STATE OF CHHATTISGARHversusAMIT AISHWARYA JOGI

                [2025] 11 S.C.R. 406 : 2025 INSC 1285

                          State of Chhattisgarh
                                    v.
                          Amit Aishwarya Jogi
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1927 of 2014)
                              06 November 2025
     [Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the three-Judge Bench judgment in the case of Lalu
       Prasad Yadav and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr. lays down the
       correct proposition of law, or whether the same requires reference
       to, and resolution by a larger bench.

                                  Headnotes†
       Position of Law – Case of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. v. State
       of Bihar and Anr, 2010 INSC 188 : [2010] 4 SCR 334 – Whether
       a different view required:
       Held: No reason to take a different view. [Para 22]

       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 341, 427, 120-B r/w. s.34 – Arms Act,
       1959 – ss.25, 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.378 –
       Murder of a National Congress Party leader – The criminal
       miscellaneous petitions were preferred before the High Court
       assailing the common judgment and order dated 31.05.2007
       passed by the Special Judge in Sessions Trial, whereby the
       trial Court, while convicting 28 accused persons, acquitted
       the accused (respondent-AJ) – The High Court relied upon
       the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of
       Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. to hold that the leave to appeal
       application filed by the State was not maintainable in a case
       investigated by the CBI – Correctness:
       Held: On a threadbare perusal of the three-Judge Bench judgment
       in Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr., applying the principles of statutory
       interpretation, the Bench held that the legislature has maintained a
       mutually exclusive division in the matter of appeal from a judgment
       and order of acquittal inasmuch as the competent authority to
       appeal from a judgment and order of acquittal in two types of cases

* Author
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                           407

              State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi


     referred to in sub-Section (2) of s.378 of the CrPC is the Central
     Government and the authority of the State Government in relation
     to such cases has been excluded – Indisputably, applying the ratio
     of the above judgment, the leave to appeal application filed by the
     State of Chhattisgarh would not be maintainable. [Paras 19, 20]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Appeal against acquittal –
     Murder of a National Congress Party leader – Respondent-AJ
     acquitted – The CBI also assailed the judgment and order
     dated 31.05.2007, passed by the trial Court acquitting the
     respondent-AJ, albeit with some delay – The application
     seeking condonation of delay and consequently, the CBI’s
     application seeking leave to appeal also stand rejected by
     the High Court vide order dated 12.09.2011:
     Held: In the present case, this Court feels that ends of justice
     will be served by condoning the delay occasioned in filing of the
     application seeking leave to appeal by the CBI and requiring the
     High Court to consider the said application filed by the CBI, on
     its own merits – Such a course of action would ensure that the
     challenge to the judgment of acquittal would be examined on
     merits by the High Court instead of a technical rejection – Though
     it is true that the CBI filed an application seeking leave to appeal
     after a significant delay of 1373 days, but it is equally true that
     the charges against the respondent-AJ were very grave, involving
     a conspiracy to murder a member of a rival political party – The
     judgment of acquittal was under challenge at the instance of
     the State Government and the de-facto-complainant and thus,
     the proceedings were still alive – Therefore, this Court is of the
     opinion that the High Court ought to have adopted a more liberal
     and pragmatic approach in dealing with CBI’s application seeking
     condonation of delay and should have examined application seeking
     leave to appeal applicable on its merits – The delay occasioned
     in filing the application for grant of leave to appeal by the CBI
     against the judgment and order of acquittal of the respondent-AJ
     is hereby condoned. [Paras 26, 30, 33]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Proviso to s.372 – Appeal
     against acquittal – Murder of a National Congress Party leader –
     Respondent-AJ acquitted – De-facto complainant sought to
     prefer an appeal under the proviso to s.372 of the CrPC – The
     High Court held the de-facto-complainant’s application seeking
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       to prefer an appeal under the proviso to s.372 of the CrPC,
       to be not maintainable:
       Held: This Court does not find any fault in the view taken by the High
       Court on the aspect of maintainability of the de-facto-complainant’s
       application filed under proviso to s.372 of the CrPC – Needless
       to say, that the judgment and order of acquittal in this case was
       rendered on 31.05.2007, whereas, the enabling provision i.e.,
       proviso to s.372 of the CrPC, which gives a substantive right to
       the victim to file an appeal against judgment and order of acquittal
       came into effect from 31.12.2009 – Thus, undeniably, as on the
       date of the judgment and order of acquittal i.e. 31.05.2007, there
       was no provision in the statute book which permitted the de-facto-
       complainant to challenge the judgment and order of acquittal
       rendered by the trial Court by approaching the High Court through
       a victim’s appeal – Thus, Criminal Appeal filed by the de-facto-
       complainant fails as being devoid of merit. [Paras 27, 29]

                                Case Law Cited
       Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr. [2010] 4 SCR
       334 : (2010) 5 SCC 1; Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented
       through LRs v. State of Karnataka and Ors. [2018] 13 SCR 1:
       (2019) 2 SCC 752 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Penal Code, 1860; Arms Act, 1959; Code of Criminal Procedure,
       1973.

                                List of Keywords
       Murder; Investigation by local police; Investigation by CBI; Lalu
       Prasad Yadav and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr; Condonation
       of delay; Order of acquittal; Principles of statutory interpretation;
       Technical rejection; Substantive right to the victim to file an
       appeal.

                               Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       1927 of 2014
       From the Judgment and Order dated 18.08.2011 of the High Court
       of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLMP No. 137 of 2008
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                         409

                  State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi


      With
      Criminal Appeal No(s). 4758 and 4759-4760 of 2025 and SLP
      (Crl) No. 3037 of 2012

                              Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant:
      Ravi Sharma, D.A.G., Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Ms. Karishma Rajput,
      M N Gopinadh, Prashant Singh, Mrs. Kanchan Kaur Dhodi, Mukesh
      Kumar Maroria.
      Advs. for the Respondent:
      Ravi Sharma, D.A.G., Mrs. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv., Mukesh
      Kumar Maroria, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Rajan Kumar Chourasia,
      Sushil Kumar Dubey, Jagdish Chandra Solanki, Rahul Sharma,
      Mrs. Reeta Dewan Puri, Ms. Smriti Puri, Dr. Saurabh Kapoor,
      P. N. Puri, Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Ms. Karishma Rajput, M N Gopinadh,
      Shivam Ganeshia, Prashant Singh, Sumeer Sodhi.

                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                    Judgment

      Mehta, J.

1.    Heard.
2.    Leave granted.
3.    These matters have been placed before the three-Judge Bench in
      terms of the order dated 12th February, 2020 wherein a Bench of
      two Judges of this Court took note of the submission of the learned
      counsel representing the State of Chhattisgarh expressing a doubt
      on the correctness of the view taken by this Court in the case of Lalu
      Prasad Yadav and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr1 (Three- Judge
      Bench decision). The said order reads as below:
             “Learned counsel for the State of Chhattisgarh seeks to
             doubt the judgment of this court in Lalu Prasad Yadav &
             Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr. – (2010) 5 SCC 1 which is of
             a Three Judges Bench.


1    (2010) 5 SCC 1.
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               We are thus, of the view that it may be appropriate that
               the matters be placed before a Three Judges’ Bench itself
               so as to avoid further duplication of the hearing.
               The matters be thus, placed before Hon’ble Chief Justice
               of India for appropriate directions.
               Registry to take necessary steps.”
4.     The State of Chhattisgarh, the Central Bureau of Investigation2 and
       Shri Satish Jaggi-de-facto complainant3 are before this Court in these
       four appeals for assailing-:
       a.      The final order dated 18th August, 2011, passed by the Division
               Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur4 in Criminal
               Miscellaneous Petition No. 137 of 2008.
       b.      The final order dated 12th September, 2011, passed by the
               Division Bench of the High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous
               Petition No. 495 of 2011.
       c.      The final order dated 19th September, 2011, passed by the
               Division Bench of the High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous
               Petition No. 434 of 2007.
5.     These criminal miscellaneous petitions were preferred before the
       High Court assailing the common judgment and order dated 31st May,
       2007 passed by the Special Judge (Atrocities), Raipur5, in Sessions
       Trial Nos. 343 of 2003 and 329 of 2005, whereby the trial Court,
       while convicting 28 accused persons, acquitted the accused Amit
       Aishwarya Jogi6. Both these cases were registered pursuant to an
       incident of violence and murder which took place within the jurisdiction
       of Police Station, Moudhapara, District Raipur on 4th June, 2003.

       BRIEF FACTS
6.     The respondent-Amit Jogi, is the son of Shri Ajit Jogi, the serving
       Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh at the time of the incident.


2    Hereinafter, being referred to as “CBI”.
3    Hereinafter, being referred to as “de-facto-complainant”.
4    Hereinafter, being referred to as “High Court”.
5    Hereinafter, being referred to as “trial Court”.
6    Hereinafter, being referred to as “respondent-Amit Jogi”.
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                           411

                    State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi


7.     It is alleged that one Shri Ramavatar Jaggi, leader of the National
       Congress Party was murdered by unknown assailants on 4th June,
       2003. Initially, an FIR pertaining to the said incident came to be lodged
       by V.K. Pandey, the then Station House Officer and Town Inspector of
       Police Station, Moudhapara under Sections 307 and 427 of the Indian
       Penal Code, 18607, being FIR No. 104 of 2003. Upon conclusion
       of the investigation, the local police submitted a chargesheet under
       Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19738, against
       Vinod Singh alias Badal, Shyam Sunder alias Anand Sharma, Jamvant
       alias Babu, Avinash Singh alias Lallan, and Vishwanath Rajbhar
       for offences punishable under Sections 341, 427, 302, 120-B read
       with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms
       Act, 1959. Since the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
       IPC was triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the case was
       committed to the Court of Sessions Judge, Raipur where Sessions
       Case No. 334 of 2003 was registered for the offences punishable
       under Sections 302, 341, 427, 120-B read with Section 34 of the
       IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.
8.     The de-facto-complainant, Shri Satish Jaggi i.e., the appellant in
       Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl.) Nos. 7331 of 2011 and 1438 of 2012,
       and son of Ramavatar Jaggi, was dissatisfied with the result of the
       investigation carried out by the local police and thus, he represented
       to the State Government and in response, the Government of
       Chhattisgarh issued a notification No. F/4/6/2004/Home-C dated 3rd
       January, 2004 transferring FIR No. 104 of 2003 of Police Station,
       Moudhapara for investigation to the CBI. The Central Government
       accepted the recommendation and assigned the investigation to
       the CBI.
9.     Pursuant thereto, the CBI registered Case Crime No. RC-1(S)/2004/
       SCB-I/Delhi for offences punishable under Sections 302, 120-B,
       427 read with 34 of the IPC and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms
       Act, 1959. An order of further investigation was procured from the
       concerned Court and pursuant to the conclusion of investigation,
       a fresh chargesheet came to be filed by the CBI with the finding
       that Amit Jogi (respondent herein), Chiman Singh, Yahaya Dhebar,


7    Hereinafter, being referred to as “IPC”.
8    Hereinafter, being referred to as “CrPC”.
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       Abhay Goyal and Firoz Siddiqui hatched a conspiracy to disrupt
       the National Congress Party’s 10th June, 2003 rally by targeting its
       treasurer, Shri Ramavatar Jaggi. A meeting to finalise the plan to
       disrupt the rally was held at the Chief Minister’s residence in May,
       2003, wherein Shri Ramavatar Jaggi was selected as the prime
       target. On 4th June, 2003, at about 10:00 PM, Chiman Singh and
       other assailants hired from Bhind ambushed the Alto car in which
       Shri Ramavatar Jaggi was traveling. They damaged the vehicle with
       sticks. Chiman Singh shot Shri Ramavatar Jaggi whereas the other
       accused persons snatched away the sacred garland of Rudraksha
       beads (necklace) worn by Shri Ramavatar Jaggi during the attack.
       The CBI filed a chargesheet against the accused persons including
       the respondent-Amit Jogi for the offences punishable under Sections
       120-B read with Sections 302, 324, 427, 193 and 218 of the IPC.
       Pursuant to the filing of the chargesheet, Sessions Trial No. 329 of
       2005 was registered before the Court concerned. Upon conclusion,
       the trial Court, vide judgment and order dated 31st May, 2007, held
       that the prosecution had successfully proved the charges against
       28 accused persons under different provisions of the IPC and Arms
       Act, 1959. However, the respondent-Amit Jogi was acquitted of
       the charges levelled against him on the ground of insufficiency of
       evidence.
10. Aggrieved by acquittal of the respondent-Amit Jogi, the State of
    Chhattisgarh filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 137 of 2008
    under Section 378(3) of the CrPC before the High Court seeking
    leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 31st May,
    2007 which stands rejected vide order dated 18th August, 2011. The
    High Court relied upon the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court
    in the case of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra) to hold that the
    leave to appeal application filed by the State was not maintainable
    in a case investigated by the CBI.
11. The de-facto-complainant, Shri Satish Jaggi, also moved an
    Interlocutory Application No. 1 of 2011 under the proviso to Section
    372 of the CrPC in Criminal Revision Petition No. 434 of 2007 pending
    before the High Court, seeking conversion of revision petition into a
    criminal appeal so as to enable him to challenge the acquittal of the
    respondent-Amit Jogi in the capacity of a victim. The said application
    stands rejected by the High Court vide order dated 19th September,
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                      413

              State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi


     2011. The High Court held the State of Chhattisgarh’s application
     seeking leave to appeal and the de-facto-complainant’s application
     seeking to prefer an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the
     CrPC, to be not maintainable. The CBI also assailed the judgment
     and order dated 31st May, 2007, passed by the trial Court acquitting
     the respondent-Amit Jogi, albeit with some delay. The application
     seeking condonation of delay and consequently, the CBI’s application
     seeking leave to appeal also stand rejected by the High Court vide
     order dated 12th September, 2011. It is, in these circumstances, these
     four appeals have been placed before this Court for adjudication.

     SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
12. It was vehemently and fervently contended by learned counsel
    representing the State of Chhattisgarh that the view taken by the
    three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Lalu Prasad Yadav and
    Anr. (supra) does not make a correct interpretation of the statutory
    provisions and in addition thereto, the ratio thereof is inapplicable
    to the case at hand. The learned counsel urged that, in the present
    case, it is admitted that the initial FIR was registered by the State
    Police, which also filed the first chargesheet after concluding the
    investigation. However, as the de-facto-complainant expressed grave
    dissatisfaction with the result of investigation conducted by the local
    police, the State Government took a considered decision to transfer
    the investigation of the original FIR to the CBI. The central agency
    simply verified and supplemented the investigation carried out by the
    local police and filed a fresh chargesheet in the Court concerned.
    Thus, the learned counsel urged that it is not an open-and-shut
    case, where the FIR was directly registered by the CBI under the
    instructions of the Central Government, thereby making the appeal
    against acquittal filed by the State Government to be incompetent by
    virtue of the decision in Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra). The
    learned counsel stressed upon Para 37 of Lalu Prasad Yadav and
    Anr. (supra) to buttress the contention that the situation at hand is
    squarely covered by the said observations:
          “37. If we give to Section 378 sub-sections (1) and (2),
          the interpretation which the State Government claims;
          we would have to say that no matter that complaint was
          not lodged by the State Government or its officers; that
          investigation was not done by its police establishment;
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          that prosecution was neither commenced nor continued
          by the State Government; that Public Prosecutor was
          not appointed by the State Government; that the State
          Government had nothing to do with the criminal case;
          that all steps from launching of prosecution until its logical
          end were taken by the Delhi Police Special Establishment
          and yet the State Government may file an appeal from
          an order of acquittal under Section 378(1). That would
          be rendering the exception (clause) reflected in the
          opening words-“save as otherwise provided in sub-section
          (2)”-redundant, meaningless and unnecessary. If the
          legislature had intended to give the right of appeal under
          Section 378(1) to the State Government in all cases of
          acquittal including the classes of cases referred to in sub-
          section (2), it would not have been necessary to incorporate
          the exception (clause) in the opening words. This objective
          could have been achieved without use of these words as
          erstwhile Section 417 of the 1898 Code enabled the State
          Government to appeal from all cases of acquittal while in
          two types of cases mentioned in sub-section (2) thereof,
          appeal from the order of acquittal could be filed under the
          direction of the Central Government as well.”
13. Relying on the above reasoning, the learned counsel urged that in
    the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where the FIR was
    initially registered with the State Police and the CBI was much later
    entrusted with the investigation at the behest of the State Government,
    the bar of maintainability would not come into play and the appeal
    filed by the State Government should not have been thrown out on
    this hyper technical ground.
14. Learned counsel representing the CBI urged that the delay occasioned
    in filing the application seeking leave to appeal under Section 378(3)
    of the CrPC by the CBI before the High Court was bona fide. The
    central agency was under an impression that the State Government
    had already chosen to file an appeal against the acquittal of the
    respondent-Amit Jogi and thus, at that stage, it was not considered
    necessary for the CBI to challenge the acquittal of the respondent-
    Amit Jogi. However, when locus of the State to file the leave to
    appeal was questioned, a conscious and considered decision was
    taken at the appropriate level to challenge the judgment and order
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                      415

              State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi


     of acquittal of the respondent-Amit Jogi passed by the trial Court,
     by filing a leave to appeal application before the High Court under
     Section 378(2) of the CrPC with a prayer to condone the delay. It
     was, therefore, contended that in a case of such a sensitive nature,
     the High Court should have adopted a pragmatic and liberal approach
     and considered the matter on merits, rather than dismissing the leave
     to appeal application filed by the CBI simply on the ground of delay.
15. Learned counsel representing the de-facto-complainant urged that
    the interpretation given by the High Court that the appeal filed by the
    de-facto-complainant is not maintainable is erroneous on the face of
    record. The learned counsel urged that the proviso to Section 372
    of the CrPC, being a socio-beneficial legislation, ought to be applied
    retrospectively and, therefore, the de-facto-complainant’s application
    should not have been thrown out on the ground of non-maintainability.

     SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
16. Per contra, the learned counsel representing the respondent-Amit
    Jogi urged that the view taken by the High Court in dismissing the
    application seeking leave to appeal filed by the State of Chhattisgarh
    and the appeal filed by the de-facto-complainant as being non-
    maintainable; and so also the application seeking leave to appeal
    filed by the CBI on ground of delay is unassailable in facts and in
    law. The learned counsel contended that there exist no questions
    of law warranting interference by this Court in the impugned orders
    passed by the High Court, which do not suffer from any infirmity.

     DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
17. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
    advanced at bar and have carefully gone through the impugned
    orders. We have also given our respectful consideration to the three-
    Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Lalu Prasad
    Yadav and Anr. (supra).

     I.   Criminal Appeal No. 1927 of 2014
18. On a threadbare perusal of the three-Judge Bench judgment in Lalu
    Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra), we find that this Court extensively
    considered and discussed the provisions of law involved in the matter
    i.e., Sections 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898/Section
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       378 of the CrPC, 1973. The Bench has elaborately drawn distinction
       in the two enabling provisions i.e., 378(1) and 378(2) of the CrPC
       in the following manner:
            “30. Section 378 is divided into six sub-sections. Sub-
            section (1) provides that the State Government may
            direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the
            High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal
            passed by any court other than the High Court or an order
            of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.
            It opens with the words “save as otherwise provided in
            sub-section (2)” followed by the words “and subject to the
            provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5)”.
            31. Sub-section (2) refers to two classes of cases, namely,
            (i) those cases where the offence has been investigated by
            the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under
            the 1946 Act, and (ii) those cases where the offence has
            been investigated by any other agency empowered to
            make investigation into an offence under any Central Act
            other than the 1973 Code and provides that the Central
            Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to
            present an appeal to the High Court from an order of
            acquittal. Such an appeal by the Central Government in
            the aforesaid two types of cases is subject to the provisions
            contained in sub-section (3).
            xxx
            35. We have surveyed Section 378 in its entirety to have
            a complete conspectus of the provision. The opening
            words-“save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)”-are
            in the nature of exception intended to exclude the classes
            of cases mentioned in sub-section (2) out of operation of
            the body of sub-section (1). These words have no other
            meaning in the context but to qualify the operation of sub-
            section (1) and take out of its purview two types of cases
            referred to in sub-section (2), namely, (i) the cases in
            which offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special
            Police Establishment constituted under the 1946 Act, and
            (ii) the cases in which the offence has been investigated
            by any other agency empowered to make investigation
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                         417

              State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi


          into an offence under any Central Act other than the 1973
          Code. By construing Section 378 in a manner that permits
          appeal from an order of acquittal by the State Government
          in every case, except two classes of cases mentioned in
          sub-section (2), full effect would be given to the exception
          (clause) articulated in the opening words.
          36. As noticed above, the words-“save as otherwise
          provided in sub -section (2)”-were added in the 1973
          Code; Section 417 of the 1898 Code did not have these
          words. It is a familiar rule of construction that all changes
          in the wording and phrasing may be presumed to have
          been deliberate and with the purpose to limit, qualify or
          enlarge the pre -existing law as the changes of the words
          employ. Any construction that makes the exception (clause)
          with which the section opens unnecessary and redundant
          should be avoided.”
19. The entire existing case law on the subject was exhaustively referred
    to and analyzed. Thereafter, applying the principles of statutory
    interpretation, the Bench held that the legislature has maintained a
    mutually exclusive division in the matter of appeal from a judgment
    and order of acquittal inasmuch as the competent authority to appeal
    from a judgment and order of acquittal in two types of cases referred
    to in sub-Section (2) of Section 378 of the CrPC is the Central
    Government and the authority of the State Government in relation
    to such cases has been excluded. The relevant observations made
    in para 54 in Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra) are quoted
    hereinbelow:
          “54. In our opinion, the legislature has maintained a
          mutually exclusive division in the matter of appeal from
          an order of acquittal inasmuch as the competent authority
          to appeal from an order of acquittal in two types of cases
          referred to in sub-section (2) is the Central Government
          and the authority of the State Government in relation to
          such cases has been excluded…”
20. Indisputably, applying the ratio of the above judgment, the leave to
    appeal application filed by the State of Chhattisgarh would not be
    maintainable.
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21. The core question which requires adjudication in these matters
    is whether the three-Judge Bench judgment in the case of Lalu
    Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra) lays down the correct proposition
    of law, or whether the same requires reference to, and resolution
    by a larger bench.
22. Having examined the statutory framework and after mulling over the
    arguments advanced at bar, we see no reason to take a different view.
    However, there is one aspect of the controversy which may require a
    deeper probe in a suitable case. In para 37 of the judgment in Lalu
    Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra), this Court gave some indication that
    if a different view was to be taken, it would imply that, irrespective
    of the complaint not being lodged by the State Government or its
    officers, the investigation not being done by its police establishment,
    and the State Government having no role in the criminal proceedings,
    and where all steps from launching of the prosecution until its logical
    end were undertaken by the Delhi Police Special Establishment, yet
    the State Government may file an appeal against a judgment and
    order of acquittal under Section 378(1) of the CrPC.
23. Apparently, these observations could give rise to an argument that, in
    cases like the present one, where at the initial stage, the investigation
    was undertaken by the State Police and subsequently, the State
    Government thought fit to assign further investigation to the CBI,
    perhaps the State Government may stake a right to challenge the
    judgment and order of acquittal on its own, irrespective of the CBI
    not pursuing such a course of action.
24. However, we do not see any reason to enter into the controversy
    nor are we persuaded to take a different view for the reason that
    in the case of Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. (supra), the CBI also
    supported the view taken by the High Court and chose not to file an
    appeal questioning the acquittal of the accused by the trial Court.
    However, in the present case, the distinguishing feature is that the
    CBI has also filed an application seeking leave to appeal against
    acquittal of the respondent-Amit Jogi.
25. In this background, we are of the view that the question as to whether
    the State Government can independently file an appeal against
    acquittal of the accused in a case which was initially registered by
    the local police and later tried on the chargesheet filed by the CBI,
    may be examined and deliberated in a suitable case involving the
    following situations:
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                          419

                  State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi


      (a)     the complaint was lodged by the State Government or its officers;
      (b)     investigation was partly done by State Police;
      (c)     prosecution was commenced at the instance of the State
              Government;
      (d)     the State Government has a stake in the criminal proceedings;
              and
      (e)     the jurisdiction of the CBI had been invoked at the instance of
              the State Government.
26. However, in the present case, we feel that ends of justice will be
    served by condoning the delay occasioned in filing of the application
    seeking leave to appeal by the CBI and requiring the High Court to
    consider the said application filed by the CBI, on its own merits. Such
    a course of action would ensure that the challenge to the judgment
    of acquittal would be examined on merits by the High Court instead
    of a technical rejection.

      II.     Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 7331 of 2011
27. We also do not find any fault in the view taken by the High Court on
    the aspect of maintainability of the de-facto-complainant’s application
    filed under proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC9. Needless to say,
    that the judgment and order of acquittal in this case was rendered
    on 31st May, 2007, whereas, the enabling provision i.e., proviso to
    Section 372 of the CrPC, which gives a substantive right to the victim
    to file an appeal against judgment and order of acquittal came into
    effect from 31st December, 2009.
28. This Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through
    LRs v. State of Karnataka and Ors.10 has affirmatively held that the
    right conferred upon a victim to prefer an appeal against an order
    of acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC arises
    only in respect of orders of acquittal passed after 31st December,
    2009. The observations made by this Court in para 72 are quoted
    hereinbelow:



9    Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 7331 of 2011.
10   (2019) 2 SCC 752.
420                                                          [2025] 11 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports


              “72. What is significant is that several High Courts have
              taken a consistent view to the effect that the victim of
              an offence has a right of appeal under the proviso to
              Section 372 CrPC. This view is in consonance with the
              plain language of the proviso. But what is more important
              is that several High Courts have also taken the view that
              the date of the alleged offence has no relevance to the
              right of appeal. It has been held, and we have referred
              to those decisions above, that the significant date is
              the date of the order of acquittal passed by the trial
              court. In a sense, the cause of action arises in favour
              of the victim of an offence only when an order of
              acquittal is passed and if that happens after 31-12-
              2009 the victim has a right to challenge the acquittal,
              through an appeal. Indeed, the right not only extends to
              challenging the order of acquittal but also challenging the
              conviction of the accused for a lesser offence or imposing
              inadequate compensation. The language of the proviso
              is quite explicit, and we should not read nuances that do
              not exist in the proviso.”
                                                   (Emphasis Supplied)

29. Thus, undeniably, as on the date of the judgment and order of acquittal
    i.e. 31st May, 2007, there was no provision in the statute book which
    permitted the de-facto-complainant to challenge the judgment and
    order of acquittal rendered by the trial Court by approaching the High
    Court through a victim’s appeal. Thus, Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.)
    No. 7331 of 2011 filed by the de-facto-complainant fails as being
    devoid of merit.

       III.   Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012 and @
              SLP(Crl.) No. 1438 of 2012
30. We now turn to Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012 filed
    by the CBI and Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 1438 of 2012 filed
    by the de-facto-complainant, assailing the order dated 12th September,
    2011. Though it is true that the CBI filed an application seeking leave
    to appeal after a significant delay of 1373 days, but it is equally true
    that the charges against the respondent-Amit Jogi were very grave,
    involving a conspiracy to murder a member of a rival political party.
[2025] 11 S.C.R.                                                     421

              State of Chhattisgarh v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi


     The judgment of acquittal was under challenge at the instance of
     the State Government and the de-facto-complainant and thus, the
     proceedings were still alive. Therefore, we are of the opinion that
     the High Court ought to have adopted a more liberal and pragmatic
     approach in dealing with CBI’s application seeking condonation of
     delay and should have examined application seeking leave to appeal
     applicable on its merits.
31. We may hasten to add that we are not giving any imprimatur to the
    explanation offered by the CBI in its application for condonation of
    delay, but our objective is to ensure that the case involving such
    grave allegations should not be thrown out on mere technicalities.
32. At the same time, we also make it clear that we are not commenting
    on the merits of the case. It shall be open to the High Court to
    examine the merits of the matter while considering the CBI’s prayer
    for grant of leave to appeal, uninfluenced by any observation made
    in this order.
33. Consequently, Criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012,
    preferred by the CBI succeeds and the impugned order is set aside.
    The delay occasioned in filing the application for grant of leave to
    appeal by the CBI against the judgment and order of acquittal of the
    respondent-Amit Jogi is hereby condoned. The matter is remitted to
    the High Court for fresh consideration of the application for grant of
    leave to appeal filed by the CBI, on merits.
34. Although, at the stage of grant of leave to appeal, the acquitted
    accused is ordinarily not required to be heard, however, in the
    peculiar facts of the present case, since we have condoned the
    significant delay occasioned by the CBI in filing the application for
    grant of leave to appeal, we consider it expedient, in the interest of
    justice, to permit the respondent-Amit Jogi (acquitted accused) an
    opportunity of hearing in the application seeking leave to appeal. The
    de-facto-complainant as well as the State of Chhattisgarh shall also
    be impleaded as parties in the CBI’s application seeking leave to
    appeal and would be entitled to advance their respective submissions
    before the High Court.
35. As a consequence, Criminal appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012
    preferred by the CBI is allowed; Criminal Appeal No. 1927 of 2014
    preferred by the State of Chhattisgarh and Criminal appeals @
422                                                     [2025] 11 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


       SLP(Crl.) Nos. 7331 of 2011 and 1438 of 2012, preferred by Satish
       Jaggi, the de-facto-complainant, are hereby dismissed.
36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Criminal appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 3037 of 2012
                            is allowed. Criminal Appeal No. 1927 of 2014,
                            SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7331 of 2011 and 1438 of 2012
                            are dismissed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan