Holding

The conviction and death sentence were vacated because the prosecution failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the DNA evidence was unreliable, the confessions were inadmissible, and the investigation was fundamentally flawed.

Summary

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for murder, rape and robbery based on circumstantial evidence, a last‑seen theory, confessions, recovered items and DNA evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether these evidentiary pillars were proved beyond reasonable doubt and whether the investigation complied with procedural safeguards. It found the last‑seen theory weak, the confessions unreliable, the recovered objects unverified, and the DNA evidence compromised by gaps in collection, sealing, storage and chain of custody. The Court also held that the test identification parade was improperly conducted and that no motive could be established. Consequently, the conviction and death sentence were set aside and the appellant was ordered to be released.

Issues considered

The adequacy of circumstantial evidence, including the last‑seen theory, to sustain a conviction and death sentence
The admissibility and reliability of DNA evidence given alleged procedural lapses
The voluntariness and evidentiary value of extra‑judicial confessions and their impact under Sections 27 and 106 of the Evidence Act
The legality and procedural compliance of the test identification parade under Section 162 Cr.P.C.
The existence of a motive for the alleged offences
The propriety of the investigation, arrest and recovery of material objects
The entitlement to compensation for wrongful conviction and prolonged incarceration

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 162, s. 313, s. 366, s. 368
Constitution of Indias. Article 21
Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 376, s. 397
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(2)(v)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose as to the correctness of the order passed by the High Court upholding the order of the conviction and death sentence of the appellant for offence punishable u/ss.302, 376 and 397 IPC. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 376, 397 – Evidence Rape and Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – DNA evidence – Reliability – Prosecution case that victims- young man and girl went to a tourist place, where allegedly, the appellant first came to the prosecution witness and his partner asking to part with her jewellery and

Subjects

Circumstantial evidenceDNA evidenceMurderRobberyRapeLast seen theoryArrestConfessionRecoveryTest Identification ParadeMotiveStar witnessFaulty investigationDirections by Supreme Court as regards DNA evidenceRight to compensationDeath sentence

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 984 : 2025 INSC 845

Kattavellai @ Devakar
v.
State of Tamilnadu
(Criminal Appeal No. 1672 of 2019)
15 July 2025
[Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as to the correctness of the order passed by the High
Court upholding the order of the conviction and death sentence of
the appellant for offence punishable u/ss.302, 376 and 397 IPC.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 376, 397 – Evidence Act, 1872 –
ss.27, 106 – Rape and Murder – Circumstantial Evidence –
DNA evidence – Reliability – Prosecution case that victims-
young man and girl went to a tourist place, where allegedly,
the appellant first came to the prosecution witness and his
partner asking to part with her jewellery and then, approached
the victims, and on their refusal to part with money and gold
led to their killings – Trial court convicted the appellant and
sentenced him to death – Upheld by the High Court considering
the evidence on record-last seen theory, arrest, confession and
recovery, TI Parade, DNA Test and motive – Interference with:
Held: None of the circumstances posited by the prosecution
found to be conclusively proved against the appellant – Chain of
circumstantial evidence in no way points to a singular hypothesis,
that is the guilt of the accused, ruling out his innocence or
involvement of none else in the crime – Circumstance of the
arrival of the two victims at the scene of the crime was on their
own – It cannot be understood how that is a circumstance that
can be, ought to be and is proved as a circumstance against the
appellant – Last seen theory is a weak piece of evidence and
cannot be the sole basis of conviction – Arrest of the appellant itself
is cast under serious doubt, since the circumstances leading to
the same are missing from the record – There is an apparent lack
of corroboration to any of the statements made by the appellant
and as such, the confessions truly unreliable – Statement of the
* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 985

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

appellant led to the recovery of certain articles, how any and/or
all of these articles related to the alleged murder of two victims
and rape of one of them is undemonstrated from the record –
Objects recovered were not verified and tested, as such not
sufficient to take the recovery of the objects as a circumstance
against the appellant – Despite the presence of DNA evidence, the
evidence to be discarded since proper methods and procedures
not followed in the collection, sealing, storage, and employment
of the evidence in the course of the appellant’s conviction – DNA
evidence collected rendered unusable – Furthermore, it is difficult
to ascribe any motive on the part of the appellant – Entire process
was that of faulty investigation, identity of the accused could not
be sufficiently protected leading to its disclosure well before the
T.I.P. was conducted; nine-day delay in conducting T.I.P entirely
unexplained; lack of coordination between investigating agencies,
partner of star witness not arrayed as a witness; requisite care
regarding the sensitive evidence-DNA not taken in the slightest,
large amount of unexplained delay, chain of custody could not be
established, possibility of contamination could not be ruled out;
postmortem of the deceased persons conducted at the spot of the
crime without due regard to the possibility of contamination, effect
of such examination being conducted in the open, none of the
courts below have found this to be objectionable, and possibility
of ruling out the involvement of third party in the crime – Thus,
the conviction of the appellant is vacated – Evidence Act, 1872 –
s.106. [Paras 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26, 27, 35, 37, 39, 42, 43, 45]
Directions by Supreme Court – DNA evidence – DNA evidence
collected being rendered unusable – No uniformity or common
procedure followed by investigating authorities – Directions
issued by this Court for all cases where DNA evidence is
involved to ensure proper collection of DNA samples, its
packaging, documentation, transportation, preservation of
DNA and maintenance of Chain of Custody Register – Registry
to send a copy of the judgment to all High Courts and also
the Directors General of the Police of all States to ensure
necessary compliance. [Para 44]
Justice delivery system – Compensation – Clean acquittal of
the accused after very long incarceration – Law Commission of
India in its 277th report dealt with the said issue, however, the
Report confined the understanding of ‘wrongful prosecution’
to include only malicious prosecution, and the prosecution
986 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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initiated without good faith, it did not directly deal with the
situation of long incarceration – In foreign jurisdictions-United
States of America, compensation is award to the persons
acquitted after a long period of incarceration on being held
innocent – Right to compensation has been recognised by
both Federal and State statutes – Legislature to consider the
said aspect. [Para 46]

Case Law Cited
State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh [1974] 1 SCR 328 : (1974) 3 SCC
277; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh [1999] 1 SCR
1033 : (1999) 4 SCC 370; Hanumant v. State of M.P [1952] 1
SCR 1091 : (1952) 2 SCC 71; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State
of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116; Nizam v.
State of Rajasthan [2015] 10 SCR 786 : (2016) 1 SCC 550;
Ravasaheb v. State of Karnataka [2023] 2 SCR 965 : (2023) 5
SCC 391; Sanjay v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 572;
Sawal Das v. State of Bihar [1974] 3 SCR 74 : (1974) 4 SCC
193; Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra [2021] 2
SCR 617 : (2021) 5 SCC 626; Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar
[2021] 8 SCR 911 : (2022) 11 SCC 800; Veerendra v. State of
M.P. [2022] 4 SCR 225 : (2022) 8 SCC 668; Bodhraj v. State of
J&K [2002] Supp. 2 SCR 67 : (2002) 8 SCC 45; State of U.P. v.
Shyam Behari [2009] 6 SCR 4 : (2009) 15 SCC 548; Sambhubhai
Raisangbhai Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 987 : (2025)
2 SCC 399; Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B. [2023] 2
SCR 20 : (2023) 6 SCC; Bijender v. State of Haryana [2021] 7
SCR 1138 : (2022) 1 SCC 92; K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of
A.P. [1963] 3 SCR 412 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 32; Anil v. State
of Maharashtra [2014] 3 SCR 34 : (2014) 4 SCC 69; Manoj v.
State of M.P. [2022] 9 SCR 452 : (2023) 2 SCC 353; Prakash
Nishad v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 8 SCR 152 : (2023) 16
SCC 357; Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P. [2004] Supp.
5 SCR 1092 : (2005) 9 SCC 631; Malkhansingh v. State of M.P.
[2003] Supp. 1 SCR 443 : (2003) 5 SCC 746; Visveswaran v.
State [2003] 3 SCR 978 : (2003) 6 SCC 73; Ashok Debbarma v.
State of Tripura [2014] 4 SCR 287 : (2014) 4 SCC 747; Umesh
Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand (2021) 17 SCC 616; Hari Nath v.
State of U.P. [1988] 1 SCR 848 : (1988) 1 SCC 14; Iqbal v. State
of U.P. [2015] 6 SCR 239 : (2015) 6 SCC 623; Raja v. State
[2019] 17 SCR 1187 : (2020) 15 SCC 562; Gireesan Nair v. State
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 987

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

of Kerala [2022] 8 SCR 599 : (2023) 1 SCC 180; Budhsen v.
State of U.P. [1971] 1 SCR 564 : (1970) 2 SCC 128; Maya Kaur
Baldevsingh Sardar v. State of Maharashtra [2007] 10 SCR
752 : (2007) 12 SCC 654; C. Muniappan v. State of T.N. [2010]
10 SCR 262 : (2010) 9 SCC 567; Sk. Umar Ahmed Shaikh v.
State of Maharashtra [1998] 2 SCR 1209 : (1998) 5 SCC 103;
Rajesh v. State of Haryana [2020] 14 SCR 1 : (2021) 1 SCC
118; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2017] 6 SCR 1 : (2017) 6
SCC 1; Mohd. Anwar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2020] 7 SCR 150 :
(2020) 7 SCC 391; Suryamoorthy v. Govindaswamy (1989) 3 SCC
24; Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [1994] Supp. 1 SCR
483 : (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 80; Mulla v. State of U.P [2010] 2
SCR 633 : (2010) 3 SCC 508; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing
Chamansing (2001) 6 SCC 145; V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy
Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 INSC 739 : [2024] 10
SCR 393 : [2024] 10 SCR 393 – referred to.

List of Websites
https://jhpolice.gov.in/sites/default/files/documents-reports/
jhpolice_ebook_a_forensic_guide_for_crime_investigators.pdf;
http://164.100.117.138/pdfs/crime%20scene%20manual%20full_
organized.pdf; https://www.cfslchandigarh.gov.in/Uploads/Media/
Original/20180627121024_IOSOP%20Final.pdf – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
M.J. Ryan, “Compensation for Wrongful Convictions in the United
States” in Compensation for Wrongful Convictions – a Comparative
Perspective, Jasinski and Kremens (Eds.) 2023 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Circumstantial evidence; DNA evidence; Murder; Robbery; Rape;
Last seen theory; Arrest; Confession; Recovery; Confession to
police authorities; Test Identification Parade; Dock Identification;
Motive; Star witness; Faulty investigation; Directions by Supreme
Court as regards DNA evidence; Right to compensation; Death
988 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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sentence; Rape and Murder; DNA Test; Motive; Coordination
between investigating agencies; Large gaps in the chain of custody;
Postmortem; Directors General of Police of all States; Clean
acquittal of accused after long incarceration; Right to life; Law
Commission of India, 277th report; Foreign jurisdictions, United
States of America; Legislature.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1672 of 2019
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras at Madurai in RTMD No. 1 of 2018

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manasa Ramakrishna, Ms. Sreepriya
K., Mangesh Naik, Ms. Trisha Chandran, A. Karthik.
Advs. for the Respondents:
V Krishnamurthy, Sr. Adv., Sabarish Subramanian, Vishnu
Unnikrishnan, Ms. Azka Sheikh Kalia, Ms. Jahnavi Taneja, Veshal
Tyagi, Danish Saifi.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Karol, J.

For convenience and ease of reference, this judgment is divided
into the following parts:

INDEX*

THE CHALLENGE .......................................................................... 4
FACTUAL PRISM ........................................................................... 4
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT ........................................................... 10

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 989

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT ....................................................... 12
RIVAL CONTENTIONS .................................................................. 13
(a) Appellant ................................................................................ 13
(b) Respondent ............................................................................ 17
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ............................................................ 19
Bird’s Eye View of the Testimonies ....................................... 21
Circumstance One: The arrival of D1 & D2 at the scene of
the crime ................................................................................. 35
Circumstance Two: Last Seen Theory ................................... 36
Circumstance Three: Arrest, Confession and Recovery ........ 41
Arrest .............................................................................. 41
Confession ..................................................................... 44
Recovery ........................................................................ 47
Circumstance Four: The Incident of Rape and DNA
Evidence ................................................................................. 53
Circumstance Five: Motive .................................................... 60
Circumstance Six: Test Identification Parade ........................ 62
Two Additional Points ............................................................. 66
One: Other Suspects Remained Unexplored ............... 66
Two: Non-examination of Bhagyalakshmi ..................... 67
FAULTY INVESTIGATION .............................................................. 69
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 70

“A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is
free to give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy. It
concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused
arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is
charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product
of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the
conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the
990 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence
by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and
the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis
would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the
benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the
accused, the courts should not at the same time reject
evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which
are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.”
H.R Khanna J., in
State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh1

1. A visit to the forest, while a narrow escape for two persons, turned
fatal for another two. The genesis allegedly was greed, with the
accused person wanting to take away jewellery to put to his use, but
the end result was far worse. Two people who were in the prime of
their youth were hastily and brutally made to meet their maker, well
before they should have. This Court is now tasked with examining
the correctness of guilt of the person (the appellant) who, according
to the State, was responsible for this barbarity.

