover, the Respondent No.1 at the
time of declaring the result vide notice dated 15.07.2024 for the
preliminary examination, failed to identify any specific cut-off for
PwD candidates, thus making it unascertainable to determine the
lowest score at which a PwD candidate was declared qualified for
the main examination. In contrast, cut-offs were clearly mentioned
for other horizontal reservation categories such as women, divorced
candidates, and widows. The petitioners assert that the omission
by Respondent No.1 has left them and other PwD candidates
without clarity regarding their selection for the Main Examination.
Consequently, they have filed the present writ petitions seeking
appropriate directions to Respondent No.1 to declare the results
separately for PwD candidates and additionally specify the cut-off
marks for their category. They contend that this failure violates their
constitutional and statutory rights to a fair selection process and
deprives them of a legitimate opportunity to be considered for the
seats reserved for their category in the Rajasthan Judicial Service
Examination, 2024.
Submissions on the side of the Petitioners:
26. It was submitted that instead of declaring a separate cut-off for PwD
candidates, the first respondent applied the cut-off for the respective
vertical category of each PwD candidate, essentially making PwD
candidates compete with the candidates of their respective vertical
categories, thereby defeating the very purpose of reservation. In fact,
262 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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one of the candidates in the PwD category scored 72 marks in the
Preliminary Examination but was not allowed to participate in the
Main Examination as the cut-off for his vertical category, viz., General
Category was 73 marks. Such an approach is in direct violation of
Rule 11(4) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017 and
Rule 5 of the Rajasthan Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules,
2018, which categorically states that vacancies for PwD candidates
would be maintained as a separate class. Therefore, the cut-off for
PwD candidates against such “separate class” of vacancies ought to
have been declared separately. In this regard, the learned counsel
drew the attention of this Court to Clause 15(iii) of the Notification
dated 09.04.2024 which states that selected PwD candidates would
be adjusted to their respective categories.
26.1. The learned counsel further submitted that in an identical case
in Writ Petition(C)No.710 of 2024 titled ‘Siddharth Sharma v.
High Court of Rajasthan & Ors.’ this Court vide order dated
24.10.2024, allowed the petitioner therein (a blind PwD
candidate) to appear in the interview round of the Rajasthan
Judicial Service Examination, 2024, considering the fact that
the selection process had not been undertaken properly. In
view of the same, in another case in Writ Petition (C) Diary
No.49998 of 2024 titled ‘Tishan Jangid v. High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan & Anr.’, this Court vide interim order
dated 25.10.2024, allowed the petitioner therein (suffering
from 60% locomotor disability) to participate in the interview
round of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examination, 2024.
Thus, only a total of 2 candidates who obtained interim
relief from this Court, got the opportunity to appear in the
interview round and finally secured the seats against the
vacancies as per the result dated 27.10.2024; and the
remaining reserved seats for PwD candidates were converted
to general category seats and were filled accordingly. The
said appointment was also confirmed by this Court vide final
order dated 07.11.2024. Due to the erroneous approach of
the first respondent in the selection process from the stage
of Preliminary Examination itself, sufficient and correct
number of PwD candidates could not be selected in the
subsequent rounds, thereby resulting in the non-fulfilment of
the vacancies reserved for them. Consequently, individuals
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 263
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
with vastly different abilities were compelled to compete
under a single category, causing a substantial number of
eligible PwD candidates to be eliminated from the selection
process and since they were required to compete with fully-
abled candidates in their respective vertical categories, the
selection process was contrary to the spirit of the Constitution
and the RPwD Act, 2016.
Submissions made by the learned counsel for Rajasthan High Court:
27. According to the learned counsel, the petitioners participated in
the Civil Judge Cadre Direct Recruitment Examination, 2024 in
pursuance of the advertisement dated 09.04.2024 and appeared
in the Preliminary Examination conducted on 23.06.2024. Since
the petitioners could not secure the qualifying marks for the main
examinations, they have preferred the present writ petitions.
27.1. Adding further, the learned counsel submitted that during the
pendency of the Writ Petitions, Main examinations for the Civil
Judge Cadre were conducted on 31.08.2024 and 01.09.2024
and the result of the same was declared on 01.10.2024.
Thereafter, interview was conducted between 16.10.2024 and
26.10.2024 and the merit-wise list of 222 selected candidates
was declared on 27.10.2024 with corrigendum on 07.11.2024.
27.2. Continuing further, it was submitted that the reservation for PwD
candidates is provided in Rule 10 of the Rajasthan Judicial
Service Rules, 2010, as per which reservation of vacancies
for persons with benchmark disabilities in the recruitment
to the judicial service shall be in accordance with the rules
of the State as amended from time to time. Hence, it was
pointed out that the Notification dated 16.03.2024 introduced
an amendment to the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010,
providing relaxation in age and a concession of 5% in marks
in favour of persons with benchmark disabilities’ candidates.
27.3. It was further submitted that the issue regarding declaring
separate cut-off marks for the persons with benchmark
disabilities arose in the context of recruitment to Civil Judge
Cadre in the State of Rajasthan in C.A.Nos.5051/2023 and
5052/2023 and this Court, vide judgment dated 21.08.2024
observed as follows:
264 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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“15…. The respondents therefore in the notice
declaring result of Preliminary Examination had
rightly shown the cut off marks for all the categories
except for the category of persons with benchmark
disabilities. The Persons with benchmark disabilities
for being adjusted in the category for which he or
she had applied, had to secure the minimum cut off
marks fixed for such category under which he or she
had applied. Such fixation of cut off marks for other
categories and non-fixation of cut off marks for the
category of persons with benchmark disability could
neither be said to be arbitrary nor violative of any of
the Fundamental Rights of the appellants.”
Therefore, according to the learned counsel, no relief can be granted
to the petitioners in the 2024 Civil Judge Cadre recruitment process.
Reply of the learned counsel for the petitioners
28. The learned counsel submitted that in the judgment dated 21.08.2024
rendered by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos.5051 of 2023 and 5052
of 2023, which has been relied upon by the first respondent, it was
observed that non-fixation of cut off marks for persons with benchmark
disabilities’ candidates did not amount to a violation of fundamental
rights. However, it is pertinent to note that the factual matrix in the
aforementioned Civil Appeals was distinct, as no separate minimum
qualifying marks had been allocated for persons with benchmark
disabilities’ candidates in that case. It was also submitted that
subsequent to the aforesaid judgment, a three-judge bench of this
Court has passed an order dated 07.11.2024 in S.M.W.(C)No.2 of
2024 laying down general guidelines for the governance of selection
of candidates to the district judiciary across the country. Therefore,
the learned counsel prayed for appropriate orders to be passed in
these writ petitions.
IV. ISSUES THAT ARISE FOR CONSIDERATION
29. The questions that need to be addressed have been outlined in
the pleadings and submissions made by the learned counsel.
While discussing and analysing them, there may be overlapping
or intersectional aspects, making it rather necessary to address
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In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
all the issues collectively. However, for clarity and a structured
understanding, conclusions will be stated issue-wise.
29.1. The following issues arise in the cases on hand:
i. Whether visually impaired candidates can be said to be
‘not suitable’ for judicial service?
ii. Whether the amendment made in Rule 6A of Madhya
Pradesh Judicial Services (Recruitment and Conditions
of Service) Rules, 1994 falls foul of the constitution?
iii. Whether proviso to Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial
Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
1994 violates the equality doctrine and the principle of
reasonable accommodation?
iv. Whether relaxation can be done in assessing the suitability
of candidates when adequate PwD candidates are not
available, after selection in their respective category?
v. Whether a separate cut-off is to be maintained and
selection conducted accordingly for visually impaired
candidates?
V. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
30. Heard the learned counsel appearing for all the parties and perused
the records.
31. The present set of cases raise important issues that touch upon
the umbrella of rights in respect of the differently abled persons or
PwD who have been afforded special protection under the law. More
particularly, the main question that needs to be addressed relates
to the suitability of visually impaired persons qualified with a degree
in law to be appointed as judicial officers, apart from allied issues
and ancillary principles as to the application of the equality doctrine
read with the principle of reasonable accommodation as has been
recognised and specifically provided for in the RPwD Act, 2016. This
Court consciously uses the word “suitability” as against “eligibility”
as it is a matter of fact that once a person completes a degree in
law and acquires the other required educational qualifications as
stipulated for appointment as a judicial officer, he/she is eligible for
appointment to the said post. However, what has been raised here
266 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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relates to the validity of the rules that touch upon the suitability of the
candidates to the said post. This in our opinion, requires a detailed
discussion and finding in order that such doubts relating to suitability
may not be raised in the future and the statutory rules in this regard
be framed and modulated accordingly.
32. The crux of the issue in the cases therefore is, on the one hand,
the validity of the Rules that bar visually impaired persons from
participating in the selection of judicial service both directly and
indirectly, and on the other hand, the non-selection of the candidates
(where they were permitted to participate) to the vacant posts under
the Unreserved Category of the Physically Handicapped Quota for
the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division (Entry Level).
A. EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK & NEED
FOR ELEVATING RIGHT AGAINST DISABILITY BASED
DISCRIMINATION TO A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
33. If there is one principle that forms part of the bedrock of the
Constitution of India, it is ‘inclusivity’ on which also rests the doctrine
of equality, which, apart from being one of the ideals set out in the
preamble to our Constitution, has been specifically stated in Articles
14, 15 and 16 under the Fundamental Rights Chapter, and forms
part of the basic structure of our Constitution. Furthermore, the other
provisions of the Constitution, more importantly the golden triangle of
Articles 14, 19 and 21 would take within their sweep every right that
forms part of the Right to life which certainly and most importantly
includes the right to live with dignity.
34. While Article 15 of the Constitution specifically bars the State
from discriminating against any citizen of India on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them, the specific
ground of ‘disability’ is conspicuous by its absence. Though the
anti-discrimination and non-discrimination clauses under Article 15
were discussed at length in the Constituent Assembly, ‘disability’
as a ground for non-discrimination was not included in Article 15. A
constitutional amendment of Article 15 to address this glaring omission
has been a long-standing demand of the disability rights movement.
This demand was also affirmed by the United Nations Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in its concluding observations
in 2019 while reviewing India’s compliance with the United Nations
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Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.15 Though
Article 15 contains a strong anti-discrimination clause, the fact that it
specifies other grounds while not mentioning ‘disability’ as a ground
has remained a stumbling block for bringing in legislation, and the
first legislation in this regard was the Persons with disabilities (Equal
opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.
The preamble to the Act would make it clear that this Act was passed
pursuant to the Proclamation on the Full Participation and Equality
of the People with Disabilities in the Asian and Pacific Region,
adopted at the Meeting to Launch the Asian and Pacific Decade
of Disabled Persons 1993 - 2002 convened by the Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and Pacific held at Beijing on 1st to 5th
December, 1992.
35. Thereafter, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities was adopted in 2006 to which India is a signatory.
Pursuant thereto, the RPwD Act, 2016 came to be passed. While it is
true that the RPwD Act, 2016 came to be passed as part of fulfilment
of India’s obligations under the treaty implementation regime and
was enacted by the Parliament under Article 253 of the Constitution,
the fact that ‘disability’ as a ground is not specifically stated under
Article 15 of the Constitution, would not mean that the same is not
part of the constitutional obligations of the State. The provisions under
section 32 and section 34 of the RPwD Act, 2016 would also be a
clear indication that similar to the State’s obligations to provide for
special protection including in the form of reservation for socially and
educationally backward classes in educational institutions as well as
in employment as stated in Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution,
the State has taken up the obligation of providing similar protection
including reservation in respect of PwD. In view of the same, it can
now be said that it is high time that an anti-discrimination clause be
included in the Constitution with a specific provision that the State
shall not discriminate on the grounds of mental or physical disability
in line with the principles as stated in the RPwD Act, 2016. At this
juncture, it is relevant to point out that as many as 70 countries out of
189 contain ‘disability’ as one of the grounds mentioned specifically in
the constitutional provisions containing the anti-discrimination clause.
15 Committee report
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36. In this context, it is also relevant to mention that the RPwD Act, 2016
today has acquired the status of a ‘super statute’. The term ‘super
statute’ was first applied in 2001 by William N. Eskridge and John
A. Ferejohn to characterise an ordinary statute that not only reveals
intention but also establishes a new normative or institutional framework
in the public culture and has a broad effect on the law. As a result,
such statutes have a quasi-constitutional significance that exceed its
former status as a statute. In the words of the authors, “these super-
statutes penetrate the public normative and institutional and institutional
culture”.16 Applying this test, it can safely be said that the RPwD Act,
2016 has acquired the status equal to that of a ‘super-statute’ and
hence, contains the ingredients of a quasi-constitutional law.
B. I N T E R N AT I O N A L D I S A B I L I T Y J U R I S P R U D E N C E ,
DOCUMENTS AND COMMITMENT
37. In international human rights law, equality is founded upon two
complementary principles: non-discrimination and reasonable
differentiation. The principle of non-discrimination seeks to ensure
that all persons can equally enjoy and exercise all their rights
and freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to arbitrary denial of
opportunities for equal participation. For example, when public
facilities and services are set on standards out of the reach of PwD,
it leads to exclusion and denial of rights. Equality not only implies
preventing discrimination (example, the protection of individuals
against unfavourable treatment by introducing anti-discrimination
laws), but goes beyond in remedying discrimination against groups
suffering systematic discrimination in society. In concrete terms, it
means embracing the notion of positive rights, affirmative action and
reasonable accommodation. The move from the patronising and
paternalistic approach to PwD represented by the medical model to
viewing them as members of the community with equal rights has
also been reflected in the evolution of international standards relating
specifically to disabilities, as well as in moves to place the rights of
PwD within the category of universal human rights.
38. It would be apposite to extract some of the provisions contained in
United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
16 William N. Eskridge Jr and John A. Ferejohn, super-statutes, 50 duke law journal 1215-1276 (2001)
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In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
2007, where all member states and signatories, including India, are
bound by, and they are as under:
PREAMBLE
b. Recognizing that the United Nations, in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and in the International
Covenants on Human Rights, has proclaimed and agreed
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth therein, without distinction of any kind
c. Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility, interdependence
and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms and the need for persons with disabilities to be
guaranteed their full enjoyment without discrimination….”
ARTICLE 1 – PURPOSE
“The purpose of the present Convention is to promote,
protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with
disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-
term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis
with others.”
ARTICLE 5 – EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
States Parties recognize that all persons are equal
before and under the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit
of the law.
States Parties shall prohibit all discrimination on the basis
of disability and guarantee to persons with disabilities
equal and effective legal protection against discrimination
on all grounds.
In order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination,
States Parties shall take all appropriate steps to ensure
that reasonable accommodation is provided.
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ARTICLE 9 – ACCESSIBILITY
To enable persons with disabilities to live independently
and participate fully in all aspects of life, States Parties
shall take appropriate measures to ensure to persons
with disabilities access, on an equal basis with others,
to the physical environment, to transportation, to
information and communications, including information and
communications technologies and systems, and to other
facilities and services open or provided to the public, both
in urban and in rural areas.
ARTICLE 13 – ACCESS TO JUSTICE
States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for
persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others,
including through the provision of procedural and age-
appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their
effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as
witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative
and other preliminary stages.
ARTICLE 14 – LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF THE PERSON
States Parties shall ensure that persons with disabilities,
on an equal basis with others:
a. Enjoy the right to liberty and security of person;
b. Are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily,
and that any deprivation of liberty is in conformity with the
law, and that the existence of a disability shall in no case
justify a deprivation of liberty.
ARTICLE 21 – FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OPINION, AND
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
ensure that persons with disabilities can exercise the
right to freedom of expression and opinion, including the
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
on an equal basis with others and through all forms of
communication of their choice.
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In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
ARTICLE 24 – EDUCATION
States Parties recognize the right of persons with
disabilities to education. With a view to realizing this right
without discrimination and on the basis of equal opportunity,
States Parties shall ensure an inclusive education system
at all levels and lifelong learning.
ARTICLE 27 – WORK AND EMPLOYMENT
To achieve de facto equality in terms of the Convention,
States parties must ensure that there is no discrimination
on the grounds of disability in connection to work and
employment. In order to ensure reasonable accommodation
as laid out in Article 5(3) and to achieve or accelerate de
facto equality in the work environment as laid out in Article
5(4), States parties should:
(a) Facilitate the transition away from segregated work
environments for persons with disabilities and support
their engagement in the open labour market, and in the
meantime also ensure the immediate applicability of labour
rights to those settings;
(b) Promote the right to supported employment, including to
work assistance, job coaching and vocational qualification
programmes; protect the rights of workers with disabilities;
and ensure the right to freely chosen employment;
(c) Ensure that persons with disabilities are paid no less
than the minimum wage and do not lose the benefit of
disability allowances when they start work;
(d) Expressly recognize the denial of reasonable
accommodation as discrimination and prohibit multiple and
intersectional discrimination, and harassment;
(e) Ensure proper transition into and out of employment for
persons with disabilities in a non-discriminatory manner.
States parties are obliged to ensure equal and effective
access to benefits and entitlements, such as retirement
or unemployment benefits. Such entitlements must not
be infringed upon by exclusion from employment, thereby
further exacerbating the situation of exclusion;
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(f) Promote work in inclusive and accessible, safe and
healthy working environments in the public and private
sectors;
(g) Ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy equal
opportunities regarding career advancement opportunities
through regular assessment meetings with their managers
and by defining the objectives to be achieved, as a part
of a comprehensive strategy;
(h) Ensure access to training, retraining and education,
including vocational training and capacity-building
for employees with disabilities, and provide training
on the employment of persons with disabilities and
reasonable accommodation for employers, representative
organizations of employees and employers, unions and
competent authorities;
(i) Work towards universally applicable occupational health
and safety measures for persons with disabilities, including
occupational safety and health regulations that are non-
discriminatory and inclusive of persons with disabilities;
(j) Recognize the right of persons with disabilities to have
access to trade and labor union.
ARTICLE 30 – PARTICIPATION IN CULTURAL LIFE, RECREATION,
LEISURE AND SPORT
States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities
to take part on an equal basis with others in cultural life,
and shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that
persons with disabilities enjoy access to cultural materials
in accessible formats.
ARTICLE 32 – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
1. States Parties recognize the importance of international
cooperation and its promotion, in support of national efforts
for the realization of the purpose and objectives of the
present Convention, and will undertake appropriate and
effective measures in this regard, between and among
States and, as appropriate, in partnership with relevant
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In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
international and regional organizations and civil society, in
particular organizations of persons with disabilities. Such
measures could include, inter alia:
a. Ensuring that international cooperation, including
international development programmes, is inclusive of and
accessible to persons with disabilities;
b. Facilitating and supporting capacity-building, including
through the exchange and sharing of information,
experiences, training programmes and best practices;
c. Facilitating cooperation in research and access to
scientific and technical knowledge;
d. Providing, as appropriate, technical and economic
assistance, including by facilitating access to and sharing
of accessible and assistive technologies, and through the
transfer of technologies.
Thus, this convention is intended to promote, protect and ensure
the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms by all persons with disabilities. It also aims to promote
respect for their inherent dignity and it combines civil and political
rights provided by anti-discrimination legislation along with an array
of social, cultural, and economic measures to fulfil the guarantee
of equality.
C. RPwD Act, 2016 - PROVISIONS AND GUARANTEES
39. The RPwD Act 2016 seeks to operationalize and give concrete
shape to the promise of full and equal citizenship held out by the
Constitution to the disabled and to execute its ethos of inclusion
and acceptance. The important provisions of the RPwD Act, 2016
are as follows:
SECTION 2
(C) “barrier” means any factor including communicational,
cultural, economic, environmental, institutional, political,
social, attitudinal or structural factors which hampers the
full and effective participation of persons with disabilities
in society;
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(h) “discrimination” in relation to disability, means any
distinction, exclusion, restriction on the basis of disability
which is the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with
others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field and includes all forms of discrimination and denial
of reasonable accommodation;
(l) “high support” means an intensive support, physical,
psychological and otherwise, which may be required by
a person with benchmark disability for daily activities, to
take independent and informed decision to access facilities
and participating in all areas of life including education,
employment, family and community life and treatment
and therapy;
(r) “person with benchmark disability” means a person
with not less than forty per cent. of a specified disability
where specified disability has not been defined in
measurable terms and includes a person with disability
where specified disability has been defined in measurable
terms, as certified by the certifying authority;
(s) “person with disability” means a person with long term
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which,
in interaction with barriers, hinders his full and effective
participation in society equally with others;
(y) “reasonable accommodation” means necessary and
appropriate modification and adjustments, without imposing
a disproportionate or undue burden in a particular case,
to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or
exercise of rights equally with others.
SECTION 3
“Equality and non-discrimination- (1) The appropriate
Government shall ensure that the persons with disabilities
enjoy the right to equality, life with dignity and respect for
his or her integrity equally with others. (2) The appropriate
Government shall take steps to utilise the capacity
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In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
of persons with disabilities by providing appropriate
environment”.
SECTION 5
Community life-(1) The persons with disabilities shall
have the right to live in the community.
SECTION 6
Protection from cruelty and inhuman treatment- (1) The
appropriate Government shall take measures to protect
persons with disabilities from being subjected to torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
SECTION 12
Access to justice-(1) The appropriate Government shall
ensure that persons with disabilities are able to exercise
the right to access any court, tribunal, authority, commission
or any other body having judicial or quasi-judicial or
investigative powers without discrimination on the basis
of disability.
SECTION 16
Duty of educational institutions- The appropriate
Government and the local authorities shall endeavour that
all educational institutions funded or recognised by them
provide inclusive education to the children with disabilities
and towards that end shall— (i) admit them without
discrimination and provide education and opportunities
for sports and recreation activities equally with others;
SECTION 20
Non-discrimination in employment- (1) No Government
establishment shall discriminate against any person with
disability in any matter relating to employment:
(2) Every Government establishment shall provide
reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier free
and conducive environment to employees with disability.
276 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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(3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on
the ground of disability.
SECTION 17
Specific measures to promote and facilitate inclusive
education.
The appropriate Government and the local authorities shall
take the following measures for the purpose of section
16, namely:
(a) to conduct survey of school going children in every five
years for identifying children with disabilities, ascertaining
their special needs and the extent to which these are
being met:
Provided that the first survey shall be conducted within
a period of two years from the date of commencement
of this Act;
(b) to establish adequate number of teacher training
institutions;
(c) to train and employ teachers, including teachers with
disability who are qualified in sign language and Braille
and also teachers who are trained in teaching children
with intellectual disability;
(d) to train professionals and staff to support inclusive
education at all levels of school education;
(e) to establish adequate number of resource centres
to support educational institutions at all levels of school
education;
(f) to promote the use of appropriate augmentative
and alternative modes including means and formats of
communication, Braille and sign language to supplement
the use of one’s own speech to fulfil the daily communication
needs of persons with speech, communication or language
disabilities and enables them to participate and contribute
to their community and society;
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(g) to provide books, other learning materials and
appropriate assistive devices to students with benchmark
disabilities free of cost up to the age of eighteen years;
(h) to provide scholarships in appropriate cases to students
with benchmark disability;
(i) to make suitable modifications in the curriculum and
examination system to meet the needs of students with
disabilities such as extra time for completion of examination
paper, facility of scribe or amanuensis, exemption from
second and third language courses;
(j) to promote research to improve learning; and
(k) any other measures, as may be required.
SECTION 20
Non-discrimination in employment- (1) No Government
establishment shall discriminate against any person with
disability in any matter relating to employment:
(2) Every Government establishment shall provide
reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier free
and conducive environment to employees with disability.
(3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on
the ground of disability
SECTION 21
Equal opportunity policy. (1) Every establishment
shall notify equal opportunity policy detailing measures
proposed to be taken by it in pursuance of the provisions
of this Chapter in the manner as may be prescribed by
the Central Government.
(2) Every establishment shall register a copy of the
said policy with the Chief Commissioner or the State
Commissioner, as the case may be.
SECTION 24
Social security- (1) The appropriate Government shall
within the limit of its economic capacity and development
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formulate necessary schemes and programmes to
safeguard and promote the right of persons with disabilities
for adequate standard of living to enable them to live
independently or in the community.
SECTION 32
Reservation in higher educational institutions:
(1) All Government institutions of higher education and
other higher education institutions receiving aid from the
Government shall reserve not less than five per cent. seats
for persons with benchmark disabilities.
(2) The persons with benchmark disabilities shall be given
an upper age relaxation of five years for admission in
institutions of higher education.
SECTION 33
Identification of posts for reservation: The appropriate
Government shall—
(i) identify posts in the establishments which can be held by
respective category of persons with benchmark disabilities
in respect of the vacancies reserved in accordance with
the provisions of section 34;
(ii) constitute an expert committee with representation of
persons with benchmark disabilities for identification of
such posts; and
(iii) undertake periodic review of the identified posts at an
interval not exceeding three years.
SECTION 34
Reservation- (1) Every appropriate Government shall
appoint in every Government establishment, not less
than four per cent. of the total number of vacancies in the
cadre strength in each group of posts meant to be filled
with persons with benchmark disabilities of which, one per
cent. each shall be reserved for persons with benchmark
disabilities under clauses (a), (b) and (c) and one per cent.
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for persons with benchmark disabilities under clauses (d)
and (e), namely:—
(a) blindness and low vision;
(b) deaf and hard of hearing;
(c) locomotor disability including cerebral palsy, leprosy
cured, dwarfism, acid attack victims and muscular
dystrophy;
(d) autism, intellectual disability, specific learning disability
and mental illness;
(e) multiple disabilities from amongst persons under
clauses (a) to (d) including deaf-blindness in the posts
identified for each disabilities.
As it can be seen, the RPwD Act, 2016 marks a significant legislative
shift by expanding the rights of PwDs and broadening the recognized
categories of disabilities. It ensures equality and non-discrimination,
mandates reasonable accommodation, and prohibits barriers to
community life, education, employment, and access to justice. It
also provides for social security measures, inclusive education,
reservations in higher education and employment, and protection
from cruelty and exploitation. More importantly, it imposes clear
responsibilities on the State and other stakeholders in this regard.
D. JUDICIAL APPROACH - PROGRESS MADE THUS FAR
40. The following judgments of this Court would illustrate the progress
made thus far on the judicial front, including elucidation of the concept
of reasonable accommodation:
(i) In Union of India & Ors v. National federation of Blind & Ors,17
this Court has recognized that employment opportunities play
an instrumental role in empowering PwD. Justice P.Sathasivam
(as he then was) observed thus:
“50. Employment is a key factor in the empowerment
and inclusion of people with disabilities. It is an
alarming reality that the disabled people are out of
17 2013 (10) SCC 772
280 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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job not because their disability comes in the way of
their functioning rather it is social and practical barriers
that prevent them from joining the workforce. As a
result, many disabled people live in poverty and in
deplorable conditions. They are denied the right to
make a useful contribution to their own lives and to
the lives of their families and community.”
(ii) In Jeeja Ghosh (supra), it has been noted by this Court that
a key component of equality is the principle of reasonable
differentiation and specific measures must be undertaken,
recognizing the different needs of PwD, to pave the way
for substantive equality. Justice A.K. Sikri stated in the said
judgement as follows:
“40. In international human rights law, equality
is founded upon two complementary principles:
non-discrimination and reasonable differentiation. The
principle of non-discrimination seeks to ensure that
all persons can equally enjoy and exercise all their
rights and freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to
arbitrary denial of opportunities for equal participation.
For example, when public facilities and services
are set on standards out of the reach of persons
with disabilities, it leads to exclusion and denial
of rights. Equality not only implies preventing
discrimination (example, the protection of
individuals against unfavourable treatment by
introducing anti-discrimination laws), but goes
beyond in remedying discrimination against
groups suffering systematic discrimination in
society. In concrete terms, it means embracing
the notion of positive rights, affirmative action
and reasonable accommodation.”
(iii) In Vikash Kumar (supra), it has been held as follows:
“35. The principle of reasonable accommodation
captures the positive obligation of the State and
private parties to provide additional support to persons
with disabilities to facilitate their full and effective
participation in society. The concept of reasonable
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accommodation is developed in section (H) below.
For the present, suffice it to say that, for a person with
disability, the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental
rights to equality, the six freedoms and the right to
life under Article 21 will ring hollow if they are not
given this additional support that helps make these
rights real and meaningful for them. Reasonable
accommodation is the instrumentality – are an
obligation as a society – to enable the disabled to
enjoy the constitutional guarantee of equality and
non-discrimination.”
“44. The principle of reasonable
accommodation. Individual dignity
undergirds the RPwD Act, 2016. Intrinsic
to its realization is recognizing the worth
of every person as an equal member of
society. Respect for the dignity of others
and fostering conditions in which every
individual can evolve according to their
capacities are key elements of a legal order
which protects, respects and facilitates
individual autonomy. In seeking to project
these values as inalienable rights of the
disabled, the RPwD Act, 2016 travels
beyond being merely a charter of non-
discrimination. It travels beyond imposing
restraints on discrimination against the
disabled. The law does this by imposing
a positive obligation on the State to
secure the realization of rights. It does so
by mandating that the State must create
conditions in which the barriers posed by
disability can be overcome. The creation
of an appropriate environment in which
the disabled can pursue the full range
of entitlements which are encompassed
within human liberty is enforceable at law.
In its emphasis on substantive equality, the
enactment of the legislation is a watershed
282 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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event in providing a legal foundation for
equality of opportunity to the disabled.
45. The principle of reasonable
accommodation acknowledges that if
disability as a social construct has to
be remedied, conditions have to be
affirmatively created for facilitating the
development of the disabled. Reasonable
accommodation is founded in the norm
of inclusion. Exclusion results in the
negation of individual dignity and worth or
they can choose the route of reasonable
accommodation, where each individuals’
dignity and worth is respected. Under
this route, the “powerful and the majority
adapt their own rules and practices, within
the limits of reason and short of undue
hardship, to permit realization of these
ends.”
46. Accommodation implies a positive obligation
to create conditions conducive to the growth and
fulfilment of the disabled in every aspect of their
existence – whether as students, members of the
workplace, participants in governance or, on a
personal plane, in realizing the fulfilling privacies
of family life. The accommodation which the law
mandates is ‘reasonable’ because it has to be tailored
to the requirements of each condition of disability.
The expectations which every disabled person has
are unique to the nature of the disability and the
character of the impediments which are encountered
as its consequence.
49. The principle contains an aspiration to meet the
needs of the class of persons facing a particular
disability. Going beyond the needs of the class,
the specific requirement of individuals who belong
to the class must also be accommodated. The
principle of reasonable accommodation must
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also account for the fact that disability based
discrimination is intersectional in nature. The
intersectional features arise in particular contexts due
to the presence of multiple disabilities and multiple
consequences arising from disability. Disability
therefore cannot be truly understood by regarding
it as unidimensional. Reasonable accommodation
requires the policy makers to comprehend disability
in all its dimensions and to design measures which
are proportionate to needs, inclusive in their reach
and respecting of differences and aspirations.
Reasonable accommodation cannot be construed
in a way that denies to each disabled person the
customization she contains an aspiration to meet
the needs of the class of persons facing a particular
disability. Going beyond the needs of the class, the
specific requirement of individuals who belong to the
class must also be accommodated. The principle
of reasonable accommodation must also account
for the fact that disability based discrimination is
intersectional in nature. The intersectional features
arise in particular contexts due to the presence
of multiple disabilities and multiple consequences
arising from disability. Disability therefore cannot be
truly understood by regarding it as unidimensional.
Reasonable accommodation requires the policy
makers to comprehend disability in all its dimensions
and to design measures which are proportionate
to needs, inclusive in their reach and respecting of
differences and aspirations.
(iv) In Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India,18
it has been held as under:
“9…In the matters of providing relief to those who
are differently abled, the approach and attitude of the
executive must be liberal and relief oriented and not
obstructive or lethargic…”
18 (2014) 14 SCC 383
284 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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(v) In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of
Delhi & Ors,19 this Court has held as under:
“The fundamental right to life which is the most
precious human right and which forms the ark of all
other rights must, therefore, be interpreted in a broad
and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance
and vitality which may endure for years to come and
enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth
of human person.”
Right to dignity has been particularly recognized in
this judgment as one of the facets of right to life:
“every act which offends against or impairs human
indignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of
this right to live.” This expansive understanding of
right to life assumes greater proportions in respect of
persons with visual impairments, who need a higher
number of compensative skill enhancing facilities in
order to go about their daily lives without suffering
the indignity of being generally perceived as being
dependent and helpless.
(vi) In Rajive Raturi v. Union of India,20 Justice A.K. Sikhri, held
as follows:
“26. The States and the Union Territories must realize
that under the 2016 Act their responsibilities have
grown and they are required to actualize the purpose
of the Act, for there is an accent on many a sphere
with regard to the rights of the disabilities. When
the law is so concerned for the disabled persons
and makes provision, it is the obligation of the law
executing authorities to give effect to the same in
quite promptitude. The steps taken in this regard
shall be concretely stated in the compliance report
within the time stipulated. When we are directing
the States, a duty is cast also on the States and its
19 (1981) 1 SCC 608
20 AIRONLINE 2018 SC 544
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In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
authorities to see that the statutory provisions that are
enshrined and applicable to the cooperative societies,
companies, firms, associations and establishments,
institutions, are scrupulously followed. The State
Governments shall take immediate steps to comply
with the requirements of the 2016 Act and file the
compliance report so that this Court can appreciate
the progress made.”
(vii) In Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India21, this Court has
observed as under:
“77. Since disability is a social construct dependent on
the interplay between mental impairment with barriers
such as social, economic and historical among other
factors, the one-size-fits-all approach can never be
used to identify the disability of a person. Disability is
not universal but is an individualistic conception based
on the impairment that a person has along with the
barriers that they face. Since the barriers that every
person faces are personal to their surroundings —
interpersonal and structural, general observations
on “how a person ought to have behaved” cannot
be made.
78. The legislative framework and decisions of this
Court on the impact of “barriers” or circumstances
on the mental health of an individual have been
discussed above. When the interaction with the
barriers causes a person to feel “disabled”, it is
extremely important to not stigmatise or discriminate
against persons having mental health issues or any
other form of disability. Such discrimination would
only further entrench the feeling of being “disabled”.
…
82. CRPD is an international human rights treaty of
the United Nations which is intended to promote,
protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of
21 (2023) 2 SCC 209
286 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all
persons with disabilities. [Article 1, CRPD 2006.]
It also aims to promote respect for their inherent
dignity. [ Article 1, CRPD 2006.] It is a holistic treaty
that combines civil and political rights provided by
anti-discrimination legislation along with an array
of social, cultural, and economic measures to fulfil
the guarantee of equality. [Jayna Kothari, “The UN
Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities: An
Engine for Law Reform in India”, 45(18) Economic
and Political Weekly 65-72 (2010).] India is a
signatory to CRPD and has ratified it on 1-10-2007.
Article 1 of the CRPD provides an inclusive definition
of persons with disabilities. It recognises that disability
is an evolving concept and that disability results from
the interaction of persons with impairments with
attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder
their full participation in society [Preamble, CRPD
2006]. Article 1 states thus:
“1. … Persons with disabilities include
those who have long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairments which
in interaction with various barriers may
hinder their full and effective participation
in society on an equal basis with others.”
In light of Section 20(4) and the general
guarantee of reasonable accommodation
that accrues to persons with disabilities, the
appellant is entitled to be reassigned to a
suitable post having the same pay scale
and benefits. The CRPF may choose to
assign him a post taking into consideration
his current mental health condition. The
suitability of the post is to be examined
based on an individualised assessment
of the reasonable accommodation that
the appellant needs. The authorities can
ensure that the post to which the appellant
is accommodated does not entail handling
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or control over firearms or equipment which
can pose a danger to himself or to others
in or around the workplace.”
Thus, these rulings underscore the principle that reasonable
accommodation is not a discretionary measure, but a fundamental
right integral to achieving substantive equality for PwD, forming part of
the right to dignity as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
It is also worthy to mention that the 73rd and 74th Amendments of the
Constitution of India made it a Constitutional obligation for the State
to make provisions for safeguarding the interest of the weaker section
of the society, including ‘handicapped and mentally retarded’. Further,
it is a well-established principle that the State has an obligation to
apply the Directive Principles of securing a social order in promotion
of the welfare of the people. The importance of Article 41 in the
Constitutional scheme can be measured by this Court’s judgment
in Jacob M. Puthuparambil & others v. Kerala Water Authority and
others22, wherein, it was held that ‘a Court should interpret an Act
so as to advance Article 41’. Therefore, Article 41 of the Constitution
which is in the nature of a Directive Principle, imposes a duty on the
State to make an effective provision, inter alia, for public assistance
to disabled persons.
E. RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH
41. The spirit of the RPwD Act, 2016 would reveal that the principle
of reasonable accommodation is a concept that not only relates to
affording equal opportunity to the PwD but also it goes further as to
ensuring the dignity of the individual by driving home the message
that the assessment of a person’s suitability, capacity and capability
is not to be tested and measured by medical or clinical assessment
of the same but must be assessed after providing reasonable
accommodation and an enabling atmosphere. The judgement of
this Court in Vikash Kumar (supra) assumes increased significance
in this regard. This Court in this case has expounded in detail
the principle of reasonable accommodation by invoking the social
model of disability. In response to the judgement, the Department
of Disability Affairs, Government of India has notified guidelines for
22 AIR 1990 SC 2228
288 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
availing of scribes by all persons with specified disabilities to appear
in written examinations thereby widening the ambit of its earlier
guidelines issued in 2018 confining this privilege only to persons
with benchmark disabilities. Very importantly, while overruling the
earlier decision in Surendra Mohan (supra), this Court has held
that any decision which is innocent to the principle of reasonable
accommodation would amount to disability-based discrimination and
is also in deep tension with the ideal of inclusive equality. After the
judgement which has focused on a rights-based model and rejection
of the medicalisation of the disability in order to assess the suitability
and capability of PwD, the “suspicion ridden medical expertise driven
model”,23 is directly opposed to the principle as laid down by this
court and also the spirit of the RPwD Act, 2016.
42. In the present case also, the opinion of the medical expert is driven
only by clinical assessment and suspicion. On the basis of the
same, the impugned rule, viz., clause 6A of the Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service Examination (Recruitment and Conditions of Service)
Rules, 1994 specifically excluding visually impaired candidates from
participation for selection as judicial officers, came to be substituted
by way of amendment, which is against the guarantee of substantive
equality embodied in the super-statute, i.e., the RPwD Act, 2016,
and the principle of reasonable accommodation as set out therein,
pursuant to India’s international obligation. The rights-based model
of disability has now become part of the national and normative
structure of anti-discrimination regime of this country. The impugned
rule, which is based on the medical report of a doctor, in the light
of the foregoing analysis, cannot have any place in the disability
jurisprudence that is ever evolving in a country like ours. Such
conclusions based merely on a clinical assessment of disability,
innocent of the principle of reasonable accommodation, cannot be
said to be a fair and proper assessment of the capability of judicial
officers with disabilities while participating in the selection to the post
of judicial officers. It is relevant to point out here that once a person
has been permitted to the degree of law course, all other opportunities,
whether in the form of practice as well as appointments, assignments
whether public or private, would automatically make them eligible
23 Sandra Fredman, “substantive Equality Revisited” Vol.14(3)., International journal of constitutional law
(2016) 712-738
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In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
to participate for selection to the same. The principle of legitimate
expectation also stands attracted to this case as part of the aspect
of non-arbitrariness while furthering the equality doctrine. Here it
also relevant to mention that UNCRPD Committee in its General
Comment No.6 on Article 5, equality and non-discrimination, has
developed the idea of inclusive/transformative equality. The relevant
portion of the committee’s observation reads as follows:
……. “Inclusive equality corresponds to a new model of
disability, the human rights model of disability, which leaves
a charity, welfare, and medical approaches behind and is
based on the assumption that disability is not primarily a
medical issue. Rather disability is a social construct and
impairment must not be taken as legitimate ground for the
denial or restriction of human rights”.
India is a signatory to this convention and hence, under an obligation to
fulfil this object of inclusive equality. In view thereof, visually impaired
candidates cannot be said to be ‘not suitable’ for judicial service
and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Examination
(Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 falls foul of
the Constitution.
F. INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION
43. In the context of the Rule viz., Proviso to Rule 7 of the Madhya
Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, though it was challenged by PwD as
well as able-bodied persons, it has been placed on record that the
order under appeal relates to scrutiny of the said Rule only vis-a-vis
the general principles of law while not examining the same in the
context of the disability jurisprudence. In the present case, the said
rule is only being dealt with in the context of the challenge made to
it by PwD more particularly, visually impaired candidates, who have
qualified themselves as lawyers and are aspiring for the post of judicial
officers. Therefore, the principle of indirect discrimination assumes
significance. Briefly put, the principle of indirect discrimination has its
basis in the fundamental principle that unequals cannot be treated
equally, and sometimes equal treatment may lead to unequal results.
The counsel for the appellants pointed out the difficulties that are
practically faced by PwD, which would go to prove that the three-
year practice as well as the alternative rule of securing 70% in the
first attempt of the examinations, though seems fair at the first blush,
290 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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and on the face of it, is truly discriminatory in operation. At this
juncture, it is pertinent to point out that the relaxation was granted
to SC/ST candidates in relation to the aggregate marks required for
obtaining a law degree. In Col. Nitisha v. Union of India,24 Justice D.Y.
Chandrachud (as he then was), while noting that the jurisprudence
relating to indirect discrimination in India is still at a nascent stage,
observed that indirect discrimination is caused by facially neutral
criteria by not taking into consideration, the underlying effects of a
provision, practice or criterion. While the observations made in the
said case relate to gender-based discrimination, they are still relevant
on principle here and hence, quoted as follows:
“We must recognise here that the structures of our society
have been created by males and for males. As a result
certain structures that may seem to be the “norm” and
appear to be harmless, are a reflection of the insidious
patriarchal system. These adjustments and amendments
however, are not concessions being granted to a set of
persons but instead are the wrongs being remedied to
obliterate years of suppression of opportunities which
should have been granted to women….Facially equal
application of laws to unequal parties is a farce, when the
law is structured to cater to a male standpoint”.
The observations made by this Court as stated above, can equally
be applied to PwD candidates.
44. The judgment in Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. v. Union of India
(UOI) and Ors.25 also explains the concept of indirect discrimination
with judgments across the world, while dealing with the validity of a
legal provision which though appears facially neutral, has the effect
of discriminating against a particular group of citizens or particular
identities. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder
for reference:
“E 1- Facial Neutrality: Through the Looking Glass
441. The moral belief which underlies Section 377 is
that sexual activities which do not result in procreation
24 2021 SCC online SC 261
25 (06.09.2018 - SC): MANU/SC/0947/2018 : (2018) 10 SCC 1
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are against the ‘order of nature’ and ought to be
criminalized Under Section 377. The intervenors submit
that Section 377, criminalizes anal and oral sex by
heterosexual couples as well. Hence, it is urged that
Section 377 applies equally to all conduct against the
‘order of nature’, irrespective of sexual orientation. This
submission is incorrect. In NALSA this Court held that
Section 377, though associated with specific sexual acts,
highlights certain identities. In Naz, the Delhi High Court
demonstrated effectively how Section 377 though facially
neutral in its application to certain acts, targets specific
communities in terms of its impact:
Section 377 Indian Penal Code is facially neutral and it
apparently targets not identities but acts, but in its operation,
it does end up unfairly targeting a particular community.
The fact is that these sexual acts which are criminalised
are associated more closely with one class of persons,
namely, the homosexuals as a class. Section 377 Indian
Penal Code has the effect of viewing all gay men as
criminals. When everything associated with homosexuality
is treated as bent, queer, repugnant, the whole gay and
lesbian community is marked with deviance and perversity.
They are subject to extensive prejudice because what
they are or what they are perceived to be, not because
of what they do. The result is that a significant group of
the population is, because of its sexual nonconformity,
persecuted, marginalised and turned in on itself.
To this end, it chronicled the experiences of the victims of
Section 377, relying on the extensive records and affidavits
submitted by the Petitioners that brought to fore instances
of custodial rape and torture, social boycott, degrading and
inhuman treatment and incarceration. The court concluded
that while Section 377 criminalized conduct, it created a
systemic pattern of disadvantage, exclusion and indignity
for the LGBT community, and for individuals who indulge
in non-heterosexual conduct.
442. Jurisprudence across national frontiers supports the
principle that facially neutral action by the State may have a
292 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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disproportionate impact upon a particular class. In Europe,
Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 5 July 2006 defines ‘indirect discrimination’
as: “where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or
practice would put persons of one sex at a particular
disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex,
unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively
justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving
that aim are appropriate and necessary.”
443. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. MANU/USSC/0066/1971:
401 U.S. 424 (1971), the US Supreme Court, whilst
recognizing that African-Americans received sub-standard
education due to segregated schools, opined that the
requirement of an aptitude/intelligence test disproportionately
affected African-American candidates. The Court held that
“The Civil Rights Act” proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation.”
444. In Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber von Hartz
(1986) ECR 1607, the European Court of Justice held that
denying pensions to part-time employees is more likely
to affect women, as women were more likely to take up
part-time jobs. The Court noted:
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty is infringed by a department
store company which excludes part-time employees from
its occupational pension scheme, where that exclusion
affects a far greater number of women than men, unless
the undertaking shows that the exclusion is based on
objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination
on grounds of sex.
445. The Canadian Supreme Court endorsed the notion of
a disparate impact where an action has a disproportionate
impact on a class of persons. In Andrews v. Law Society
of British Columbia MANU/SCCN/0036/1989: (1989) 1
SCR 143, the Court noted:
Discrimination is a distinction which, whether intentional
or not but based on grounds relating to personal
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characteristics of the individual or group, has an effect
which imposes disadvantages not imposed upon others
or which withholds or limits access to advantages
available to other members of society. Distinctions based
on personal characteristics attributed to an individual
solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely
escape the charge of discrimination, while those based
on an individual’s merits and capacities will rarely be
so classed.
Thus, when an action has “the effect of imposing burdens,
obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group
not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits
access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available
to other members of society”, it would be suspect.
446. In City Council of Pretoria v. Walker MANU/
SACC/0001/1998: (1998) 3 BCLR 257, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa observed:
The concept of indirect discrimination ... was developed
precisely to deal with situations where discrimination lay
disguised behind apparently neutral criteria or where
persons already adversely hit by patterns of historic
subordination had their disadvantage entrenched or
intensified by the impact of measures not overtly intended
to prejudice them.
In many cases, particularly those in which indirect
discrimination is alleged, the protective purpose would
be defeated if the persons complaining of discrimination
had to prove not only that they were unfairly discriminated
against but also that the unfair discrimination was
intentional. This problem would be particularly acute in
cases of indirect discrimination where there is almost
always some purpose other than a discriminatory purpose
involved in the conduct or action to which objection is
taken.”
45. Some other decisions relating to Indirect Discrimination in the context
of proviso to Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules,
may also be noted to understand the concept deeper and they are
as follows:
294 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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(i) Walter E. Washington, etc., et. al. v. Alfred E. Davis et al.,26
wherein, the case involves the validity of a qualifying test
administered to applicants, who are two negro police officers,
alleging that the promotion policies of the Department were
racially discriminatory, which is violative of the rights under
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The test was sustained by the District Court,
but invalidated by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
of United States was in agreement with the District Court and
accordingly, reversed the judgment of the Court of appeals.
While doing so, it was observed that “a rule that a statute
designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent
compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one
race more than another would be far reaching and would raise
serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range
of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and licensing statutes
that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white”.
(ii) Council Directive 2000/78/EC (February 27, 2000) defines the
concept of “indirect discrimination”. In S. Coleman v. Attridge
Law and Steve Law,27 it was held by the Grand Chamber, UK
that “the prohibition of harassment laid down by the provisions
of the Directive 2000/78 is not limited only to people who are
themselves disabled; where it is established that the unwanted
conduct amounting to harassment, which is suffered by an
employee, who is not himself disabled is related to the disability
of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee,
such conduct is contrary to the provisions to the prohibition of
harassment”.
(iii) The South African Constitutional Court in City Council of Pretoria
v. Walker,28 while interpreting and enforcing the Constitution,
has held that “the concept of indirect discrimination... was
developed precisely to deal with situations where discrimination
lay disguised behind apparently neutral criteria or where persons
26 426 U.S. 229
27 European Court Reports 2008 1-05603
28 SACC – 1998 (2) SA 363
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already adversely hit by patterns of historic subordination had
their disadvantage entrenched or intensified by the impact of
measures not overtly intended to prejudice them”. ... “In many
cases, particularly those in which indirect discrimination is
alleged, the protective purpose would be defeated if the persons
complaining of discrimination had to prove not only that they
were unfairly discriminated against but also that the unfair
discrimination was intentional. This problem would be particularly
acute in cases of indirect discrimination where there is almost
always some purpose other than a discriminatory purpose
involved in the conduct or action to which objection is taken”.
The same was referred to by this Court in Nitisha (supra) and
the Delhi High Court in Madhu v. Northern Railway.29
(iv) In a recent decision in Mahlangu v. Minister of Labour,30 the
South African Constitutional Court (SACC) had to rule on the
constitutionality of Section 1(xix)(v) of the Compensation for
Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 130 of 1993. This
provision explicitly excluded domestic workers from the definition
of employees under the Act. This had the consequence of
depriving domestic workers access to the social security benefits
contained in the legislation, in the event of injury, disablement
and death. The SACC, inter alia, rendered a finding that the
provision was hit by the constitutional prohibition on indirect
discrimination.
