Holding

Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 19 were correctly applied, and the dismissals were valid because the situation made an inquiry not reasonably practicable.

Summary

The appellants, employees of the Research and Analysis Wing, were dismissed under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, without a charge‑sheet or inquiry, after a violent pen‑down strike and intimidation of witnesses. The Union argued that the situation made it not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, a contention supported by affidavits showing widespread disorder. The Supreme Court, applying the principles laid down in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, held that the disciplinary authority was justified in dispensing with the inquiry because the atmosphere of violence and intimidation rendered an inquiry impracticable, and the reasons for doing so were properly recorded. Consequently, the dismissals were upheld as valid. The Court also clarified the scope of the second proviso, the conditions for its application, and directed the appellants to file departmental appeals within a specified time.

Issues considered

The applicability of clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 19 to dismiss the appellants without an inquiry.
Whether the circumstances of the pen‑down strike made it "not reasonably practicable" to hold an inquiry.
Whether the disciplinary authority recorded sufficient reasons in writing as required by the proviso.
Whether the dismissals were mala fide or based on extraneous grounds.

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965s. Rule 10(1), s. Rule 14, s. Rule 19, s. Rule 25(1)
Constitution of Indias. Article 163(3), s. Article 309, s. Article 310, s. Article 311(2), s. Article 74(2)
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952s. 7
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 186, s. 332, s. 333, s. 342, s. 353, s. 506
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 2, s. 22

Subjects

Article 311second provisodisciplinary dismissalreasonable practicabilityRule 19civil servicepen‑down strikenatural justicejudicial review

Judgment

791

A
SATYAVIR SINGH AND OTHERS
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS. ETC. ETC.

SEPTE!'!BER 12, 1985
B
[V.D. TULZAPU!U<.Ak, R.S. PATHAK AND D.P. MADON, JJ.]

Service jurisprudence - Dismissal from serv.ice under clause
(b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution
of India read with Rule 19 (ii) of the Central Civil Services
(Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 without serving C
any charge-sheet and without holding any inquiry - r.onstitutional
validity of.

It is incwnbant upon the competent authority, before exer-
cising its power to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank of persons
employed in civil capacities under. his control, to follow the D
constitutional provisions contained in Article 311 and also the
procedure prescribed in Rules 14 to 18 of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.

Prior to the amendment of the second clause of. Article 311
of the· Cons-titution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 with E
effect from January 3, 1977, the second proviso to the said
clause was the only proviso to the said clause 2. Article 311 as
amended- by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 and
the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 reads as
follows:-

.. 311 Dismissal, remi>val or reduction in rank of persons F
employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State:-

( l) No person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or
holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed
or removed by an autttority . subordinate to that by which he was
appointed. G

(2) No such person as - aforesaid shall be .dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an in<,.uiry in which he
has been informed of the charges against him and given a reason-
able opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:-
H
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to
impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP:Z S.C.R.

A on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it
shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of
making representation on the penalty proposed:

Ptovided further that this clause shall not apply:-

(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank
on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a
criminal chargt; or

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person
or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be
recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably
c practicable to hold such inquiry;'or

(c) where the Ptesident or the Governor, as the cse may be, is
satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is
not expedient to hold such inquiry.

(3) If, in respect of any such person as afo~esaid, a question
IJ arises whether it is reasonably practicable to· hold such inquiry
as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the
authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce
him in rank shall be final•" ·

In exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Article
;; 309 of the Constitution the President has made the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 Rule 19
of the said Rules is in substance the same as the second proviso
to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and provides as follows:-

"Rule 19 Special procedure in certain cases:- Notwithstand-
F ing anything contained in Rule 14 to rule 18:-

(i) where any penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal
charge, or

G (ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons
to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practi-
cable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules,
or

(iii) where the Ptesident is satisfied that in the interest of
H the securit; of the State, it is not expedient to hold any
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I. 793

inquiry in the manner provl.ded in these rules, the disciplinary
A
authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make
such orders thereon as it deems fit:

Ptovided that the Commission shall be consulted, where such
consultation is necessary before any orders are made in any case
under this rule."
B
The wrod "COlllllission" is defined by clause (d) of Rule 2 as
meaning "the Union l'Ublic Service Commission".

A five-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, with
one learned Judge dissenting, except as regards the interpreta-
tion to be placed upon clause ( c) of the second proviso to
c
Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, while interpreting Articles
309, 310 and 311 of the Cons_titution and in particular the second
proviso to Article 311 (Z) of the Constitution, in the case of
Union of India and Another v. Tulairam Patel. and other connected
matters, [1985] 3 sec 398 reached as many as 114 conclusions on
D
several issues like the pleasure doctrine in the United Kingdom
and in India, the nature of inquiry under Article 311 (2) of the
Constitution and in particular the second proviso to Article 311
(2), Article H and the second proviso, the Service Rules and
Acts, the ratio decfdenclf in Divisianal Personnel Officer,
Sonthern Rai1-y and another V• T.!l. Qnllappan, [1976] 1 SCR 783
and the correctness ther~of, and the remedies available to civil
E
servants both departmental remedies and by way of judicial review
etc.

According to Challappan's case, a civil servant to whom a
service rule analogous to the second proviso to Article 311 (2)
is sought_ to be applied has only the right to be heard with
F
respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him. The
majority judgment , in Tulsiram Patel's case, has, however,
conferred upon the civil servants who have been dismissed or
removed from service or reduced in rank bY applying the second
proviso to Article 311 (2) or an analogous service rule the right
to a full and complete inquiry in, an appeal or ,revision unless -a
G
situation envisaged by the secMd proviso is pre'lailing at the
time of the hearing of th.. appeal or revision application. Even
in such a case under the majority judgment the hearing of the
appeal or revision application is to he postponed for a
reasonable length of time for the situation to become norms!.
H
The a,ppellants in both the appeals were employees of the
Research and Analysis Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of
794 SUPRE~!E COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP;2 s.c.~.

A
India. Earlier, the different branches and departments of the RAW
in New Delhi were scattered in several buildings. Ultimately, a
new building was constructed for the RAW at Lodhi Road. In the
said building the Counter Intelligence Section was house~. After
the CIS was shifted to the building at Lodhi Raod, strict
B security measures were introduced and the employees, when going
from one floor to the other, had to show their identity cards.
This was resented by the employees and they demanded the with-
drawal of this regulation and insisted that the identification
check should be made only at the time of entering the building.
In the forenoon on November 2 7 , 1980 a number of staff members
collected in the galleries leading to the CIS rooms, protesting
c against the said security regulation and demanding its immediate
withdrawal. All attempts to pacify them proved unsuccessful,
More and more employees joined them and they turned aggressive,
breaking into the various rooms of the CIS unit. Several persons
forced their entry into the room of the Director CIS and forced ,
him as also the Assistant Director and the Security Field Officer
who were in the room to stand in a corner and did not allow them
D to move f rnm the spot but kept them as hostages in order to have
their deJMnd conceded. The employees who had gathered there
shouted slogans against the organisation and its officers. These
slogans were obscene, abusive, threatening and personal in
nacure. All attempts made by senior officers to pacify them
proved unsuccessful and the employees made it clear that they
E would not let the said three officers go unless the Director of
, the Counter Intelll gnece Section announced the withdrawal of the
said security regulation. Ultimately with the help of the local
police &t about 8,30 p.m. the said three officers were rescued
and 31 agitators who were found inside the room were arrested and
charged under sections 342, 506, 353, 186, 332 and 333 of the
F Indian Penal Code and section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1952. The arrested employees were suspended under clause (b)
of sub-rule 1 of rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classi-
fication, Control arni Appeal) Rules, 1965 as a criminal case
against them was under investigation. The next day, namely, on
November 28, 1980, the agitation continued and many employees did
~ot perform their duties but instead collected inside the
G
building and in the premises in groups stopping work in many
branches. A large number of them went round shouting slogans and
made speeches in the corridors of the office. On November 29,
1980, a letter was issued by an association called the Cabinet
Secretariat, (Research and Analysis Wing) Employees Association
H
(Regd.) demanding the illlnediate withdrawal of the criminal cases
against the 31 e.mployees as also of the said security regulation.
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I. 795

A
The letter stated that unless these demands were met, the
employees would go on a pen-down strike with immediate effect.
Thereupon, orders of suspension were issued" against those who
were taking a leading, active and aggressive role in the
agitation and indulging in these activities. The said suspension
orders were issued from the 1st December, 1980 onwards but the B
pen-down strike continued and spread to other off ices of the RAW
in New Delhi as well as in different parts of India including
Lu~.know and JS111111.1. Daily the situation worsened. There was
completed insubordination and total breskdown of discipline. The
atmosphere was charged with tension and there did not seem any
hope of the situation becoming normal. Ultimately the seven c
·Appellants ir. Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1982 and the sole Appellant
in Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982 were dismissed by orders dsted
December 6, 1980 without holding any enquiry by applying to them
clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) re'ld with
Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1965. D

Thereupon a writ petition was filed in the Delhi High Court.
At the date of the filing of the said writ petition only appel-
lants Numbers 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1982 had been
served with the orders of dismissal while the remaining Appel-
lants and Respondents Nos. 4 to 44 in Civil Appeal· No. 242 of
1982 joined in the said writ petition as co-petitioners together E
with the Cabinet Secretariat (Research and Analysis Wing)
Employees Association (Regel.), contending that similar action of
dismissal was being 'lpprehended by them. Pending the said writ
petition the orders of dismissal were also served upon the
remaining Appellants. During the course of the hearing of the
said writ petition a statement was made to the High Court on F
behalf of the Union of India that the other petitioners would not
be dismissed without holding a regular inquiry. The said writ
petitf.on, therefore, proceeded only so far as the Appellants in
these two appeals were concerned. A Division Bench of the said
High Court dismissed the writ petition by its judgment and order
dated September 25, 1981. Hence the appeals by special leave. G

In view of the judgment in Tulsiram Patel's case over-
ruling Cballappan'a case, the only contention taken at the
hearing of these two Appeals wss that the said orders of
dismissal were passed mala fide and the reasons given therein for
dispensing with the inquiry were not true and that an inquiry was H
reasonably practicable. In support thereof, it was contended that
(i) the orders of suspension showed that a disciplinary inquiry
796 SUPREME COORT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A was in fact contemplated and nothing had happened between the
date of the orders of suspension and the date of the orders of
dismissal warranting the conclusion that the inquiry was not
reasonably practicable; (ii) while eight employees were dismissed
for their part in the agitation which took place in Delhi, in
respect of the agitation which took place in the Lucknow office
B of the RAW only two employees of that office were dismissed and
therefore, there was no applicaion of mind on the part of the
disciplinary authority; (iii) even on December 6, 1980 a suspen-
sion order was issued against one of the employees and that ~n
December 9, 1980 a suspension orders were issued against two
other employees, and that the issuance of these suspension orders
on the 6th and 9th December showed that the holding of an inquiry
c was .reasonably practicable; (iv) it was not alleged by the
authorities that anyone was physically injured in the agitation;
(v) after the suspension orders, the Appellants were prohibited
from visiting any of the Cabinet Secretariat Off ices except for
the purpose of collecting their dues and that too with prior
permission and therefore, they could not have held any meeting or
demonstration inside the office premises; (vi) even though
IJ co-workers may not have been available as witnesses, there were
policemen and police officers posted inside and outside the
building and they were available to give evidence and that
superior officers were also available to give evidence; and (vii)
the Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982, who was posted at
Jammu could not, have taken any active part in the agitation
.which took place in Delhi.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court, summarizing topic-wise
the conclusions reached in Union of India and another v. Tulsiram
Patel and other connected matters, [1985] 3 s.c.c. 398.

I' HELD: 1.1 Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 3ll
(2) and Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, .1965, were properly applied to the
case of ~ach of the Appellants and the impugned orders of
dismi.ssal were validly passed against them. [841 C-DJ

G Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel and other
connceted matters, [1985] 3 sec 398 applied.

1.2 It is true that each order of suspension stated that
the concerned employee was being suspended in the exercise of the
powers conferred by Rule 10 ( l) of the Central Civil Services
H (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, because a
SAT'iAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I. 797

A
disciplinary proceeding against him under Rule 14 of the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965
was contemplated and that at the date of the orders cif suspension
disciplinary proceedings against the Appellants was in contempla-
tion. This, however, does not mean that the situation will
continue to be the same and. that at no time thereafter will the B
holding of the inquiry become "not reasonably practicable.· It is
not necessary that a situation which makes the holding of an
inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist before the
disciplinary inquiry is initiated, because a situation which
renders the holding of ~n inquiry not reasonably practicable can
come into being .even during the course of an enquiry. [838 A-D] c
In the instant case, the affidavits filed in the High Court
clearly show that the situation had so changed after the orders
of suspension were issued against the appellants that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry against the appel-
lants. The all-India pen-down strike was spreading. More and more D
centres in India were joining in the said strike. The position
was fast deteriorating; Employees were being instigated into
~urther acts of indisci.pline and insubordination and loyal
employees and senior officers were being intimidated. Meetings
and demonstrations were regularly being held within the office
premises and their presincts and there was no possibility of any
witness coming forward to give evidence against the appellants E
who were said to have taken a leading part in this agitation.
Further, when the first batch of dismissal orders was served upon
some of the appellants on December 8, 1980, the pen-down strike
was called off on December 9, 1980. In such a situation as was·
then prevailing, prompt and urgent action was required to bring
the situation under control, Sometimes not taking prompt action
F
may result in the trouble spreading and the situation worsening
and at times becoming uncontrolable, and may at times be also
construed by the trouble""1llakers and agitators as a sigo of weak-
ness on the part of the authorities and encourage them to step up
the tempo of their .activities or agitation. This is exactly what
happened when the suspen.qion orders were issued and that what was
G
required was prompt and urgent ation against those who were
considered to be.· the ring leaders and that once such action was
taken the situation improved and started becoming normal. It is
pertinent to note that when the first batch of dismissal orders
were served upon some of the appellants on December 8, 1980, the
pen-down strike was called off on December 9, 1980. [838 o-G] H

1,3 The fact that it was thought fit t0 dismiss only two
employees of the Lucknow of flee cannot lead to the conclusion
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP:2 s.c.R.

A
that the appellants were wrongly dismissed without any
application of mind. [893 C-D]

1.4 It will not be reasonably practicable to hold an
inquiry where an atmosphere of violence or of general indisci-
B pline and insubordination prevails.· It is, therefore, not
necessary that the disciplinary authority should wait until inci-
dents take place in which physical injury is caused to others
before dispensing with the inquiry. [839 F-G]

1.5 In view of the admitted position that the appellants
were regularly coming to the office building and talking with
c other employees over the wall and at the gate twice a day at
11.30 a.m. and 3.30 a.m. and were making inflamatory speeches and
holding out threats, it cannot be said that they could not have
held any meeting or demonstration inside the office premises.
[839 H, 840 A-BJ

1.6 Where the disdplinary authority feels that crucial and
D
material evidence will not be available in an inquiry because the
witnesses who could give such evidence are intimidated and would
not come forward and the only evidence which would be available,
namely, in this case, of policemen, police officers and senior
officers, would only be peripheral and cannot realte to all the
charges and that, therefore, leading only such evidence may be
E
assailed in a Court of law as being a mere farce of an inquiry
and a deliberate attempt to keep back material witnesses, the
disciplinary authority would be justified in coming to the con-
clusion that an inquiry is not reasonable practicable. From a
perusal of the affidavit filed and its annexures it is clear that
the police officers, policemen and senior officers could not have
F
possibly given evidence with respect to all these acts. Further
the senior officers were also intimidated and were threatened
with dire consequences if they gave evidence. Grievances were
· also made against the senior officers of the RAW in the charter
of demands submitted by the association and the evidence of
senior officers would have been attacked . as being biased and
G partisan. [840 C-G]

1.7 The contention taken on behalf of the sole appellant in
Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982 that having been posted at Jammu, he
could not have taken part in the agitation which took place in
New Delhi is falsified by the fact that during the relevant time
he had taken leave for personal reasons and had come down to
H
Delhi and had played an active role in the said agitation. He
made inflamatory speeches on the Ist, 3rd, 4th and 5th of
December, 1980 and had instigated the other employees to continue
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [MADON, J.] 799

the agitatio!l and intimidated those who had not joined in the A
agitation into doing so. Further, in a speech made by him on
December 4, 1980 he had tried to make public some of the top
secret operations of the RAW claiming to have special knowledge
of these operations by virtue of his having been posted earlier
in a sensitive branch. He was also actively engaged in collecting
funds for continuing the agitation. [840 G-H, 841 A-B] B

The Court, directed:- (i) if any payment has been made to
any of the appellants in pursuance of any interim order, such
appellant will not be liable to refund such· amount or any part
thereof; and (ii) since the appellants have a right to file a
departmental appeal under the Central Civil Services (Classifica- c
tion, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 in case they desires' to
file such an appeal, they may do so on or before October 31, 1985
and that the Appellate Authority must condone, ln the exercise of
its power under the proviso to Rule 25 of the Central Civil
•' Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 the
delay in filing the appeal and hear and dispose of such appeals D
expeditiously subject to what has been laid down in Tulsir-
PAtel 's case.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 242 & 576
of 1982.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25. 9 .1981 of the Delhi E
High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1786 of 1980.

Appellant in person for Petr. No. 4 in C.A. No. 242 of 1982.

V.N. Ganpule for the Appellant in C.A. No. 242/82.
F
V.M •. Tarkunde, V.N. Ganpule and G.B. Sathe for the Appel-
lants in C.A. No. 576 of i982.

K.Parasaran, Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for
the Respondents.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MADON, J. The appellants who were employed in the Research
and Analysis Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India were
dismissed from service in the exercise of the power conferred by
clause (b) of the second p.roviso to Article 311 (2) of the H
Constitution of India read with Rule 19 of the Central Civil
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1%5) SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, with-
out serving any charge-sheet ·upon them and w.ithout. holding any
inquiry. The Appellants thereupon filed in the relhi High Court a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging
the said orders of dismissal. The said writ petition was dismiss-
ed by a Division Bench of ·the Delhi High Court by its judgment
B and order dated September 25, 1981. It is against the said judg-
ment and order of the Delhi High Court that the present two
Appeals have been filed by Special Leave granted by this Court.

Article 311 of the Constitution

Prior to the amendment of the second clause of Article 311
C of the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment)
Act, 1976, with effect from January 3, 1977, the second proviso
to the said clause was the only proviso to the said clause (2).
Article 311 as amended by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment)
Act, 1963, and the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act,
1976, reads as follows:

D "311. Dismissal, removal or reduction In rank ofpersons employed
in civil capacities uoder the Union or a State. -

(1) No person who is a memher of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or
holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed
E or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed.

(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he
has been informed of the charges· against hirn and given a reason-
F able oppo~tunity of being heard in respect of those charges:

Provided that where it is proposed ·after such .inquiry, to
impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may he imposed on
the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it
shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity or
G making representation on the penalty proposed:

Provided further that this clause shall not apply-

(a) ''where a person is dismissed or removed or r(~duced i 1:1
rank on the ground of conduct which has led to h i.s
Ii conviction on a criminal charge; or
SP.T'L>VIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [MADON, J.] 801

(b) where the authority empowered to dism�ss or remove a A
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for
some reason, to be recorded by that authority in
wri.ting, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry; or

(c) where the Fresic;ent or the Governor, as the case may B
be, is sati.sfied that in the interest of the security
of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.

(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a
question arises whether it is reasonably practicable
to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), C
the decision thereon of the nuthority empowered to
dismiss or remov·e such person or to reGuce him in rank
shall be final."

Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and
Appeal} Rules, 1965 D

The Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1965, have been made by the President in exercise
of the power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution. Rule 19 of the said Rules is in substance the same
as the second proviso to Article 311 (2) and provides as follows:
E
"19. Special procedure. in cettain """""" - Notwithstanding
anything contained in rule 14 to rule 18 -

(i) where any penalty is imposed on a Government
servant on the ground of conduct which bas led to his
conviction on a crimiP.al charge, or F

(ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied
for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is
not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the
manner provided in these rules, or
G
(iii) where the President is satisfied that in the
interest ot the security of the State, it is not
expedi.ent to hold any inquiry in the manner provided
in these rules,

tlw diSc.i\)linary authority llKlY COll�l,!l�r th� drqnnstances of the H

case and make such orders theron as ;t de.en's fit;
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) SUPP.2 s.c.R.

. Provided that the Commission shall be .consulted, where such.
consultation is necessary, before any orders are mad~ in any case
under this rule." '

The word "Co!l:mission" is defined by clause (d) of Rule 2 as mean-
ing "the Union Public Service Commission".

The Decision in Tulsiram Patel's Case

It was not disputed at the hearing of these two Appeals that
they fall to be decided in the light of what was held in Union of
India and another v.Tulsiram Patel and other connected lllattezs.
[1985) 3 s.c.c. 398. By the decision in Tulsiram Patel's Case a
large Dlllllber of writ petitions either filed in this Court or in
various High Courts and transferred to this Court and several
Appeals by Special Leave, all involving the interpretation of
Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution and in particular
of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), were disposed of by a
five-judge Constitution tench of this Court,· with one learned
judge dissenting except as regards the interpretation to be .
placed upon clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2).

A large number of points fell for decision in . Tulsirais
Patel's case. (1985] 3 s.c.i::. 398. It will, therefore, be conve-
nient first to summarize topic-wise the conclusions reached by
the majority in that · case and then to emphasize the important·
rights conferred by the majority judgment upon persons who are
members of a civil service of the Union of India or an all-India
service or a civil service of a State or hold a civil post under
the Union of India or a State, 1n other words, upon civil
servants, and thereafter to deal with the facts of the present
Appeals and the contentions raised at the hearing thereof.

The conclusions reached by the majority in Tulsiram Patel's
Case were:

I. The Pleasure Doctrine in the United Kil'&dom

(l).The pleasure doctrine relates to the tenure of a
government servant, that is, his right to continue to
hold office. Under it all public officers and servants
of the Crown in the United Kingdom hold their appoint-
ments at the pleasure of the Crown and their services
can be terminated at will without assigning ar.y cause.

'
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.Q. I. [MADON, J.] 803

(2) The pleasure doctrine is not based upon any A
special prerogative of the Crown but is based on
public poiicy and is in public interest and for public
good. The basis of the pleasure doctrine is that the
public is vitally interested in the efficiency and
integrity of civil services and, therefore public
policy requires, public interest needs and public good li
demands that civil servants who are inefficient, dis-
honest or corrupt or have become a security risk
should not continue in service.

(3) In the United Kingdom, Parliament is sovereign and
can make any law whatever and the courts have no power <.:
to declare it void. In the United Kingdom, therefore,
the pleasure doctrine is subject to what may be
expressly provided otherwise by legislation.

II. The Pleasure Doctrine in India
ll
(4) In India the pleasure doctrine has received
Constitutional sanction by being enacted in Article
310 (1) of the ConstitutJ.on of India. Under Article
310 (1), except as expressly provided in the Constitu-
tion, every person who is a member of a defence
service or of a civil serv:!.ce oi t'he Union of India or
of an all-India service or holds. any post connected E
wj th defence or any civil post under the Union of
India holds office during the ple&sure of the
President, and every per.son who is a member of a civil
service of a State or holds any civil post under a
State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor
of the State. F

(5) Thus, unlike in the Untied Kingdom, in India the
pleasure doctrine is not subject to any law made by
Parliament or a State Legislature but is subject to
only what · i.s expressly provided in the Constitutfon.
In India, the.refore, the exceptions to the pleasure G
doctrine can only be those which are expressly provi-
ded in the Constitution.

(6) There are several exceptions to the pleaGure
doctrine expressly provided in the Constitutione

(7) Article 3li, being an express provision of the
Constitution, is an exception to the pleasure doctrine
804 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
contained in Article 310 (1) of ·the Constitution.
Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 restrict the opera-
tion of the pleasure doctri1le so far as civil servants
. are concerned by conferring upon civil servants the
safeguards provided in those clauses.
B
(8) Under clause (1) of Article 311 no civil servant
can be dismissed or removed f ram service by an
authority subordinate to that by which he was
appointed.

(9) Under Clause (2) of Article 311 no civil servant
can be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in
c rank except after an inquiry :i.n which he has been
informed of the charges against him and given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of
such charges. By reason of the amendment made by the
Constitution (Forty-second A'!lendment) Act, 1976, in
clause (2) of Article 311 it is now not necessary to
give to a civil servant an opportunlty of making a
D represent:atio~ with respect to the penalty proposed to
be i.rnposed upon him.

(10) An order of compulsory retiren:ent from service
:i.1tposed upon a civil servant by way of pE·nalty amounts
to "removal"'from service and attracts the provisions
E
of Article 311.

(11) Restrictions on the operation of the pleasure
doctrine contained in legislation Il'iade by Parli.ament
~i.n the Uni.ted Kingdom and· in clauses (1) and (2) of
"Article 311 in India are aJ,so based on pobli . ;.. policy
F
and are in public tnterest and for public good in.as-
much ar. they give to c.ivtl servants a feeling of
security of tenure.

·· (12) The safeguard provided to civil servants by
clause (.2) of ArticJe 311. is t;-;kcu away when any of
G
the thret clauses of the second proviso (origin.:ilJy
the only pt'O'/iso) to i\rt.ic1f::· 3li (2) becomes
app1 ir:rtr.1 p"

(13) lr: l~ ir1correct t:o sf!y that tl1e pleasure doctrine
is a -prero5ative of the British Crown lj,'hic\i haH heen
H
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.o. I. [!'.AIXJN, J.] 805

A
inherited by India and transposed into its Constitu-.
tion , adapted to suit the Constitutional. set up of
the Republic of India. Author.itative jUdicial dicta
both in England and in India, for instance, Shenton v.
Smith, L.R. [1895] A.C. 229 J.C. Dunn v. The Queen,
L.R. [1896] Q.B.D. 116, 119-120; s.c. [1895-96] 73
L.T.R. 695 and sub oomine Dunn v. Regeni in [1895-1899] B
All E. R. Rep. 907. n,.;State of Uttar Pradesh and
others v. Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2 s.c.R. 679, 696.
Motl. Ram Ueka etc. v.· General l1anager N.E.F. Railways,
Maligaon, Pando, etc. [1964] 5 s.c.R. 683, 734-5 and
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, [1968] 1 s.C.R.
185, 195, have laid down that the pleasure doctrine c
and the protection afforded · to civil servants by
legislation in the United Kingdom and by clauses ( 1)
and (2) of Article 311 in India are based on public
policy and are in public interest and for·public good.
Similarly, the withdrawal of the safeguard contained
D
in clause (2) of Article 311 by the second proviso to
that clause is also based. on public policy and is in
public interest and for public good.

(14) Neither Article 309 nor Article 310 nor Article
311 8ets out the grounds for dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank or for imposition of any other
E
penalty upon a civil servant. These Articles also d(,.
not specify what the · other penalties are. Tqese
matters are left to be dealt with by rules made under
the proviso to Article 309 or by Acts referable to
that Article or rules ~de under such.·Acts.
F
(15) The pleasure of the ·President or the Governor is
not to be exercised by him personally. It is to be
exercised by the appropriate . authotity specified in
rules made.under the proviso to Article 309 or by Acts
referable to that Article "Or rules made under such
Acts. \..There, however, the President _or the Governor,
G
as the.- case m.B.y . be, e:Xertise hi!? -pleasure -under -
Article 310 (1), it is not required that such act of
exercise of the pleasure under Article 310 (1) 1m1st be
an act of the President (lr the Governor himself but it
must be an act of __ the President or the Governor in the
Constitutional sense, that is, with the" aid and on the H
advice of the Council of Ministers.
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A III. The Inquiry under Article 311 (2)

(lb) Clasue (2) of Article 311 gives a Constitutional
mandate to the principles of natural justice and the
audi alteram partem rule by providingthat a civil
servant shall not be dismissed or removed from service
B or reduced in rank until after an inquiry in which he
has been informed of the charges against him and has
been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges.

(17) The nature ot this inquiry has been elaborately
set out by this Court in Khan Chand v. The Union of
c India and others [195tiJ s.c.R. 10~0, 1005-97 and even
after the Constitution (Forty-second AP.lendment) Act,
197b, the inquiry required by clause (2) of Article
311 would be the same except that it would not be
necessary to give to a civil servant an opportunity to
make a representation with respect to the penalty
proposed to be imposed upon him.
D
(18) As held in Suresh Koshy George v. The University
of Kerala and others [1969J s.c.R. 317,326-7. and
Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. T.C. Shrivast,,va
and others, [1984] 3 S.C.R. 361, 369. apart from
Article 311 prior to its amendment by the Constitution
E (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, it is not necess-
ary either under the ordinary law of the land or under
industrial law to give a second opportunity to show
casue against the penalty proposed to be imposed upon
an employee.

(19) If an inquiry held against a civil servant under
Article 311 (2) is unfair or biased or has been
conducted in such a manner as not to give him a fair
or reasonable opportunity to defend himself, the
principles of natural justice would be violated; but
in such a case the order of di.Smissal, removal or
reduction in rank would be bad as contravening the
express provisions of Article Jll \2) and there is no
scope for having recourse to Article 14 for the
purpose of invalidating it.

IV. The Second Proviso to Article 311 (2)
Ii

)
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I. [MADON, J.] 807

(20) The language of the second proviso to Article 311 A
(2) is plain and unambiguous. The keywords in the
second proviso are "this clause shall not apply".
There is no ambiguity in these words. Where, there-
fore, a situaion envisagea in any of the three clauses
of the second proviso arises, the safeguard provided
to a civil servant by clause (2) of Article 311 is B
taken away.

(21) The second proviso to Article 311 (2) becomes
applicable in the three cases mentioned in clauses (a)
to (c) of that proviso, namely, (a) where a person is
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground C
of conduct which has led to his conviction on a crimi-
nal charge; (b) where the authority empowered to dis-
miss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank - is
satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable
to hold such inquiry;· and (c) where the Ptesident or D
the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in
the interest of the security of the State it is not
expedieat to hold such inquiry.

(22) The governing words of the second proviso to
clause (2) of Article 311, namely, "this clause shall
not apply", are mandatory and not directory and are in E
·the nature of a Constitutional prohibitory injunction
restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an
inquiry under Article 311 (2) or from giving any kind
of opportunity to the concerned civil servant in a
case where one of the three clauses of the seco!ld
proviso becomes applicable. There is thus no scope for F
introducing into the second proviso some kind of
inquiry or opportunity to show cause by a process of
inference or implication. The maxim "expressum fac!t
cessare tacitum" ("when there is express mention of
certain things, then anything not mentioned is
excluded") applies to the case. ThiS well-known maxim G
is a principle of logic and co~n sense and not
merely a technical rule of construction as pointed out
in B.Sbankara Rao Badami. and others v. State of Mysore
and another [1969] 3 s.c.R. 1, 12.

(23) The second proviso to Article 311 (2) has been in H
the Constitution of India since the time the Constitu-
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
ti.on was originally 12:nacted. It was not blindly or
slavJshly copied from section 240 (3) of the Govern-
ment of lnciia Act, 1935. There was a considerable
debate on this proviso i.n the ConstjtutEnt Assembly as
shown by the Offici.al Ri::-port of the Constituen,t
·Assembly Debates, vo.l. IX, pages 1099 to 1116. The
B majority of the members of the Consti.tuent Assembly
had fought for freedom and had suffered imprisonment
in the cause of liberty and were, therefore, not
likely to introduce into our Constitution any provi-
sion fron; the earlier Government of India Act which
had been enacted purely for the benefit of a foreign
i.mperalistic power. They retained the second proviso
c as a matter of public policy and as being in the
public interest and for public good. They further
inserted clause (c) in the second proviso dispensing
with the inquiry under ArtiCJe 311 (2) in a case where
the Presidtnt or the Governor, as the case may be, is
satisfied that in the interest of the security of the
State .it is not expedient to hold such 1.nquiry as also
D ,added a new clause, namely, clause (3), in Article 311
gjving finality to the decision of the disciplinary
authority that it is not reasonably practicable to
hold the inquiry under Article 311 (2). Section 240 cf
·the Government of India Act, 1935, did not contain any
pr0vision similar to clause (c) of the second proviso
E to Article 311 (2) or clause (3) of Article 311.

V. Article 14 and the Secorul Proviso

(24) The principles of natural justice are not the
creatoon of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14
F is not the begetter of the principles of natural
· justice but if.J their Constitutionnl guardian.

(25) Tht: principles of natural justice consist
prirr.arily of two main rules, nen~ely, "nemojudex in
causa sua ("no man shall be a judge .inhis own
G cause")8nd "audi atleram parterrt ("hearthe other
side"). The coWllary deduced from the above two niles
and parti.cularly the audi alterampartemrule was "qui
aliquid statuerit parte inaudita altera, aequum licet
dixerit, haud aequum fecerit" ("he who shall decide
anything without the other side having been heard,
H
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [MADON, J.] 809

A
although he may have said what is right will not have
done what is right" or as is now expressed "justice
should not only be done but should manifestly be seen
to be done"). These two rules and their corollary are
neither new nor were they the discovery of English
judges but were recognized in many civj lizations and B
over many centuries.

(26) Art.icle 14 applies not only to d.iscrirr,.inatory
cl.ass legislation but also to arbitrary or discrimina-
tory State action. Violation of ;;i rule of natural
justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as C
discrim:i_nati.on, and where ·discrimination is the result
of a State action, it is a .violation cf Article 14.
Therefore, a violation of a princi.ple of natural
justice by "a State action is a .violation of Article
14.

(27) The principles of natural justice apply both to
quasi-judicial as well as administrative inquiries
entailing civil consequences.

(28) It is well established both in England and in
India that the principles of natural justice yield to E
and change with the exigencies of different situation.s
and do not apply in the £ame manner to situations
which are not alike. They are neither cast- in & rigid
mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-ja_cket.
They are not immutable but flexihle and can be
adapted, mOdlfied or excluded by statute and statutory
rules a_s also by· the constitution of the tribunal F
which has to decide a particular matter and the rules
by which such. tribunal is governed. I.nstcinces of cases
i.n which it has been so held are Norwest Holst Lt:d. v.
Secretary of State for T~ade and others, L.R. [1978] 1
Ch. 201, 227. Suresh Koshy George v. The University of
Kerala and others, [1969] 1 s.C·R· 317, 322. A.K. \.
Kraipak and others· etc. v. Union of India and others,
[1970] l s.c.R. 457, 469. Uni.on of India v. Col. J.N.
Sinha and. another, [1971] 1 s.c.R. 791, 694-5.
Swadeshl Cotton.Mills v. Union of India, [1981] 2
s.c.R. 533, 591. J. M()ha(l2tra & Co. and another v.
State of Orissa and another, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 322,
334-5. and ~.ianeka Gandhi. v. Union of India. [1978] 2 H
s.c.R. 621, 681.
810 SUPREME COURT KEPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
(29) If legislation and the necessities of a situation
can exclude the principles of natural justice includ-
ing the audi alterai:i partem rule, a fortiorari so can
a provision of the constitution such as the second
proviso to Article 311 (2).
B
(30) The audi alteram partem rule having been excluded
by a Constitutional provision, namely, the second
proviso to Article 311 (2), the.re is no scope for
reintroducing it by a side-door to provide once again
the same inquiry which the Constitutional provision
c has expressly prohibited.

(31) A rigllt of making a representation after an
action is taken against a person has been held by this
0

Court in Maneka Gandhi's Case, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621,
681, and in Liberty Oil Mills aod others v. Union of
India and others, [19811j 3 s.c.R. 465. to be a suffi-
D cient compliance with the requirements of natural
justice. In the case of a civil servant to whom the
provisions of the second proviso to Article 311 (2)
have been applied, he has the right of a departmental
appeal in which he can show that the charges made
against him are not true, and an appeal is a wider and
more effective remedy than a right of making a
E representat.ion.

(32) The majority view in A.K. Gopalan v. The State of
Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 88, namely, that parti.cular
Articles governing certain Fundamental Rights operate
exclusively without having any interrelation with any
F other Article in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights was
disapproved and held to be not correct in llustom
Cawasji Cooper v. Union of India. [1970] 3. s.C.R.
530. The position that the majority view in Gopalan's
case [1950] S.C.R. 88, was overruled in R.C. Cooper's
Case [1970 j 3 s.c.R. 530, was reiterated in Sambbu
G Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal aod others
[1974] 1 s.C.R.l. Hardball Saha and another v. The
st.~te of West ll2ngal and others, 11975] 1 s.c.R. 832.
Klwdiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and others,
[1975] 2 S.C.R. 832 and Hanek.a Gandhi's Case [1978] 2
S.C.R. 621, 681. Thus, the majority view in Gopalan's
H Case [1950] S.C.R.88, was buried In R.C. Cooper's Case
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I. [MADON, J.] 811

[1970] 3 S.C.R •. 530. its burial service was read in A
Samblm Nath Sarkar Vo 'lbe State of· West Bengal and
others, [1974] 1 s.c.R. 1. llardhan Saha and another Vo
The State of West Bengal and others [1975] 1 s.c.R.
832 and Khudiram Das Vo The State of West Bengal and
others [1975] 2 s.c.R. 832 and its funeral oration was
delivered in Maneka Gandhi's Case [1978] 2 S.C.R. B
621,681 and it is to be hoped that the ghost of that
majority view does not at some future time rise form
its grave and stand, clanking its chains, seeking to
block the onward march of our country to progress,
prosperity and the establishment of a Welfare State.
c
(33) The decisions in RoC. Cooper's Case [1970] 3
s.c.R. 530 and the other cases which followed it do
not, however, apply where a Fundamental Right, includ-
ing the audi alteram partein rule comprehended !'ithin
the guarantee of .Article 14, is excluded by the
Constitution itself. Instances of such express D
exclusionary provisions contained in the Constitution
are Article 31A (1), Article 31B, Article 31C, Article
22 (5), and the second proviso to Article 311 (2) as
regards the audi alteram partem rule, namely, afford-
ing an opportunity of a hearing to a civil servant
before imposing the penalty of dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank upon him. E

(34) The principles of natural justice must be
confined within their proper limits and not allowed to

-
run wild. The concept of natural justice is a magni-
ficient thoroughbred on which this nation gallops
forwards towards its proclaimed and destined goal of F
"JUSTICE, social, economic and political". This
thoroughbred must not be allowed to turn .into a wild
and unruly horse, careering off where it lists,
unsaddling its rider, and bursting into fields where
the sign "no pasaran" is put up.
G
VI. Service Rules and Acts
(35) Article 309 is expressly made subject to the
provisions of the Constitution. Rules made under the
proviso to Article 309 Acts- referable to that Article,
and rules made under such Acts are, therefore, subject H
both to Article 310 (1) as also to Article 311. If any
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 S.C.R.

A
such rule or A~t impinges upon or restri'cts the opera-
tion of the pleasure doctrine exbodied in Article 310
(l) except as expressly provided in the Constitution
or restricts or takes away the safeguards provl.ded to
civil servants by clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311,
it would be void.and unconstitutional as contravening
B the provisions of Article 310 (1) or clause (1) or
clause (2) of Article 311, as the case may be. Any
such Act or rule which provides for dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank of a civil servant with-
out holding an inquiry as contemplated by clause (2)
of Article 311 except in the three cases specified in
the second proviso to that clause would, therefore, be
c unconstitutional and viod as contravenfog Articte 311
(2).

(36) In the same way, for an Act or a rule to provide
that in a case where the second proviso to Article 311
(2) applies, any of the safeguards excluded by that
proviso will be available to a civil servant would be
D void and unconstitutional as impinging upon the
pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case
' may be.

(37) A well-settled rule of construction of statutes
is that where two interpretations are possible, one of
E which would preserve and save the constitutionality of
the particular statutory provision while the other
'4 would render it unconstitutional and void, the one
which saves and preserves its constitutionality should
be adopted and the other rejected.

F (38) Where an Act or a rule provides that in a case in
which the second proviso to Article 311 (2) applies
any of the safeguards excluded by that proviso will be
available to a civil servant, the constitutionality of
such provision would be preserved by interpreting. it
as being directory and not mandatory. The breach of
G such directory provision would not, hov.:-ever, furnish
any cause of action or ground of challenge to a civil
servant because at the threshold such cause of action
or ground of challenge would be barred by the second
proviso to Article 311 (2).

H
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [MADON, J.] 813

(39) Service rules may reproduce the provisions of the A
second proviso to Article 311 (2) and authorize the
disciplinary authority to dispense with the inquiry as
contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311 in the
three cases mentioned in ~he second proviso to that
clause or any one or more of them. Such a provision,
however* is not valid and constitutional without B
reference to the second proviso to Article 311 (2) and
cannot be read apart from it. Thus, while the source
of authority of a particular officer tO act as a
disciplinary author.tty and dispense with the inquiry
is deri.ved from the ser\r.ice rules, the soucre of his
power to dispense with the inquiry is derived.from the c
second proviso to Article 311 (2) and not from any
service rule.

(40) The omission to mention in an order of dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank the relevant clause of
the second proviso or the relevant service rule will o
not have the effect of invalidating the order imposing
such penalty, and the order rust be read as having
been made unde< the applicable clause of the second
proviso to Article 311. (2) read wi~h the relevant
service rule.

(41) Rule 37 of the Central Industrial Security Force E
Rules, J.969, is clumsily worded and makes little
sense. To provide that a member of the Central
Industrial Security Force who has .been convicted to
rigorous imprisonment on a criminal charge "shall be
dismissed from service" and at the same time to
provide that "only a notice shall be given to the F
party charged proposing the penalty of dismissal for
his having been convicted to rigourous impri$9nme.nt
and asking him to explain as to why the proposed
penalty of dismissal should not be imposed" is a
contradiction in teruiB. To read these provisions as
mandatory would be to render them unconstitutlonal and .G
void. These provisions TID..lSt, therefore, be read as
directory in order to preserve their constitu-
tionality.

(42) Rule 19 of the. Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, is H
identical with Rule 14 of the Railway Servant
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP;2 s.c.R.

A (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, and the interpre-
tation of the said Rule 19 would be the same as that
of the said Rule 14.

VII. Challappan's Case

B (43) The three-Judge Bench of this Court in Divisiotial
Persoonel Officer, Southern Railway and anotber v.
T.R. Challappan, [1976] 1. S.C.R. 783, was in error in
interpreting Rule 14 of the Railway Servant (Discip-
line and Appeal) Rules, 1968, by itself and not in
conjuction with the second proviso to Article 311 (2).

c (44) The Court in Challappan 1s Case, [1976] 1 S.C.R.
783, also erred in _holding that the addition of the
words "the disciplinary authority may consider the
circumstances of the case and make such order thereon
as it deems fit" in the siad Rule 14 warranted an
interpretation of the said Rule different from that to
be placed upon the second proviso to Article 311 (2).
D
(45) The Court in Challappan's Case, [1976] 1 S.C.R.
783, also erred in the interpretation placed by i t
upon the word "consider" occurring in the above phrase
in the said rule 14. The view taken by the Court in
that case that a consideration of the circumstances of
E the case cannot be unilateral but llllst be after
hearing the delinquent civil servant would render this
part of the said Rule 14 unconstitutional as restrict-
ing the full exclusionary operation of the second
proviso to Article 311 (2).

F ( 46) The word "consider" in its ordinary and natural
sense is not capable of the meaning assingned to it in
Challappan's Case., [1976] 1 s.c.R. 783.

(47) The consideration of the circumstances under the
said Rule 14 must, therefore, be ex parte and without
G affording to the concerned civ~l servant an
opportunity of being heard.

( 48) The decision in Challappan 's Case, [1976] 1
S.C.R. 783, never held the field for the judgment in
•
that case was delivered on September 15, 1975, it was
H
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [MADON, J.] 815

reported in [1976] l ·s.c.R. at page 783ff., and hardly
A
was that case reported, then in the next group of
appeals in which the same question was raised the
matter was referred to a larger Bench by an order made
on November 18, 1976, in view of the earlier decision
of another three-Judge Bench in M. Gopala Krislma
Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh. [1968] l s.c.R. 355.
B
The correctness of·Cballappan's Case, [1976] l s.c.R.
783, was, therefore, doubted from the very beginning.

Vlll. Ezecutive Instructions

(49) Executive Instructions stand on a lower footing
than a,· statutory rule. Executive instructions which
c
provide that in a case where the second proviso to
Article. 311 (2) applies, any safeguard excluded by
that proviso would be available to a civil servant
would,only be directory and not mandatory.
D
IX. The Scope of the Second Proviso

(50) The three clauses of the second proviso to
Article 311 are not intended to be applied in normal
and ordinary situations. The secOnd proviso is an
exception to the normal rule and before any of the
three clauses of that proviso is applied to the case
E
of a civil servant, the conditions laid down in that
clause 111USt be satisfied.

(51) Where a situation envisaged in one of the clauses
of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) exists, it is
not mandatory that the punishment of dismissal,
F
removal or reduction in rank should be imposed upon a
civil servant. The disciplinary atuhority will first
have to decide what punislunent is warranted by the
facts and circlDllBtances of the case. Such considera-
tion would, however, be ex parte and without hearing
the concerned· civil servant. If the disciplinary
G
authority comes to the conclusion that the plmishment
which is called for is that of dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank, it must dispense with the inquiry
and then decide for its elf which of the aforesaid
three penalties should be imposed.
H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A x. Clause (a) of ~ Second Proviso
(52) In a case whete clause (a) of the second proviso
to Article 311 (2) applies the disciplinary authority
is to take the conviction of the concerned civil
servant as sufficient proof of misconduct on his part.
B It has thereafter to decide whether the conduct which
had led to the civil servant's conviction on a
criminal charge was such as to warrant the imposition
of a penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be.
For this purpose it llllSt persue the judgment of the
criminal Court and take into conaideration all the
facts and circumstances of ·the case and the various
c factors set out in a.allappan'a Case, [1976] 1 s.c.R.
783, suCb as, the· entire conduct of the civil servant,
the gravity of the offence committed by him, the
impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the
administration, whether the offence for which he was
convicted was of a technical or trivial nature, and
the extenuating circumstances, if any, present in the
D case. This, however, has to be done by the disciplin-
ary authority ~ parte and without hearing the con-
cerned civil servant.

(53) The penalty imposed upon the civil servant should
not be arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all
E proportion to the offence cOlllllitted or one not
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case.

(54) Where a civil servant goes to the office of his
superior office whom he believes to be responsible for
stopping his increment and hits him on the head with
F an iron rod, so that the superior officer falls down
with a bleeding head, and the delinquent civil servant
is tried and convi~ted under section 332 of the. Indian
Penal Code but th~ Magistrate, instead of sentencing
him to imprisonment, applies to him the provisions of
section 4 of the Ptobation of Offendets Act, 1958 and
G after such conviction the d!.sciplinary authority,
taking the above facts into consideration, by way of
punishment compul~orily retires the delinquent civil
servant under clarlse (i) of section 19 of the Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965, it cannot be said that the punishment
H inflicted upon the'
civil servant was excessive or
arbitrary. I
I
!
5A'IYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I. (MADON, J.] 817

XI. Clause (b) of the Second Proviso A

(55) There are two conditions precedent which urust be
satisfied before clause (b) of the second proviso to
Article 311 (2) can be applied. These conditions are: '

(i) there must exist a situation which makes . the B
holding of an inquiry contemplated by Article 311 (2)
not reasonably practicable, and

(ii) the disciplinary authority should record in
writing its reason for its satisfaction that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. C

(56) Whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or
not must be judged in the context of whether it was
reasonably practicable to do so.

(57) It is not a total or absolute impracticability D

which is required by clause (b) of the second proviso.
What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry
is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man
taking a reasonable view of the prevailing siuation.

(58) The reasonable practicability of holding an E
inquiry is a matter of assessment to be ·made by the
disciplinary authority and must be judged in the light
of the circumstances then prevailing. The disciplinary
authority is generally on the spot and knows what is
happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is
the best judge of the prevailing situation that clause
(3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the discip F

linary authority on this question final.

(59) It is not possible to enumerate the cases in
which it would not be. reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry.
G

Illustrative cases would be -

(a:) where a civil servant, particularly through or
together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens
or intimidates witnesses who are going to give
evidence A�Ainst him with fear of repr1eill ae to ·

H
prevent them from doing so, or
818 SU! : ..clE COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A (b) where the civil servant by himself or together
with or through others threatens, intimidates and
terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary autho
rity or members of his family so that he is afraid to
hold the inquiry or direct it to be held, or

{c) where an atmosphere of violence or of general
indiscipline and insubordination prevails, it being
B
immaterial whether the concerned civil servant is or
is not a party to bringing about such a situation. In
all these cases. it must be remembered that numbers
coerce and terrify while an individual may not.

(60) The disciplinary authority is not expected to
c dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or
arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in
order ·to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because
the Department's case against the civil servant is
weak and must fail.

(61) The word "inquiry" in clause {b) of the second
D proviso includes a part .of an inquiry. It is, there
fore, not .necessary that the situation which makes the
holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable
should exist before the inquiry is instituted against
the civil servant. Such a situation can also come into
existence subsequently during the course of the
E inquiry, for instance, after the service of a charge
sheet upon the civil servant or after he has filed his
written statement thereto or even after evidence has
been·led in part.

(62) It will also not be reasonably practicable to

F afford to the civil servant an opportunity of a hear
ing or further hearing, as the case may be, when at
the commencement of the inquiry or pending it, the
civil servant absconds and cannot be served or will
not participate in the inquiry. In such cases, the
matter must proceed ex parte andonthe materials before
G the disciplinary authority.

(63) The recording of the reason for dispensing with
the inquiry is a condition precedent to the applica
tion of clause (b) of the second proviso. This is 11 t
Constitutional obligation and. if such reason is not

H
SA'IYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [!'.ADON, J.] 819

recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the A
inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon
would both be void and unconstitutional. It is, how-
ever, not necessary that the reason should find a
place in the final order but it would be advisable to
record it in the final order in order to avoid an
allegation that the reason was not recorded in writing B
before passing the final order but was subsequently
fabricated.
/
// ( 64) The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need
not contain detailed particulars but it cannot be
vague or just a repetition of' the language of clause C
(b) of the second proviso. ·

(65) It is also not necessary to coinmunicate the
reason for di&pensing with the inquiry to the
concerned civil servant but it would be better to do
so in order to eliminate the posibility of an allega- D
tion being . made that the reason was subsequently
fabricated.

(66) The obligation to record the reason in writing is
provided in clause (b) of the second proviso so that
the superiors of the disciplinary authority may be E
able to judge whether .such authority had exercised its
power under clause (b) properly or not with a view to
judge the performance and capacity of that officer for
the purposes of promotion etc.

(67) 'It is, however, better for the disciplinary
authority to conmrunicate to the concerned civil F
servant its reason for dispensing with the inquiry
because such comnunication.would eliminate the possi-
bility of an allegation being mae that the reason had
been subsequentiy fabricated. It would also enable the
civil servant to approach·the High Court under Article
226 or, in a fit case, the Supreme Court under Article G
.32.

(68) Th~ submission that where a delinquent government
servant so terrorizes the disciplinary authority that
neither that officer nor any other officer stationed
at thiit place is willing to hold the inquiry, ,some
senior officer can be sent from outside to hold the H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

'
A inquiry cannot be 'accepted.
'
This subnission itself
shows that in such a case the holding of an inquiry is
not reasonably practicable. It 'WOuld be illogical to
hold that administrative work carried out by senior
officers should be paralysed just because a delinquent
civil servant either by himself or along with or
through others makes the holding of an inquiry by the
B . designated disciplinary authority or inquiry officer
I
not reasonably practicable.

(69) In a case falling under clasue (b) of the second
proviso it is not necessary that the civil servant
should be placed under suspension until such time as
the situation improves and it becomes possible to hold
c the inquiry because in such cases neither public
interest nor public good requires that salary or
subsistence allowanl:e should be continued to be paid
out of the public exchequer to the concerned cl vil
servant. It would also be difficult to foresee how
long the situation would last and when.normalcy would
return or be restored. In certain cases, the exigen-
D cies of a situatioJ'l would require that prompt action
should be taken and suspending a civil servant "WOuld
not serve the purpose and sometimes not taking prompt
action might result in the trouble spreading and the
situation worsening' and at, times becoming uncontrol-
able. Not taking prompt action msy also be construed
E by the trouble makers as a sign of weakness on the
part of the authorities and thus encourage them to
step up their activities or agitation. Where such
prompt action is ,taken in order to prevent this
happening, there is!an element of deterrence in it but
I
this is an unavoidable and necessary concomitance of
F such an action resulting from a situation which is not
of the creation of the authorities.

(70) The contention that where an inquiry into the
charges against a civil servant is not reasonably
practicable, none the less before dispensing with the
G inquiry there should be a preliminary inquiry into the
question whether the disciplinary inquiry should be
dispensed with or not is illogical and is a contradic-
tion in terms. If an inquiry into the charges against
a civil servant is not reasonable practicable, it

H
SATYAVIR SINGH v, U.o .I. [MADON, J • J 821

stands to reason that an inquiry into the question A
whether· the disciplinary inquiry .should be dispensed
with or not is equally not ressonably practicable.

(71) Where a large group of members of the Central
Industrial Security Force Unit posted at the plant of
the Bokaro Steel Ltd. indulged in acts of insubordina- B
tion, indiscipline, dereliction of duty, abstention
from physical training and parade, taking out
processions, shouting inflamatory slogans, participa-
ting in the 'gherao' of supervisory officers, going on
hunger strike and 'dharna' near the Quarter Guard and
Adminsitrative Building of the Unit, indulging in c
thrests of violence, bOdily harm and other acts of
intimidation to supervisory officers and.loyal members
of the said Unit, and thus created a situation whereby
the normal functioning of the said Unit of the Central
Industrial Security Force was made difficult and
impossible, the disciplinary authority was justified D
in applying clause (b) of the second proviso to those
who were consid~red responsible for such acts. Clasue
(b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) was also
properly applied in the cases of those members of the
Central Industrial Security Force who were considered
responsible for creating a similar situation at E
Hoshangabad.

(72) In cases such as the above, it is not possible to
state in the order of dismissal the particular acts
done by each of the members of the concerned group as
such cases are very nruch like a case under section 149
of the Indian Penal Code. F

(73) In situations such as the one where a large group
acting collectively with the common object of coercing
those in charge of the administration of the Central
Industrial Security Force and the Government to compel
them to grant recoginition to their Association and to G
concede their demands, it is not possible to parti-
cularize in the orders of dismissal the acts of each
• individual member who participated in the commission
of these· acts. The participation of each individual
might be of a greater or lesser degree but the acts of
each individual contributed to the creation of a
situation in which a security fprce itself became a R
security risk.
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A (74) Railway service is a public utility service
within the meaning of clause (a) of section 2 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the proper running
of the railway service is vital to the country.

(75) Where, therefore, the railway employees went on
an illegal all-India strike without complying with the
B provisions of section 22 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, and thereby committed an offence punishable
with imprisonment and fine under section 26 (1) of the
, · said Act and the situation became such that the
railway services were paralysed, loyal workers and
superior officers assaulted and intimidated, the
country held to ransom, and the economy of the country
c and public interest and public good prejudicially
' affected, prompt and iI'!IOOdiate action was called for
·.in order to bring the situation to normal. In these
, circumstances, it cannot be said that an inquiry was
reasonably practicable or that clause (b) of the
second proviso was not properlyapplied. The fact that
the railway employees may have gone on strike with the
D
. object of forcing the Government to meet their demands
is not relevant because their demands were for their
private gain and in their private interest and the
railway employees were not entitled in,seekiug to have
their demands conceded to cause untold hardship to th~
public and prejudicially affect public good and public
E interest and the good and interest of the nation.

(76) The quantum and extent of the penalty to be
imposed in cases si.ich as the above would depend upon
the gravity of the situation at a particular centre
and the extent to which the acts said to be committed
F by particular civil servants, even though not serious
in themselves, in conjunction with acts committed by
others contributed to bringing about the situation.
The fact, therefore, that at a particular centre
certain civil servants were dismissed from service
· while at some other centres they were only removed
G from service does not mean that the penalties were
arbitrarily imposed.

XII. Clause ( c) of the Second Proviso

(77) ·The expression "security of the State" in clause
H
(c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) does not
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.I. [MADCN, J • l 823

mean security of the entire country or a whole State
but includes security of a part of a State. A

(78) Security of the State cannot be confined to an
armed rebellion or revolt for there are various ways
in which the security of the State can be affected
such as by State secrets or information relating to
defence production or similar matters being passed on li
to other countries, whether inimical or not to India,
or by secret links with terrorists.

(79) The way in which the security of the State is ·
affected may be either open or clandestine.
c
(80) One of the obvious acts which would affec.t the
security of the State would be disaffection in the
armed forces or paramilitary forces or the police
force. The importance of the proper discharge of the
duties by members of these Forces and the maintenance
of discipline among them fs emphasized in Article 33 D
of the Constitution.

(81) Disaffection in any armed force or para-military
force or police force is likely to spread because
dissatisfied and disaffected ·member of such a Force
spread dissatisfaction and disaffection among other
members of the · Force and thus induce them not to E
discharge their duties properly and to commit acts of
indiscipline, insubordination or disobedience to the
orders of their superiors. Such a situation cannot be
a matter affecting only law and order or Pubic order
but is a matter vitally affecting the security of the
State. F

(82) The interest of the security of the State can be
affected by actual acts or even ·by the likelihood of
such acts taking plsce.

(83) In·an Inquiry into acts affecting the interest of G
the security of the State, several matters not fit or
proper to be made public, including the source of
information involving a civil servant in such acts,
would be disclosed and thus in· such cases an inquiry
into sets prejudicial to the interest of the security
H
824 SUPREME COUIIT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
of the State would as much prejudice the interest of
the security of the State as those acts themselves
would.

(84) The condition for the application of clause (c)
of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is the satis-
I! faction of the President or the Governor, as the case
may be, that it is not expedient in the interest of
the security of the State to hold a disciplinary
inquiry.

(85) Such satisfaction. is not required to be that of
the President or the Governor personally but of the
c President or the Governor, as the case may be, acting
in the Constitutional sense.

(86) ''Expedient" means "advantageous, fit, proper,
suitable or politic". Where, therefore, the President
or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that
it will not be advantageous or fit or proper or suit-
D
able or politic in the interest of the security of the
State to hold an inquiry, he would be entitled to
dispense with it under clause (c) of the second
proviso.

(87) Under clause (c) of the second proviso the satis-
faction reached by the President or the Governor, as
the case may be, must necessarily be a subjective
satisfaction because expediency involves matters of
policy.

(88) Satisfaction of the President or the Governor
F under clause (c) of the second proviso may be arrived
at as a result of secret information received by the
Government about the brewing danger to the security of
the State and like matters. There are other factors
wh:tch are also required to be considered, weighed and
balanced in order to reach the requisite satisfaction
G whether holding an inquiry would be expedient or not.
If the requisite satisfaction has been reached as a
result of secret information received by the Govern-
ment, making known such information may very often
result in disclosure of the source of such information
and once known the particular source from which the
Ii information was received would no more be available to
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.Q.I. [MADON, J.] 825

the Government. The reason for the satisfaction A
reached by the President or the Governor under clause
(c) of the second proviso cannot, therefore, be
required to be recorded in the order of dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank nor can it be made
public.
B
( 89) The police are the guardians of law and order.
They stand guard· at the border between the green
valleys of law and order and the rough and hilly
terrain of lawlessness and public disorder, and . if
these guards turn law-breakers and create violent
public disorder and incite others to do the same, one C
can only exclaim with Juvenal, ·~ custodietilllsoa I
CustodeaY- -

''Who is to guard the guards themselves?" (Satires, VI,
347). In such a situation prompt and urgent action
becomes necessary and the holding of an inquiry into D
the conduct of each .individual member of the police
force would not be expedient in the interest of the
security of th~ State.

(90) When, therefore, a number of members of the
Madhya Pradesh District Police Force and the Madhya
Pradesh Special Armed Force, in order to obtain the E
release on bail of two of. their colleagues who had
been refused bail and remanded into judicial custody
because of an incident which took place at the annual
Mela held at Gwalior in which one man was burnt alive,
indulged in violent demonstrations and i;ioted at the
Mela ground, attacked the police station at the Mela F
ground, ransacked it and forced the wireless operator
to close down the wireless set and the situation
became so dangerous that senior district and police
officers had to approach the Judicial Magistrate at
night to get the two arrested constables released on
bail and, after discussion at a Cabinet meeting, a G
decision was taken and the advice of the Council of
Ministers was tendered to the Governor of Madhya
Pradesh who accepted it and issued orders of dismissal
of these persons by applying clause (c) of the second
proviso to them, it cannot be said that the provisions
of the said clause ( c) were not properly applied. II

'
826 , SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
(91) Similarly, when after these members of the Madhya
Pradesh Dietrict Police Force and the Madhya Pradesh
· ·Special Armed Force were dlsmissed, some ohter members
of these Forces began carrying on an active propaganda
against the Government, visiting various places in the
State of Madhya Pradesh, holding secret meetings,
distributing leaflets and inciting the constabulary in
ll
these places to rise against the administration as a
body in protest against the action taken by the
Government and, on such information being received,
• they were also dismissed by applying clasue (c) of the
second proviso to them, it cannot be said that the
said clause (c) was not properly applied.
c XIII. Remedies available to a Civil Servant

(92) A civil servant who has been dismissed, removed
,or reduced in rank by applying to his case one of the
clauses of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) or an
analogous service rule has two remedies available to
him. These remedies are:
D

(i) the appropriate departmental remedy provided for
rin the relevant service rules, and

(li) if still dissatisfied, invoking the court's power
of judicial revieY.

,XIV. Departmental Remedies

(93) Service rules generally provide for departmental
remedies by way of an appeal, revision and review in
the case of disciplinary action taken against a civil
servant.

(94) Sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of the first
proviso to Rule 25 (1) of the Railway Servants
(Discipline and. Appeal) Rules, 1968, inter a1ia
G
provides that where an inquiry has not been held, the
revising authority shall itself hold such inquiry or
direct such inquiry to be held, subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 14 of the said Rules which is analogous
to the second proviso to Article 311 (2). Thus, under
the said Rules a railway servant has a right to demand
H
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.Q.I. [MADON, J.] 827

in rev1s1on an inquiry into the charges against him A
subject to a situation envisaged in l<ule 14 of the
said Rules not prevailing at that time.

(95) Although a provision similar to sub-clause (ii)
of clause (c) of the first proviso to Rule 25 (1) of
the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, B
196ti, does not exist in the rules relating to appeals
in the said Rules, having regard to the factors set
' out in Rule 22 (2) of the said Rules which are to be
considered by the appellate authority in deciding an
appeal, a provision similar to the said sub-clause
(ii) of clause (c) of the first proviso to Rule 25 (1) c
should be read and imported into the provisions
rel~ting to appeals in the said Rules.

\ 9b) Where service rules do not contain a provision
similar to sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of the first
proviso to Rule 25 ( 1) of the Hallway Servants D
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, having regard to
the factors to be taken into accour,t by the appellate
authority in deciding an appeal, a provision similar
: to the said sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) of Rule 25
(1) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal)
Hules, 1968, should be read and imported into the
provisions relating to appeals and.revision contained E
in such service rules. This would, however, be subject
to a situation envisaged by . the second proviso to
Article 311 (2) not existing at the time of the
hearing of the appeal or revision.

(97) Even in a case where at the time of the hearing F
of the appeal or revision,· as the case may be, a
situation envisaged by the second proviso to Article
311 (2) exists, as the civil servant, if dismissed or
removed, is not.continuing in service and if reduced
in rank·, is continuing in service with the reduced
rank, the hearing of the appeal or revision, as the G
case may be, should be postponed for a reasonable
length of time to enable the situation to return to
normal.

(98) An order imposing penalty passed by the President
or the Governor, as the case may be, cannot be H
challenged in a departmental appeal or revision.
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A (99) A civil servant who has been dismissed or removed
from service or reduced in rank by applying to his
case one of the clauses of the second proviso of
Article 311 (2) or of an analogous service rule has,
therefore, the right in a departmental appeal or
revision to a full and complete inquiry into the
B allegations made against him subject to a situation
envisaged in the second proviso to Article 311 (2) not
existing at the time of the hearing of the appeal or
revision application. Even in a case where such a
situation exists, he has the right to have the hearing
of the appeal or revision application postponed for a
reasonable length of time for the situation to become
c normal.

(100) In an appeal, revision or review by a civil
servant who has been dismissed or removed from service
or reduced in rank by applying to his case clause (a)
of the second proviso or an analogous service rule, it
is not open to the civil servant to contend that he
D was wrongly convicted by the criminal Court. He can,
however, contend that the penalty imposed upon him is
too severe or excessive -or was one not warranted by
the facts and circumstances of the case. If he is in
fact nqt the civil servant who was actually convicted
on a criminal charge, he can contend in appeal,
E revision or review against such order of penalty that
it was a case of mistaken identity.

(101) A civil servant who has been dismissed or remov-
ed from service or reduced in rank by applying to his
case clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311
F (2) or an analogous service rule can claim in appeal
or revision that an inquiry ~hould be held with
respect to the charges on which such penalty has been
imposed upon him unless a situation envisaged by the
second proviso is prevailing at the hearing of the
appeal or revision application. Even in such a case
G the hearing of the appeal or revision application
should be postponed for a reasonable length of time
for the situation to return to normal.

(102) In a case where a civil servant has been
dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank
Ii .bY applying clause (b) of the second proviso or an
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.l., [MADON, J.] 829

analogous service rule to him, by reason .of clause (3) A
of Article 311 it is not open to him to contend in
appeal, revision or review that the inquiry was
~ongly dispensed with.

( 103) In a case ~ere a civil servant has been
dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank B
by applying clause (c) of the second proviso or an
analogous service rule to him, no appeal or revision
will lie if the order of penalty was passed by the
President or the Governor. If, hwever, the inquiry
has been dispensed with by the President or the
Governor and the order of penalty has been passed by c
the disciplinary authority (a position envisaged by
clause (iii) of Rule 14 of the Railway Servants
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, and clause
(iii) of Rule 19 of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965), a
departmental appeal or revision will lie. In such an D
appeal or revision, the civil servant can ask for an
inquiry to be· held into his alleged conduct unless at
the time of the hearing of the appeal or revision a
situation envisaged by the second proviso to Article
311 (2) is prevailing. Even in such a situation the
hearing of the appeal or revision application should E
be postponed ,for a reasonable length of time for the
situation to become normal. The civil servant, how-
ever, cannot contend in such appecll or revision that
the inquiry was ~ongly dispensed with by the
President or the Governor •
. I

XV. Judicial Review F

(104) Where a clause of the second proviso to Article
311 (2) or an analogous service rule is applied on an
extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to
the situation envisaged in such clause or rule, the
, action of the disciplinary authority in applying that G
clause or rule would be mala fide and, therefore, bad
in law and the Court in exercise of its power of
judicial review would strike down both the order
dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty
following thereupon.

H
l!30 SUPREME COUR:r REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R. ,

A (105) Where a civil servant has . been dismissed or
removed from service or reduced in rank by applying
clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) or
an analogous service rule and he invokes the Court's
power of judicial review, if the Court finds that the
penalty imposed by the impugned order is arbitrary or
B grossly excessive or out of all porportion to the
offence comnitted or was not warranted by the facts
and circumstances of the case or the requirements of
the particular government service to which the
concerned civil servant belonged, the Court will
1 strike down the impugned order. In such a case, it is,
however, not necessary that the Court should always
c order reinstatement. ·The Court can instead substitute
a penalty which in its opinion would be just and
proper in the circumstances of the case. If, however,
the Court finds that he was not in fact the civil
ser'1ant who was convicted, it will strike down the
impugned order of penalty and order his reinstatement.

D ( 106) In the case of a civil servant who has been
dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank
by applying clause (b) of the second proviso to
Article 311 (2) or an analogous service rule, the High
Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32
will interfere on grounds well-established in law for
E the exercise of its power of judicial review in
I
matters where administrative discretion is exercised. ~
(1U7) The finality given by clause (3) of Article 311
to the disciplinary authority's decision that it was
not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry is not
•
F binding upon the court and the court would consider
whether clause (b) of the second proviso or an
analogous service rule had been properly applied or
not.

(108) In examining the relevancy of the reasons given
G for dispensing · with the inquiry, the Court will
•
·consider the circumstances which, accroding to the
disciplinary authority, made it C:lllle·to the conclusion
that it ·was not reasonably practicable to hold the
inquiry. If the court finds that the reasons are
irrelevant, the order dispensing with the inquiry and
H the order of penalty following upon it would be void
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.r. [MADON, J.] 831

and the Court will strike them down. In considering A
the relevancy of the reasons given by the disciplinary
authority, the Court will not, however, sit in judg-
ment over the reasons like a Court of first appeal in
order to decide whether or not the reasons are germane
to clause ( b) of the second proviso or an analogous
service rule. The Court must put itself in the place B
of the disciplinary authority and consider what in the
then prevailing situation a rasonable man acting in a
reasonable manner would have done. It will judge the
matter in the light of the then prevailing situation
and not as if the disciplinary authority was deciding
the question whether the inquiry should be dispenaed c
with or not in the cool and detached atmosphere of a
Court-room, ,removed in time from the situation in
question. Where two views are posssible, the Court
will decline to interfere.

(109) Where it is alleged that clause (b) of the D
second proviso or an analogous service rule was
applied mala fide, the Court will examine the charge
of mala ffdes. A mere bare allegation Of mala fides
without any particulars .of mala fides will not:, how-
ever, amount to a plea of mala fides and requires to
be ignored.
E
(110) If the reasons for dispenaing with the inquiry
are not c~cated to the concerned civil servant
and the matter comes to Court, the Court can direct
the reasons to be prc:iduced arid furnished to the civil
servant and if still not produced, a presumption
should be drawn that the reasons were not recorded in F
i
1
writing and the impugned order would then stand
invalidated. 'Such presumption can, however, be
rebutted by a satisfactory explanation for the non-
production of the written reasons.

(lll) Where a civil servant is dismissed or removed G
from service or reduced in rank by applying clause (c)
of the second proviso or an analogous service rule to
his case, the· satisfaction of the President or the
Governor that it is not expedient in the interest of
the security of the ~tate to hold an inquiry being a
subjective satisfaction would not be a fit matter for H.
judicial review.
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 S.C.R.

A (112) It is not necessary for the Cou~t to decide the
question whether the satisfaction of the President or
the Governor has been reached mala fide, or is based on
wholly extraneous or irrelevant grow'ld.s in a case
where all the materials including the adi vce of the
Council of Ministers have been produced and .such
B materials show that the satisfaction of the President
or the Governor was neither reached mala. fide nor was
it based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground.

(113) By reason of the express provision of Article 74
(2) and Article 163 (3) of the C'.onstitution the
question whether any, and if so what,. advice was
c tendered by the Ministers to the Presldent or the
Governor, as the case may be, cannot be ii.nquired into
by any Court.
'·-
(114) Whether the Court should order production of the
materials upon which the advice of the Council of
Ministers to the Prsident or the Governor, as the case
D may be, was based in order to determine whether the
satisfaction of the President or · the Governor was
arrived at mal.a fide or was based on wholly extraneous
or irrelevant grounds would depend upon whether the
documents fall within the class of privileged docu-
ments and whether in respect of them privilege has
E been properly claimed or not.

In Tulsiraa Patel's Case [1985j 3 s.c.c. 398, where appeals
filed by certain dismissed members of the Central lnduatrial
Security Force had not been disposed of by the appellate autho-
rity, the majority judgment directed the· appellate authority to
F dispose of such appeals as expeditioualy as possible· In those
matters where civil servants had been dismissed or removed from
service by applying to their cases clauae (b) of the second
proviso to Article 311 (2) or an analogous service rule, the
Court gave such civil servants time to file appeals and directed
the concerned appellate authority to condone, in the exercise of
G its power under the relevant service rule, the delay in filing
such appeals.

It is important to note that the majority judgment in
Tulsiraa Patel's Case [1985] 3 s.c.c. 398, is more beneficial to
civil servants .and confers greater rights upon them than
Ii a.allappan's Case did. According to Qvillappan's Case a civil
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.I. [MADON, J.] 833

servant to whom a service rule analogous to the second proviso to A
Article 311 (2) is sought to be applied has only the right to be
heard with respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon
him. The majority judgment in 'l.\Jlsiram PAi:el. 's Case [1985] 3
s.c.c. 398, has, however, conferred upon the civil servants who
have been dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank bY
applying the second proviso to Article 311 (2) or an analogous B
service rule ·the right to a full and complete inquiry in an
appeal or revision unless a situation envisaged bY the second
proviso is prevailing at the time of the hearing of the appeal or
revision application. Even in such a case under the majority
judgment the hearing of the appeal or revision application is to
be postponed for a reasonable length of time for the situation to C
become normal.

The Facts of the Two Civil Appeals

Having seen what.· was decided in 'l.\Jlsiram PAtel 's Case,
[1985] 3 s.c.c. 398, we now turn to the facts of the i:wo Civil D
Appeals before us. The facts of both these Appeals are com11•:m.
All the Appellants were employees of the Research and analysis
Wing ("RAW", in short). Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.

In 1904 an Intelligence Bureau had been formed which was
reorganized in 1948. Originally the Intelligence Bureau was
concerned both with domestic and international intelligence. In E
1968, a branch of the Intelligence Bureau was set up as a
separate department and the Intelligence Bur~au since that time
was concerned with only domestic affairs While the RAW was
concerned with international affairs .and under-cover .a~tiviti~s
pertaining to national security. Certain cadres of employees of
the RAW formed an Association under the riame of "The Cabinet .F
Sectetariat (Research and Analysis Wing) Employees Ass6ciation
(Regd.)" The said Association submitted a charter of demands. We
are not concerned in these Appeals with the reasonableness or
otherwise of the said demands.

Earlier, the different branches and departments of the RAW G
in New Delhi were scattered in several buiidings. Ultimately, a
new building was constructed for the RAW at Lodhi Road. In the
said building the Counter Intelligence Section ("CIS", for short)
was housed. The other departments were housed in the South Bolek
at R.K. PUram. After the CIS was shifted to the building at Lodhi
Road, Strict security mea8ures were introduced and the employees, H
when going from one floor to the other, had to show their
834 SUPKEME COUKT REPORTS [19B5j SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A identity cards. This was resented by the employees and they
demanded the withdrawal of this regulation and insisted that the
identification check should be made only at the time of entering
the building. This demand can only be characterized as wholly
unreasonable. The RAW is a security and intelligence section the
Government of India dealing with many sensitive matters ·affecting
B national. security and relations with other countries including
counter intelligence. The basic rule of intelligence work is that
no person engaged in it should know more than what he needs to
know. It is for this reason that when an outside agent is
employed for espionage, care is taken to see that he does not
know who his real employers are but knows only the name of his
contact maa which name is generally an ali.as. Employees of an
c intelligence service cannot, 'therefore, be the best .judges of
what security measures should be adopted to prevent secrets from
leaking out.
'
To return to our narrative, in the forenoon on November 27,
198U, a· number of stat£ members collected in t~e galleries
leading .to the ClS rooms, protesting against the said security
D regulation and demanding its immediate· withdrawal. All attempts
to pacify them proved unsuccessful. More and more employees
Joined them and they turned aggressive, breaking into the various·
roomS of the CIS unit. Several persons forced their ·entry into
the room of the Director ( CIS) and forced him as also the
Assistant Director and the Secruity Field Officer who were in the
E room to stand in a corner·and did not ·allow them to move from the
spot but kept them as hostages in order to have their demand
conceded. The employees who had gathered there shouted slogans
against the organization and its officers. These slogans were
obscene, abusive, threa"tening, and personal in nature. All
attempts made by Senior officers to pacify them proved unsuccess-
ful and the employees made it clear that they would not let the
said . three officers go unless the Director of the Counter
Intelligence Section anaounced the withdrawal of the said
security regulation. This st"ate of affairs continued until late
in the evening. Ultimately, the loCal police were sent for and
about 8.30 p.m. the local police entered the premises and went to
G the galleries in front of the CIS branch. Some of the agitators
who were in the gallery escaped. Those inside the said room
closed the door to prevent the police party from entering it ~ut
the police forced open. the door and ·rescued the said three
Officers. Thirty-one agitators who were fowid inside the room
were arrested and charged under section 342, 506, 353, 186, 332
and 333 of the Indian Penal Code and section 7 of the Criminal
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.I. [MADON, J.] 835

A
Law Amendment Act, 1952. They were subsequently released on bail
by the Judicial Magistrate. These arrested employees were
suspended under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965, as a criminal case against them was under
investigation.
B

The next day, namely, on November 28, 1980, the agitation
continued and many employees did not perform their duties.
Instead, they collected inside the building and in the premises
in groups stopping work in many branches. A large number of them
went rung shouting slogans and made speeches in the corridors of
the office. On November 29, 1980, a letter was issued by the said
c
Association demanding the immediate withdrawal of the criminal
cases against the said employees as also of the said security
regulation. The letter stated that unless these demands were met,
the employees would go on a pen-down strike with immediate
effect.' Thereupon, orders of suspension were issued ,against those
D
who were taking a leading, active and aggressive role in the
agitation and indulging in these activities. The said suspension
orders were issued from the 1st December' 1980 onwards but the
pen-down strike continued spread to other offices of the RAW in
New Delhi as well as in different , parts of India including
Lucknow and Jammu. Daily the situation worsened. There was
complete insubordination and total breakdown of discipline. The
E
atmosphere was charged with tension and there did not seem any
hope of the situation becoming normal. Ultimately, the seven
Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1982 and the sole Appellant
in Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982 were dismissed by orders dated
December 6, 1980, without holding any inquiry by applying to them
clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) read with
F
Rule 19 of the said Rules. Thereupon a writ petition was filed in
the Delhi High Court. At the date of the filing of the said writ
petition only Appellants Nos. 1 to 3 in Civil Appeal No. 242 of
1982 had been served with the orders of dismissal, while the
remaining Appellants and Respondents Nos. 4 to 44 in Civil Appeal
No. 242 of 1982 joined in the said writ petition as co-peti-
G
tioners together with the Cabinet Secretariat (Research and
Analysis Wing) Employees Association (Regd.), contending the
smimilar action of dismissal was being apprehended by them.
Pending the said writ petition the orders of dismissal were also
served upon the remaining Appellants. Doring the course' of the
hearing of the said writ petition a statement was made to the , H
High Court on behalf of the Union, of India that the other
petitioners would not be dismissed without holding a regular
836 SUPill:l'lli COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

~ inquiry. The said writ petition, therefore, proceeded only so far
as the Appellants in these two Appeals were concerned. A Division
Bench of the said High Court dismissed the writ petition by its
judgment and order dated September 25, 1981. It is against this
Judgment and order of the said High Court, that these two Appeals
by Special Leave have been preferred.

'llle Jmpigoed Orders of Dhwi ssal

All the eight impugned orders of dismissal were in identical
terms and i t will, therefore, be sufficient to reproduce the
order of dismissal passed against the First Appellant in Civil
Appeal No. 242 of 1982. The said order reads as follows:-
c
"No. 3/AU1N/80-6486(N)
WWI<NMENT OF lNDlA
Cabinet Secretariat,
Room No. 8-B, South 8lock.

New Delhi, the 6th Dec, 1980.
D
ORDKR

Whereas a large number of employees of the Cabinet
Secretariat (R & AW) located at Delhi" have for some
time past been indulging in various acts of mis-
E conduct, indiscipline, intimidation and insubordina-
tion, such as abstaining from work, wilful neglect of
the duties assigned to them and disobedience of lawful
instructions and orders of the official superiors;

and whereas the said employees are also regularly
holding meetings and demonstrations unauthorisedly and
in violation of specific orders, within the office
premises and its precincts;

and Whereas the said employees have resorted to
coercion, intimidation and incitement of other fellow
employees which has a serious demoralizing effect on
the members of the organization, and whereas such
conduct of the said employees is unbecoming of a
Government servant and is ill gross violation of the
Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964;

If and whereas· Shri Satyavir Singh, .Field Assistant, is
one of the said employees actively participating in
such activities;
SATYAVIR SINGH v. u.o.r. '[MADON, J • l 837

and whereas due to the practice of coercion, intimi- A
dation and such like threats and postures adopted by
the said employees the atmosphere is so tense and
abnormal that no witness will c?i-operate with any
proceedings in accordance .with the provisions of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and
AP,peal) Rules, 1965; B

and whereas I am satisfied that the circumstances are
such that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a
regular enquiry as contemplated by the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1965; c
and whereas on a consideration of the facts and
circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the
penalty of dismissal from service should be imposed on
Shri Satyavir Singh, Field Assistant; ·
D
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers under -the
proviso (b) of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the
Constitution read with rule 19 of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1965, I as_the appointing authority do hereby dismiss
Shri Satyavir Singh from the post of Field Assistnat
in the R & AW with effect from the forenoon of E
December 6, 1980.
Sd/-
6.12.80.
(H.N. KAK)
Joint Director
Contentions F

Though serveral ·contentions were raised in the said writ ·
petition, in view of the judgment in Msiram Patel's Case
[1985] 3 s.c.c. 398, the only .contention taken at the hearing of
these two Appeals was that the s·a1d orders of dismissal were
passed mala fide and the reasons given therein for dispensing G
with the inquiry were noi: true and that an inquiry wa.s reasonably
practicable. Several points were urged in support of this
contention.

The first . pol.nt was that the orders of suspension showed
that a disciplinary inquiry was in fact contemplated and, if so., H
nothing had happened between the date of the orders of suspension
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS tl985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
atld the date of the orders of dismissal to come to the conclusion
that the inqyiry was not reasonably practicable. (Each order or
suspension stated that the concerned employee was being suspended
in the exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 10 (1) of tl1e
said Hules because a disciplinary proceeding against him under
Kille 14 of the said Rules "Was contempiated.) Clause (a) of Rule
B lU (l) confers power upon a disciplinary authority to place the
government servant under suspension where a disciplinary proce~d
ing against him is contemplated or is pending. Rule 14 prescribes
the procedure for imposing maJor penalties. Upe of. the major
penalties set out in Rule 11 is the penalty or dismissal from
service, lt is thus clear that at the date of the orders ot
suspension disciplinary proceedings against the Appellants was in
c contemplation. This however, does not mean that the situation
will continue to be the same and that at no time thereafter will
the holding of the inquiry become "not reasonably practicable".
As pointed out in Tulsir- Patel's Case [1985] 3 s.c.c. 398, it
is not necessary that a situation which makes the holding of an
inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist .before the
disciplinary inquiry is initiated, because a situation which
D
renders the holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable can
come into being even during the course of an inquiry. The
affidavits filed in the High Court clearly show that the
situation had so changed after the orders of suspension were
issued against the appellants that it was not reasonably practi-
cable to hold any inquiry against the Appellants. The all-India
E
pen-down strike was spreading. More and more centres in India
were joining in the said strike. The postition was fast
deteriorating. Employees were being instigated into further acts
of indiscipline and insubordination and loyal employees and
senior officers were being intimidated. Meetings and demonstra-
tions were regularly. being held within the office premises and
F
their precincts and there was no possibility of any witness
coming forward. to give ·evidence against the Appellants who were
said to have taken a~leading part in this agitation. It is also
pertinent to note that when the first batch of dismissal orders
was served uvon some of the Appt!llants .on l.Jecember 8, 1980, the
pen-down strike was called otf on December Y, 198U. In such a
G
situation as was then prevailing, prompt and urgent action was
required to bring the situation under control. As pointed out in
Tulsiraa Patel's Case, t1985] 3 s.c.c. 398, sometimes not taking
prompt action may result ·in the trouble "spreading and the
situation worsening and at times becoming uncontrolable, and may
at times be also construed by the trouble-makers and agitators as
H
a sign of weakness on the part of the authorities and encourage
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O. I. [MADON, J.] 839

them to step up the tempo of their activities or agitation. The A
affidavits filed in the High Court clearly show that this is
exactly what happened when the suspension orders were issued and
that what was required was prompt and urgent action agianst those
who were considered to be the ring leaders and that once such
action was taken the situation improved and started becoming
normal. B

The next point which was urged was that while eight
employees were dismissed for their part in the agitation which
took place in Delhi, in respect of the agitation which took place
in the Lucknow office of the RAW only two employees of that
off ice were dismissed and, therefore, there was no application of c
mind on the part of the disciplinary authority. It is very
difficult to understand this argument. We do now how what
precisely the situation at Lucknow was and how many employees
were actively engaged in leading the agitation, and the fact that
it was thought fit to dismiss only two employees of the Lucknow
Office cannot lead to the conclusion that the Appellants were D
wrongly dismissed without any application of mind.

The next point which was .'.lrged was that even on December 6,
1980, a suspension order was issued against one of the employees·
and that on December 9, 1980, suspension orders were issued
against two other employees, and that the issuance of these
suspension orders on the 6th and 9th December show what the E
holding of the inquiry was reasonably practicable. As the charge-
sheets issUed against these three employees show, these employees
were working in the R.K. PUram Offiee and are not alleged to have
taken any leading part in the agitation or in bringing about the
atmosphere of violence, insubordination and indiscipline.
F
The next point was that it was not alleged by the author-
ities that anyone was physically injured in the agitation. This
is another. argument which is difficult to understand. As held in
Tulsiram Patel's case, it will not be reasonably practicable to.
hold an inquiry where an ·atmosphere of violence or ·of general
indiscipline and insubordination prevails. It is, therefore, not G
necessary that the disciplinary authority should wait until
incideats take place in which physical injury is caused to others
before dispensing with the inquiry.

It was next submitted that after the suspension orders, the
appellants were prohibited from. visiting any of the Cabinet H
Secretariat Offices except fol- the purpose of collecting their
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A they could not have held any meeting or demonstration inside the
office premises. There is no substance in this submission.· The
admitted position is that the Appellants were regularly coming to
the officce building and talking with other employees over the
wall and at the gate twice a day at 11.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m. and
were making inflamatory speeches and holding out threats.
B
The point which was next urged in support of the contention
that the impugned orders were passed mala fide was that even
though co-workers may not have been available as witnesses, there
were policemen and police officers posted inside and outside the
building and they were available to give evidence and that
superior officers were also available to give evidence. The
C crucial and material evidence against the Appellants would be
that of their co-workers for these co-workers were directly
concerned in and were eye-witnesses to the various incidents.
Where the disciplinary authority feels that crucial and material
evidence will not be available in an inquiry because the
witnesses who could give such evidence are intimidated and would
not come forward and the only evidence which would be available,
D namely, in· this case, of policemen, police officers and senior
officers, would .only be peripheral and cannot relate to all the
·charges and that, therefore, leading only such evidence may be
assailed in a court of law as being a mere farce of an inquiry
and a deliberate attempt to keep back material witnesses, the
disciplinary authority would be justified in coming to the
E conclusion that an inquiry is not reasonably practicable. The
affidavit filed by the Joint Director, Research and Analysis
Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, llari Narain Kak, who haci passed the
impugned orders sets out in detail the various acts of intimida-
tion, violence and incitement committed by each of the
Appellants. Copies of the written reasons for dispensing with the
F inquiry in the case of the Appellants have also been annexed to
the said affidavit. It is clear from a perusal of the said
affidavit. It is clear from a perusal of the said affidavit and
its annexures that the police officers, policemen and senior
officers could not have possibly given evidence with respect to
all these acts. The said affidavit further states that the senior
G officers of the RAW in the said charter of demands submitted by
the said Association and the evidence of senior officers would
bave been attacked as being biased and partisan. Ther!' is thus no
substance in this point also.

The last point which was urged that D.P. Vohra, th~
Ii Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982 was posted at Jammu and
could not, therefore, have taken any active part in the agitatior
SATYAVIR SINGH v. U.O.I. [MADON, J.] 841

which took place in Delhi. This .submission is completely bt..Lied A
by the said affidavit of Hari Narain Kak. The said affidavit
shows that during the relevant time Vohra had taken leave for
personal reasons and have come down to Delhi and had played on
active role in the said agitation. He made inflamatory speeches
on the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th of December, 1980 and had instigated
the other employees to continue the agitation and intimidated B
those who had not joined in the agitation .into doing so. In a
speech made by him on December 4, 1980, he had tried to make
public some of the top secret operations of the RAW claiming to
have special knowledge of these operations by virtue of having
been posted earlier in a sensitive ·oranch. He was also actively
engaged in collecting funds for continuing the agitation. C

We are, therefore, of the opinion that clause ( b) of the
second proviso to. Article 311(2)·and Rule 19 of the Central Civil
Services (Classification, control and .Appeal) Rules, 1965, were
properly applied to the case of each of the Appellants and the
impugned orders of dismissal were validly passed against them. D

Final Orders

In the result, both these Appeals fail and are dismissed and
the interim orders passed in these Appeals are hereby vacated. If
any payment has been made to any of the Appellants in. the
pursuance of any interim order, such" Appellant will not be liable E
to refund such amount or any part thereof. The Appellants have a
right to file a departmental appeal under the Central Civil
Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965• .In case
they desire to file such an appeal, we give them time until
October 31, 1985, to do so and we direct the appellate authority
to condone in the exercise of its power under the proviso to Rule F
25 of.the said Rules the delay in filing the appeal and to hear
and dispose of such appeals expeditiously subject to what has
been laid down in Tulsir- Patel's case and summarized in the
earlier part of this judgment.

There will be no order as to the costs of these Appeals. G

S.R. Appeals dismissed.