THE CHALLENGE
2. The present Appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 13th
March 2019, in Referred Trial [MD] No.1 of 2018 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Madras, Madurai Bench, which, in turn, was
preferred against the judgment dated 07th March 2018 in Special
Sessions Case No.9 of 2013 passed by the Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Theni, whereby the conviction of the Appellant under
Section 302, 376 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602, came
to be affirmed. The Trial Court imposed the death penalty on the
Appellant-convict, which also came to be affirmed by the High Court.

FACTUAL PRISM
3. The incident in question, relates to the unfortunate death of two
young people. The prosecution case as emerging from the record,
as also set out by the Courts below, is as follows:

1 (1974) 3 SCC 277
2 Hereinafter referred to as “IPC”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 991

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

3.1 On 14th May 2011, a young man named Ezhil Muthalvan3, left
his house on his father’s motorbike under the pretext of playing
cricket. Similarly, the second victim4 left home that morning telling
her parents that she was going to college. Unbeknownst to
either set of parents, the two victims went to Suruli Falls, which
was apparently a popular meeting point for friends and lovers.
3.2 Already there, was another couple, one Rajkumar (PW-5) and
Bhagyalakshmi5 (not examined), eating food. The two victims
were also seated a short distance away, approximately 60
meters from them. It is alleged that the appellant-convict, first
came to PW-5 and his partner asking Bhagiyalakshmi, to part
with her jewellery, which she did but upon finding that they were
not made of gold and instead were imitation made of brass,
he threw the same back at her and approached the victims.
PW-5 and his partner subsequently fled from the place having
noticed the former having some conversation with the victims.
3.3 The appellant-convict is said to have threatened the victims to
part with money and gold, which they refused. Such refusal,
according to the prosecution is what led to him killing the victims.
3.4 Given that D-2 was missing, her father Ganesan (PW-4) lodged
a complaint dated 15th May 2011 with All Women Police Station,
Theni, being Crime No.30 of 2011 under Section 366 of IPC
alleging that D-1, son of Thanganathi (PW-2) had kidnapped
his daughter.
3.5 On 15th May 2011, Ramesh (PW-11) who was the proprietor of
a tea stall near the Falls, informed forest officials that a bike
of Hero Honda make had been parked, unattended near his
tea stall for the last two days. On receipt of such information,
Forest Officials, namely, Thangaraj (PW-1) and Chelladurai
(PW-6) came to the spot and informed higher officials as also
the Sub-Inspector of Police, Rayappanpatti Police Station about
such fact. The said vehicle was taken and parked at the forest
bungalow. On 18th May 2011, having come to know of this from

3 Hereinafter D1
4 Hereinafter D2
5 Numerous spellings have been used throughout the record for this name. For the purpose of this
judgment, we use ‘Bhagyalakshmi’
992 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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a local person Pitchai, PW-2 (father of D-1) went there and
identified the bike to be belonging to him.
3.6 Thinking that since the bike was in the vicinity of the jungle,
D-1 must be nearby, they requested for grant of permission
to search the forest area. However, they were asked to come
the next day. Upon conducting the search the following day,
they found the two victims whose bodies had decomposed
considerably, lying face down. Certain relatives were brought
in, and due identification of the bodies was conducted.
3.7 PW-1 made a complaint pursuant to which Ramakrishnan
(PW-38) the then Sub-Inspector of Police, Cumbum North
Police Station, registered the case as Rayappanpatti P.S.
Cr.No.145/11 under Section 174 Cr.P.C., and forwarded the same
to the Judicial Magistrate Court, Uthamapalayam, and also to
the higher officials through Mr. L. Prasath, Spl. Sub Inspector
(PW-39). Vinoji (PW-52) Inspector of Police, Cumbum North
Police Station, took reigns of the investigation. Dr. Juliana
Jeyanthi (PW-37) conducted the postmortem of the victims at
the spot of the crime and noticed the following injuries, while
concluding that both the deaths were homicidal in nature, having
occurred 5-6 days prior to the autopsy :-
“D1
1) A chop wound of size 36 cms x 12 cms through
and through noted over the front, both sides and back
of the neck leaving a tag of skin of the length 4cms
at the bruise side of the back of the neck with the
surrounding bruise injuring the underlying muscles
vessels, nerves and bones. Margins were regular.
On dissection:
The wound passed downwards and inwards below
the seventh cervical vertebra, vertebral column and
spinal cord with the surrounding bruise.
D2
1) A chop wound of size 12 cms x 4.5 cms x 2.5
cms noted over the left side of the face extending
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 993

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

from left eye to the left side of the chin with the
surrounding bruise injuring the underlying muscles,
vessels an nerves.
Margins were regular.

On dissection:
The wound passed downwards and inwards injuring
the underlying muscles, vessels and nerves, with the
surrounding bruise.
2) A chop wound of size 12 cms x 4.5 cms x through
and through noted over the right wrist joint, with the
surrounding bruise injuring the underlying muscles,
vessels, nerves and bones. Margins were regular.
Right hand was missing.

On dissection:
The wound passed downwards and inwards injuring
the underlying muslces, vessels, nerves and bones
with the surrounding bruise.
3) Chop wounds of sizes 2 cms x 1.5 cms x through
and through, 2 cms x 1 cm x through and through,
1.5 cms x 1 cm x through and through and 1 cm x
1 cm x through and through seen over left second,
third and fourth fingers with the surrounding bruise
injuring the underlying muscles, vessels, nerves and
bones. Margins were regular.

On dissection:
The wound passed downwards and inwards injuring
the underlying muscles, vessels, nerves and bones
with the surrounding bruise.
4) A chop wound of size 23 cms x 10 cms x through
and through noted over the middle of the right leg
with the surrounding bruise injuring the underlying
muscles, vessels, nerves and bones. Margins were
regular. The chopped right leg was missing.
994 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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On dissection:
The wound passed downwards and inwards injuring
the underlying muscles, vessels, nerves and bones
with the surrounding bruise.
5) A chop wound of size 8 cms x 6 cms x through
and through noted over the left ankle joint, with the
surrounding bruise injuring the underlying muscles,
vessels, nerves and bones. Margins were regular.

On dissection:
The wound passed downwards and inwards injuring
the underlying, muscles, vessels, nerves and bones
with the surrounding bruise.
6) A stab wound of size 4.5 cms x 3 cms x 2.5 cms
noted over the back of the right arm with the
surrounding bruise injuring the underlying muscles,
vessels and nerves. Margins were regular. One end
was pointed and the other end was rounded.

On dissection:
The wound passed downwards and inwards injuring
the underlying muscles, vessels and nerves with the
surrounding bruise.
7) Vaginal introits was torn (5cms x 3 cms x 2 cms)
at 6’O clock position with the surrounding bruise
injuring the surrounding muscles, vessels, nerves.
Margins were irregular. Hymen was torn. Vagina
freely admitted one finger.”
3.8 PW-5 apparently came to know of the untimely deaths of the
victims and went to the Police Station on 20th May 2011 to
inform the investigators of the events that took place on the
14th May 2011.
3.9 ‘Taking cue’ from such information, the suspicion of investigators
zeroed in upon the appellant-convict who was eventually arrested
on 28th May 2011. Upon such arrest, he gave a voluntary
confession and effected recovery of certain material objects
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 995

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

from his own residence as also that of his mother-in-law. The
then I.O., noting that both the appellant-convict and the victims
belonged to backward communities, added a charge under
Section (3)(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19896, along with two counts of
Section 302; as also 379 and 376 IPC.
3.10 On 6th June 2011, the Police conducted a T.I. parade wherein
PW-5 positively identified the appellant-convict.
3.11 In total, to establish its case, the prosecution examined 56
witnesses and exhibited 77 documents as also 29 material
objects. The appellant-convict pleaded his innocence but,
however, did not examine any witnesses or lead any other
evidence.

TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT
4. Charges were framed against the accused on 8th October 2013
under Sections 302, 376, 392 r/w 397 IPC and (3)(2)(v) of the
SCST Act. The case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence. The
Principal District and Sessions Judge, Theni, in Special Session
Case 09/2013 vide judgment dated 7th March 2018 found the
accused (appellant-convict) before us guilty of the offences under
Section 302, 376 and 379, but declared not guilty under Section
392. It was also observed that the charge under SCST Act could
not be taken into consideration. The punishment as awarded is
extracted as under:-
“1. Enemy is sentenced to life for murdering Ezhilmuthalvan
under I.P.C. section 302, and penalty Rs.2,000/- is also
levied, if failed to pay the penalty, he should undergo 2
months of imprisonment.
2. Enemy is sentenced to death under I.P.C. section 302
for murdering the girl accompanied by Ezhilmuthalvan,
death sentence should be carried out by hanging him on
neck until he dies, and no other penalty is sentenced as
the maximum punishment of death penalty is declared.

6 Hereinafter SCST Act
996 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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3. Enemy is sentenced to life under I.P.C. section 376 for
the crime proven against him, and penalty of Rs.2,000/- is
also levied, if failed to pay the penalty, he should undergo
2 months of imprisonment.
4. This court is issuing the order that enemy is sentenced to
7 years of severe imprisonment, and penalty of Rs.1,000/- is
also levied, if failed to pay the penalty, he should undergo
1 month of imprisonment.
5. As it is determined that enemy is not the criminal under
I.P.C. section 397, the court releases him under Cr.P.C.
section 235(1) determining that he is not the criminal under
the alternate accusation under I.P.C section 392 accused on
him and, this court determines that Prevention of Atrocities
rule against schedule and schedule tribe cannot be taken into
consideration to grant punishment along with I.P.C. section
302, 376, 397 which has been accused upon the enemy.
6. As the enemy is sentenced to death for number one
crime under I.P.C section 302, it is declared that all the
penalties sentenced under other sections should be carried
out along with the death penalty.
7. It is declared that the judgment declared on this case
and all the documents should be sent to Chennai High
Court to ensure the death penalty sentenced to the enemy
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 366(1)
8. Action should be taken to execute the death penalty
sentenced to the enemy only after the death penalty
sentenced to the enemy is ensured by the Honourable High
Court, Chennai, under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
section 368.
…”

THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
5. Since the sentence imposed by the Trial Court was that of death by
hanging, the matter travelled up to the High Court in terms of Section
366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19737, being Referred to

7 Hereinafter referred to as “Cr.PC”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 997

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

Trial [MD] No.1 of 2018. The High Court considered the evidence
on record under the following heads: -
(a) Last seen theory;
(b) Arrest, confession and recovery;
(c) T.I. Parade;
(d) DNA Test; and
(e) Motive
The following is a tabular representation of the evidence considered
against each of the above heads:

Sl.No. Heading Description
1. Last seen theory PWs -2, 3, 5, 8, 25
2. Arrest, confession and PWs-5, 18, 19, 31, 32, 52 &
recovery 54; Exhs.P-8, P-75.
3. T.I. Parade PW-5
4. DNA Test PWs-34, 37, 42; Exhs.P-52
5. Motive PW-5

Having examined the documents and exhibits as above, the High
Court found the following circumstances to be established beyond
reasonable doubt against the Appellant-convict :-
“(a) On the date of occurrence, D1 and D2 left their
respective house and came to the place of occurrence
on their own by bike (MO.1).
(b) D1 and D2 were lastly seen alive by PW5 with the
accused.
(c) The accused was seen with weapon by PW25 on the
date of occurrence.
(d) The link between the recovery of MOs.10 and 18 from
the accused and the offence.
(e) The offence of rape committed by the accused was
proved through scientific evidence namely DNA report.
(f) Adverse inference against accused.”
998 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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6. Challenging his conviction and sentence, the Appellant-convict has
approached this Court. We have heard Ms. V. Mohana, learned
senior counsel for the Appellant-convict and Mr. V. Krishnamurthy,
learned senior counsel for the State. To be determined is whether the
Courts below were justified in handing down judgments of conviction
for the offences, as alleged and in connection therewith sentencing
him to death.

RIVAL CONTENTIONS

(a) Appellant
7. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant can be
summarised, inter alia, as follows :
Firstly, the learned senior counsel submitted that PW-5 was, on the
whole, an unreliable witness. Going so far as to say that he was a
planted witness introduced by the Police. She highlighted that PW-5’s
conduct of silence regarding the incident was unnatural, particularly
as he was aware through Bhagyalakshmi, that D-2 her collegemate
had not attended college the next day. His assumption that D-1 and
D-2 ran away to get married (which is the only plausible explanation
for non-reporting) is without basis since he himself admitted to having
no prior knowledge of any such plans or their relationship to such
an extent;
Secondly, the non-examination of Bhagyalakshmi, is the absence
of a material witness as she is the link between PW-5, D-1 and
D-2, since the former did not know the two victims directly but only
through her;
Thirdly, the T.I.P conducted is unbelievable given it was conducted
after a considerable delay of nine days from the date of arrest of the
appellant-convict. His identity was well-known by such time since
there had been news reports regarding the incident. Further, by
PW-5’s own admission, the Police authorities had informed him prior
to the TIP that one Kattavellai @ Devakar had committed the offence.
Still further, he also states that within a week of his statement to the
Police, PW-5 saw the appellant-convict at the Cumbum Police Station;
Fourthly, the testimony of PW-25 is vague and unreliable. He has not
identified the accused particularly such as through clothes recovered
from the appellant-convict nor through T.I.P;
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 999

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

Fifthly, there is no basis for suspicion against the appellant-convict
as on 28th May 2011. The story of the prosecution is that the genesis
of the suspicion is the attempted suicide by the Appellant-convict on
22nd May 2011. However, no credible explanation has been offered
for the suspicion. The FIR pertaining to the attempted suicide was
registered on 23rd May 2011. However, no steps in connection
therewith were taken and neither was any information given to
Royappanpatti Police Station. PW-52 and 54 (I.Os) both state that
they learnt of the suicide only after the arrest;
Sixthly, the circumstances of arrest are suspicious since no records
have been produced regarding appellant-convict’s admission in
the hospital during the period 22nd - 25th May 2011. There are no
independent witnesses to the arrest since PW-16 states that he was
called there ten minutes after the arrest. He has also accused the
police of torture at the police station;
Seventhly, the disclosure statement and the subsequent recovery of
articles is surrounded by suspicious circumstances – for instance,
PW-4 identified the chain in Court and deposed that he was shown
a gold chain by the police, it is unclear whether this was the same
chain that belonged to D-2. None of the witnesses mentioned any
distinctive feature thereof. The FIR makes a mention of a gold chain
of 2.5 sovereigns but does not mention the ‘ohm’ dollar; the weapon
allegedly used for the commission of the offence is not subjected to
any forensic examination; the clothes recovered from the house of
the appellant-convict are not subjected to any forensic examination
and cannot be linked to the crime. The disclosure statement does
not specify all articles such as the jute bag, tiffin box and, therefore,
their recovery is not a consequence of the disclosure statement. The
independent witness, PW-16 does not depose the exact location
of the materials recovered from the house of the appellant-convict;
Eighthly, the DNA evidence cannot be relied on since there are
several gaps in the chain of custody leaving open the possibility of
tampering. PW-37 states that she took the vaginal swab and handed
them over to the Constable on duty but correspondingly PW-41 does
not make any mention thereof when the samples were packaged,
sealed, kept at one location, safely or otherwise, sent to another
location etc., the record thereof is absent. The semen sample of
the Appellant-convict was taken on 13th June 2011, and they were
1000 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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allegedly sent to FSL, Chennai. There is no record of the same being
sent, returned and/or thereafter being stored, preserved or disposed
of. A blood sample was collected from the appellant-convict, but PW-
37, the doctor concerned, does not testify thereto, nor does PW-52,
the concerned I.O., record anything regarding the same; and
Ninthly, motive has not been established. Various articles other
than the gold chain, also belonging to the victims such as mobile
phone, ring etc., were neither recovered from the spot of the crime
nor from the Appellant-convict. Further, it is not the pleaded case of
the prosecution that he disposed of the articles.
In making the above submissions, the learned senior counsels
referred to certain decisions of this Court, which we have perused
and considered.

(b) Respondent
8. The Respondent-State submitted, inter-alia, as follows :
First, relying on the observation of the High Court that PW-5, upon
finding out of the death of D1 and D2, he himself went to the Police
Station, it is submitted that there is no actual delay in reporting of
the incident by PW-5;
Second, calling into question the T.I.P. conducted and the identification
made therein, is unjustified since PW-5 himself has never stated that
prior to the T.I.P., he had seen the picture of the convict appellant.
The pictures shown to him, in fact, were only of habitual offenders.
PW-25 who states that he had seen the appellant-convict with a
sickle on the date of the offence, corroborates and lends strength
to the statement of PW-5;
Third, regarding the confession statement (Ext.P-8) it is submitted that
whether or not the object discovered would be considered relevant
or not has to be decided in accordance with State of Himachal
Pradesh v. Jeet Singh8. It is submitted that the credibility of recovery
is sought to be questioned by the appellant saying that the exact
location of the recovery has not been disclosed, however, it has
been – his house, temple near the forest and mother-in-law’s house.

8 (1999) 4 SCC 370
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1001

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

In regards gold chain, the submission that PW-4 has categorically
identified the chain recovered, as belonging to D-2; and
Fourth, the testimony of PW-37 clearly establishes the factum of rape
upon D-2. DNA evidence, i.e., vaginal swab, has been clearly and
properly maintained, preserved and utilised. This is said in reference
to testimony of PWs 27, 48 and 34 and exhibits P-37, P-49, P-21,
P-29 and P-30.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
9. In all 56 witnesses were examined by the prosecution.
10. Unquestionably, there is no eyewitness to the crime. The appellant-
convict has been directed to be sent to the gallows on the basis of
circumstantial evidence which, in the considered view of the Courts
below, forms a chain so complete that it rules out any and all other
possibility of any other person, except the accused alone, having
killed D-1 and D-2.
11. The law on this count is exceptionally well settled, and although it
does not require to be elaborately restated, we will refer to a few
judgments for the purposes of immediate recall.
11.1 In Hanumant v. State of M.P 9, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, speaking through Mehr Chand Mahajan, J., (as his
Lordship then was) observed thus:
“12. It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully
established, and all the facts so established should
be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of
the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of
a conclusive nature and tendency and they should
be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be
a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent

9 (1952) 2 SCC 71
1002 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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with the innocence of the accused and it must be
such as to show that within all human probability the
act much have been done by the accused.”
11.2 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra10 lays
down the ‘Panchsheel Principles’ which are extracted below:-
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled before
a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not
“may be” established. There is not only a grammatical
but a legal distinction between “may be proved”
and “must be or should be proved” as was held by
this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri)
1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations
were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused
must be and not merely may be guilty before a court
can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’
and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures
from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused,
that is to say, they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and

10 (1984) 4 SCC 116
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1003

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused.”

Bird’s Eye View of the Testimonies
12. Let us now undertake an individual examination of each of the
circumstances found to be proved by the Courts below, reproduced
supra. In doing so, a bird’s eye view of the relevant PWs is necessary.
12.1 PW-1 was the Forest Guard, Surulipatti. He has deposed in
connection with the bike using which D-1 had come to the
location where he ultimately met his end. He was informed of the
unattended bike, which he later parked at the forest bungalow
after informing the higher authorities. He also testified to being
a member of the search party that discovered the bodies of
the two victims. He described the identification undertaken by
the relatives of the deceased and that he lodged a complaint
with the concerned police station regarding the events. He
made a positive identification of the motorbike (M.O.-1) and
the clothes worn by D-1.
In his cross-examination, it has come forth, upon the filing of
complaint the concerned inspector came to the location and
confiscated the corpse.
12.2 PW-2 is the father of D-1. He deposed that when his son
did not return, he individually searched for him, however, to
no avail. He stated that PW-4’s second daughter Kousalya,
called the younger brother of D-1 inquiring about D-2, when
it was revealed that even D-1 had not returned home. It is in
this context that a complaint was made before the All Women
Police Station, Theni, alleging that D-1 had kidnapped D-2.
He submitted that prior to these unfortunate events, he had
suspected the involvement of four persons, namely, Arjunan,
Amnbazhagan, Viji and Francies. As such he approached
the High Court wanting the investigation of the case to be
transferred to the CBCID, which was accepted. It has also
come in his testimony that he came to know of the arrest of
the Appellant-convict through the newspaper.
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12.3 Chellandiammal, PW-3 is the mother of D-1. She deposed
that on 19th May 2011, certain members of her family went
to search the forest where bodies of D-1 and D-2 were
found. Although she was not a member of search party, but
she has described the condition in which the same were
found. She deposed that bodies were brought to the village
where she identified D-1 and, thereafter, cremated per
customs.
In her cross-examination, it is revealed that she did, in fact, go
to Suruli on 19th May 2011. She made a categorical statement
about the identification of Jewellery worn by D-2 through her
parents.
12.4 PW-4 is the father of D-2. He stated that when D-2 did not
return, through Kousalya, they inquired from D-1’s brother
about the whereabouts of D-2 when they found that D-1 was
also missing. He levelled accusations against D-1 for eloping
with his daughter and as such filed a complaint with the All
Women Police Station, Theni. Upon discovering the body of the
victims, the gold chain which was the alleged prime reason for
this act of extreme violence was found and positively identified.
She was also wearing a gold ring which, however, was not
recovered. He testified that the doctors conducted the post-
mortem at the spot of the crime itself and thereafter handed
the corpses to them for performing final rites.
In the cross-examination, it is admitted that even though D-2
was missing, he did not file a missing person’s complaint
regarding his daughter.
Regarding the complaint filed before the All-Women Police
Station, Theni, here only we may partly refer to the testimony
of PW-51, Peula Mary, who was the Inspector of Police at that
time has deposed of having perused the Police Station Petition
N/2011 filed by PW-4 as taken down by Katturrani (PW-50).
She deposed that her course of action would have been to
call both D-1 and D-2 and enquire about their whereabouts.
PW-4 told her that since both the parties belong to the same
caste, they would settle the matter without the intervention of
the police or the authorities, as such the said complaint was
closed. Thereafter, on another complaint made by PW-4 on
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1005

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

19th May 2011 at 6:00 am alleging that D-1 and his parents
had kidnapped D-2, this witness registered, Crime No.30/2011
under Section 366 IPC to an unknown outcome.
12.5 PW-5 is the star-witness of the prosecution. The circumstances
of the last-seen theory and motive are largely dependent on
his testimony. In fact, the hangman’s noose purely rests on
his testimony. Considering the same it would be appropriate
to extract the same in its entirety.
“DEPOSITION OF WITNESS
(CHAPTER XXIII CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE)
IN THE COURT OF THE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT
AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
THENI
SPL.S.C.NO.9/2013
DEPOSITION OF P.W. 5
Chief Examination :-
I am residing at Kadamalaikundu. I am an Auto
Driver by profession. At the time of the occurrence
of the case, I was studying 3rd Year Economics in the
College of Madurai Kamaraj University, Aundipatti.
I am having relationship with one Bagyalakshmi,
D/o Subburaj of Theni. Bagyalakshmi was studying
B.Ed., in Annai Womens College, Aanaimalaiyanpatti.
I know deceased Ezhilmuthalvan. I know his lover
Kasturi also. My lover Bagyalakshmi and Kasturi were
friends. Hence, I know Kasturi and Ezhilmuthalvan.
Ezhilmuthalvan is belonging to SC Pallar community.
His lover Kasturi is also belonging to SC Pallar
Community. I know the accused present here.
Previously, I saw the Accused for the first time
inside Suruli Falls Forest. On 14.05.2011, I and
Bagyalakshmi went to Suruli by bus. Ezhilmuthalvan
and Kasturi came to Suruli by bike. After having talked
in the hill forest, I and Bagyalakshmi were sitting at
a distance of about 60 meters for taking food. At that
1006 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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time, the accused herein came to us with a sickle in
his hand and demanded the chain and Earring worn
by Bagyalakshmi. I told him that the jewels worn
by Bagyalakshmi are not gold jewels and they are
covering jewels. For which, the Accused shouted as
to whether you will give it or I will hack you. Out of
fear, Bagyalakshmi gave the jewels worn by her. The
Accused received it, verified and threw away since
they are covering jewels. When Bagyalakshmi took
the said jewels, the Accused told us, “Are you worthy
of love affair? Get lost”. After sending us, he went to
the place where Ezhilmuthalvan was. After some time,
when I went to bring Ezhilmuthalvan, the Accused
was threatening Ezhilmuthalvan and Kasturi to give
the jewels. I thought that the Accused will threaten
them like he threatened us and then he will leave
them, myself and Bagyalakshmi came down. After
coming down, I phoned Ezhilmuthalvan’s cell phone.
But Ezhilmuthalvan did not attend the phone. Then,
I and Bagyalakshmi took the bus and came to Theni
and I dropped Bagyalakshmi at Theni and went to
my village. On the next day, Bagyalakshmi phoned
me and said that Kasturi did not come to the college.
We were of the assumption that both of them might
have gone to get married. Thereafter, Bagyalakshmi
informed me over phone that Ezhilmuthalvan and
Kasturi have been murdered in a suspicious manner.
Then I was enquired at Royappanpatti Police Station.
Then, police have informed me that Ezhilmuthalvan
and Kasturi were murdered by one Kattavellai @
Dhivakar of K.M. Patti and that police have confiscated
the jewels of Kasturi. They asked me whether I can
identify the person if I see him. I said that I can
identify. On 06.06.2011, they brought me to Central
Prison, Madurai. They conducted identification parade
there. There were 9 persons. Judge was present. The
Judge told me to identify the person who was seen
by me at the place of occurrence by touching him.
I have identified the person who was seen by me
at the place of occurrence by touching him. He told
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1007

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

me to wait outside and after changing the persons,
he told me to identify. Similarly, I have identified
three times. Thereafter, on 15.06.2011, they brought
me to Bodi Court. The Judge has obtained secret
statement from me. I have given statement in respect
of the occurrence took place. The statement given
by me was recorded in the court and my signature
was obtained therein. The signature shown to me is
the signature I put up in the Court. My 164 Cr.P.C
statement is Ex. P.2. Royappanpatti Police, Cumbum
Police and DSPs have enquired me with regard to
this case.

… … …

31.07.2014 - Spl S.C. No. 9/2013
On 20.05.2011, I was enquired at Royappanpatti,
Cumbum and Uthamapalayam I was enquired
for 3 days. Firstly, Royppanpatti Police enquired
me on 20th Royappanpatti Police did not enquire.
DSP Pandiarajan has enquired on 2th I went to
Royappanpati Police did not enquire. DSP Pandiarajan
has enquired On 20th I went to Royappanpatti Police.
On 21 st at 3.00 Hours, I went to Royappanpatti
Police. SI in Royappanpatti Police enquired me. I
don’t remember as to whether Royappanpatti Police
and Uthamapalayam DSP have written what I have
stated. They did not obtain my signature for the said
3 days. On 22nd, I was enquired at Cumbum Police
Station. I don’t remember as to whether they have
written anything there. Even thereafter, I was enquired
at Cumbum and Theni CBCID Office. Undertaking
was obtained from me at Collector Office that I have
to come for enquiry as and when called. On 14th, I
saw Kasturi for the first time in Hill area. Even after
the Accused chased us away, I went to the hill area
again. I went there to bring them. We used to go that
side and they also used to come there then and there.
Kasturi and Bagyalakshmi have decided to go there
1008 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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on the date of occurrence. She brought Dosa. We
ate it. I did not notice whether Kasturi brought food.
We ate it separately so as to be secluded. When
the Accused threatened us by showing the sickle,
I did not have the thought to call Ezhilmuthalvan by
shouting. I thought that he will threaten and go away
and hence I did not take it as serious Kasturi and
Ezhilmuthalvan did not see the Accused threatening
us. It is a dense forest. Normally even those who are
near won’t be visible. I don’t know whether the jewels
worn by Kasturi are gold jewels. If asked whether
the accused has the chance for seeing them, there
is chance. It is not correct that the Accused did not
threaten me. If it is said that I have alerted through
cell phone that the Accused is coming, I phoned only
after coming down. I can’t do anything due to anxiety.
It is not correct that he did not threaten me and that
I am suppressing it. We can reach the basement within
10 minutes. I trued to talk through cell phone, but it
was not reached. It is not correct that I have not tried
anything and I am lying. I did not say it thinking that
he will threaten the deceased like he threatened me.
If it is said can we four of us intercept the Accused,
the Accused has sickle in his hand. If it is asked
whether I have informed either in the house of Kasturi
or in the house of Ezhilmuthalvan, even after hearing
the news through Bagyalakshmi that Kasturi did not
come to the College on 16.05.2014, I did not inform.
Previously, they did not tell me that they are going to
elope and marry. It is not correct that I did not go to
Suruli along with Bagya Lakshmi and that if I went
there, I would have given the information. Lastly,
when phoned on 14th, it was replied as Not available.
Hence, I have not phoned again. After 14th up to 20th
I did not tell anyone either about the threatening of the
accused or about the threatening of Ezhilmuthalvan.
After 20th, for the first time, I told Uthamapalayam
Police Station about the treatening by the Accused.
About within a week, I saw the Accused at Cumbum
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1009

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

Police Station. On 20, 21 and 22, Police have shown
many photos and asked me to identify. They asked
me at Suruli. Uthamapalayam Police have asked
me. I don’t know whether the covering jewels worn
by Bagyalakshmi were confiscated by the Police.
Bagyalakshmi also did not ask me. I did not give any
separate complaint about the Accused threatened me.
It is not correct that I did not go to Suruli and that
there was no such occurrence took place. It is not
correct that I am giving false evidence as taught by
the Police. It is not correct that I have given statement
in Judicial Magistrate Court as taught by the Police.
It is not correct that I am giving false evidence since
the Police have threatened me that they will implead
me in the case.
My lover Bagyalakshmi and Kasturi are friends.
Hence, I know Kasturi and Ezhilmuthalvan. If it is
asked whether I have stated in the police enquiry that
Ezhilmuthalvan is belonging to SC Pallar Community
and his lover Kasturi is also belonging to S.C Pallar
Community, I have stated that. After we were sent,
when we went up to bring Ezhilmuthalvan, the
accused was threatening Ezhilmuthalvan and Kasturi
with the sickle to give their jewels. If it is asked as to
whether I have told in the police enquiry as to whether
I thought that the Accused will threaten them also
like he threatened, I and Bagyalakshmi came down.

… … …”

12.6 PW-16 was the village administrative officer. He testified that
upon the arrest of the Appellant-convict on 28th May 2011,
he gave a voluntary confession statement. He also deposed
that the latter brought them to his house from where certain
material objects were recovered and thereafter the house of
his mother-in-law from where a chain was recovered (M.O. 10).
12.7 Maheswari (PW-17), Mayakkal (PW-18) and Raja (PW-19)
have deposed in connection with a gold chain which PW-4
has positively identified as belonging to D-2. Hence, they are
1010 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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dealt with collectively. PW-18 having received a chain through
her daughter-in-law gave it to PW-17, who pledged it with
the Cumbum Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society for
Rs.10,000/-. PW-19 testifies that the said amount along with
interest of Rs.52/- was returned on 27th May, 2011.
12.8 PW-31, namely, Dr. S. Chellapandian, was the doctor who
examined the appellant-convict when he was brought to the
Government Medical College Hospital, Theni having consumed
an unidentified poison. While under treatment the doctor came
to know about his involvement in the offences subject matter
of appeal. The appellant-convict was discharged on 25th May
2011.
12.9 PW-32, namely, Udaiyali was the Special Sub Inspector,
Gudalur South Police Station. He received information on
25th May 2011 that the appellant-convict had been admitted to
hospital having consumed poison. Accordingly, he registered
Gudalur North PS Crime No.120/2011, under Section 309
IPC. In connection therewith he also recorded the statement
of one Vijaya, mother of the convict-appellant.
12.10 PW-34, namely, Dr. Kamalashi Krishnamoorthy, the Additional
Director and Director (I/c) of Forensic Science Department,
Chennai, had examined the DNA extracted from semen stains
and the vaginal swab. She has concluded the DNA present
on both the stains and the swab match.
12.11 PW-37 is Dr. Juliana Jeyanthi, who conducted the postmortem
of the two victims. We have already noted supra, the injuries
sustained by them, earlier in this judgment. She has further
testified that the convict-appellant had no injuries whatsoever;
she has also stated that she may have handed over (though
not certain) the vaginal swabs taken by her to the constable
on duty.
12.12 PW-38, namely, Ramakrishnan, was the Sub Inspector of
Police, Cumbum North Police Station at the relevant time. He
was the one who registered FIR in Crime No.145/2011 under
the category of suspicious death, upon receipt of a complaint
from PW-1. He testified to the transferring of the case to CBCID
on 6th September 2011.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1011

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

12.13 PW-41, namely, Mohd. Abul Rashid, was the Special Sub
Inspector of Police, Cumbum North Police Station. He was
appointed to assist the Investigating Officer (PW-52). He
conducted the inquest of the body of D-2. The body was
handed over to him which he then handed over to PW-37,
accompanying her to the hospital therefor, and after the
postmortem he gave the same to the relatives of the victims.
The organs of the victims were received by him and sent
to the regional FSL at Madurai for chemical analysis. Later,
Viscera was handed over to the Judicial Magistrate’s Court
at Uthamapalayam.
12.14 PW-42, Pandiarajan, who then was a Head Constable at
Royappanpatti Police Station, stated that upon instructions
of the Inspector of Police, Cumbum PS, on 29th June 2011
he took two vaginal swabs taken from the body of D-2 and
deposited the same with the Judicial Magistrate’s Court at
Uthamapalayam. There is a corresponding entry in the Pocket
Note maintained at Royappanpatti PS. Regarding the said
vaginal swabs, PW-27, Vijayendran, an employee at FSL
Madurai, deposed that he received the vaginal swabs of D-2
through sealed letter dated 29th June 2011.
12.15 PW-52, Vinoji was the main Investigating Officer of the
case. Since I.Os. are the charioteers of an investigation,
their testimony has to be accorded necessary importance
and attention. Having taken charge of the case, he went to
the spot of the crime and prepared the observation mahazar
and rough sketch and confiscated certain articles from there
such as hair pins, bangles, blood stained sand and also sand
otherwise. Subsequently, he went to the spot where the body
of D2 was discovered and undertook the same processes.
He carried out enquiry from the witnesses present there after
having completed the inquest upon D2. The next day, he
confiscated the bike of D1 and recorded statements of certain
witnesses. On 28th May 2011 he recorded the confession
statement of the Appellant-convict.
In his cross-examination, it is revealed that he has no
recollection of the number of persons present at the place
of occurrence; he had not himself prepared the observation
1012 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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mahazar and sketch - neither does he recall as to who the
concerned constable was, who had prepared such documents.
He had not obtained their statements under Section 161(3)
Cr.P.C; It has also come on record that despite a search,
the amputated parts of the deceased’s body were not
recovered; regarding the collection of blood-stained sand,
it was suggested that the same was not collected neither it
was sent for testing; regarding the Appellant-convict it comes
forth in the cross-examination that he had no information
as to the latter being admitted at the Government Hospital;
when it comes to the vaginal swab, he is unclear about its
status and in whose possession the same was safely kept.
He simply stated that had it been given to the police officials,
it would have been mentioned in the case diary; the source
of suspicion which made him pursue the appellant-convict as
a suspect and make enquiries is unclear; he further admits
that the confession statements of the Appellant-convict were
not written by him, nor does he recall the particulars of the
assistant who allegedly wrote the same. He also states that
such assistant had not signed upon the statements and it had
only been signed by the Village Administrative Officer, Village
Assistant, Appellant-convict and himself; he denies having
brought into the case, as witnesses PW-16 and Manikandan
from other villages and no person from the village concerned
where the offence took place, so as to make it easier for
him to get testimonies in favour of the case put forth by the
prosecution.
12.16 PW-54, namely, R. Pandiarajan, took reins of the investigation
from Inspector of Police, Cumbum North P.S. on the basis
of the order of District Superintendent of Police dated 28th
May 2011. In the chief examination, the witness has listed
out the various persons he examined in the course of
investigation.
His cross-examination reveals that he did not know as to how
he came to have the knowledge of the Appellant-convict’s
attempt of suicide. Further, it has been stated therein that
there is no clarity as to which of the two victims was killed
first; and that it would not be wrong to say that PW-37 handed
over the sample taken to the Constable on duty.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1013

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

12.17 PW-55, MXB. Stanli, took over investigation from PW-54. In
his cross-examination, he states that PW-54 ought to have
gone to the scene of occurrence on 19th May 2011 as per
Rules; according to him it is not correct that a semen sample
was taken from the Appellant-convict and kept in the custody
of the police department till 13th June 2011; he has confirmed
the giving of a confession statement and recovery of material
objects at the instance of Appellant-convict; the factum of the
latter’s possession of a mobile phone remained un-investigated.
12.18 PW-56 – Tr. Dayalan Tamilselvan, was the DSP, CBCID,
Madurai. He undertook investigation in accordance with the
order of the Additional Director General of Police, CBCID,
Chennai. The examination-in-chief details the process
of investigation, carried out on various dates. Further, it
is admitted that there is no specific reason for the non-
examination of Bhagyalakshmi.
13. We now proceed to consider each of the circumstances held to be
proven against the Appellant-convict by the courts below.

