ROHIT CHATURVEDIversusSTATE OF UTTARAKHAND & OTHERS

                 [2026] 6 S.C.R. 263 : 2026 INSC 490

                           Rohit Chaturvedi
                                   v.
                    State of Uttarakhand & Others
                 (Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 446 of 2023)
                                 15 May 2026
             [B.V. Nagarathna* and Ujjjal Bhuyan, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Matter pertains to the premature release of the petitioner sentenced
       to life imprisonment for the murder of the deceased, and has been
       in jail for approximately twenty-two years.

                                  Headnotes†
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.432(7) – Bharatiya
       Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.473 – Remission/Premature
       Release – Petitioner along with other co-accused convicted for
       the murder of the deceased by the Special Judge u/s.120B/302
       IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine – Investigation
       initially carried out by UP police and was later transferred to
       the State of Uttarakhand – Order of conviction and sentence
       upheld by the High Court and this Court – Having undergone
       more than twenty-two years of incarceration, the petitioner
       sought premature release from prison – Rejected by the
       respondent-Union of India on the ground of heinousness of
       the crime whereas the State of Uttarakhand recommended the
       premature release of the petitioner – However, the Ministry
       of Home Affairs (MHA), Union of India by the impugned letter
       dated 09.07.2025 disallowed the recommendation of the State
       Government – Instant writ petition seeking quashing of the
       letter dated 09.07.2025 of the Ministry which rejected the
       recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand and disallowed
       the plea of premature release of the petitioner who has been
       in jail for approximately twenty-two years:
       Held: Denial of remission cannot rest solely on the ground of
       heinousness of the crime – Remission is not an extension of the
       sentencing process, but a distinct executive function concerned


* Author
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       with the present and future, namely, the prisoner’s conduct,
       evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into
       society – To predicate its denial only on the heinous nature of the
       offence is to collapse this distinction and to reconvert remission
       into a retrospective reaffirmation of guilt, which the criminal justice
       system has already adjudicated upon – Criminal justice system that
       refuses to look beyond the gravity of the offence to the offender’s
       transformation will betray its reformative ideal particularly at the
       remission stage – Justice does not permit permanent incarceration
       of an individual in the shadow of their worst act – Nature of the
       offence cannot, thus, be the sole ground for denying remission –
       Emotive retribution is a course, incompatible with constitutional
       values – Decision on remission must emerge from a holistic
       assessment of the prisoner and after balancing societal interests
       with the prisoner’s right to be considered for release on fair and
       reasonable criteria – State Government, being directly concerned
       with prison administration and the implementation of remission
       policies, has not found any reason to deny the petitioner the
       benefit of premature release – Petitioner’s custody certificate
       specifically records that his conduct during incarceration has been
       good – Petitioner has already undergone more than twenty-two
       years of incarceration – Co-accused in the very same offence
       arising out of the same incident has been granted the benefit of
       premature release after undergoing a lesser period of incarceration,
       the denial of similar consideration to the petitioner necessarily
       requires the existence of cogent, rational, and clearly discernible
       distinguishing circumstances, and no such reasons are forthcoming
       in the instant case – Petitioner’s case to be considered in light
       of the reformative theory underlying the modern criminal justice
       system – Object of punishment is not merely retribution, but also
       the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender so as to enable
       his eventual reintegration into society – Continued incarceration in
       such circumstances would run contrary to the reformative object
       underlying remission and premature release policies particularly,
       when his co-accused has already been released – Impugned letter
       of MHA which disallowed the plea of premature release of the
       petitioner arbitrary, non-speaking, unsustainable in law and merit
       and thus, set aside and quashed – Petitioner entitled to the benefit
       of premature release/remission. [Paras 7, 7.1, 8.1-10]
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            Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


                             Case Law Cited
     Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah Alias Lala Vakil v. State of Gujarat
     and Another (2022) 8 SCC 552; Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of
     India [2024] 1 SCR 743 : (2024) 5 SCC 481; Laxman Naskar v.
     State of W.B [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 62 : (2000) 7 SCC 626; Laxman
     Naskar v. Union of India [2000] 1 SCR 796 : (2000) 2 SCC 595;
     State (NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 235 : (2003)
     7 SCC 121; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961]
     2 SCR 133 : AIR 1961 SC 334; State of Haryana v. Mahender
     Singh [2007] 11 SCR 932 : (2007) 13 SCC 606; Satish v. State of
     U.P. (2021) 14 SCC 580; Mohd. Giasuddin v. State of A.P. [1978]
     1 SCR 153 : (1977) 3 SCC 287 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
     Sanhita, 2023; Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; Penal
     Code, 1860; Prisons Act, 1894; Constitution of India.

                             List of Keywords
     Uttarakhand State (for Remission/Premature Release of Convicted
     Prisoners Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by Courts) Permanent
     Policy, 2022; Remission/Premature Release; Convicted prisoners
     sentenced to life imprisonment; Twenty-two years of incarceration;
     Premature release from prison; Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Criminal)
     No. 446 of 2023
     Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
     With
     Miscellaneous Application No. 1370 of 2024 in Writ Petition
     (Criminal) No. 446 of 2023 and Miscellaneous Application No.
     2339 of 2024 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 446 of 2023

                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Petitioner(s):
     N. Hariharan, Sr. Adv., Pradeep Misra, Daleep Dhyani, Suraj Singh,
     Aditya Vaibhav Singh, Ms. Vanya Gupta, Ms. Aarushi Singh, Aman
     Akhtar, Ms. Riya Parihar, Ms. Rekha, Arjan Singh Mandla.
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       Adv. for the Respondent(s):
       Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G, Ms. Suveni Bhagat, Sudarshan Singh
       Rawat, Sunny Sachin Rawat, Pradeep Misra, Mukesh Kumar
       Maroria, Raman Yadav, Siddhartha Sinha, Ms. Sonali Jain, Bharat
       Sood, Ms. Srishti Mishra, Anmol Chandan, Suraj Mishra, Animesh
       Upadhyay, Sahil Bhalotia, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Shashank Manish,
       Ms. Nidhi Sahay, Ms. Pragati Singh, Ms. Subhadra S. Chatterjee,
       Ms. Debjani Sarswat, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, Akhileshwar Jha,
       Anupam Kumar, Ms. S. Kaveri.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

       Nagarathna, J.

       The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of
       certiorari for quashing letter dated 09.07.2025 of the Ministry of
       Home Affairs (MHA) (for short “impugned letter”) which rejected the
       recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand and disallowed the
       plea of premature release of the petitioner who has been in jail for
       approximately twenty-two (22) years.
2.     This case has a chequered history and its facts may briefly be
       adverted to. On the basis of a complaint dated 09.05.2003 of the
       elder sister of the deceased, Case No.162/2003 under Section 302
       of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) was registered at
       Mahanagar Police Station, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) against
       the petitioner and other accused persons. The investigation was
       initially carried out by the U.P. State Police and thereafter by CB-
       CID. However, vide Notification dated 24.06.2003, the case was
       transferred to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Pursuant to the
       investigation, the petitioner along with other co-accused faced Trial
       before the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, U.P. However, this Court, by its
       order dated 08.02.2007, in Transfer Petition No.456/2005, transferred
       the trial to Dehradun, Uttarakhand with a request to the then Chief
       Justice of Uttarakhand to create a Special Court for the trial of the
       case. The petitioner along with other co-accused was convicted for
       the murder of the deceased by the Special Judge, Dehradun vide
       judgment dated 24.10.2007 in Sessions Trial No.411/2005 under
       Sections 120B/302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine.
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           Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