(v) In Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons - Sears,31
the Canadian Supreme Court expounded the doctrine of
indirect discrimination, while entertaining a challenge under
Section 4(1)(g) of the Ontario Human Rights Code.32 In analyzing
whether a work policy mandating inflexible working hours on
Friday evenings and Saturdays indirectly discriminated against
the appellant on the basis of her creed, in that her religion
required her to strictly observe the Sabbath, the Court noted
as follows:
29 Order dated 17.01.2018 in LPA.640/2017
30 [2020] ZACC 24
31 “Ontario HRC”, MANU/SCCN/0009/1985
32 Section 4(1)(g) of the Ontario Human Rights Code prohibited discrimination against an employee with
regard to any term or condition of employment on the basis of race, creed, colour, sex, age, etc.
296 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“18. A distinction must be made between what I would
describe as direct discrimination and the concept
already referred to as adverse effect discrimination
in connection with employment. Direct discrimination
occurs in this connection where an employer adopts
a practice or rule which on its face discriminates on
a prohibited ground. For example, “No Catholics or
no women or no blacks employed here.” There is,
of course, no disagreement in the case at bar that
direct discrimination of that nature would contravene
the Act. On the other hand, there is the concept of
adverse effect discrimination. It arises where an
employer for genuine business reasons adopts a
rule or standard which is on its face neutral, and
which will apply equally to all employees, but which
has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited ground
on one employee or group of employees in that it
imposes, because of some special characteristic of
the employee or group, obligations, penalties, or
restrictive conditions not imposed on other members
of the work force. For essentially the same reasons
that led to the conclusion that an intent to discriminate
was not required as an element of discrimination
contravening the Code I am of the opinion that this
Court may consider adverse effect discrimination
as described in these reasons a contradiction of the
terms of the Code. An employment rule honestly made
for sound economic or business reasons, equally
applicable to all to whom it is intended to apply, may
yet be discriminatory if it affects a person or group of
persons differently from others to whom it may apply.
From the foregoing I therefore conclude that the
appellant showed a prima facie case of discrimination
based on creed before the Board of Inquiry.”
(vi) In Orsus v. Croatia,33 the allegation raised by the applicants was
that they had been attending separate classes comprising only
roma pupils at times during their primary education and thereby
33 [2010] ECHR 337
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 297
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
discriminated in the enjoyment of that right on account of their
race or ethnic origin. The European Court of Human Rights was
of the view that “indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur,
where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would
put persons of an ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage
compared with other persons, unless it is objectively justified
by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are
appropriate, necessary and proportionate”.
(vii) The Supreme Court of Canada, in Action Travail des Femmes
v. Canadian National Railway Company34 analyzed the claim
of woman seeking equal employment opportunities in the
National Railroad Company. In echoing the mutually reinforcing
consequences of direct and indirect discrimination within
organizational structures as a systemic feature, the Court
observed as under:
“Systemic discrimination in an employment context is
discrimination that results from the simple operation
of established procedures of recruitment, hiring and
promotion, none of which is necessarily designed to
promote discrimination. The discrimination is then
reinforced by the very exclusion of the disadvantaged
group because the exclusion fosters the belief, both
within and outside the group, that the exclusion is a
result of “natural forces”, for example, that women “just
can’t do the job”(see the Abella Report, pp.9-10). To
combat systemic discrimination, it is essential to create
a climate in which both negative practices and negative
attitudes can be challenged and discouraged”....
In prescribing remedies against systemic discrimination, the
Court consciously noted as follows:
“the remedies do not have to be merely
compensatory, but also prospective in terms
of the benefit that is designed to improve the
situation in the future”. The Court structured
the remedy as follows: “An employment equity
program thus is designed to work in three ways.
34 (1987) 1 SCR 1114
298 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
First, by countering the cumulative effects of
systemic discrimination, such a program renders
further discrimination pointless....”.
(viii) The framework provided in Action Travail des -Femmes was
followed by the Human Rights Tribunal of Canada, in National
Capital Alliance on Race Relations v. Canada (Health and
Welfare)35 wherein the Court had to examine a case against the
Health and Welfare Department of Canada for discriminating
against visible minorities by establishing employment policies
and practices that deprive visible minorities (race, colour
and ethnic origin) of employment opportunities in senior
management. The Court conducted a holistic analysis of
the organization by collating testimonies of workers in the
organization and by engaging experts on statistical analysis
and human resource management. The evidence of the expert
on human resources was analysed to situate systemic issues
ranging from ghettoization of minorities in Canada translating
into lesser encouragement for professional ambition. Societal
impact of discrimination was evidenced in the informal staffing
decisions providing fertile ground for unconscious bias and a
broader perception of visible minorities as unfit for management.
In upholding the claims of the plaintiffs, corrective measures were
prescribed to counteract the effects of systemic discrimination
in the workforce. The said decision was pointed out by this
Court in Nitisha (supra).
(ix) In Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom,36 the
European Court of Human Rights held that “As to the present
matter, it can be said that the advancement of the equality
of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of
the Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons
would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment
on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the
Convention”. Following the said decision, the European Court
of Human Rights once again observed in Van Raalte v. The
35 1997 28 C.H.R.R.D / 179 (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal)
36 [1985] ECHR 7
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 299
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
Netherlands,37 that in the applicant’s submission, differences
in treatment based on sex were already unacceptable when
section 25 of the General Child Care Benefits Act was enacted
in 1962. The wording of Article 14 of the Convention showed that
such had been the prevailing view as early as 1950. Moreover,
legal and social developments showed a clear trend towards
equality between men and women. Further reference was made
to Abdulaziz, which stated explicitly that “the advancement of
the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member
States of the Council of Europe” and that “very weighty reasons
would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment
on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the
Convention”. These observations were referred to by this Court
in Anuj Garg (supra).
(x) In relation to the principle of indirect discrimination, the
judgement of the Madras High Court in M. Sameeha Barvin v.
Government of India,38 assumes significance, in which, one of us
(Justice R. Mahadevan) observed that “while the jurisprudence
on Indirect discrimination is still growing, it is pertinent to identify
these instances of systemic and indirect discrimination, couched
in neutrality and seemingly innocent reasons perpetuated by
social conditioning but which cannot stand scrutiny before law
in the teeth of the expansive substantive equality as envisioned
and envisaged in our Constitution, and to discard them just as
stark instances of discrimination. Such instances of indirect
discrimination perpetuate inequality and cripple the salient
personal freedom and autonomy available to every citizen of this
country, irrespective of their personal attributes and differences”.
46. Thus, the principle of indirect discrimination hereinbefore applied
to counter gender-based discrimination, can also be applied to
the facts of the present case, where disabled/visually impaired
legal practitioners are sought to be equated with their able-bodied
counterparts in the matter of application of certain conditions for
participation for selection to the post of judicial officers. Applying
such a test of indirect discrimination, the ease of practice as well
37 [1997] ECHR 6
38 (2021) 1 Madras Law Journal 466
300 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
as the securing of marks cannot be said to be an equal condition
to both classes of citizens, viz., disabled and able-bodied lawyers,
given that the atmosphere in which they operate cannot be said to
be the same. This is also a perfect example of how unequals are
sought to be treated equally, and that itself would be a negation
of the principle of substantive equality. Therefore, it can easily be
inferred that the rule relating to practice or in the alternative, to
secure 70% in the first attempt in the examinations, is a case of
indirect discrimination as the provisions are facially neutral but
discriminatory in operation. In view of the same, Rule 7 of the
Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, to the extent it
prescribes the additional requirement of either a three-year practice
period or securing an aggregate score of 70% in the first attempt,
is liable to be struck down insofar as it applies to PwD candidates.
Accordingly, the impugned Rule will be applicable to PwD candidates
insofar as it prescribes the educational and other qualifications as
eligibility criteria including the minimum aggregate score of 70%
(with relaxation as may be determined like in the case of SC/ST
candidates) but without the requirement of either that it should be
in the first attempt or that they should have three years’ practice.
This issue stands answered in the said terms.
G. RELAXATION IN CRITERIA FOR SELECTION & SEPARATE
CUT-OFF MARKS FOR DISABLED CANDIDATES - WHETHER
PERMISSIBLE
47. The learned counsel for the appellant [SLP(C)No.7683 of 2024], in
his arguments prayed for relaxation of marks on the basis of vacancy
and Office Memorandum No. 36035/02/2017-Estt (Res) [Reservation
for Persons with Benchmark Disabilities] dated 15.01.2018.
48. The primary contention is that though the appellant has secured
more marks in aggregate than the selected disabled candidates, he
could not secure the minimum cut-off of 20 marks in the interview,
due to which he fell out of the zone of consideration, and that inspite
of there being vacancies available, the authority has not relaxed
the interview minimum cut-off marks, despite there being a power
to relax the same pursuant to the Office Memorandum referred to
in the previous paragraph. The further case of the appellant is that
even generally, prescription of any minimum cutoff for interview alone
is not permissible in law.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 301
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
49. We may refer to the following judgment, which would make it clear that
mere existence of vacancies cannot be a ground to claim relaxation
in marks. At the same time, this Court in several cases has held that
laying down a minimum cutoff for interview is legally permissible.
Therefore, the only question that remains to be decided is, when
there are suitable executive instructions/orders giving the authority
the power to relax, whether such a power should be exercised in
order to relax the minimum required marks in favour of the visually
impaired candidates for selection.
49.1. Neetu Devi Singh v. High Court of Allahabad,39 wherein, it
was held as under:
‘In view thereof, as the reservation is provided for
physically handicapped persons, though horizontal
in nature, he/she must secure minimum qualifying
marks as fixed by the authority concerned. The
appellant-petitioner who has failed to achieve the
said benchmark as she secured 36 percent marks
while qualifying marks had been fixed as 55 percent,
would be denied further consideration in view of the
provisions of Article 335 of the Constitution of India.
It is not the case of the appellant-petitioner that any
other physically handicapped person securing lesser
marks than her, is being permitted consideration any
further.’
50. Examining whether relaxation of cut off marks can be granted to the
appellant, reliance may be placed to Taniya Malik v. High Court of
Delhi,40 wherein it was held as under:
‘Merely by the fact that some more posts were advertised
and they are lying vacant, it could not have been a ground
to relax the minimum marks for interview after the interview
has already been held. It would not have been appropriate
to do so and the High Court has objected to relaxation of
minimum passing marks in viva voce examination in its
39 2008 (2) AWC 1541
40 (2018) 14 SCC 129
302 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
reply and as the power to relax is to be exercised by the
High Court and since it has opposed such a prayer on
reasonable ground and the institutional objective behind
such prescription, we are not inclined to direct the High
Court to relax the minimum marks.’
51. In a similar case of Rajinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors,41
the writ petitioner (PwD) secured 48.8%, whereas the minimum
aggregate passing mark for clearing mains examination was 50%,
prayed for relaxation of 5% marks for PwD on the ground that there
are 4 vacancies. The Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissed the
prayer of the petitioner holding as under:
“Merely because the posts advertised under Category 9
have gone abegging would by itself not clothe the writ
court to issue a direction contrary to the Rules of service
to fill up such posts by relaxing standards. But looking to
the fact that persons with disabilities have not made it on
general standards, the appropriate Government i.e. the
Government of Punjab may consider the issue raised in this
petition in the light of the 1995 Act and take a final decision
with respect to grant or non-grant of relaxed standards to
persons with disabilities consistent with its duty both of
affirmative action and empowerment and to maintain the
efficiency required for holding judicial office and to do so
within a reasonable period and preferably before the next
recruitment is made to the P.C.S. (Judicial Branch).”
52. However, it is now well-established that PwD are supposed to be
identified as a separate class in itself and therefore, some kind of
benefits has to be extended to them with respect to eligibility which
was extended similarly to other vertical reserved class. The Delhi
High Court in Anamol Bhandari v. Delhi Technological University42,
provided for relaxation or concession marks to PwD at the same par
as that of SC/ST candidates. The relevant paragraph is extracted
as under:
41 2012 SCC Online P&H 2017
42 2012 SCC Online Del 4788
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 303
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
“21. Reference to the aforesaid judgment is made by us
to highlight the decision taken by the Government, and
accepted by the Supreme Court that reservation for disabled
is called horizontal reservation which cuts across all vertical
categories such as SC, ST, OBC & General. Therefore,
what was recognized was that since PwDs belonging to
SC/ST categories, i.e., vertical categories enjoyed the
relaxation which is provided to SC/ST categories, there is
no reason not to give the same benefit/concession to those
disabled who are in General Category or Other Backward
Class Category as that process only would bring parity
among all persons’ disparity irrespective of their vertical
categories. This itself provides for justification to accord
same concession, viz., 10% concession to PwDs as well,
in all categories which is extended to those PwDs who fall
in the category of SC/ST.
22. All the aforesaid clinchingly demonstrates that the
people suffering from disabilities are equally socially
backward, if not more, as those belonging to SC/ST
categories and therefore, as per the Constitutional
mandates, they are entitled to at least the same benefit
of relaxation as given to SC/ST candidates.
52.1. This Court in Aryan Raj v. State (UT) of Chandigarh43 affirmed
the above principle and held as follows:
“3. We are of the view that the High Court is correct on
the bifurcation aspect. Further, insofar as the aptitude
test having to be passed is concerned, the High Court
is correct in saying that no exemption ought to be
granted, but we follow the principle laid down in the
Delhi High Court’s judgment in Anamol Bhandari
v. Delhi Technological University [Anamol
Bhandari v. Delhi Technological University, 2012
SCC OnLine Del 4788 : (2012) 131 DRJ 583] in
which the High Court has correctly held that
people suffering from disabilities are also socially
43 2021 (19) SCC 813
304 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
backward, and are therefore, at the very least,
entitled to the same benefits as given to the
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidates.
..
5. In our view, considering that Scheduled Caste/
Scheduled Tribe candidates require 35% to pass in
the aptitude test, the same shall apply so far as the
disabled are concerned in future. Shri Gonsalves’s
client is, therefore, at liberty to apply afresh for the
current year, in which the requisite certificate that
is spoken about in the advertisement dated 31-5-
2019, is furnished stating that he is fit to pursue the
course in Painting or Applied Art. Further, it is clear
that aptitude test pass mark, so far as disabled are
concerned, is now 35%.”
53. This Court in S.M.W.(C). No 2/2024 passed the following order on
21.05.2024:
“1. After our order dated 21.03.2024, we are informed that
thirty one specially abled candidates appeared in the main
examination. We are also informed that they are not called
for interview either on the ground that they are ineligible
or that they have not secured minimum marks.
2. In furtherance of our order dated 21.03.2024, and to
take it to its logical conclusion, we direct that if anyone
of these thirty one candidates have secured the requisite
minimum mark(s) as is provided for reserved (SC/ST)
candidates, they shall be called for interview.”
53.1. This Court in this case, thus exercising its powers, found fit
to undo the discrimination of not treating PwD as a separate
class which requires to be treated so as to ensure equality
of results, by not specifying any relaxations or concessions
which was provided to other reserved candidates.
54. This Court in Haridas Parsedia v. Urmila Shakya,44 dealt with whether
when relaxation of marks is not permitted to SC/ST candidates who
44 (2000) 1 SCC 81
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 305
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
compete in the same exam, the posts reserved for these categories
will go unfilled and after such unfilled carry forward posts continue
to remain unfilled for the given permissible period of recruitment,
these reserved posts would get unreserved and would be available
to general category candidates and that this would frustrate the policy
decision taken by the State under Article 16 (4) for enabling the SC/
ST candidates to be appointed in the posts reserved for them. This
Court held that under Article 309, Rules relaxation power is available
to the government, the exercise of that power can be either by a
General Administrative order or by special administrative order and
hence, relaxation/concession of marks were permissible.
55. This Court in S.M.W.(C) No.2/2024 also issued directions to the
High Court on 07.11.2024, that while making recruitment to judicial
service, they ought to provide separate qualifying marks for PwBD
in the Preliminary and Main Examinations. This Court also observed
that the qualifying marks should ordinarily be the same as for SC/
ST candidates or can even be lower if so prescribed by the relevant
Rules. If the Rules are silent, then the competent authority can lay
down such qualifying marks.
56. It is also pertinent to point out at this juncture that pursuant to the order
of this Court dated 07.11.2024, the Delhi High Court has been providing
reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities on reserved post
in judicial service. Further, the copy of the minutes of the meeting of
Examination Committee held on 11.12.2024, proceeds to state that the
order passed by this Court issuing directions governing the selection
of candidates to the District Judiciary across the country has been
perused and accordingly, separate qualifying marks for persons with
benchmark disabilities at different stages of the examinations have
been provided under the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970
and Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970, besides providing separate
cut-off for persons with benchmark disabilities at various stages of the
selection process. It also states that this High Court is providing the
benefit of reservation to persons with benchmark disabilities in terms
of the Gazette Notification dated 04.01.2021 issued by the Ministry
of Social Justice and Empowerment, Department of Empowerment
of Persons with Disabilities (Divyangjan), whereby various disabilities
including blindness and low vision, have been identified to be suitable
for the post of Judicial Officers.
306 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
57. In the present case, the High Court though gave relaxation of marks
to candidates belonging to SC / ST in written examinations (both
prelims and mains), but it explicitly deemed not to give any relaxation
to candidates from the other categories in the interview. The above
direction passed by this court in a connected matter also deemed
not to specify any minimum qualifying mark separately in interview
for any categories.
58. In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India,45 seven judge Constitution Bench
proposed for reservation of PwD candidates in public employment and
for relaxation of lesser qualifying marks as amounting to affirmative
action in their favour. The following paragraphs are relevant:
“293. Preference without reservation may be adopted in
favour of the chosen classes of citizens by prescribing for
them a longer period for passing a test or by awarding
additional marks or granting other advantages like
relaxation of age or other minimum requirements. (See
the preferential treatment in State of Kerala v. N.M.
Thomas [(1976) 2 SCC 310, 380 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 227 :
(1976) 1 SCR 906]). Furthermore, it would be within the
discretion of the State to provide financial assistance
to such persons by way of grant, scholarships, fee
concessions etc. Such preferences or advantages are
like temporary crutches for additional support to enable
the members of the backward and other disadvantaged
classes to march forward and compete with the rest of
the people. These preferences are extended to them
because of their inability otherwise to compete effectively
in open selections on the basis of merits for appointment
to posts in public services and the like or for selection to
academic courses. Such preferences can be extended to
all disadvantaged classes of citizens, whether or not they
are victims of prior discrimination. What qualifies persons
for preference is backwardness or disadvantage of any
kind which the State has responsibility to ameliorate.
The blind and the deaf, the dumb and the maimed, and
45 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 307
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
other handicapped persons qualify for preference. So
do all other classes of citizens who are at a comparative
disadvantage for whatever reason, and whether or not
they are victims of prior discrimination. All these persons
may be beneficiaries of preferences short of reservation.
Any such preference, although discriminatory on its face,
may be justified as a benign classification for affirmative
action warranted by a compelling State interest.
294. In addition to such preferences, quotas may be
provided exclusively reserving posts in public services
or seats in academic institutions for backward people
entitled to such protection. Reservation is intended to
redress backwardness of a higher degree. Reservation
prima facie is the very antithesis of a free and open
selection. It is a discriminatory exclusion of the disfavoured
classes of meritorious candidates : M.R. Balaji [1963
Supp 1 SCR 439 : AIR 1963 SC 649] . It is not a case
of merely providing an advantage or a concession
or preference in favour of the backward classes and
other disadvantaged groups. It is not even a handicap
to disadvantage the forward classes so as to attain a
measure of qualitative or relative equality between the two
groups. Reservation which excludes from consideration
all those persons falling outside the specially favoured
groups, irrespective of merits and qualifications, is much
more positive and drastic a discrimination — albeit to
achieve the same end of qualitative equality — but
unless strictly and narrowly tailored to a compelling
constitutional mandate, it is unlikely to qualify as a
benign discrimination. Unlike in the case of other
affirmative action programmes, backwardness by itself
is not sufficient to warrant reservation. What qualifies
for reservation is backwardness which is the result of
identified past discrimination and which is comparable to
that of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
Reservation is a remedial action specially addressed to
the ill effects stemming from historical discrimination. To
ignore this vital distinction between affirmative action
308 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
short of reservation and reservation by a predetermined
quota as a remedy for past inequities is to ignore the
special characteristic of the constitutional grant of power
specially addressed to the constitutionally recognised
backwardness.
PRESCRIBING LESSER QUALIFYING MARKS
831. We must also make it clear that it would not be
impermissible for the State to extend concessions and
relaxations to members of reserved categories in the
matter of promotion without compromising the efficiency
of the administration. The relaxation concerned in Thomas
[(1976) 2 SCC 310, 380 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 227 : (1976) 1
SCR 906] and the concessions namely carrying forward of
vacancies and provisions for in-service coaching/training
in Karamchari Sangh [(1981) 1 SCC 246, 289 : 1981
SCC (L&S) 50 : (1981) 2 SCR 185, 234] are instances
of such concessions and relaxations. However, it would
not be permissible to prescribe lower qualifying marks or
a lesser level of evaluation for the members of reserved
categories since that would compromise the efficiency of
administration. We reiterate that while it may be permissible
to prescribe a reasonably lesser qualifying marks or
evaluation for the OBCs, SCs and STs — consistent with
the efficiency of administration and the nature of duties
attaching to the office concerned — in the matter of direct
recruitment, such a course would not be permissible in the
matter of promotions for the reasons recorded hereinabove.
832. In Balaji [1963 Supp 1 SCR 439 : AIR 1963 SC 649]
and other cases, it was assumed that reservations are
necessarily anti-meritarian. For example, in Janki Prasad
Parimoo [(1973) 1 SCC 420 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 217 : (1973)
3 SCR 236, 252] it was observed, “it is implicit in the idea
of reservation that a less meritorious person be preferred
to another who is more meritorious”. To the same effect is
the opinion of Khanna, J in Thomas [(1976) 2 SCC 310,
380 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 227 : (1976) 1 SCR 906] , though
it is a minority opinion. Even Subba Rao, J who did not
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 309
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
agree with this view did recognize some force in it. In his
dissenting opinion in Devadasan [T. Devadasan v. Union
of India, (1964) 4 SCR 680 : AIR 1964 SC 179 : (1965)
2 LLJ 560] while holding that there is no conflict between
Article 16(4) and Article 335, he did say, “it is inevitable in
the nature of reservation that there will be a lowering of
standards to some extent”, but, he said, on that account
the provision cannot be said to be bad, inasmuch as in
that case, the State had, as a matter of fact, prescribed
minimum qualifications, and only those possessing such
minimum qualifications were appointed. This view was,
however, not accepted by Krishna Iyer, J in Thomas [(1976)
2 SCC 310, 380 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 227 : (1976) 1 SCR
906] . He said : (SCC p. 366, para 132)
“[E]fficiency means, in terms of good government,
not marks in examinations only, but responsible
and responsive service to the people. A chaotic
genius is a grave danger in public administration.
The inputs of efficiency include a sense of
belonging and of accountability which springs in
the bosom of the bureaucracy (not pejoratively
used) if its composition takes in also the weaker
segments of ‘We, the people of India’. No other
understanding can reconcile the claim of the
radical present and the hangover of the unjust
past.”
833. A similar view was expressed in Vasanth Kumar [1985
Supp SCC 714 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 352] by Chinnappa
Reddy, J. The learned Judge said (SCC p. 739, para 36)
“[T]he mere securing of high marks at an
examination may not necessarily mark out a
good administrator. An efficient administrator,
one takes it, must be one who possesses among
other qualities the capacity to understand with
sympathy and, therefore, to tackle bravely the
problems of a large segment of population
constituting the weaker sections of the people.
310 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
And, who better than the ones belonging to
those very sections? Why not ask ourselves
why 35 years after Independence, the position
of the Scheduled Castes, etc. has not greatly
improved? Is it not a legitimate question to ask
whether things might have been different, had the
District Administrators and the State and Central
Bureaucrats been drawn in larger numbers
from these classes? Courts are not equipped
to answer these questions, but the courts may
not interfere with the honest endeavours of the
Government to find answers and solutions. We
do not mean to say that efficiency in the civil
service is unnecessary or that it is a myth. All
that we mean to say is that one need not make
a fastidious fetish of it.”
834. It is submitted by the learned counsel for petitioners
that reservation necessarily means appointment of less
meritorious persons, which in turn leads to lowering of
efficiency of administration. The submission, therefore,
is that reservation should be confined to a small minority
of appointments/posts, — in any event, to not more than
30%, the figure referred to in the speech of Dr Ambedkar
in the Constituent Assembly. The mandate of Article 335, it
is argued, implies that reservations should be so operated
as not to affect the efficiency of administration. Even Article
16 and the directive of Article 46, it is said, should be read
subject to the aforesaid mandate of Article 335.
835. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that
the marks obtained at the examination/test/interview
at the stage of entry into service is not an indicium of
the inherent merit of a candidate. They rely upon the
opinion of Douglas, J in DeFunis [40 L Ed 2d 164 : 416
US 312 (1974)] where the learned Judge illustrates the
said aspect by giving the example of a candidate coming
from disadvantaged sections of society and yet obtaining
reasonably good scores — thus manifesting his “promise
and potential” — vis-a-vis a candidate from a higher strata
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 311
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
obtaining higher scores. (His opinion is referred to in para
716.) On account of the disadvantages suffered by them
and the lack of opportunities, — the respondents say —
members of backward classes of citizens may not score
equally with the members of socially advanced classes at
the inception but in course of time, they would. It would be
fallacious to presume that nature has endowed intelligence
only to the members of the forward classes. It is to be
found everywhere. It only requires an opportunity to prove
itself. The directive in Article 46 must be understood and
implemented keeping in view these aspects, say the
respondents.
836. We do not think it necessary to express ourselves at
any length on the correctness or otherwise of the opposing
points of view referred to above. (It is, however, necessary
to point out that the mandate — if it can be called that —
of Article 335 is to take the claims of members of SC/
ST into consideration, consistent with the maintenance
of efficiency of administration. It would be a misreading
of the article to say that the mandate is maintenance of
efficiency of administration.) Maybe, efficiency, competence
and merit are not synonymous concepts; maybe, it is
wrong to treat merit as synonymous with efficiency in
administration and that merit is but a component of the
efficiency of an administrator. Even so, the relevance
and significance of merit at the stage of initial recruitment
cannot be ignored. It cannot also be ignored that the very
idea of reservation implies selection of a less meritorious
person. At the same time, we recognise that this much
cost has to be paid, if the constitutional promise of social
justice is to be redeemed. We also firmly believe that given
an opportunity, members of these classes are bound to
overcome their initial disadvantages and would compete
with — and may, in some cases, excel — members of
open competition. It is undeniable that nature has endowed
merit upon members of backward classes as much as it
has endowed upon members of other classes and that
what is required is an opportunity to prove it. It may not,
312 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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therefore, be said that reservations are anti-meritarian.
Merit there is even among the reserved candidates and
the small difference, that may be allowed at the stage of
initial recruitment is bound to disappear in course of time.
These members too will compete with and improve their
efficiency along with others.
837. Having said this, we must append a note of
clarification. In some cases arising under Article 15, this
Court has upheld the removal of minimum qualifying
marks, in the case of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
candidates, in the matter of admission to medical
courses. For example, in State of M.P. v. Nivedita Jain
[(1981) 4 SCC 296: (1982) 1 SCR 759] admission to
medical course was regulated by an entrance test (called
Pre-Medical Test). For general candidates, the minimum
qualifying marks were 50% in the aggregate and 33%
in each subject. For Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
candidates, however, it was 40% and 30% respectively. On
finding that Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe candidates
equal to the number of the seats reserved for them did
not qualify on the above standard, the Government did
away with the said minimum standard altogether. The
Government’s action was challenged in this Court but was
upheld. Since it was a case under Article 15, Article 335
had no relevance and was not applied. But in the case
of Article 16, Article 335 would be relevant and any order
on the lines of the order of the Government of Madhya
Pradesh (in Nivedita Jain [(1981) 4 SCC 296: (1982) 1
SCR 759]) would not be permissible, being inconsistent
with the efficiency of administration. To wit, in the matter
of appointment of Medical Officers, the Government or
the Public Service Commission cannot say that there shall
be no minimum qualifying marks for Scheduled Caste/
Scheduled Tribe candidates, while prescribing a minimum
for others. It may be permissible for the Government to
prescribe a reasonably lower standard for Scheduled
Castes/Scheduled Tribes/Backward Classes —
consistent with the requirements of efficiency of
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 313
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
administration — it would not be permissible not to
prescribe any such minimum standard at all. While
prescribing the lower minimum standard for reserved
category, the nature of duties attached to the post
and the interest of the general public should also be
kept in mind.”
59. The above judgment therefore illustrates that relaxation in marks can
be given to PwD candidates and this relaxation in minimum marks does
not dilute the efficiency in administration as contended by the learned
counsel for the respondent. This, coupled with Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service Rules (Recruitment and Conditions of Service)
Rules, 1994) [As amended up to F. No. 3106/XXI-B(One)/2023,
dated 22-6-2023] which empowers the High Court with the power
to relax, may be used to arrive at a conclusion that relaxation of
marks in interview is possible for PwD candidates. The said Rule is
extracted hereunder:
19. Power to relax.—Where the Hon’ble Chief Justice is
satisfied that the operation of any of these rules causes
undue hardship in any particular case or class of cases,
he may for reasons to be recorded in writing dispense with
or relax the particular rule to such an extent and subject
to such exceptions and conditions as may be deemed
necessary:
Provided that as and when any such a relaxation is
granted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, the Governor shall
be informed of the same.
60. Furthermore, the Office Memorandum No. 36035/02/2017-Estt
(Res) [Reservation for Persons with Benchmark Disabilities] dated
15.01.2018, issued by Ministry of Personal, Public Grievances &
Pensions, Department of Personnel & Training also provides for
relaxation in standards of suitability, the relevant clause of which
reads as under:
“11. RELAXATION OF STANDARD OF SUITABILITY:
11.1 If sufficient number of candidates with benchmark
disabilities candidates are not available on the basis of the
general standard to fill all the vacancies reserved for them,
314 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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candidates belonging to this category may be selected
on relaxed standard to fill up the remaining vacancies
reserved for them provided they are not found unfit for
such post or posts. However, this provision shall not be
used to allow any relaxation in the eligibility criteria laid
down for the issuance of certificate of disability.
Same relaxed standard should be applied for all the
candidates with Benchmark Disabilities whether they
belong to Unreserved/SC/ST/OBC. No further relaxation
of standards will be considered or admissible in favour of
any candidate from any category whatsoever.”
61. In this connection, it is apt to refer to a three-judge bench decision
of this Court in Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services46
wherein it was observed as follows:
“57. The provision of an audit trail to assess whether a given
accommodation required by a student with disability places
an undue burden on the institution is a vital safeguard
for transparency and fairness. Dr Satendra Singh in his
report dated 20 October 2024 has made suggestions to
(i) rename the Disability Assessment Boards as Ability
Assessment Boards to align them better with their intended
purpose; (ii) include a doctor with disability or who is well
conversant with disability rights in such Boards; (iii) use a
human rights model of disability for assessment; (iv) issue
guidance on clinical accommodations; (v) train the Boards
in carrying out the disability competency assessment; and
(vi) use the Enabling Units to serve as a contact point for
clinical accommodations. As far as the inclusion of doctors
with disabilities in the Disability Assessment Boards is
concerned the first respondent has issued a circular on
24 March 2022 mandating such inclusion. This direction
shall be complied with by all Boards.
58. The second respondent has submitted that in light of
the judgment of this Court in Omkar Gond (supra), it will be
46 2024 SCC Online SC 3130
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 315
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
constituting a new committee of domain experts to comply
with the directions in that judgment. We note the assurance
of the second respondent and direct that this committee shall
include persons with disability or one or more experts who
are well conversant with disability rights. The committee
shall recommend fresh guidelines to replace the existing
guidelines. The above suggestions shall be duly considered
by the government on its own merits. The recommendations
so formulated shall comply with this judgment.”
These observations may be borne in mind by the appointing authorities
so that specially-abled persons form part of the interview panel,
enabling them to put themselves in the shoes of the candidates and
assess their capabilities accordingly.
62. Thus, it is discernible from the above that in light of the decision
in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India,47 relaxation of minimum marks
is permissible in law. Further, the aforesaid Office Memorandum
clearly permits the authority to relax the minimum marks. Therefore,
we are of the opinion that relaxation in minimum cut-off marks is
permissible, especially when there is a specific power of relaxation
available to the appointing authority. Accordingly, these issues are
answered by us.
Ancillary issues
63. With respect to the main contention of the learned counsel appearing
for the writ petitioners in WP Nos. 484 and 494 of 2024, as well as
the subject matter in Suo Motu Writ Petition No. 6/2024, regarding the
non-publication of separate cutoff marks for persons with disabilities’
candidates in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Examinations, despite
clear cut-offs being specified and published for other horizontal
reservation categories, such as women, divorced candidates, and
widows, let us first examine the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan
Judicial Service Rules, 2010, which read as follows:
“10. Reservation of vacancies for Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, More
47 (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217
316 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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Backward Classes, Economically Weaker Sections,
Persons with Disabilities and Women candidates.
(4) Reservation of vacancies for Persons with benchmark
disabilities in the recruitment to the service shall be in
accordance with the rules of the State issued from time
to time in this behalf.”
“20. Scheme of Examination and Syllabus – (1) The
competitive examination for the recruitment to the post of
Civil Judge shall be conducted by the Recruiting Authority
in two stages i.e. preliminary examination and Main
examination as per the Scheme specified in Schedule-IV.
The marks obtained in the preliminary Examination by
the candidate who are declared qualified for admission to
the main examination will not be counted for determining
their final merit.
(2) The number of candidate to be admitted to the main
examination will be fifteen times the total number of
vacancies (Category wise) to be filled in the year but in
the said range all those candidates who secure the same
percentage of marks as may be fixed by the Recruiting
Authority for any lower range will be admitted to the Main
Examination.
(3) On the basis of marks secured in Main Examination,
candidates to the extent of three times of total number of
vacancies (Category wise) shall be declared qualified to
be called for interview.
(3-A) The committee consisting of two sitting judges of the
High Court and an expert not below the rank of Professor
(Law), nominated by the Chief Justice, shall interview the
candidates.
(4) The Recruiting Authority shall not recommend a
candidate who has failed to appear, in any of the written
paper or before the Board for Viva Voce.
(5) Syllabus shall be such as may be prescribed by the
Recruiting Authority from time to time.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 317
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
“24. List of candidates recommended by the
Recruiting Authority.- The Recruiting Authority
shall prepare a list of the candidates in the
order of their performance on the basis of
their aggregate marks. If two or more of such
candidates obtain equal marks in the aggregate,
the Recruiting Authority shall arrange them
in the order of merit on the basis of their
general suitability for service and recommend
their names to the Appointing Authority for
appointment to the Cadre of Civil Judge:
Provided that the Recruiting Authority shall not
recommend a candidate of Scheduled Castes
or Scheduled Tribes category unless he obtains
minimum 35% marks in the aggregate of written
examination and the interview, and, in the
case of other candidates, unless he obtains
minimum 40% marks in the aggregate of written
examination and the interview.”
“41. List of selected candidates.-
The Court shall prepare the merit
list category wise on the basis of
aggregate marks obtained in Main
examination and interview considering
the suitability in general.
Provided that notwithstanding
anything contained in any rule or
schedule, and having regard to the
requirement of efficiency in service,
the court may determine such cut
off marks as considered fit for being
recommended for appointment.”
The above provisions lead us to conclude that under Rule
10, the rule making body delineated PwBD as a separate
category by providing them reservation separately; and
Rule 41 mandates that the High Court shall prepare a
merit list of candidates’ category wise by determining cut
off marks as may be deemed fit.
318 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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63.1. According to the High Court of Rajasthan, the notification
dated 16.03.2024 amends Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules,
2010, by providing relaxation in age and concession of 5%
in marks in favour of PwBD candidates; and they are abiding
by any orders/directions issued by this Court.
63.2. In the light of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, we
hold that relaxation of cutoff marks is permissible in respect of
persons with disabilities’ candidates appearing for the judicial
service examinations.
63.3. Taking note of all these aspects, we are of the opinion that
maintaining and operating a separate cut-off list is mandatory
for each category, which axiomatically includes PwD category
as well. Non-declaration of cut-off marks affects transparency
and creates ambiguity, and candidates being not informed
about the basis of their results. Such candidates are left
uninformed about the last mark scored by the qualifying
candidate belonging to the particular category, to be able to
get through to the next stage of selection process. In effect,
it compels PwD candidates to compete with other category
candidates on unequal terms. Further, when the Rules referred
to above, considered the PwD as a separate category and
provided them with reservations, it is indispensable on the
part of the authorities concerned to declare separate cut-off
marks for PwD category at each stage to ensure that those
similarly placed candidates are adequately represented in
the service fulfilling the very purpose of reservation. The non-
disclosure of cut-off marks would lead to a situation, where
such candidates may not be adequately represented in the
judicial service, which is against the provisions of the RPwD
Act, 2016. Therefore, we direct the authorities concerned to
declare separate cut-off marks and publish separate merit list
for the PwD category at every stage of the examination and
proceed with the selection process accordingly.
64. At this juncture, this Court reiterates that for the purpose of
rights and entitlements of persons with disabilities, particularly in
employment, and more specifically in respect of the issues covered
in this judgment, there can be no distinction between Persons with
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 319
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD).
It is made abundantly clear that any such technical distinction sought
to be made by the authorities cannot be sustained in law. It will be
appropriate to state that this principle has been maintained by this
Court and the same is evident from the observation made in Vikash
Kumar as follows:
“31. Conflating the rights and entitlements which inhere
in Persons with disabilities with the notion of benchmark
disabilities does dis-service to the salutary purpose
underlying the enactment of the RPwD Act 2016. Worse
still, to deny the rights and entitlements recognized for
persons with disabilities on the ground that they do not
fulfil a benchmark disability would be plainly ultra vires
the RPwD Act 2016.”
H. SHINING EXAMPLES TO SHOW - ‘IT CAN BE DONE’
65. The findings and conclusions reached by this Court are strongly
reinforced by the exemplary achievements of distinguished individuals
in the legal profession who have demonstrated that visual impairment
is no barrier to attaining professional excellence, competing on
equal footing, and making significant contributions to the justice
delivery system alongside their able-bodied counterparts. In this
regard, the learned counsel for the intervenor drew our attention to
several visually impaired legal experts from various branches of the
profession, featured in the IDAP interview series, ‘It Can Be Done,’
conducted by Rahul Bajaj, Anusha Reddy, and Madhavi Singh. The
series aims to provide actionable insights from lawyers and judges
with disabilities on the strategies they have used to succeed, while
also promoting awareness and fostering meaningful dialogue on
the necessity of reasonable accommodations for PwD. A few of the
interviews are outlined below:
(i) Justice Zak Mohammed Yacoob, who lost his sight at 16 months
due to meningitis, served as a judge on the South African
Constitutional Court from 1998 to 2013. Despite his blindness,
he effectively discharged his judicial duties with the assistance
of a legally trained personal assistant, a talking computer, a
braille printer, and a note-taker who converted text into braille.
While acknowledging that reading case materials took longer,
320 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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he firmly rejected the misconception that blind individuals
are incapable of assessing critical evidence, such as charts,
maps, or witness demeanour. He argued that the belief that
one must “see” a witness to assess credibility was unfounded.
Throughout his tenure, Justice Yacoob strongly advocated for
the constitutional protection of the rights of differently-abled
individuals, emphasizing the need for accessibility and equality
within the justice system.
(ii) Justice David S. Tatel, a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, adapted to his
blindness by employing law clerks and a reader to assist with
visual materials. Though less adept with modern technology,
he relied on a braille keyboard. He firmly asserted that
blindness does not limit a lawyer’s ability to argue cases
effectively. Rejecting the imposition of low expectations on
blind professionals, he preferred to be recognized as a “judge
who happens to be blind” rather than a “blind judge” reinforcing
the principle that competence in the legal profession is not
diminished by disability.
(iii) David Lepofsky, a distinguished Canadian lawyer, has argued
over 30 cases before the Supreme Court of Canada and more
than 200 before the Ontario Court of Appeal. Acknowledged
as one of Canada’s most influential lawyers, he has leveraged
technological advancements to enhance his legal practice.
Previously reliant on volunteers to read trial transcripts, he now
accesses case materials digitally through screen readers and
cloud-based platforms, allowing him to work from anywhere.
Despite the inherent challenges, Lepofsky remains steadfast
in his commitment to ensuring litigants receive their rightful
entitlements, demonstrating perseverance and self-reliance in
overcoming professional barriers.
(iv) Senior Advocate S.K. Rungta of India, conferred with the
prestigious title of Senior Advocate by the Delhi High Court in
2011, has dedicated his career to breaking down barriers for the
differently-abled. Initially reliant on clerks for mobility and legal
filings, he has substantially reduced this dependence with the
advent of assistive technology. While he encountered skepticism
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 321
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
from some judges regarding his capabilities, he asserts that the
judiciary has largely been supportive. His contributions have
been instrumental from facilitating entry of the blind to into the
civil services to enforcing disability reservations under Indian
law, securing the right of blind individuals to serve as witnesses,
and shaping India’s disability legislation- The Persons with
Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full
Participation) Act, 1995.
(v) Tomer Rosner, a blind legal advisor to the Israeli Parliament,
plays a crucial role in drafting and analyzing legislation,
particularly concerning disability rights. Given the extensive
volume of legal documents he must review, he employs screen
readers and optical character recognition (OCR) technology
to access text that is otherwise inaccessible. Despite these
technological aids, there remain instances where he relies on
personal readers. He acknowledges the challenges inherent
in his profession but maintains that with the effective use of
technology and adaptive strategies, legal professionals with
disabilities can manage their responsibilities with competence
and efficiency.
(vi) Mr. Jack Chen, a blind patent attorney at Google, highlighted
that the primary challenge for visually impaired lawyers is not
completing legal tasks but doing so with efficiency. Tasks such
as legal drafting and formatting, particularly those requiring
adherence to citation standards like the Bluebook, demand
significantly more time. He noted that while blind professionals
may take longer in certain tasks, they often outperform their
sighted peers in others, particularly in reading speed when
using screen readers. His success exemplifies the capacity of
blind legal professionals to adapt and excel in highly technical
fields through the strategic use of assistive technology.
(vii) Yetnebersh Nigussie, an Ethiopian lawyer and disability rights
activist, attributes her ability to pursue a legal career to the loss
of her eyesight at the age of five, an event she considers to
have spared her from early child marriage. She has dedicated
herself to using education as a tool to empower persons
with disabilities, particularly women and girls, who often face
322 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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compounded discrimination. She emphasizes that genuine
inclusion requires changing societal mindsets and providing
tangible facilities to ensure access to education and healthcare.
Arguing that no form of discrimination should be tolerated, she
stresses the importance of adopting a holistic approach to human
rights, reinforcing the principle that all individuals, irrespective
of gender or disability, deserve equal opportunities.
(viii) Judge Ronald M. Gould of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, who has progressive multiple sclerosis,
underscores the significance of legal protections such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in ensuring that reasonable
accommodations are not a matter of discretion but a legally
enforceable right. He advocates for systemic reforms that
balance accessibility with professional excellence, emphasizing
that disabled individuals should not be viewed through the lens
of charity but as professionals capable of delivering high-quality
legal work when provided with appropriate accommodations.
(ix) Nirmita Narasimhan, a visually impaired lawyer and Policy
Director at the Centre for Internet and Society, has been
instrumental in advancing digital accessibility and policy reforms.
A graduate of Campus Law Centre, Delhi University, with
additional degrees in German and Music, she played a key
role in drafting India’s National Policy on Universal Electronic
Accessibility and has worked extensively with government
agencies to integrate accessibility into public programs.
Recognized with multiple awards, including the National Award
for Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities (2010), she
highlights the challenges of working with government institutions,
where accessibility is often overlooked and progress is slowed
by bureaucratic hurdles. She emphasizes that addressing these
systemic hurdles as a broader governance issue affecting
everyone, rather than focusing solely on disability, would
indirectly lead to more effective accessibility reforms.
(x) Haben Girma, the first deafblind graduate of Harvard Law
School, has established herself as an influential accessibility
consultant, working to remove barriers that hinder professionals
with disabilities. She engages with legal materials using screen
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 323
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
readers, braille displays, and notetaking support. Highlighting
the challenges faced by blind legal professionals in accessing
visual information, she emphasizes the need for institutions to
provide alternative formats, such as text descriptions or tactile
graphics. She underscores that access to legal work is not just
about individual effort but also about systemic responsibility,
urging legal institutions to proactively adopt inclusive practices
that ensure equal participation for professionals with disabilities.
66. Similarly, several other accomplished individuals who are blind or
visually impaired and part of the interview series, have excelled in
the legal profession and beyond, showcasing that visual impairment
does not preclude one’s ability to make significant contributions to the
field of law. Richard Chen, counsel in the corporate and securities
practice group at Arnold & Porter LLP, Isaac Lidsky, former clerk
for U.S. Supreme Court Judges Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, a Harvard graduate (cum laude), founder of multiple
startups and nonprofits, and a New York Times best-selling author of
Eyes Wide Open, Milan Mittal, a lawyer at Indus Law, Rajesh Asudani,
who began his career as a railway announcer, later pursued law,
and rose to become an Assistant Manager at the RBI, and Shirish
Deshpande, a faculty member at MNLU, Nagpur, who pursued his
studies at the University of Oxford—all stand as a testament to the
fact that disability is no bar to excellence in the legal profession or
any other field.
VI. CONCLUSION
67. The overall analysis would demonstrate that a rights-based approach
necessitates that PwDs must not face any discrimination in their pursuit
of judicial service opportunities, and instead, there must be affirmative
action on behalf of the State to provide an inclusive framework.
Now, it is high time that we view the right against disability-based
discrimination, as recognized in the RPwD Act 2016, of the same
stature as a fundamental right, thereby ensuring that no candidate is
denied consideration solely on account of their disability. Further, as
extensively discussed, the principle of reasonable accommodation,
as enshrined in international conventions, established jurisprudence,
and the RPwD Act, 2016, mandate that accommodations be provided
to PwDs as a prerequisite to assessing their eligibility. In the light of
324 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
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the above, any indirect discrimination that results in the exclusion
of PwDs, whether through rigid cut-offs or procedural barriers,
must be interfered with in order to uphold substantive equality. The
commitment to ensuring equal opportunity necessitates a structured
and inclusive approach, where merit is evaluated with due regard to
the reasonable accommodations required, thereby fostering judicial
appointments that truly reflects the principles of fairness and justice.
67.1. Thus, after considering the pleadings, submissions of the
learned counsel appearing for all the parties, as well as the
legal positions and case laws, we conclude as follows:
(i) Visually impaired candidates cannot be said to be ‘not
suitable’ for judicial service and they are eligible to
participate in selection for posts in judicial service.
(ii) The amendment made in Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh
Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service)
Rules, 1994 falls foul of the Constitution, and is hence,
struck down to the extent that it does not include visually
impaired persons who are educationally qualified for the
post to apply therefor.
(iii) The proviso to Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial
Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
1994 relating to additional requirements, violates
the equality doctrine and the principle of reasonable
accommodation, and is hereby struck down in its
application to differently abled persons who have the
requisite educational qualifications for applying to the posts
under judicial service.
(iv) Relaxation can be done in assessing suitability of
candidates when enough PwD are not available after
selection in their respective category, to the extent as
stated in the relevant paragraphs above, and in the light of
existing Rules and Official Circulars and executive orders
in this regard, as in the present case.
(v) A separate cut-off is to be maintained and selection
made accordingly for visually-impaired candidates as has
been indicated in the relevant paragraphs in line with the
judgment in Indra Sawhney.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 325
In Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services
(vi) For the purpose of rights and entitlements of persons
with disabilities, particularly in employment, and more
specifically in respect of the issues covered in this
judgment, there can be no distinction between Persons
with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark
Disabilities (PwBD).
VII. RESULT
68. In the upshot:
(i) Visually impaired candidates are eligible to participate in
selection for the posts under the judicial service and hence,
Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 is struck down insofar
as it excludes visually impaired and low vision candidates for
appointment in judicial service.
(ii) Rule 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Recruitment and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 to the extent of prescribing
additional requirement of either a three-year practice period or
securing an aggregate score of 70% in the first attempt, is struck
down insofar as it applies to PwD candidates. The said rule will
be applicable to the PwD candidates insofar as it prescribes
the educational and other qualifications as eligibility criteria
including the minimum aggregate score of 70% (with relaxation
as may be determined like in the case of SC/ST candidates),
but without the requirement of either that it should be in the
first attempt or that they should have three years’ practice. As
a sequel, the impugned order dated 01.04.2024 passed by the
High Court and the consequential notification dated 17.11.2023
issued by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, are set aside as
against the PwD candidates and the appellant viz., Ayush Yardi
and similarly placed persons, are entitled to be considered for
participating in the selection process in the light of this decision.
(iii) The order of the High Court dated 11.01.2024 and the notification
dated 18.02.2023 are set aside as far as the appellant viz.,
Alok Singh and similarly placed persons are concerned. The
appellant and similarly placed persons who had participated
in the selection process, are entitled to be considered in the
326 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
light of this decision, and they may be appointed, if they are
otherwise eligible in the vacant posts after applying applicable
relaxation as provided for in the executive orders.
(iv) The writ petitioners in WP (C) Nos. 484 and 494 of 2024, who
contend that separate cut-off was not applied in the Rajasthan
Judicial Service Preliminary Examinations, and consequently
were not selected for the main examination, shall be entitled to
be considered in the light of this decision in the next recruitment,
if they so apply to the post notified along with the post unfilled
now and carried forward to the next recruitment by maintaining
a separate cut off and merit list for PwDs.
(v) The respective authorities are directed to proceed with the
selection process for appointment of the judicial officers, in the
light of this decision and complete the same, as expeditiously as
possible, preferably, within a period of three months, from today.
69. All the cases stand disposed of, on the above terms. No costs.
Connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
Post the matters after three months “for reporting compliance”.
Result of the case: Matters disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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