Circumstance One: The arrival of D1 & D2 at the scene of the
crime
14. The first circumstance is that D-1 and D-2 came to the scene of the
occurrence on their own. While that is a true statement of fact as
evidenced by the testimonies of PW-2, 3 and 4, we are at a loss to
understand how that is a circumstance that can be; ought to be and
is proved as a circumstance against the accused. The two lovers
had plans to meet, and so they did. They left their houses under
completely different pretexts, which is also not an occurrence out of
the ordinary or the usual when young, budding romances are often
sought to be hidden from family, which is evidenced by the fact
that the parents of the victims were not aware of the relationship
between them. Had it been the case that the Appellant-convict, by
some act, had encouraged or furthered the reason for D1 and D2
coming to the spot of the crime, then it could have been a suggested
thought and premeditation on his part, qualifying to be counted as
a circumstance against his innocence. This, most certainly, is not
the pleaded case of the prosecution. This circumstance, therefore,
is only a circumstance in name and of no value whatsoever.
1014 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Circumstance Two: Last Seen Theory
15. The next circumstance that is to consider is the last seen theory. It
is well established that this is a weak piece of evidence and cannot
be the sole basis of conviction.11 We may further refer to certain
judgments that expand upon the application of this theory.
15.1 In Ravasaheb v. State of Karnataka12, a three Judge Bench
(which included two of us, Nath and Karol JJ.) observed thus:
“29. On its own, last seen theory is considered to
be a weak basis for conviction. However, when the
same is coupled with other factors such as when the
deceased was last seen with the accused, proximity
of time to the recovery of the body of the deceased,
etc. The accused is bound to give an explanation
under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. If he
does not do so, or furnishes what may be termed
as wrong explanation or if a motive is established —
pleading securely to the conviction of the accused
closing out the possibility of any other hypothesis,
then a conviction can be based thereon. [Satpal v.
State of Haryana [Satpal v. State of Haryana, (2018)
6 SCC 610] and Ram Gopal v. State of M.P. [Ram
Gopal v. State of M.P., (2023) 5 SCC 534]]”
[See also: Sanjay v. State of U.P.13]
15.2 The application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, doesn’t absolve the prosecution of its duty to establish
its case against the accused, beyond reasonable doubt. [See:
Sawal Das v. State of Bihar14 and Shivaji Chintappa Patil v.
State of Maharashtra15]
15.3 In applying the last-seen theory, Courts should keep in mind
the totality of the circumstances, or the case put forward by
the prosecution. In other words, also to be seen is, what

11 Nizam v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550
12 (2023) 5 SCC 391
13 2025 SCC OnLine SC 572
14 (1974) 4 SCC 193
15 (2021) 5 SCC 626
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1015

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

preceded and followed the accused person being last seen
with the deceased. [See: Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar16]
15.4 In Veerendra v. State of M.P.17, referring to Nizam (supra)
it was observed that when the time between the ‘last seen’
and the ‘time of occurrence’ is significant, conviction thereon
would not be advisable or sustainable.
15.5 The converse of the above is that the theory comes into play
“where the time gap between the point of time when the
accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when
the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any
person other than the accused being the author of the crime
becomes impossible.” [See: Bodhraj v. State of J&K18 , State
of U.P. v. Shyam Behari19 and Sambhubhai Raisangbhai
Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat20]
16. The two witnesses relied on by the prosecution to establish the
evidence of last seen are PW-5 and PW-25. The High Court found
the evidence of PW-5 to be inspiring in confidence, rejecting the
argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant-convict that his silence
from 14th May 2011 to 20th May 2011 renders his testimony doubtful.
This was done on the ground that the reaction of PW-5 – relief of
having escaped the negative consequence of attempted robbery of
Bhagyalakshmi’s jewels; the assumption that D1 and D2 would have
faced something similar; would be alive and well; also, would have
gone into the forest to get married, an entirely plausible manner of
perceiving the event having taken place. The question is – Is it so?
17. The evidence of PW-5 stands extracted in toto, supra. On independent
analysis, while we acknowledge the point of view of the High Court
that no two persons can act in the same manner, we are unable to
record our agreement with the findings returned qua this witness. It
is a settled proposition of law that if two interpretations of a given
situation are possible, the one favouring the accused will be taken.
But, at the same time, the principle in judging the conduct of a

16 (2022) 11 SCC 800
17 (2022) 8 SCC 668
18 (2002) 8 SCC 45
19 (2009) 15 SCC 548
20 (2025) 2 SCC 399
1016 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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person is the reasonable man test. The examination that we must
undertake is whether the act of PW-5 satisfies this understanding.
Certain questions, therefore, arise. First and foremost, why did he
not inform anyone about the occurrence between the 14th and the
20th; Second, having seen that the Appellant-convict was threatening
D1 and D2, and finding that D1 did not pick up the phone when this
witness called after coming down the hill-ordinarily should have raised
sufficient concern in PW-5 to have taken further steps, for instance,
himself intervening, to support D1 and D2 against the actions of the
Appellant-convict, or alerting the forest rangers of unruly behaviour,
contacting police authorities or informing them of the near theft/threat
they had received as also seen others receiving et cetera; yet further
when Bhagyalakshmi informed PW-5, that on the next day D2 did not
attend college, yet again there was no action on part of PW-5 – In
fact, stoic silence, any which way. He testified that they assumed that
the Appellant-convict would let D1 and D2 go, as he did to them, and
that they would have gone off into the woods to get married. Striking
quite the opposite tone, in his cross-examination it appears that there
had been no discussion whatsoever of this possibility. The question
then is how such an assumption could be justified. The High Court
held this exploration to be valid and possible but then the record
speaks differently. These circumstances, taken cumulatively, appear
to be sufficient enough to ring alarm bells and yet he sat quietly
and waited till the 20th May 2011 to inform any of the investigating
authorities or any other person in regards to what he had seen at
the hill. Can this be termed as the conduct of a reasonable man or,
in other terms be so plausible that it be chalked out to differences
in human behaviour. Considering the above discussion, we find the
testimony of PW-5 who is the star witness of the prosecution to be
full of holes, stretches and surmises. With far too much emphasis
being given on the possibility of such an action being reasonable.
Knowing both the victims, having seen them be threatened, finding
them missing from everyday activity and even out of contact, and
yet not even uttering so much as a whisper to anybody, is hard to
conceive as reasonable. In our considered view, therefore, there are
sufficient holes in the testimony of PW-5 for it to be cast in doubt.
This then takes us to the question as to whether he is a witness
worthy of credence and his testimony believable. We are afraid
not so. Particularly, as he himself admits having been repeatedly
questioned by all the investigating officers.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1017

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

18. The next witness relied on by the prosecution to establish last seen
is PW-25 who is a Forest Guide. His statement is limited to the
fact of seeing the Appellant-convict with a Sickle or ‘Aruval’, which
is the alleged murder weapon, on the day of the occurrence. In
ordinary circumstances, this would have been an important piece
of evidence. However, in the attending facts and circumstances of
this case, particularly that the Appellant-convict was employed as a
‘coconut cutter’ as can be seen from the testimony of PW-23, further
substantiated by the testimonies of PW-10 and PW-24, who are also
similarly placed men, this job is done with the use of an ‘Aruval’,
and so, it cannot be held to be strange that a person who is, in
the course of his employment, regularly using such an instrument
has it in his possession. In other words, the evidence of PW-25 is
a mere statement and cannot help, in any way in the case against
the Appellant-convict.

Circumstance Three: Arrest, Confession and Recovery

Arrest
19. The next aspect to be considered is the arrest of the Appellant-convict.
The sequence of events leading up to the arrest is that the bodies
of the victims were discovered on 19th May, 2011; PW-5 spoke to
the investigating authorities on 20th May 2011; as a consequence of
unrelated actions, the Appellant-convict attempts suicide, such attempt
is thwarted-he is admitted to the Government Medical College Hospital,
Theni, on 22nd May, 2011 brought by certain constables; he was later
sent to K. Vilakku Hospital and discharged on 25th of May, 2011, after
having received treatment at the hands of PW-31; and he is arrested
on 28th May 2011. The High Court judgment, curiously, records that
the investigating authorities, “taking a cue” from the statement of
PW-5, arrested the Appellant-convict on 28th May, 2011. However,
the record is unclear how such an arrest order was passed.
20. PW-31, in his cross-examination states that while the Appellant-convict
was admitted under his care, he came to know either on the day
of the latter’s admission, or the next day, that he was involved in a
murder investigation. For clarity, it may be stated that this occurrence
happened either on 22nd or 23rd of May 2011. We notice that PW-32,
who, at the relevant point of time, was a Special Sub Inspector, Gudalur
South PS, states that he received information on 25th May, 2011 that
1018 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the Appellant-convict had been admitted there. It has come forth in
his statement that when he reached, the latter was accompanied only
by his mother. Apparently, his mother’s statement was also recorded;
however, the same is not on record. There is an apparent difference
in the sequence of events, as narrated by these two witnesses.
21. The Appellant-convict came to be arrested, according to the
prosecution, on 28th May, 2011 (which fact he denies in his statement
under section 313 Cr.P.C.). PW-16, who is the Village Administrative
Official, testified that the Inspector of Police, Cumbum, arrested him
and relayed such information. The only reason for such an arrest is
suspicion. As we have already observed, the other statement relating
to the arrest of the Appellant-convict is that he was arrested, taking a
cue from the statement of PW-5. The record is conspicuously silent
as to the genesis of the suspicion the authorities cast upon him or
what cue or hint they took from the statement of PW-5. So, how
one thing led to another is unclear. We may also observe that it is
strange that the Courts below did not emphasize how such an arrest
came to be, particularly when none of the witnesses examined for
the prosecution stated with ample clarity regarding the same. The
arrest of the Appellant-convict itself is cast under serious doubt,
since the circumstances leading to the same are missing from the
record. Various questions that ought to have been answered were
in fact not done so - such as what led the police to suspect him,
when this suspicion arose; what processes were undertaken to lend
credence to such suspicion, before making an arrest, et cetera. The
High Court, in para 32 of the impugned judgment, records that the
Appellant-convict had been arrested in the presence of PW-16 and
one Manikandan. This appears to be incorrect on the face of the
record. The cross-examination of PW-16 reads :
“…if it is said that the accused was arrested at about 11:30
AM on 28 May 2011 by the Inspector of police, he was
brought for enquiry. The Inspector caught the accused at
11:30 AM and informed me after 15 minutes. He informed
me through cell phone. I was in the office of the Village
Administrative Officer, Surulipatti, when the Inspector
informed me. 10 minutes after I left, police have enquired.
The enquiry was started where the accused was caught…”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1019

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

It is clear that at the time of arrest, there was no independent witness.
The evidence of Manikandan, if taken, is not on record.

Confession
22. The appellant convict made two confession statements before the
police authorities, Ex. P.8 dated 28th May, 2011 and Ex. P.75 dated
31st May, 2012. The evidentiary value of such a confession has
been considered many a times before this Court. In Nikhil Chandra
Mondal v. State of W.B.21 B.R Gavai, J., (as his Lordship then was)
discussed the law as follows:
“16. It is a settled principle of law that extra-judicial
confession is a weak piece of evidence. It has been held
that where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by
suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful
and it loses its importance. It has further been held that it is
well-settled that it is a rule of caution where the court would
generally look for an independent reliable corroboration
before placing any reliance upon such extra-judicial
confession. It has been held that there is no doubt that
conviction can be based on extra-judicial confession, but
in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence.
17. Reliance in this respect could be placed on the judgment
of this Court in Sahadevan v. State of T.N. [Sahadevan v.
State of T.N., (2012) 6 SCC 403 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 146]
This Court, in the said case, after referring to various
earlier judgments on the point, observed thus : (SCC pp.
412-13, para 16)
“16. Upon a proper analysis of the abovereferred judgments
of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles
which would make an extra-judicial confession an
admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis
of conviction of an accused. These precepts would guide
the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases
where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial
confession alleged to have been made by the accused:

21 (2023) 6 SCC
1020 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by
itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care
and caution.
(ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful.
(iii) It should inspire confidence.
(iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility
and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of
cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other
prosecution evidence.
(v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis
of conviction, it should not suffer from any material
discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.
(vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any
other fact and in accordance with law.”
23. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles of law, we have perused
both the confessions. In the first confession dated 28th May, 2011 after
giving a background of his upbringing and also previous involvement
in petty crimes, coming to the instant crime he admitted that he struck
a blow on D1 who, as a result thereof, started bleeding. PW-54, to
some extent corroborates this stating that he had recovered sand
both with and without blood near the corpse of D2. However, contrary
to this version of events, PW-28 who is the Scientific Officer at the
Regional Laboratory states that from the material recovered, there
was no blood to be found. The confessional statement records that
having hacked the body of D2, he threw the severed limbs in the
nearby bushes but, it is a matter of record that despite an extensive
search, they could not be located. It is also unclear that a man, who
by his own admission, has been in the past involved in petty crimes
would take stolen articles not only back to his own home but also
give one of them to be pledged in order to get money - the natural
question is that once he has stolen the said chain, it would be easier
to dispose it of and get whatever money it is worth rather than using
it as collateral to get money from other, more legitimate sources
leaving open the possibility of it being traced back.
24. That apart, we find that the record is silent as to why there was a
need to record a second confession more than a year after the date
of offence. The Deputy Superintendent of Police upon order of the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1021

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

Additional Director General of Police, CBCID, Chennai, commenced
investigation in the matter following the latter’s order dated 13th August,
2011 and, thereafter, enquired and examined various witnesses. Given
that the Appellant- convict was already in custody, the recording of
a second confession without any reason therefor, or clearly stating
that the Appellant-convict upon his own volition wished to give a
second confession, in our view, is unjustified. As recorded supra, it
has been held that if the circumstances surrounding the recording
of the confession are suspicious, placing reliance thereon is totally
unsafe, and that too without any corroboration. We find there to be
an apparent lack of corroboration to any of the statements made by
the Appellant-convict and as such, find that the confessions are truly
unreliable. This is, of course, over and above the settled position of
law that confessions made to a police officer are wholly inadmissible
as evidence in a Court of law.

Recovery
25. The Courts below have found that since, in the confessions given by
the Appellant-convict, certain information regarding the location of
material objects was divulged, that limited portion of the confession
becomes admissible according to Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act,1872. That is the correct proposition in law. Reference may be
made to some judgments of this Court as follows :
25.1 Surya Kant J., writing for a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of
this Court in Bijender v. State of Haryana22, held as under :
“16. We have implored ourselves with abounding
pronouncements of this Court on this point. It may be
true that at times the court can convict an accused
exclusively on the basis of his disclosure statement
and the resultant recovery of inculpatory material.
However, in order to sustain the guilt of such accused,
the recovery should be unimpeachable and not be
shrouded with elements of doubt. [Vijay Thakur v.
State of H.P., (2014) 14 SCC 609 : (2015) 1 SCC
(Cri) 454] We may hasten to add that circumstances
such as : (i) the period of interval between the

22 (2022) 1 SCC 92
1022 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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malfeasance and the disclosure; (ii) commonality
of the recovered object and its availability in the
market; (iii) nature of the object and its relevance to
the crime; (iv) ease of transferability of the object;
(v) the testimony and trustworthiness of the attesting
witness before the court and/or other like factors, are
weighty considerations that aid in gauging the intrinsic
evidentiary value and credibility of the recovery.
(See : Tulsiram Kanu v. State [Tulsiram Kanu v. State,
1951 SCC 92 : AIR 1954 SC 1] , Pancho v. State of
Haryana [Pancho v. State of Haryana, (2011) 10 SCC
165 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 223] , State of Rajasthan v.
Talevar [State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC
666 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 457] and Bharama Parasram
Kudhachkar v. State of Karnataka [Bharama Parasram
Kudhachkar v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 14 SCC
431 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] )
17. Incontrovertibly, where the prosecution fails to
inspire confidence in the manner and/or contents of
the recovery with regard to its nexus to the alleged
offence, the court ought to stretch the benefit of
doubt to the accused. It is nearly three centuries old
cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that “it is
better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer” [ W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England, Book IV, c. 27 (1897), p. 358.
Ed. : see R. v. John Paul Lepage, 1995 SCC OnLine
Can SC 19.] . The doctrine of extending benefit of
doubt to an accused, notwithstanding the proof of a
strong suspicion, holds its fort on the premise that “the
acquittal of a guilty person constitutes a miscarriage of
justice just as much as the conviction of the innocent”.
(Emphasis supplied)

25.2 Earlier in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P.23, a three-
Judge Bench had summarised the situation as under:

23 1962 SCC OnLine SC 32
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1023

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

“Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor [ (1946) 74 IA 65]
where a part of the statement leading to the recovery
of a knife in a murder case was held inadmissible
by the Judicial Committee. In that case the Judicial
Committee considered Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which is in these terms:
“Provided that, when any fact is deposed
to as discovered in consequence of
information received from a person accused
of any offence, in the custody of a police
officer, so much of such information,
whether it amounts to a confession or
not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.”
This section is an exception to Sections 25 and 26,
which prohibit the proof of a confession made to a
police officer or a confession made while a person
is in police custody, unless it is made in immediate
presence of a Magistrate. Section 27 allows that part
of the statement made by the accused to the police
“whether it amounts to a confession or not” which
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered to be
proved. Thus even a confessional statement before
the police which distinctly relates to the discovery of
a fact may be proved under Section 27. The Judicial
Committee had in that case to consider how much
of the information given by the accused to the police
would be admissible under Section 27 and laid stress
on the words “so much of such information … as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” in that
connection. It held that the extent of the information
admissible must depend on the exact nature of the
fact discovered to which such information is required
to relate. It was further pointed out that “the fact
discovered embraces the place from which the object
is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to
this, and the information given must relate distinctly
to this fact”.
1024 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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26. In the preceding paragraph, we have considered the law laid down
by this Court on that issue. Let us now consider the circumstances
in which the recovery was made from the locations as disclosed. It
cannot be questioned that such recovery would be relevant since
the Appellant-convict could have affected the recovery only if he had
specific knowledge of the location. This, however, in our view, is not
sufficient to take the recovery of the objects as a circumstance against
the Appellant convict. This we say for the reason that the objects
recovered also have to be verified and tested. Now, this was not done.
His statement is said to have led to the recovery of - (i) a sickle, (ii)
a jute bag, (iii) a green coloured lungi, (iv) a blue colour checked
shirt, and (v) a red and yellow colour striped towel from his house.
27. How any and/or all of these articles related to the alleged murder
of two victims and rape of one of them is undemonstrated from the
record. None of the relatives of either D1 or D2 have testified to any
of these belongings being that of the victims.
28. Still further, we would separately deal with the recovery of each of
the articles relating to the guilt of the Appellant-convict:
(a) Sickle- The sickle, M.O. 18, has not been sent for FSL-in other
words, on what basis is it established that this very sickle was
used to hack the victims? Also, sickle is an easily available item
for a person like the accused whose work is to cut coconut.
No blood was found on the weapon. Even the doctor doesn’t
state that the injuries on the body of the deceased could have
been caused with the same. There is a total disconnect with
the weapon and the injuries resulting into death. None has
also testified the weapon to be owned by the Appellant-convict.
(b) Semen or Blood- There is no forensic report as to the recovery
of either semen or blood on the clothes so recovered; the
manner in which it was preserved and kept in whose custody.
(c) Jute Bag- There is no identification of the owner and possessor
of the jute bag.
(d) Black bag, a different box and a book- recoveries were also
made of a black bag, a different box, and a book - M.Os.23,
24 and 25, from the bushes near Karuppasamy Temple. These
items, too, were not verified or ownership established. In other
words, how they are to be considered to be the ‘material objects’
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1025

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

for the purpose of this case? More so, when these items were
recovered on the basis of confessional statement of the accused
himself, as recorded by PW-52, but the confessional statement
is in itself not reliable, even otherwise to what effect.
(e) Gold chain - Further, insofar as the gold chain is concerned, it
is the uncontroverted testimony of PW-16 that a chain of such a
design is readily available in stores. That apart, the testimony of
PW-18 reveals that she came into possession of the said chain
through her adopted daughter, who is the wife of the Appellant
convict. Such wife, namely Pavithra, was not examined to
establish the chain’s ownership or the source of such acquisition
on her part. The parents of D-2 have indeed identified the
chain (M.O.10) as hers, but we record our surprise that only
the chain was produced before them for identification and none
of the other material allegedly recovered at the instance of the
Appellant-convict. Be that as it may, even if the identification
of the chain by the parents of D2 is taken at face value, even
then, to affix the gauntlet of guilt upon the Appellant-convict on
this count alone, would be entirely unwarranted.

Circumstance Four: The Incident of Rape and DNA Evidence
28. According to the prosecution, since the vaginal swabs collected from
D2 show penetrative sexual assault and since the DNA found, matches
that of the Appellant-convict, the factum of rape is established. The
case put up by the Appellant-convict, on the other hand, is that DNA
evidence, in the facts and circumstances of this case is unreliable,
and therefore, the fact of rape cannot be established. The primary
ground urged in this regard is concerning the chain of custody of
the DNA. A sequence of events concerning DNA evidence, as per
the prosecution may be useful to be noted at this stage:

19.05.2011 PW 37 (Asst. Professor Medical Department)
- Internal organs were sent to FSL, Madurai (Pg.128)
- Two Vaginal Swabs were collected and sent to FSL,
Chennai.
PW 56 (D.S.P CBCID)
- Vaginal Swabs were kept in Royappanppatti Police
Station. (Pg.219)
1026 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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31.05.2011 PW 30 (Assistant Director FSL, Madurai)
- Internal Organ received in laboratory from FSL, Theni
(Pg.105)
PW 41 (Sub-inspector PS Cumbum)
- Brought internal organ of D2 to FSL, Madurai (Pg.144)
- Handed over the VISCERA to Doctors | and handed
over to Judicial Magistrate
06.06.2011 Pw 28 (Scientific Officer)
- Received Wooden Box at Regional Laboratory,
Madurai from Judicial Magistrate, Uthamapalayam.
(Pg.100)
29.09.2011 PW 27 (Scientific Officer)
- After analysis the Swab, Sent the same to FSL
Chennai.
PW 42 (Head Constable)
- Collected samples from Government College took
them to FSL Madurai (Pg.147)
30.11.2011 PW 34 (Asst. Director FSL, Chennai)
- Received Blood Stain through HC 934 Constable.
(PW.48)
PW 41 (Sub-inspector PS Cumbum)
- Received organs of body from doctor, went to Police
Station and handed over to Judicial Magistrate Court.
(Pg.144)

29. The first limb of considering the DNA evidence is the vagina swabs
taken from D-2. PW-37 in her chief examination, stated that once she
took the said samples, they were sent to FSL Madurai, for DNA test,
but striking an entirely different tone in her cross-examination, she
said that having taken these samples she ‘might have’ handed over
the said swabs to the constable on duty. It is noteworthy to observe
here itself that PW-41, who was the constable on duty, makes no
such mention of having received the swabs from PW-37. PWs 52
and 54 both state that upon collection, the samples remained with
PW-37 at the Government Hospital. Per contra, PW-56 states that
the samples were kept at Royappanpatti Police Station. PW-42,
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1027

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

who is a police carrier, states that he collected the samples from the
Government Medical College and took them to the Regional Forensic
Science Laboratory, Madurai, on 29th June, 2011. This means they
were sent to the FSL after a delay of 41 days, having been taken
on 19th May, 2011. The prosecution has not been able to explain the
reason as to why this delay took place. We find force in the argument
made on behalf of the Appellant-convict that the circumstances under
which the samples were sent from FSL, Madurai to FSL, Chennai,
are unclear. PW-27, who is a Scientific Officer only states that after
his analysis of the swab, he sent the same to the DNA wing of the
FSL Chennai. No reason is forthcoming as to why and under whose
orders the same were sent to a different city. The final DNA report
was prepared by PW-34. He, however, in his evidence does not
mention when the samples were received by him or his office. Nor
does he depose the conditions in which the sample was received. In
this regard, the Appellant-convict contended that the swab itself was
received by speed post. We find that to be an incorrect statement
of facts. PW-34 states that the report prepared by him was DNA
152/2011. A perusal of the annexure to the DNA report24 shows the
label given to the document sent by speed post as matching that
of the report prepared by PW-34. So, it is clear that the report was
what was sent by speed post, not the swab itself. That apart, had it
actually been that the swab was sent by speed post, we would be
nothing short of aghast. Time and again, this Court has emphasized
the importance of maintaining the sanctity of these samples and,
the investigating authorities actually doing something so glaringly
irresponsible would be an affront to any and all observations that
have been made by this Court over the years.
30. Having noticed various gaps as above, the logical question that arises
is where were the swabs?; why were they sent for forensic analysis
belatedly?; were they properly stored?; whether the Malkhana of
the Police Station where they were kept according to some of the
witnesses, was sufficiently equipped or not; if the same were kept
in the hospital, was it ensured that no other member of the staff
could have had access to them?; in whose custody were they?; if
the swabs were damaged, who shall be held responsible for the

24 page 215 of the Appellants Convenience compilation
1028 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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destruction of vital evidence, etc. Similar questions arise in connection
with the semen sample taken from the accused as a consequence
of an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Uthamapalayam, on
13th June, 2011. PW-56 states that the said samples were sent to
FSL, Chennai, on 16th June, 2011 but subsequently returned. It is
unclear, yet again, that between 13th and 16th June 2011 where such
samples were stored; who was in charge thereof and whether he had
kept them in safe custody?; how and in what condition they were
sent; when and why they were returned - unfortunately, all these
questions have no answer forthcoming from the record.
31. In Anil v. State of Maharashtra25 this Court observed that DNA
profiles have had a tremendous impact on criminal investigations.
A DNA profile is valid and reliable, but the same depends on quality
control and procedures in the laboratory. We may add to this position
and say, that quality control and procedures outside the laboratory
matter equally as much in ensuring that the best results can be derived
from the samples collected. We record with some sadness that there
are quite a few cases in which DNA evidence, despite being there, has
to be rejected for the reason that the manner, in which the samples
were handled during and after collection by the concerned doctor,
in transit to the lab, inside the lab and the results drawn therefrom,
are not in accordance with the best possible practices which would
focus on ensuring that throughout this process the samples remain
in pristine, hygienic and biologically suitable conditions.
32. One such instance where DNA evidence had to be rejected, fairly
recently, was a three-Judge Bench decision in Manoj v. State of
M.P.26. The Appellants in the said case had been sentenced to death
by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Indore, for the murder in the
course of the robbery of 3 women. Ultimately, the Court commuted
the death sentence to life imprisonment with a minimum 25 years
sentence; while dealing with such evidence, it made detailed
references to a 2007 paper titled DNA Profiling In Justice Delivery
System published by the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, Kolkata
and the previous judgments of this Court wherein the topic of DNA
has been dealt with, as also the 185th report of the Law Commission

25 (2014) 4 SCC 69
26 (2023) 2 SCC 353
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1029

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

of India. In this case, DNA was rejected on the ground that recovery,
which was affected, was made from an open place, and the likelihood
of its contamination cannot be ruled out. It is also observed that the
bloodstains found on the articles were disintegrated, and the quantity
was insufficient to run any classification tests.
33. Rahul (supra) was a case concerning the kidnap, rape and murder
of a woman, wherein 3 persons were convicted by the Special
Fast-Track Court, Dwarka Courts in Sessions Case No.91 of 2013.
These persons had kidnapped a woman as she returned from work,
proceeded to do horrible things to her, and then dumped her lifeless
remains in a field, from where it was discovered four days later.
The DNA evidence, here, was rejected because it remained in the
police Malkhana for two months and in such time, the possibility of
tampering could not be ruled out. It was also held that neither the
Trial Court nor the High Court had examined the underlying basis
of the findings in the DNA reports or whether the techniques used
had been reliably applied by the concerned expert. As such, it was
concluded that the DNA profile, in the absence of such evidence,
had become highly vulnerable when the collection and sealing of the
samples sent for examination was not free from suspicion.
34. Prakash Nishad v. State of Maharashtra27 was a case concerning
the rape and murder of a 6-year-old child. Similar to the present case,
it was a case of circumstantial evidence. Based on the disclosure
statement made by the Appellant therein, the police found certain
garments as also traces of semen of the Appellant on the vaginal
smear of the minor victim, based on which he was sought to be
convicted. DNA evidence had to be rejected by this Court on the
grounds that there was a delay in sending the samples to the FSL,
which was unexplained. It was observed that because of the delay,
the concomitant prospect of contamination could not be ruled out.
The need for expediency in sending samples to the concerned
laboratories was underscored.
35. This case, incidentally, if not unfortunately, is another one of the like
of the above. Despite the presence of DNA evidence, it has to be
discarded for the reason that proper methods and procedures were
not followed in the collection, sealing, storage, and employment of

27 (2023) 16 SCC 357
1030 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the evidence in the course of the Appellant-convict’s conviction.
DNA, as we have observed, has been held to be largely dependable,
even though this evidence is only of probative value, subject to the
condition that it is properly dealt with. Over the past decades, many
cases have come to their logical conclusion with the aid of DNA
evidence in many regions across the world. It is also equally true
that many persons wrongly convicted have finally had justice served,
with them being declared innocent because of advancements in this
technology. It is unfortunate that, alongside such advancements, we
still have cases where, despite the evidence being present, it has
to be rejected for the reason that the concerned persons, either
doctors or investigators, have been careless in the handling of such
sensitive evidence.

Circumstance Five: Motive
36. It is settled law that, in a case of circumstantial evidence as this one is,
motive forms one of the chains of circumstance which can collectively
point to the guilt of the accused. According to the prosecution, robbery
was the Appellant-convict’s motive for ending the lives of D1 and
D2. On first blush, this hypothesis appears to be attractive for the
reason that the robbery of gold ornaments worn by Bhagyalakshmi
at the first instance, and subsequently D2, is what eventually gave
way to the crimes for which he stands convicted concurrently by the
Courts below. The counsel for the Appellant-convict seeks to dispel
the presence of motive by stating that there were other instruments/
ornaments of the two victims, which could have been taken by the
Appellant-convict and put to his own use or sold off for one sum of
money or another; however, that was not the case. The ring worn
by D2 and the mobile phone of D1, which undoubtedly were in their
possession, were neither found in the possession of the Appellant-
convict nor near the scene of the crime.
37. It has come on record that the Appellant-convict, due to various
factors, had taken to crime. As we have already discussed, it is not
the case of the prosecution that the said objects were taken by the
Appellant-convict and then misused or sold. When the identity of the
gold chain could not be unquestionably established and the fact that
the other goods that were in possession of the victims at the time
of the crime were also not recovered from or at the instance of the
Appellant-convict, we find it difficult to ascribe any motive on his part.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1031

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

Circumstance Six: Test Identification Parade
38. The investigating authorities conducted a test identification parade -
asking PW-5 to identify the Appellant-convict from a long line of
habitual offenders. He did so thrice. This has been taken as another
circumstance against the convict Appellant. Before proceeding to
the merits of this circumstance, let us appreciate the law on this
point.
38.1 No provision of law casts an obligation upon the investigating
authorities to conduct a test identification parade. If it is
conducted, the provision that governs is Section 162,
Cr.P.C. [See: Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P.28;
Malkhansingh v. State of M.P.29; Visveswaran v. State30;
and Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura31.]
38.2 The onus to show that the T.I.P. has been conducted in
accordance with law lies on the prosecution, and only after
this burden stands prima facie discharged, does the question
of considering objections in this regard arise. [See: Umesh
Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand32.]
38.3 It is not a substantive piece of evidence. Its only purpose is
for the investigating authorities to analyse the correctness, or
lack thereof, of the direction in which they are steering the
investigation. [See: Hari Nath v. State of U.P.33; and Iqbal v.
State of U.P.34]
38.4 If the prosecution does not establish, by examination of
witnesses to the T.I.P., and the Magistrate entrusted therewith,
it cannot be said that it was conducted per law. [See: Umesh
Chandra (supra).]
38.5 There is no hard and fast rule about delay in conducting T.I.P.
being fatal to the case of the prosecution. In certain cases,

28 (2005) 9 SCC 631
29 (2003) 5 SCC 746
30 (2003) 6 SCC 73
31 (2014) 4 SCC 747
32 (2021) 17 SCC 616
33 (1988) 1 SCC 14
34 (2015) 6 SCC 623
1032 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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relatively small delay has been considered fatal yet in others, a
delay of as much as 40 days is not fatal. [See: Raja v. State35.]
38.6 The prosecution must establish that prior to the test identification
parade being conducted, the witness had no opportunity to
see the accused. In other words, the accused must be kept
‘baparda’. [See: Gireesan Nair v. State of Kerala 36; and
Budhsen v. State of U.P.37.]
38.7 If the above has not been ensured, the evidence of the T.I.P.
becomes inadmissible. It has also been held that if, prior to
the T.I.P. the witness has the opportunity to see even the
photograph of the accused person, such process becomes
inconsequential. [See: Maya Kaur Baldevsingh Sardar v.
State of Maharashtra38; C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.39;
and Sk. Umar Ahmed Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra40.]
38.8 Dock identification by the informant, even in the absence of
T.I.P., can be accepted, but generally, as a matter of prudence,
a witness’s identification of an accused in Court is sought to
be corroborated by the identification by the former of the latter
in previously conducted identification proceedings [Rajesh v.
State of Haryana41; and Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi)42.]
38.9 Considering the facts and circumstances of the case at hand,
it is open for the Court to draw an adverse inference against
the witness, should they put forth a refusal to participate in
the identification proceedings. [See: Mohd. Anwar v. State
(NCT of Delhi)43.]
39. It is plain as day that the above principles were not observed in the
present case. We are constrained to record our astonishment as to
how the Courts below considered the identification proceedings as a

35 (2020) 15 SCC 562
36 (2023) 1 SCC 180
37 (1970) 2 SCC 128
38 (2007) 12 SCC 654
39 (2010) 9 SCC 567
40 (1998) 5 SCC 103
41 (2021) 1 SCC 118
42 (2017) 6 SCC 1
43 (2020) 7 SCC 391
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1033

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

circumstance accruing against the Appellant-convict. It is undoubted
that PW-50, in his testimony, gives sufficient detail as to the procedure
followed in conducting the T.I.P., and on that count, no assault can
be made thereon, however, as the preceding paragraph establishes,
there are other equally crucial factors. It is a matter of record that
PW-5 (the witness who participated in the T.I.P.), in his testimony,
stated that about a week after he gave information to the concerned
police about the incident of 14th May, 2011, he saw the Appellant-
convict at the said police station. Most importantly, as has come on
record, the police officials had informed him about the Appellant-
convict committing the crime. As held by Budhsen (supra) as far back
as the year 1970, by Suryamoorthy v. Govindaswamy44 in 1989,
Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar45 in 1995, Mulla v. State
of U.P46 in 2010, i.e., well before the judgment of the learned Trial
Court was pronounced, that if the said witness had the opportunity
to see the accused, in any form, after the incident the subject matter
of testimony, but prior to the identification proceedings, it would
render the same to be ineffective. Then, in our view, the courts below
committed an error of elephantine proportions in considering these
proceedings as forming one of the chains of circumstances against
the Appellant-convict.

Two Additional Points

One: Other Suspects Remained Unexplored
40. Most importantly, PW-2, the father of D1 in his testimony deposed
that he feared the involvement of four other persons. In order to
have that possibility sufficiently explored, he filed a case before the
High Court seeking transfer of the investigation to CBCID. PW-56,
the Investigating Officer on behalf of the CBCID submitted that on
8th August, 2011, he recorded the statements of PW-5 (Rajkumar),
Bhagyalakshmi, and suspects - Francis, Arjunan, Ambazhagan.
These statements are not on record. How these statements were
pursued, verified, and taken to their logical conclusion is unknown to
record, more so, to the findings of the Courts below. PW-56, in his

44 (1989) 3 SCC 24
45 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 80
46 (2010) 3 SCC 508
1034 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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own deposition, also does not give any details as to what they may
have said to him during his examination. Curiously, if Bhagyalakshmi
had been examined by him, why her statement was not produced
before the Trial Court is a question which remains unanswered. The
prosecution has nowhere stated that PW-2’s suspicion on these
persons was unfounded or misguided. That being the case, the
non-pursuance of these suspects is a circumstance to be taken
against the prosecution case.

Two: Non-examination of Bhagyalakshami
41. PW-5 in his testimony states that he knew both the victims, D1 and
D2 through Bhagyakshami. Undisputably, D2 and she were friends.
She was obviously there at the time of the incident. She was the
one who had informed PW-5 that D2 did not attend college the next
day. Further, she was the one who told PW-5 that they had been
murdered in suspicious circumstances which led the latter to go to the
police on 20th May, 2011 and tell them his version of events on the
fateful day of 14th May 2011. All of these essential happenings have
a link, i.e., the lover of PW-5. Then, why she remained unexamined
by the prosecution is a mystery. Still further, it has come on record,
as we have noticed supra that PW-56 recorded her statement.
However, how it escaped the attention of both the Courts below
that the statement was not on record, is surprising. She could have
given essential testimony for the last seen theory to be applied to
the present case; she could have deposed as to the relationship
between D1 and D2; the possibility of an elopement which formed
the basis of PW-5 not approaching the authorities even after he
came to know from her that D2 did not attend college. She could
have further been an additional witness in the T.I.P., which would
have lent credence to the prosecution case. Undoubtedly, she would
have been a material witness, and her non-examination is a negative
circumstance against the prosecution’s case. We are supported in
our conclusion by the observations made Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore
Kubersing Chamansing47, which are extracted as follows :
“19… It is true that if a material witness, who would
unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of

47 (2001) 6 SCC 145
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1035

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore
otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the
prosecution case which could have been supplied or made
good by examining a witness who though available is not
examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering
from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness
would oblige the court to draw an adverse inference against
the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have
been examined it would not have supported the prosecution
case. On the other hand if already overwhelming evidence
is available and examination of other witnesses would
only be a repetition or duplication of the evidence already
adduced, non-examination of such other witnesses may
not be material. In such a case the court ought to scrutinise
the worth of the evidence adduced. The court of facts must
ask itself — whether in the facts and circumstances of the
case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and
if so, whether such witness was available to be examined
and yet was being withheld from the court. If the answer
be positive then only a question of drawing an adverse
inference may arise. If the witnesses already examined
are reliable and the testimony coming from their mouth is
unimpeachable the court can safely act upon it, uninfluenced
by the factum of non-examination of other witnesses.”

FAULTY INVESTIGATION
42. A common thread that can be seen to be running through the entire
process that has culminated by way of this judgment, is that of faulty
investigation. Since we have already discussed the evidence on
record in detail, we may only point out various instances :
A) The identity of the accused could not be sufficiently protected
leading to its disclosure well before the T.I.P. was conducted;
B) Although there is no straight-jacket formula as to when T.I.P.
can be/cannot be conducted, the delay in doing so has to be
examined in the facts and circumstances of the case. The nine-
day delay herein is entirely unexplained;
C) Lack of coordination between investigating agencies.
Bhagyalakshmi has not been arrayed as a witness, despite
1036 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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examination by PW-56 who is the person concerned at the
CBCID. The other investigating officer did not examine her
despite a clear link to the deceased persons and the star
witness of the prosecution;
D) Requisite care regarding the sensitive evidence (DNA etc.) was
not taken in the slightest. There are large gaps in the chain of
custody which are unexplained;
E) Surprisingly and shockingly, we may say that the post-mortem
of the deceased persons was conducted at the spot of the
crime without due regard to the possibility of contamination,
effect of such examination being conducted in the open, etc.
None of the Courts below have found this to be objectionable;
F) Possibility of ruling out the involvement of third party in the crime.

DNA- A NECISSITATED ADDENDUM
43. As we have discussed earlier in this judgment, the DNA evidence
collected has been rendered unusable. It suffers from various
shortcomings in as much as there is large amount of unexplained delay;
the chain of custody cannot be established; possibility of contamination
cannot be ruled out etc. We have also referred to instances in the
recent past where, similar to the case at hand the DNA evidence
was rendered unusable on account of similar lapses. A perusal of
the various documents released by a number of bodies such as the
Standard Operating Procedure for Crime Scene Investigation issued
by the Directorate of Forensic Science Service, Ministry of Home
Affairs and Government of India48; Guidelines for collection, storage
and transportation of Crime Scene DNA samples issued by the Central
Forensic Science Laboratory, Directorate of Forensic Science Service,
Ministry of Home Affairs and Government of India49; a Forensic Guide
for Crime Investigators (Standard Operating Procedures) issued
by LNJN National Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India50 show that, although,
procedures have been suggested, there is no uniformity nor there is a

48 http://164.100.117.138/pdfs/crime%20scene%20manual%20full_organized.pdf
49 https://www.cfslchandigarh.gov.in/Uploads/Media/Original/20180627121024_IO-SOP%20Final.pdf
50 https://jhpolice.gov.in/sites/default/files/documents-reports/jhpolice_ebook_a_forensic_guide_for_
crime_investigators.pdf
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1037

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

common procedure which is required to be followed by all investigating
authorities. This, obviously, has the potential to have an impact on
the cases investigated. When it comes to procedure followed by the
police generally, differences therein are understandable keeping in view
the difference in society, regional complexities as also other factors
given the wide length and breadth of the Country, however, the same
yardstick cannot be applied when it comes to sensitive evidence such
as DNA for the concerns, causes of its dilution in evidentiary value and
requirements for it to be collected and maintained in pristine condition
is not subject to the same factors. So, even though ‘Police’, ‘Public
Order’ are subjects mentioned in List-II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution of India that in itself cannot permit differing procedures and
sensitivities to such evidence, to rule the roost. The aspects in which
we find there to be errors committed regularly are in fact procedural
aspects which aid the sanctity of the evidence.
44. This lack of a common procedure to be followed, is concerning.
As such, we issue the following directions which shall be followed
henceforth, in all cases where DNA Evidence is involved:
1. The collection of DNA samples once made after due care and
compliance of all necessary procedure including swift and
appropriate packaging including a) FIR number and date; b)
Section and the statute involved therein; c) details of I.O., Police
station; and d) requisite serial number shall be duly documented.
The document recording the collection shall have the signatures
and designations of the medical professional present, the
investigating officer and independent witnesses. Here only we
may clarify that the absence of independent witnesses shall not
be taken to be compromising to the collection of such evidence,
but the efforts made to join such witnesses and the eventual
inability to do so shall be duly put down in record.
2. The Investigating Officer shall be responsible for the
transportation of the DNA evidence to the concerned police
station or the hospital concerned, as the case may be. He shall
also be responsible for ensuring that the samples so taken reach
the concerned forensic science laboratory with dispatch and in
any case not later than 48-hours from the time of collection.
Should any extraneous circumstance present itself and the
48-hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the
1038 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. Throughout, the
requisite efforts be made to preserve the samples as per the
requirement corresponding to the nature of the sample taken.
3. In the time that the DNA samples are stored pending trial appeal
etc., no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without
express authorisation of the Trial Court acting upon a statement
of a duly qualified and experienced medical professional to the
effect that the same shall not have a negative impact on the
sanctity of the evidence and with the Court being assured that
such a step is necessary for proper and just outcome of the
Investigation/Trial.
4. Right from the point of collection to the logical end, i.e., conviction
or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall be
maintained wherein each and every movement of the evidence
shall be recorded with counter sign at each end thereof stating
also the reason therefor. This Chain of Custody Register shall
necessarily be appended as part of the Trial Court record.
Failure to maintain the same shall render the I.O. responsible
for explaining such lapse.
The Directors General of Police of all the States shall prepare sample
forms of the Chain of Custody Register and all other documentation
directed above and ensure its dispatch to all districts with necessary
instruction as may be required.

CONCLUSION
45. Consequent to the above discussion, we have no hesitation in
holding that none of the circumstances posited by the prosecution
are found to be conclusively proved against the Appellant-convict.
The chain of circumstantial evidence in no way points to a singular
hypothesis, that is the guilt of the accused, ruling out his innocence
or involvement of none else in the crime. As a result, the conviction
of the Appellant-convict is vacated. He is directed to be released
forthwith if not required in any other case. The appeal is allowed.
46. Recently, this Court, in a case concerning violation of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 200251 and where the accused person had

51 V. Senthil Balaji v. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement-2024 INSC 739
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1039

Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu

been in prolonged detention, made some observations regarding
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. They are extracted below for
reference :
“28. Some day, the courts, especially the Constitutional
Courts, will have to take a call on a peculiar situation that
arises in our justice delivery system. There are cases
where clean acquittal is granted by the criminal courts to
the accused after very long incarceration as an undertrial.
When we say clean acquittal, we are excluding the cases
where the witnesses have turned hostile or there is a
bona fide defective investigation. In such cases of clean
acquittal, crucial years in the life of the accused are lost.
In a given case, it may amount to violation of rights of the
accused under Article 21 of the Constitution which may
give rise to a claim for compensation.
29. As stated earlier, the appellant has been incarcerated
for 15 months or more for the offence punishable under the
PMLA. In the facts of the case, the trial of the scheduled
offences and, consequently, the PMLA offence is not likely
to be completed in three to four years or even more. If
the appellant’s detention is continued, it will amount to an
infringement of his fundamental right under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India of speedy trial.”
Kattavellai @ Devakar has secured a clean acquittal here as well.
Let it be clarified that we are not commenting as to whether the day
of reckoning with this question has arrived, but we may only see
that in case such an approach is adopted, we would not be breaking
new ground but only affirming our commitment to the constitutional
guarantee of Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. The Law Commission of India in its 277th report titled ‘Wrongful
Prosecution Miscarriage of Justice: Legal Remedies’ dealt with this
issue. However, the Report confined the understanding of ‘wrongful
prosecution’ to include only malicious prosecution, and the prosecution
initiated without good faith. It does not, therefore, directly deal
with the situation with which we are confronted. In this case, as is
obvious, the accused was taken into custody, and it is the judicial
process that has taken such a long time to come to a conclusion.
The worrying feature here is that the conviction had no legs to stand
1040 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

on whatsoever and yet the Appellant-convict has been in custody for
years. In foreign jurisdictions such as the United States of America52,
acquittal after a long period of incarceration has led Courts to direct
States to award compensation to the persons who suffered behind
bars, only to be eventually held innocent. This right to compensation
has been recognised by both Federal and State statutes. There
are two ways that compensation can be claimed – tort claims/civil
rights suits/moral bills of obligation and, statutory claims. Given the
variety of statutes across jurisdictions grounds for compensations/
procedures vary significantly.
Well, it is for the legislature to consider this aspect.
The Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to all High
Courts and also the Directors General of the Police of all States to
ensure necessary compliance. The Police Academies of the States
are requested to examine the necessity of conducting training of the
Investigating Officers to ensure full compliance with the requisite
precautions and procedures in accordance with the directions issued
herein above.
Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain

52 M.J. Ryan, “Compensation for Wrongful Convictions in the United States” in Compensation for Wrongful
Convictions – a Comparative Perspective, Jasinski and Kremens (Eds.) 2023.