     2.1 Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal
         No.507/2007 before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital
         but the same came to be rejected by judgment dated 16.07.2012
         and the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court was
         affirmed. The petitioner then preferred SLP (Crl.) No.7507/2013
         against the judgment dated 16.07.2012. However, the same
         was also dismissed by order dated 19.11.2013 by this Court.
     2.2 On 06.09.2022, the petitioner made a representation to the
         Principal Secretary, Office of the President of India seeking
         premature release from prison. The said representation was
         forwarded to the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand for
         proper action. Since no action was taken on the said representation,
         the petitioner approached the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital
         in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2146/2022 seeking a writ of mandamus
         directing the State of Uttarakhand to consider premature release
         of the petitioner. The High Court by its order dated 13.01.2023
         directed the respondents to consider the premature release of
         the applicant within a week failing which the applicant would be
         released on bail. The State of Uttarakhand having failed to take
         a decision within a week, the petitioner approached the Trial
         Court for bail and was granted bail vide order dated 30.01.2023
         by the Special Judge, Anti-corruption, Dehradun.
     2.3 Subsequently, the petitioner received a letter dated 07.06.2023
         wherein it was mentioned that the appropriate Government vide
         G.O. dated 07.05.2023 had rejected his premature release
         application and consequently, the petitioner was directed to
         surrender immediately. The petitioner, accordingly, surrendered
         on 17.06.2023 at District Jail, Haridwar, Uttarakhand.
     2.4 Sometime later, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition (Crl.)
         No.896/2023 before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital
         seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State of Uttarakhand to
         furnish grounds in support of the rejection of premature release
         of the applicant, which according to him were never furnished
         to him. However, the said writ petition came to be dismissed as
         withdrawn by order dated 06.07.2023 with liberty to challenge
         the said decision, as the grounds were furnished by the State
         of Uttarakhand in the Court. Briefly put, the premature release
         was rejected on the ground that the petitioner fell within clause
         5 of the Uttarakhand State (for Remission/Premature Release
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           of Convicted Prisoners Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by
           Courts) Permanent Policy, 2022 which is a prohibited category
           for grant of premature release being a case investigated by the
           CBI under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.
       By order dated 15.12.2023, this Court passed the following order
       in this Writ Petition:
           “… The point now being raised by the petitioner is that
           the Government of Uttar Pradesh would have been the
           proper authority for considering the remission plea as the
           offence had occurred within that State. This appears to be
           the position of law, as enunciated by a Coordinate Bench
           of this Court in the case of Radheshyam Bhagwandas
           Shah Alias Lala Vakil Vs. State of Gujarat and Another
           reported in 2022 (8) SCC 552. In this judgment, it was held:
                “14. In the instant case, once the crime was committed
                in the State of Gujarat, after the trial had been
                concluded and judgment of conviction came to be
                passed, all further proceedings have to be considered
                including remission or premature release, as the case
                may be, in terms of the policy which is applicable in
                the State of Gujarat where the crime was committed
                and not the State where the trial stands transferred
                and concluded for exceptional reasons under the
                orders of this Court.”
           This being the position of law, the entire exercise conducted
           by the State of Uttarakhand appears to be without
           jurisdiction and hence not sustainable under the law. We,
           accordingly, direct that the remission plea which was filed
           by the petitioner-convict be sent to the Home Secretary,
           State of Uttar Pradesh by the State of Uttarakhand. This
           shall be done within a period of three weeks from date.
           Thereafter, the State of Uttar Pradesh shall examine the
           question and take a decision in that regard within a further
           period of eight weeks.
           The State of Uttar Pradesh shall consider the plea without
           being influenced in any manner by the order passed by the
           State of Uttarakhand and any observation made therein.
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           Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


           The present petition shall stand disposed of in the above
           terms.”
     2.5 However, on expiry of the said period, since no action was taken
         by the State of U.P., the petitioner preferred a representation
         dated 11.03.2024 to the Additional Chief Secretary (Home
         Department), Government of U.P. highlighting the above issue
         and praying to consider his premature release in terms of the
         order dated 15.12.2023 passed in this Writ Petition. The State
         of U.P. having failed to decide on the premature release of the
         petitioner in terms of the order dated 15.12.2023 passed in
         this case by this Court, the petitioner preferred an application
         before this Court. This Court, by its order dated 02.12.2024,
         recalled its earlier order dated 15.12.2023 on the ground that in
         Bilkis Yakub Rasool vs. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481,
         (“Bilkis”) this Court had held the judgment in Radheshyam
         Bhagwandas Shah vs. State of Gujarat, (2022) 8 SCC 552
         to be per incuriam and non est in law and had further held the
         appropriate Government as defined in Section 432(7), Code of
         Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) for considering remission
         or suspension or commutation is the Government of the State
         in which the trial and conviction took place and not where
         the crime was committed. Accordingly, the application of the
         petitioner for remission was directed to be considered by the
         State of Uttarakhand on its own merits and in accordance with
         the applicable policy.
     2.6 Thereafter, on 31.01.2025, this Court noted that the instant
         case was investigated by the CBI. Therefore, in terms of
         sub-Section (1) of Section 477 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
         Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “BNSS”), the State Government could
         take a decision on the prayer for grant of remission under
         sub-Section (1) of Section 473 of BNSS only after the concurrence
         of the Central Government. Accordingly, it directed that the
         State Government shall forward its decision for concurrence
         of the Central Government and the appropriate authority of
         the Central Government shall take a decision within a period
         of one month from the receipt of the reference from the State
         Government. Noting no progress in the matter and considering
         the long period of incarceration, this Court granted interim bail
         to the petitioner on 21.05.2025.
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       2.7 On 28.07.2025, this Court recorded the submission of the State
           Government that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Union of
           India by the impugned letter dated 09.07.2025 had disallowed the
           recommendation of the State Government which had proposed
           to release the petitioner. However, since the same had not yet
           been communicated to the petitioner, this Court directed that
           the same be made within two weeks from the date of its order.
           Subsequently, the petitioner filed Crl. M.P. No.239654/2025
           seeking amendment of this Writ Petition to add an additional
           prayer for a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned letter
           dated 09.07.2025 which disallowed the premature release of
           the petitioner. The same was allowed and an amended petition
           in the above terms has been filed before us.
       2.8 The counter affidavit on behalf of the Union of India/MHA has
           also been filed. The following is stated therein:
            a)   Since the present case was investigated by the CBI, the
                 respondent-MHA sought comments of the CBI, and in
                 response, the CBI furnished their comments by way of
                 a letter dated 08.04.2025 stating that considering the
                 seriousness of the crime committed by the petitioner, he
                 may not be released in the interest of justice.
            b)   Subsequently, vide order dated 02.05.2025 this Court
                 inter alia directed the CBI as well as respondent-MHA
                 to immediately take a decision on the basis of the
                 recommendation forwarded by the State of Uttarakhand
                 and report compliance. Pursuant thereto, the Government
                 of Uttarakhand by way of letter dated 12.06.2025
                 forwarded the proposal for premature release of petitioner
                 to the MHA.
            c)   However, respondent-MHA communicated on 09.07.2025
                 to the State of Uttarakhand on their proposal of premature
                 release of the petitioner, informing that it does not concur
                 with the proposal of Government of Uttarakhand for
                 premature release of the petitioner.
            d)   The said decision was later communicated to the
                 Advocate-on-Record of the petitioner by way of letter
                 dated 30.07.2025.
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           Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


3.   We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing
     counsel for the State of Uttarakhand, and learned ASG on behalf
     of the Union of India and have also perused the material on record.
     3.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ
         petition has been amended and an additional prayer has
         been sought seeking quashing of the impugned letter dated
         09.07.2025 of the respondent-Union of India/CBI. By the
         impugned letter, the application filed by the petitioner for
         premature release/remission of his life sentence has been
         rejected. It was contended that the impugned letter is a non-
         speaking one and does not provide reasons for disagreeing
         with the recommendation of the State Government to release
         the petitioner. It was also brought to our notice that the
         Government of Uttar Pradesh, by notification dated 24.08.2023,
         has already granted the benefit of premature release to one of
         the co-accused, namely, Amarmani Tripathi who had undergone
         approximately seventeen (17) years of actual sentence and
         only twenty (20) years with earned remission, keeping in
         view his age and conduct. Therefore, the petitioner, who is in
         custody for more than 22 years, too, is entitled to the relief
         of remission of his sentence on the ground of parity. It was
         further argued that no purpose would be served in remanding
         the matter to the respondent-Union of India as on merits they
         have already decided, albeit incorrectly, that the petitioner is
         not entitled to the remission of his sentence having regard to
         the facts and circumstances of this case. The petitioner prayed
         that by order dated 21.05.2025, this Court had granted interim
         bail to him and that the said interim order may be extended
         pending disposal of this writ petition. Learned counsel for the
         petitioner stressed on the fact that the State of Uttarakhand
         had recommended premature release of the petitioner but it
         is the respondent-Union of India/CBI/MHA which has come in
         the way of granting relief of remission to the petitioner herein,
         hence the said order may be quashed.
     3.2 Learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand also
         confirmed that the State had recommended premature release
         of the petitioner. However, the respondent-Union of India has
         declined to grant the relief to the petitioner, hence appropriate
         orders may be passed in this case.
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4.     Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General (ASG) Sri Banerjee
       appearing for the respondent-Union of India contended that there is
       no merit in this petition. The role of the petitioner in the crime has to
       be considered from the proven facts of this case, and it is apparent
       that the petitioner played a very significant role in the death of the
       deceased. Merely because the co-accused has been released from
       the prison is no reason to grant similar relief to the petitioner. The
       impugned letter holding that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief
       of remission has been rightly passed. Having regard to the facts and
       circumstances, the impugned letter may be sustained and the writ
       petition may be dismissed.
5.     Having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions
       and on perusal of the material on record, we are of the view that
       the impugned letter of the MHA which disallowed the premature
       release of the petitioner ought to be quashed on account of it being a
       non-speaking and cryptic order. The letter, in relevant paragraph,
       noted:
            “3. The relevant documents having regards to all facts and
            material placed on record produced by the Government of
            Uttarakhand vide aforesaid letter, the judgements of the
            court of Special Judge/ Session Judge, Dehradun, Hon’ble
            High Court, Uttarakhand and Hon’ble Supreme Court of
            India were considered by the Competent Authority. After
            considering the above facts, documents and material on
            record, Competent Authority is not concurred with the
            proposal of the Uttarakhand Government for premature
            release of life convict, Rohit Chaturvedi s/o Suresh Chandra
            Chaturvedi.”
       Quite clearly, the letter is ex facie non-speaking, as it does not disclose
       any reason whatsoever for the conclusion arrived at by the Competent
       Authority. While it makes a bare reference to the consideration
       of certain documents, including the letter of the Government of
       Uttarakhand and the judgments of the Special Judge, Dehradun, the
       High Court of Uttarakhand, and this Court, it conspicuously fails to
       indicate what weighed with the Competent Authority in rejecting the
       proposal for premature release.
       5.1 It is a settled principle of law that any order affecting rights of
           a person and particularly his liberty must be with reasons and
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           Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


           must reflect due application of mind. Recording of reasons is
           not an empty formality, it is a safeguard against arbitrariness
           and ensures transparency, fairness, and accountability in
           decision-making. The absence of reasons renders it bald and
           makes it impossible to ascertain whether relevant factors were
           duly considered or not.
     5.2 In the present case, the order merely states that the Competent
         Authority “does not concur” with the proposal, without disclosing
         any basis for such disagreement. There is no discussion of
         the petitioner’s conduct, applicable remission policy, or any
         specific adverse material, if at all, against the petitioner. The
         letter, therefore, fails to meet the minimum requirement of a
         reasoned order and reflects complete non-application of mind.
         Such a cryptic rejection not only violates the principles of
         natural justice but also frustrates the petitioner’s right to seek
         effective judicial review as the absence of reasons deprives a
         constitutional Court of the opportunity to examine the propriety
         of the decision.
           Executive discretion, though broad in matters of remission, is
           not uncanalised and must necessarily be exercised on relevant,
           rational, and non-discriminatory considerations and not being
           rejected owing to irrelevant and extraneous reasons.
     5.3 In this regard, we may usefully refer to the case of Laxman
         Naskar vs. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626, in which the
         jail authorities were in favour of releasing the petitioner, but
         the review committee constituted by the State Government
         recommended the rejection of the claim for premature release
         on three grounds. They were (i) the two witnesses who had
         deposed during the trial as also the people of the locality were
         apprehensive that the release of the petitioner will disrupt the
         peace in the locality; (ii) that the petitioner being 43 years old
         had the potential of committing another crime; (iii) the incident
         is not an individual act of crime but a sequel of a political feud.
         This Court while placing reliance on Laxman Naskar vs. Union
         of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595 stipulated certain factors that govern
         the grant of remission. These are namely:
           (i)   Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without
                 affecting the society at large?
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            (ii)   Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of
                   committing crime?
            (iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing
                  crime?
            (iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this
                 convict anymore?
            (v)    Socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.
            Based on the above factors, this Court held in the said case
            that the decision to reject the claim of remission was based
            on irrelevant reasons. Consequently, the Court quashed the
            order of the government and directed it to consider the matter
            afresh, as under:
                   “8. If we look at the reasons given by the Government,
                   we are afraid that the same are palpably irrelevant or
                   devoid of substance. Firstly, the views of the witnesses
                   who had been examined in the case or the persons
                   in the locality cannot determine whether the petitioner
                   would be a danger if prematurely released because
                   the persons in the locality and the witnesses may still
                   live in the past and their memories are being relied
                   upon without reference to the present and the report
                   of the jail authorities to the effect that the petitioner
                   has reformed himself to a large extent. Secondly,
                   by reason of one’s age one cannot say whether the
                   convict has still potentiality of committing the crime or
                   not, but it depends on his attitude to matters, which
                   is not being taken note of by the Government. Lastly,
                   the suggestion that the incident is not an individual
                   act of crime but a sequel of the political feud affecting
                   society at large, whether his political views have been
                   changed or still carries the same so as to commit
                   crime has not been examined by the Government.”
       5.4 In the instant case, even the bare attempt to give any reason,
           good or bad notwithstanding, is also not made out. On that
           basis alone, this Court can quash the impugned letter dated
           09.07.2025 on the ground that it is a non-speaking order and
           remand the matter to the respondent–Union of India for fresh
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           Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


           consideration. However, in our view, such a course would serve
           no useful purpose in the peculiar facts of the present case. The
           respondent–Union of India has defended its decision before this
           Court by contending that the petitioner is not entitled to remission
           having regard to the role attributed to him in the offence. The
           stand of the respondent on merits thus stands fully stated and
           conclusively articulated before this Court. In such circumstances,
           remanding the matter to the very authority which has already
           taken a firm view against the petitioner would amount to an
           empty formality. The controversy before this Court, therefore,
           appears not to be one of absence of consideration, but the
           legality and sustainability of the conclusion already reached.
           In that light, remand may not be directed mechanically where
           it would not serve any substantive purpose. Considering that
           the petitioner has already undergone more than twenty-two
           (22) years of incarceration and all relevant material is already
           before this Court, relegating the petitioner to another round of
           administrative consideration would only prolong the proceedings
           unnecessarily. Sending the matter to the very same authority
           for reconsideration would be futile and not serve the interests
           of justice, particularly when the basis of that rejection is already
           fully articulated before this Court on merits. We, therefore,
           proceed to examine the case on merits.
6.   The principles governing the grant of remission, as distinct from
     commutation, pardon, and reprieve, may be understood with reference
     to the judgment of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Prem
     Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121 (“Prem Raj”). Articles 72 and 161 of the
     Constitution of India deal with the clemency powers of the President
     of India and the Governor of a State, respectively. These provisions
     confer the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions
     of punishment, as well as the power to suspend, remit, or commute
     sentences in specified cases. Under Article 72, the President’s power
     extends, inter alia, to (i) all cases where the punishment or sentence
     is for an offence against a law relating to a matter to which the
     executive power of the Union extends; and (ii) all cases where the
     sentence is one of death. Similarly, Article 161 empowers the Governor
     of a State to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of
     punishment, or to suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any
     person convicted of an offence against a law relating to a matter to
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       which the executive power of the State extends. In Prem Raj, it was
       observed that the powers under Articles 72 and 161 are absolute
       in nature and cannot be fettered by statutory provisions such as
       Sections 432, 433, or 433-A of the CrPC akin to Sections 473, 474
       and 475 of BNSS, or by prison rules.
       6.1 The judgment in Prem Raj further clarified the distinctions
           between the various forms of clemency:
            a)   A pardon is an act of grace from the authority entrusted
                 with the execution of laws, which exempts the individual
                 from the punishment imposed for the offence committed.
                 A pardon affects not only the punishment prescribed for
                 the offence but also the guilt of the offender itself.
            b)   A pardon must, however, be distinguished from amnesty,
                 which is a general pardon of political prisoners and an
                 act of oblivion. Amnesty may result in the release of the
                 convict, but it does not erase any disqualification incurred
                 by reason of conviction.
            c)   A reprieve means a stay or postponement of the execution
                 of a sentence, particularly a capital sentence.
            d)   A respite refers to the awarding of a lesser sentence instead
                 of the prescribed penalty, having regard to mitigating
                 circumstances, such as the absence of prior convictions,
                 etc. It is akin to release on probation for good conduct under
                 Section 360 of the CrPC akin to Section 401 of the BNSS.
            e)   Remission, in contrast, merely reduces the period of
                 sentence without altering its character. In the case of
                 remission, neither the conviction nor the guilt of the offender
                 is affected. The sentence imposed by the court also remains
                 intact, except to the extent that the convict is relieved from
                 undergoing incarceration for the entire term awarded. Thus,
                 remission only shortens the duration of actual imprisonment.
            f)   Finally, commutation involves the substitution of one form
                 of sentence with a lighter sentence of a different nature.
            In this context, Section 432 of the CrPC akin to Section 473
            of BNSS empowers the appropriate Government to suspend
            or remit sentences.
[2026] 6 S.C.R.                                                          277

           Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


     6.2 In this regard, reference may be had to Sarat Chandra
         Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334, wherein
         this Court clarified that an order of remission does not interfere
         with or alter the judicial order of conviction and sentence. The
         conviction and sentence continue to stand exactly as passed
         by the court; only the obligation to undergo the entire term of
         imprisonment is curtailed. The power of remission, being an
         executive power, cannot produce the same effect as an appellate
         or revisional order reducing the sentence judicially imposed
         by the trial court and substituting it with a lesser sentence.
         The cutting short of a sentence by an act of clemency is an
         exercise of executive power which abridges the enforcement
         of the judgment, but does not alter the judgment itself.
     6.3 The same principles were reiterated in State of Haryana vs.
         Mahender Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 606, wherein this Court
         observed that the right of a convict to be considered for remission
         under the governing remission policy must surely be regarded
         as a legal right. Such a right emanates not only from the Prisons
         Act, 1894, but also from the Rules framed thereunder. Although
         no convict can claim remission as an absolute constitutional
         right, except under Articles 72 and 161, the existence of a
         remission policy nevertheless confers a legal entitlement to
         be considered for remission in terms of that policy. The Court
         further held that where a policy decision has been formulated,
         whether by statutory rule or otherwise, all persons falling within
         its ambit are entitled to equal treatment.
     6.4 In Satish vs. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580 (“Satish”),
         this Court held that neither the length of the sentence nor the
         gravity of the original offence can, by themselves, constitute
         the sole basis for refusing premature release. Any assessment
         regarding the likelihood of reoffending upon release must instead
         be founded on the antecedents of the prisoner and his conduct
         while in custody, rather than merely on age or apprehensions
         expressed by victims or witnesses. The Court further observed
         that although remission cannot be claimed as a matter of right,
         once the appropriate legislature has enacted a law governing
         remission, the executive cannot indirectly defeat or subvert its
         mandate. It was also held that where executive authorities fail
         to discharge their statutory obligations despite judicial directions,
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            a Constitutional Court exercising powers of judicial review may
            itself intervene and secure compliance through the issuance of a
            writ of mandamus. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners
            in Satish had undergone nearly two decades of incarceration
            and had suffered the consequences of their actions, the Court
            sought to strike a balance between individual reformation and
            societal welfare by directing their conditional premature release,
            subject to continued good conduct. Consequently, the State
            Government was directed to release the prisoners on probation
            under Section 2 of the U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation
            Act, 1938 within two weeks.
7.     Reverting to the present case, the faint ground invoked by the
       respondent-Union of India in support of rejection of the petitioner’s
       plea for premature release is that the crime committed by the
       petitioner was a heinous one. We wish to make it clear that in
       a constitutional polity governed by the rule of law, the denial of
       remission cannot rest solely on the ground of heinousness of
       the crime. As we have already stated above, remission is not an
       extension of the sentencing process, but a distinct executive function
       concerned with the present and future, namely, the prisoner’s
       conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration
       into society. To predicate its denial only on the heinous nature of
       the offence is to collapse this distinction and to reconvert remission
       into a retrospective reaffirmation of guilt, which the criminal justice
       system has already adjudicated upon. The gravity and heinousness
       of the offence stand exhausted at the stage of sentencing and
       the judicial determination of punishment necessarily incorporates
       these considerations. A criminal justice system that refuses to look
       beyond the gravity of the offence to the offender’s transformation
       will betray its reformative ideal particularly at the remission stage.
       Justice does not permit permanent incarceration of an individual in
       the shadow of their worst act.
       7.1 The nature of the offence cannot, therefore, be the sole
           ground for denying remission. Emotive retribution is a
           course, incompatible with constitutional values. The decision
           on remission must emerge from a holistic assessment of
           the prisoner and after balancing societal interests with the
           prisoner’s right to be considered for release on fair and
           reasonable criteria.
[2026] 6 S.C.R.                                                           279

           Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


     7.2 As Plato, the Greek Scholar and Philosopher, said any means,
         of word or deed, privilege or deprivation, that can be used
         to make the unjust man or the criminal, hate injustice and
         avoid recidivism are to be employed: the inculcation of an all
         but instinctive aversion to injustice “is quite the noblest work
         of law” (Thomas L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato, Basic Book
         Publishers, 1980). Thus, Plato reminds us to treat punishment
         as an instrument with a definitive end, namely, to produce in
         the offender an instinctive aversion to injustice sufficient to
         prevent recidivism. Reading this into the law of remission will
         yield a clear conclusion: a remission authority is not revisiting
         the gravity of the crime; it is assessing whether the purpose of
         punishment continues to subsist. In that sense, Plato supplies
         a legal test for remission decisions: If the offender’s conduct
         and record in custody indicate that this “instinctive aversion to
         injustice” has taken root, then continued incarceration becomes
         unnecessary and arguably contrary to its own objective. The
         deprivation of liberty no longer serves correction but becomes
         retribution. In a liberal constitutional order, punishment and all
         its incidents, including remission, must necessarily be justified
         through reason and not outrage.
     7.3 Invoking Plato again, as this very court noted in Bilkis as follows:
                “1. …punishment is to be inflicted, not for the sake of
                vengeance, for what is done cannot be undone, but
                for the sake of prevention and reformation (Thomas
                L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato, Basic Book Publishers,
                1980). In his treatise, Plato reasons that the lawgiver,
                as far as he can, ought to imitate the doctor who
                does not apply his drug with a view to pain only,
                but to do the patient good. This curative theory of
                punishment likens penalty to medicine, administered
                for the good of the one who is being chastised
                (Trevor J. Saunders, Plato’s Penal Code : Tradition,
                Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology, Oxford
                University Press, 1991).”
           In Plato’s rejection of punishment as retroactive vengeance
           lies the deep insight that the past cannot be changed. Instead,
           punishment is justified only insofar as it serves a future-oriented
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            purpose, namely, prevention, reform, and the restoration of
            order. The comparison between the judge and the doctor is
            also significant. A doctor may incidentally cause pain through
            surgery or medicine, but the pain is not the objective, healing
            is. Likewise, punishment may involve suffering, but suffering
            itself is not normatively valuable. Its legitimacy comes only
            from its capacity to heal the individual and protect the polis (a
            political/civic community).
8.     All relevant considerations necessary for adjudicating the petitioner’s
       entitlement to remission already being before this Court, we will now
       proceed to examine the same on merits.
       8.1 Firstly, the State Government of Uttarakhand had recommended
           the petitioner’s premature release after considering the relevant
           factors pertaining to his incarceration and conduct. The learned
           Standing Counsel appearing for the State has also taken the
           stand before this Court that appropriate orders may be passed
           in the present case. Thus, the only impediment to the grant of
           remission is the refusal by the respondent–Union of India. The
           recommendation of the State assumes significance, as the State
           authorities are best placed to assess the petitioner’s behaviour
           during custody, his reformation, institutional discipline, and the
           likelihood of his reintegration into society. The fact that the State
           Government, after evaluating the petitioner’s case in its entirety,
           found him fit for premature release shows that the petitioner
           satisfies the parameters ordinarily relevant for consideration
           of remission. This assumes importance particularly because
           the State Government, being directly concerned with prison
           administration and the implementation of remission policies,
           has not found any reason to deny the petitioner the benefit of
           premature release. In fact, the petitioner’s custody certificate
           dated 16.05.2025 specifically records that his conduct during
           incarceration has been good.
       8.2 Secondly, the petitioner has already undergone more than
           twenty-two years of incarceration. The petitioner having spent
           more than two decades in continuous custody, the sentence
           undergone by him is itself a relevant consideration while
           examining his entitlement to premature release/remission.
           The prolonged incarceration undergone by the petitioner
[2026] 6 S.C.R.                                                        281

           Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Others


           demonstrates that he has already suffered the consequences
           of the conviction for an extensive duration and has remained
           subject to the rigours of imprisonment for a considerable part
           of his life.
     8.3 Thirdly, one of the co-accused, namely, Amarmani Tripathi, has
         already been granted the benefit of premature release by the
         Government of Uttar Pradesh vide notification dated 24.08.2023
         after undergoing approximately seventeen years of actual
         imprisonment and twenty years with earned remission. The
         petitioner’s plea of parity is therefore founded on an admitted
         factual position arising out of the treatment accorded to another
         convict in the very same case. Despite this, the respondent–
         Union of India has opposed the petitioner’s plea of premature
         release both in the impugned letter and before this Court by
         relying upon the role attributed to the petitioner in the offence.
         Once a co-accused in the very same offence arising out of
         the same incident has been granted the benefit of premature
         release after undergoing a lesser period of incarceration, the
         denial of similar consideration to the petitioner necessarily
         requires the existence of cogent, rational, and clearly discernible
         distinguishing circumstances. In the absence of such reasons,
         differential treatment between co-accused would fall foul of the
         constitutional requirement of fairness and non-arbitrariness. No
         such reasons are forthcoming in the present case.
     8.4 Fourthly, the petitioner’s case deserves to be considered in light
         of the reformative theory underlying the modern criminal justice
         system. The object of punishment is not merely retribution,
         but also the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender so
         as to enable his eventual reintegration into society. In Mohd.
         Giasuddin vs. State of A.P., (1977) 3 SCC 287, Krishna Iyer, J.,
         while emphasizing the reformative philosophy of sentencing,
         quoted George Bernard Shaw’s observation that: “If you are to
         punish a man retributively, you must injure him. If you are to
         reform him, you must improve him and men are not improved
         by injuries.” The learned Judge also observed that modern
         penology regards sentencing as a process of reshaping a
         person who has deteriorated into criminality and that society
         itself has a vital stake in the rehabilitation of the offender
         as a means of social defence. The reformative approach to
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               punishment, therefore, constitutes an integral component of
               criminal jurisprudence and remission policies are founded upon
               this principle. In the present case, the petitioner has undergone
               more than twenty-two (22) years of incarceration and his custody
               certificate records that his conduct during imprisonment has
               been good. The recommendation of the State Government for
               his premature release also indicates that the petitioner’s conduct
               and rehabilitation have been found satisfactory by the competent
               authorities. Continued incarceration in such circumstances would
               run contrary to the reformative object underlying remission and
               premature release policies particularly, when his co-accused
               has already been released.
9.     In view of the cumulative reasons above, we have no hesitation to
       hold that the impugned letter dated 09.07.2025 of MHA which rejected
       the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand and disallowed the
       plea of premature release of the petitioner is arbitrary, non-speaking,
       unsustainable in law and merit and is therefore set aside and quashed.
10. Since we have held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of
    premature release/remission and since he is already on interim bail,
    his surrender shall not be required, and the respondents shall treat
    him as having been prematurely released/remitted in terms of the
    present order.
11. This Writ Petition is allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
12. The Miscellaneous Applications are also disposed of in the aforesaid
    terms.

       Result of the case: Writ Petition disposed of.
                            Miscellaneous Applications disposed of




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain