THE COMMISSIONER, BRUHAT BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKEversusK.K. UMESH KUMAR & ORS.

                 [2026] 7 S.C.R. 101 : 2026 INSC 637

 The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike
                          v.
              K.K. Umesh Kumar & Ors.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 8455 of 2026)
                                11 June 2026
   [Sanjay Karol* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose whether the appellant can be held liable under the
       Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the injuries sustained by respondent
       no.1 that were caused due to the falling of a roadside tree on
       the vehicle by which the respondent no.1 was travelling, but had
       stopped under the tree waiting for the rain to subside and then
       proceed further.

                                  Headnotes†
       Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation – Claim petition –
       Falling of a tree on an auto, if would qualify as an accident
       for which claim can be filed – Respondent was traveling in
       auto and due to heavy rain, stopped under the tree waiting
       for the rain to subside and then proceed – However, branch
       of the tree got detached and fell on the top of the vehicle,
       injuring the respondent who was then admitted to the
       hospital and received treatment – Claim petition filed seeking
       compensation – Tribunal dismissed the petition on the ground
       that the incident was a natural calamity – In the first round,
       the High Court dismissed the matter on the point of delay – In
       the second round, the High Court awarded Rs.17,10,500/- as
       compensation and, directed the Insurance Company of the
       auto to pay 50% of the amount, while the appellant and the
       State Horticulture Department were to pay one-fourth each –
       Challenge to:
       Held: In view of the liberal interpretation of the term ‘use’, in
       ordinary circumstances, the presence of the respondent in the
       auto rickshaw suffice as ‘use’ – Motor vehicle itself does not play
       an active role in the accident – It is not part of the proximate
       cause of the accident, thus, a claim u/s.166 specifically may not
       be appropriate – However, person who has suffered such life
* Author
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       altering grievous injuries, being left in lurch, without any money to
       sustain himself, does not appeal to the conscience of justice – It
       is within the domain of this Court, as the final Court to ensure the
       law, as implemented, specially in cases like these, is humane and
       in accordance with the salutary principles of the Constitution –
       Compensation as determined by the High Court, insufficient,
       owing to technical approach adopted by the High Court – In view
       thereof, total compensation enhanced to Rs.25,00,000/- along
       with interest as determined by the High Court, to be calculated
       from the date of filing of the claim petition – Apportionment of
       liability remain undisturbed – Constitution of India – Art.142.
       [Paras 13, 15]

                                    Case Law Cited
       S. Vedantacharya v. Highways Deptt. of South Arcot (1987) 3 SCC
       400; Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai v. State of Gujarat [2016] 2 SCR
       772 : (2016) 12 SCC 1; Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben
       Jayantilal Nakum [1997] 1 SCR 304 : (1997) 9 SCC 552; Shivaji
       Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More [1991] 3 SCR 26 : (1991)
       3 SCC 530 – referred to.
       Nichols v. Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1; Rylands v. Fletcher (1868)
       LR 3 HL 330; Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway Co,
       [1917] UKHL 3; The Majestic, 166 U.S.375 (1897) – referred to.

                                       List of Acts
       Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Constitution of India.

                                   List of Keywords
       Injuries sustained due to falling of a roadside tree on the vehicle;
       Compensation; Falling of a tree on an auto, if would qualify as
       accident to file claim; Incident was natural calamity; Apportionment
       of liability.

                                  Case Arising From
       C I V I L A P P E L L AT E J U R I S D I C T I O N : C i v i l A p p e a l N o .
       8455 of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 10.09.2020 of the High Court
       of Karnataka at Bengaluru in MFA No. 6470 of 2015.
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                        103

       The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v.
                     K.K. Umesh Kumar & Ors.

                          Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant(s):
      Anand Sanjay M Nuli, Sr. Adv., Suraj Kaushik, Shiva Swaroop,
      M/S. Nuli & Nuli.
      Advs. for the Respondent(s):
      Ms. Shweta Garg, Pankaj Seth, Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Ms. Jyoti,
      Ms. Shruti Jain, Ms. Sheetal Sharma, Ms. Patil Rekha Chandra
      Gouda.

                   Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

      Sanjay Karol, J.

      Leave Granted.
2.    The issue for our consideration is whether the appellant can be held
      liable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the injuries sustained
      by respondent no.1 that were caused due to the falling of a roadside
      tree on the vehicle by which the respondent no.1 was travelling, but
      had stopped under the tree waiting for the rain to subside and then
      proceed further.
3.    The facts in which this question arose are as follows:
      Respondent no.1 was travelling on 23rd June 2007 in an auto from
      Queens Road to Chinnaswamy Stadium when due to heavy rain
      it was requested by respondent no.1 that the vehicle be pulled
      up to the side of the road. Along the road were older trees, some
      even as old as hundred years and when the vehicle was stationary
      underneath one of these trees, a branch got detached from the tree
      fell on top, injuring the respondent. Thereafter, he was admitted to
      Mallya Hospital and received treatment.
      A claim petition1 was filed before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal,
      Bangalore, seeking compensation of Rs.50 lakhs. The Claims
      Tribunal in terms of order dated 10th April 2013 dismissed the claim



1    MVC No.1313/2020
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       on account of it being a natural calamity. The High Court of Karnataka
       at Bangaluru2 dismissed the claim on the point of delay. This is the
       proceeding in the first round. This concurrent dismissal was challenged
       before this Court3 which remanded the matter on the point of non-
       condonation of delay. In the second round of proceedings, the High
       Court allowed the appeal and awarded 17,10,500/- out of which 25%
       was directed to be paid by the appellant herein, 50% was to be paid
       by the Insurer of the autorickshaw and further 25% by respondent
       no.4-Horticulture Department, Government of Karnataka. It is this
       apportionment of liability towards the appellant which has been
       challenged before us.
4.     We have heard learned senior counsel and counsel appearing for
       the parties.
5.     In essence, the case of the appellant as also respondent no.4 that is
       the Horticulture Department, State of Karnataka is that they bore no
       responsibility for the unfortunate act that has quite literally, befallen
       respondent no.1. What happened was a natural occurrence over
       which the State authorities obviously had no control. That being
       the case, we must understand the position of law when it comes to
       such natural calamities, or in other words, the cases that deal with
       the proposition of ‘Act of God’.
6.     Naturally, let us turn to the House of Lords to understand the origins
       of the doctrine. In Nichols v. Marsland 4, the Court of Appeal had
       a case where the respondent had, on his land, artificial ponds with
       built-in safety mechanisms allowing excess water to flow out. Due
       to an incident of extremely heavy rainfall, there was a lot of excess
       water which flowed into the plaintiff’s land. He claimed damages under
       the strict liability rule of Rylands v. Fletcher5, however outcome was
       in favour of the defendant since the flooding was not reasonably
       foreseeable. ‘Act of God’ or ‘Vis Major’ was accepted as a defence
       to strict liability. Next, we must consider Greenock Corporation v.



2    MFA No.6470/2015 (MV)
3    Civil Appeal No.20865/2017
4    (1876) 2 Ex D 1.
5    (1868) LR 3 HL 330
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                            105

       The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v.
                     K.K. Umesh Kumar & Ors.

      Caledonian Railway Co6 in this case, flooding of an artificially created
      public playground and paddling pool which eventually damaged the
      nearby land that belonged to the respondent. The House of Lords
      eventually dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim of damnum fatale since
      they had altered the course of the stream. The Supreme Court
      of the United States in its 1897 decision titled The Majestic7
      discussed the rule as follows:
             “The act of God, said Chancellor Kent (vol. 2, p. 597),
             means “inevitable accident, without the intervention of
             man and public enemies” and again (vol. 3, p. 216) that
             “perils of the sea denote natural accidents peculiar to that
             element, which do not happen by the intervention of man,
             nor are to be prevented by human prudence.”
             A “casus fortuitous” was defined in the civil law to be
             quod damno fatali contingit, cuivis diligentissimo possit
             contingere. It is a ‘loss happening in spite of all human
             effort and sagacity.’ The words ‘perils of the sea’ may
             indeed have grown to have a broader signification than
             ‘the act of God,’ but that is unimportant here.
             Judge Shipman in the Court of Appeals quotes from 1
             Parsons on Shipping 255, the definition there given of the
             “act of God,” and the reason for it, as follows:
             “The ‘act of God’ is limited to causes in which no man has
             any agency whatever, because it was never intended to
             raise, in the case of the common carrier, the dangerous
             and difficult question whether he actually had any agency
             in causing the loss; for if this were possible, he should
             be held.”
7.    We now move to the decisions of this Court. In S. Vedantacharya v.
      Highways Deptt. of South Arcot 8, this Court observed that when it
      comes to bridges and culverts, heavy rain or flood are not possibilities
      outside the contemplation of the department concerned. Since there


6    [1917] UKHL 3
7    166 U.S.375 (1897)
8    (1987) 3 SCC 400
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       was nothing on record in the case to show that the concerned
       department had taken any preventive action, the finding of the High
       Court dismissing the claim was overturned and judgment was entered
       for the plaintiffs. Another case was Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai v.
       State of Gujarat 9 wherein certain landowners claimed compensation
       on account of severe damage and submersion of their lands leading
       to widespread loss of crops and other vegetation. The same was
       resisted, averring that there had been a great amount of rainfall
       leading to the dam being overfilled, necessitating 60000 cusecs of
       water having to be released in order to protect the dam. The Court
       in order to complete justice gave Rs 5 lacs as compensation against
       a claim of Rs.21,50,000/-:
            “22. There are two exceptions to the aforesaid rule of
            strict liability, which were recognised in Rylands v. Fletcher
            [Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 37 LJ Ex 161]
            itself viz.:
            (a) where it can be shown that the escape was owing to
            the plaintiff’s default, or
            (b) the escape was the consequence of vis major or the
            act of God.
            An act of God is that which is a direct, violent, sudden
            and irresistible act of nature as could not, by any amount
            of ability, have been foreseen, or if foreseen, could
            not by any amount of human care and skill have been
            resisted. Generally, those acts which are occasioned
            by the elementary forces of nature, unconnected with
            the agency of man or other cause will come under the
            category of acts of God. Examples are : storm, tempest,
            lightning, extraordinary fall of rain, extraordinary high tide,
            extraordinary severe frost, or a tidal bore which sweeps a
            ship in mid-water. What is important here is that it is not
            necessary that it should be unique or that it should happen
            for the first time. It is enough that it is extraordinary and
            such as could not reasonably be anticipated. We would


9   (2016) 12 SCC 1
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                            107

       The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v.
                     K.K. Umesh Kumar & Ors.

             like to discuss a few cases having bearing on this issue
             with which we are confronted in the instant appeal.”
8.    Before proceeding further, we must also deal with Rajkot Municipal
      Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum10 on which extensive reliance
      has been placed by the appellants. In that case, the deceased
      Jayantilal, was walking on the footpath when a tree fell upon him,
      leading to grievous injuries and eventual death. Against the claim
      of Rs.1,00,000/- against the appellant Corporation, the Trial Court
      granted the claim to the extent of Rs.45,000/-. The same was
      confirmed by the High Court on appeal. This Court, in its detailed
      judgment considered extensively the concept of negligence, the duty
      of municipal authorities etc. in the following words:
             “59. … When the defendant is under a statutory duty to
             take care not to create latent source of physical danger
             to the property or the person who in the circumstances is
             considered to be reasonably foreseeable as likely to be
             affected thereby, the defendant would be liable for tort
             of negligence. If the latent defect causes actual physical
             damages to the person, the defendant is liable to damages
             for tortious liability. The negligent act or omission of the
             statutory authority must be examined with reference to the
             statutory provisions, creating the duty and the resultant
             consequences. The negligent act or omission must be
             specifically directed to safeguard the public or some
             sections of the public to which the plaintiff was a member,
             from the particular danger which has resulted.”
9.    In view of the law as discussed above, let us move to applying the law.
      A tree has been on the side of the road for many years. Because it is
      part of the city, the Municipal Corporation does have a duty to ensure
      that those trees are looked after, from the point of view of not only
      keeping the trees hale and healthy but also that periodic maintenance
      thereof is undertaken to ensure that unfortunate incidents such as
      these do not happen. It is a reality that the boundaries of City are
      ever expanding in India, in view of the constant migration, and so the



10   (1997) 9 SCC 552
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       number of people that a Corporation is serving increases overtime. It
       would be unrealistic to expect that authorities of the Corporation can
       maintain a constant vigil over each tree/shrub. In the similar vein,
       while it may be perfectly within contemplation that an old branch of
       an old tree may give way at any time, the prudent call cannot be
       that all branches are slashed with a saw.
10. The importance of trees especially in the ever-expanding concrete
    jungles that we call cities today cannot be overstated. In our city of
    Delhi, for example, we find vast differences in green cover depending
    on the area you travel to. In such a situation, it is the primary duty
    of Centre and state level authorities to increase greencover in cities
    howsoever possible, with due consultation from experts facilitating
    the long term survival of each tree or plant sown into the soil.
11. Let it be stated, lest we be misunderstood that we are not even for
    a moment trivializing the injuries of the respondent or affording any
    escape to the appellant from its duty of maintaining the trees in the
    city. All that we are saying is that in the facts and circumstances of
    this case neither was taking a shelter under the tree was anything
    out of the ordinary nor was the unfortunate falling of a branch within
    contemplation of any Authority or even the driver of the autorickshaw.
    In these circumstances, it would be unfair to fasten the liability upon
    the appellant under the MVA. Under Section 166, MVA a claim can
    be filed for an accident as described in Section 165(1). The latter
    reads as follows:
            “165. Claims Tribunals.—(1) A State Government may,
            by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or
            more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this
            Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as
            may be specified in the notification for the purpose of
            adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of
            accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons
            arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to
            any property of a third party so arising, or both.
            Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
            declared that the expression “claims for compensation
            in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily
            injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles”
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                            109

       The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v.
                     K.K. Umesh Kumar & Ors.

             includes claims for compensation under section 140 [and
             section 163A]…”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)

12. The question that arises is whether the falling of a tree on an
    autorickshaw, would qualify as an accident for which a claim can
    be filed. The phrase emphasised by us in the Section above was,
    in its corresponding form in the preceding legislation interpreted by
    this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More11, :
             “26. These decisions indicate that the word “use”, in the
             context of motor vehicles, has been construed in a wider
             sense to include the period when the vehicle is not moving
             and is stationary, being either parked on the road and when
             it is not in a position to move due to some breakdown or
             mechanical defect. … In our opinion, the word “use” has a
             wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is
             not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does
             not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered
             immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defect
             or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that
             the petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when it
             was lying on its side after the collision with the truck.
             …
             33. …The words “arising out of” were not construed to mean
             “arising under” as in Union of India v. E.B. Aaby’s Rederi
             A/S [1975 AC 797 : (1974) 2 All ER 874] which decision
             was held inapplicable to the construction of Section
             20(2)(1)(h) and it was observed by Lord Brand-on:
                    “With regard to the first point, I would readily
                    accept that in certain contexts the expression
                    ‘arising out of’ may, on the ordinary and natural
                    meaning of the words used, be the equivalent of
                    the expression ‘arising under’, and not that of the
                    wider expression ‘connected with’. In my view,


11   (1991) 3 SCC 530
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            however, the expression ‘arising out of’ is, on
            the ordinary and natural meaning of the words
            used, capable, in other contexts, of being the
            equivalent of the wider expression ‘connected
            with’. Whether the expression ‘arising out of’
            has the narrower or the wider meaning in any
            particular case must depend on the context in
            which it is used.”
       Keeping in view the context in which the expression was
       used in the statute it was construed to have the wider
       meaning viz. “connected with”.
       34. In the context of motor accidents the expressions
       “caused by” and “arising out of” are often used in statutes.
       Although both these expressions imply a causal relationship
       between the accident resulting in injury and the use of the
       motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of proximity
       of such relationship. This distinction has been lucidly
       brought out in the decision of the High Court of Australia
       in Government Insurance Office of N.S.W. v. R.J. Green
       case [(1965) 114 CLR 437], wherein Lord Barwick, C.J.
       has stated : (CLR p. 433)
            “Bearing in mind the general purpose of the Act
            I think the expression ‘arising out of’ must be
            taken to require a less proximate relationship of
            the injury to the relevant use of the vehicle than
            is required to satisfy the words ‘caused by’. It
            may be that an association of the injury with the
            use of the vehicle while it cannot be said that
            that use was causally related to the injury may
            yet be enough to satisfy the expression ‘arise
            out of’ as used in the Act and in the policy.”
       35. In the same case, Windeyer, J. has observed as
       under : (CLR p. 447)
            “The words ‘injury caused by or arising out of the
            use of the vehicle’ postulate a causal relationship
            between the use of the vehicle and the injury.
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                            111

      The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v.
                    K.K. Umesh Kumar & Ors.

                 ‘Caused by’ connotes a ‘direct’ or ‘proximate’
                 relationship of cause and effect. ‘Arising out of’
                 extends this to a result that is less immediate;
                 but it still carries a sense of consequence.”
13. In view of the stated liberal interpretation of this term, will the presence
    of the respondent in the auto rickshaw suffice as ‘use’. In ordinary
    circumstances, it probably would have. But take for instance a scenario
    where the respondent was a pedestrian and stood near or under the
    tree in an attempt to take shelter from the heavy rain and now the
    branch falls on him. This is an entirely likely scenario. In other words,
    the motor vehicle itself does not play an active role in the accident. It
    is not part of the proximate cause of the accident. For that reason, a
    claim under Section166 specifically may not be appropriate.
14. In that view of the matter, the question of law is accordingly settled.
15. A question however refuses to leave us. Will the respondent be
    forced to contend for compensation in another round of litigation? Is
    this conclusion in the interest of justice? Should we have to decide
    only the question of law then actual money reaching the hands of
    the respondent would be delayed. It appears to us, to be not so. A
    person who has suffered such life altering grievous injuries, being
    left in lurch, without any money to sustain himself, does not appeal
    to the conscience of justice. For ready reference the injuries as
    noticed by the High Court, is extracted hereunder:-
           “The doctor has also stated that on clinical and radiological
           assessment, the following disabilities are found:
           “1. Total paraplegia both lower limbs with bladder and
           bowel incontinence.
           2. ‘X’ ray of the spin shows fracture healing and implants
           position good.”
     It is within our domain, as the final Court of the country to ensure
     the law, as implemented, specially in cases like these, is humane
     and in accordance with the salutary principles of the Constitution.
     That apart, we may observe that the compensation as determined by
     the High Court in itself, is insufficient as per the settled principles of
     law, owing to a somewhat technical approach adopted by the High
     Court. In that view of the matter, we enhance the total compensation
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       to Rs.25,00,000/- along with interest as determined by the High
       Court, to be calculated from the date of filing of the claim petition.
       The apportionment of liability shall remain undisturbed. This we do
       under the exercise of Article 142 of the Constitution.
16. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the above. The amount of
    compensation along with the interest shall be deposited into the
    bank account of the respondent directly. Learned counsel for the
    respondent shall furnish the bank details of the respondent to the
    learned counsel for the appellant. The amount shall be disbursed
    to the respondent within four weeks from the pronouncement of
    this judgment. The other parties who have been directed to pay the
    amount i.e., the Insurance Company and the Horticulture Department,
    Government of Karnataka, shall also do so within four weeks.
       Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.

       Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain