THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS.versusRANJAN KUMAR & ORS.
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 466
- Decided
- 8 May 2026
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary dismissal was valid, the High Court’s interference was unlawful, and the order of dismissal is restored.
Summary
The appellant State of Jharkhand sought to uphold the dismissal of Constable Ranjan Kumar, who was found to have obtained dual appointments in Jharkhand and Bihar police forces using forged documents and assumed a false identity. The respondent contested the dismissal, alleging lack of evidence, procedural irregularities, and that the High Court correctly set aside the disciplinary order. The Supreme Court examined the departmental inquiry records, forensic reports confirming the identity fraud, and the procedural compliance with the Jharkhand Police Manual. It held that the disciplinary authority had complied with natural‑justice requirements and that the evidence, though not examined in a criminal trial, was sufficient on a pre‑ponderance‑of‑probabilities basis. The Court concluded that the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction by re‑appreciating the evidence and set aside its judgment, restoring the dismissal and ordering criminal proceedings to be initiated.
Issues considered
- Whether the disciplinary dismissal of the respondent is legally infirm and liable to be set aside.
- Whether the High Court erred in re‑appreciating the evidence and interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the disciplinary, appellate and revisional authorities.
- Whether the departmental inquiry complied with the principles of natural justice and the procedural requirements of the Jharkhand Police Manual.
- Whether criminal proceedings should be directed against the respondent for alleged offences under the Penal Code/Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
Legislation cited
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose for consideration whether the disciplinary action taken against respondent No.1, culminating in his removal from service, suffers from any legal infirmity warranting interference. Headnotes† Service law – Dismissal from service – Respondent under the name “SK” with Bihar Police while continuing in service as a Constable in the Jharkhand Police under the name “RK” through fabricated documents and thereafter remained unauthorisedly absent from service – Memorandum of charge issued in view of the
Subjects
Judgment
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 522 : 2026 INSC 466
The State of Jharkhand & Ors.
v.
Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7364 of 2026)
08 May 2026
[Ahsanuddin Amanullah and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose for consideration whether the disciplinary action taken
against respondent No.1, culminating in his removal from service,
suffers from any legal infirmity warranting interference.
Headnotes†
Service law – Dismissal from service – Respondent No.1
secured appointment as a Constable under the name “SK”
with Bihar Police while continuing in service as a Constable in
the Jharkhand Police under the name “RK” through fabricated
documents and thereafter remained unauthorisedly absent
from service – Memorandum of charge issued in view of the
serious irregularities committed to which respondent no.1
submitted written statement of defence – Inquiry Officer
thereafter submitted his report – Thereafter, the Superintendent
of Police dismissed respondent No.1 from service – Concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the disciplinary authority, the
appellate authority and the revisional authority that the charges
of fraud, impersonation, forgery, cheating, unauthorised
absence from duty and violation of service discipline stood
proved – Single Judge of the High Court upheld the dismissal,
however, the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the
same – Correctness:
Held: Member of the police force expected to maintain the
highest degree of integrity, honesty and discipline – Fraud at the
threshold of entry into service strikes at the very root of public
employment – On facts, material available goes far beyond mere
suspicion and reasonably establishes a conscious course of deceit
adopted by respondent No.1 for obtaining employment benefits
* Author
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 523
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
from two sovereign employers in a disciplined force – Single
Judge correctly appreciated the limited scope of judicial review
and declined to substitute judicial opinion in place of the findings
recorded in the disciplinary proceedings – However, the Division
Bench, clearly transgressed the settled parameters of judicial
review by reappreciating the evidence and disturbing concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the disciplinary authority, Appellate
Authority and Revisional Authority – Such approach cannot
be countenanced in law – Respondent No.1 was duly served
with a charge memorandum, furnished with relevant materials,
afforded adequate opportunity to submit his defence, participated
in the enquiry proceedings, received copy of the enquiry report,
and submitted his representation thereon – Requirements of
procedural fairness and substantial compliance with the prescribed
procedure thus stand satisfied – Since the allegations levelled
against respondent no.1 pertain to impersonation, fraud, use of
forged credentials, dual employment in police departments and
unauthorised absence, the continuance of such an employee
in service would be wholly detrimental to institutional discipline,
public confidence, and the credibility of the police force – Order
of dismissal passed against respondent no.1 was a proportionate
and justified administrative measure arising out of a fair and lawful
enquiry – Thus, the Division Bench not justified in reappreciating the
evidence and setting aside the punishment imposed – Allegations,
reinforced by forensic findings, prima facie disclose the commission
of cognizable offences such as cheating, impersonation, forgery,
use of forged documents and furnishing false information to
public authorities – Public employment, particularly in the police
service, cannot be converted into an instrument of fraud – If
individuals entrusted with enforcing the law themselves secure
entry into service through deception and fabricated credentials,
it would seriously erode the rule of law – In these circumstances,
while restoring the disciplinary action, it is both necessary and
appropriate to direct initiation of criminal proceedings in accordance
with law – Matter to be examined by the competent jurisdictional
police authority and appropriate steps be taken, in accordance
with law – Impugned judgment of the Division Bench set aside,
and that of the Single Judge along with the order of dismissal
passed by the disciplinary authority, as affirmed by appellate
authority and revisional authority stands restored – Patna District
524 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Order quashed, and appointment of respondent No.3, “SK”, as
Constable in the Bihar Police set aside – Jharkhand Police Manual.
[Paras 17, 19, 20-27.1]
Case Law Cited
State of Haryana and Another v. Rattan Singh (1977) 2 SCC 491;
M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and Others [2006] 3 SCR 896 : (2006)
5 SCC 88; Union of India and Others v. Subrata Nath [2022] 18
SCR 605 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860;
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
List of Keywords
Disciplinary action; Removal from service; Exercise of judicial
review; Dismissal from service; Appointment; Bihar Police;
Jharkhand Police; Fabricated documents; Unauthorisedly absent
from service; Constable in Jharkhand Police; Constable in Patna
District; Different set of certificates; Memorandum of charge;
Serious irregularities; Charges of fraud, impersonation, forgery,
cheating, unauthorised absence from duty and violation of service
discipline.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
7364 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.08.2022 of the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA No. 74 of 2016
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Kumar Anurag Singh, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee, Zain A. Khan,
Dev Aaryan, Mohd. Abran Khan,
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Kumar Shivam, Manoj Tandon, Sameer Ranjan, Samir Ali Khan,
Pranjal Sharma, Kashif Irshad Khan Faridi.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 525
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellants assailing
the final judgment and order dated 25.08.2022 passed by the High
Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi1 in L.P.A. No. 74 of 2016, whereby the
Division Bench allowed the appeal preferred by Respondent No. 1
and set aside the judgment and order dated 30.10.2015 passed
by the Learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 1128 of 2012 and
consequentially, quashed the order dated 20.08.2010 passed by the
disciplinary authority dismissing Respondent No. 1 from service, the
order dated 21.05.2011 passed by the Appellate Authority affirming
the same, and the order dated 06.02.2012 passed by the revisional
authority rejecting the memorial petition.
3. The case of the appellants, as projected in the present appeal is
that Respondent No. 1 – Ranjan Kumar, son of Kamta Singh, was
appointed as Constable in the Jharkhand Police on 18.05.2005. While
serving at Dhurki Police Station as Reserve Guard, he was granted
compensatory leave for two days from the afternoon of 20.12.2007
till 23.12.2007. However, he failed to rejoin duty on 23.12.2007 and
remained unauthorisedly absent thereafter.
3.1. During the said period of absence, Respondent No. 1 is alleged
to have secured appointment as Constable in the State of Bihar
vide Patna District Order No. 10524 of 2007 dated 26.12.2007
under the name Santosh Kumar, son of Kamta Sharma, by
relying upon forged certificates and fabricated credentials. It
is further alleged that without any information or permission,
he abandoned duty from Patna District Police on 06.01.2008.
3.2. Thereafter, notice was issued to him by the Senior Superintendent
of Police, Patna vide Memo No. 6868 dated 24.04.2008.
Subsequently, the Superintendent of Police, Jehanabad caused
an enquiry to be conducted through the Officer-in-Charge,
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
526 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Onkari Police Station, and addressed Memo No. 2512/Go dated
21.06.2008. Pursuant thereto, an enquiry was conducted and
the report submitted therein disclosed that Respondent No. 1
and the said Santosh Kumar were one and same person.
3.3. Based on the aforesaid material, a memorandum of charge dated
02.09.2008 came to be issued to Respondent No. 1, to which,
he submitted his written statement of defence on 29.09.2008.
Upon conclusion of the departmental enquiry, Appellant No. 4,
Superintendent of Police, Garhwa, passed an order dated
20.08.2010 dismissing Respondent No. 1 from service.
3.4. Aggrieved thereby, Respondent No. 1 preferred a statutory
appeal before the Appellate Authority, Appellant No. 3, which
came to be rejected vide Memo No. 806/Go dated 21.05.2011.
A memorial petition thereafter preferred by Respondent No. 1
was also rejected by the revisional authority, Appellant No. 2,
vide Memo No. 59 dated 06.02.2012.
3.5. After exhausting the departmental remedies, Respondent No.
1 filed W.P (S) No. 1128 of 2012 before the High Court. The
learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, dismissed the
writ petition by order dated 30.10.2015. Being dissatisfied,
Respondent No. 1 preferred L.P.A. No. 74 of 2016, which came
to be allowed by the Division Bench through the impugned
judgment dated 25.08.2022. It is in the aforesaid circumstances
that the appellants are before this Court with the present appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Division Bench
erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment passed by the
learned Single Judge in the writ petition and consequentially, quashing
the orders of the appellants dismissing Respondent No. 1 from service.
4.1. It was contended that the learned Single Judge had specifically
held that the order of penalty was neither passed by ignoring
relevant material on record nor based on no evidence. Despite
such findings, the Division Bench wrongly concluded that there
was no evidence to establish that Respondent No. 1 had secured
appointment with Bihar Police while continuing in service under
the Jharkhand Police.
4.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the charges framed against
Respondent No. 1 stood duly proved on the basis of evidence
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 527
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
adduced in the departmental proceedings, including photocopies
of application forms, photographs, certificates submitted before the
Bihar Police authorities, forms with photographs and certificates
produced before the Garhwa Police, Jharkhand at the time of
joining as well as reports obtained from the Superintendent of
Police, Patna and Superintendent of Police, Jehanabad. It was
urged that the High Court fell into error in observing that the
enquiry report referred to in letter dated 21.06.2008 had neither
been tendered in evidence nor furnished to Respondent No.1,
whereas in fact the said report had been supplied to him both
along with the chargesheet and the enquiry report.
4.3. It was next submitted that findings of fact recorded by the
disciplinary authority ought not to be interfered with as a matter of
course, particularly in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, and the Letters Patent Appeal was
itself only an extension of the writ proceedings. In departmental
proceedings, the applicable standard is that of preponderance of
probabilities, which, according to learned counsel, clearly stood
satisfied in the present case. All statutory remedies available
to Respondent No. 1 had already been exhausted.
4.4. Learned counsel pointed out that in the enquiry conducted by
the Garhwa Police, it was found that Respondent No. 1 had
secured appointment on 18.05.2005 as a Constable in the
Jharkhand Police under the name “Ranjan Kumar”, son of
Kamta Singh, resident of Village and P.O. Pitamberpur, P.S.
Ghoshi, District Jehanabad, by submitting one set of certificates.
Thereafter, the same individual allegedly secured appointment
on 26.12.2007 as a Constable in Patna District under the
name “Santosh Kumar”, son of Kamta Sharma, resident of
Village Pitamberpur, P.S. Ghoshi, District Jehanabad, on the
strength of a different set of certificates. In view of the serious
irregularities so committed, a memorandum of charge dated
02.09.2008 was issued to Respondent No. 1, to which he
submitted a written statement of defence on 29.09.2008. The
Inquiry Officer thereafter submitted his report on 01.07.2010,
which was followed by Respondent No.1’s written reply dated
31.07.2010. Ultimately, by order dated 20.08.2010 passed by
the Superintendent of Police, Garhwa, Respondent No. 1 was
dismissed from service.
528 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
4.5. Placing reliance on the decision in State of Haryana and
another v. Rattan Singh2, learned counsel submitted that in a
domestic enquiry, strict and technical rules of evidence under
the Indian Evidence Act do not apply, and any material which
is logically probative for a prudent mind is admissible.
4.6. It was urged that the misconduct proved was not of a minor
nature, but involved deliberate acts of forgery and fraud for
illegally drawing salary from the public exchequer. In such
circumstances, the Division Bench ought to have dismissed the
Letters Patent Appeal preferred by Respondent No. 1.
4.7. Learned counsel lastly submitted that even assuming that
material witnesses had not been examined, the Division Bench
ought at the highest to have granted liberty to the appellants to
continue the enquiry from the stage of examination of witnesses
and/or to hold a fresh enquiry.
4.8. It was further contended that the effect of the impugned judgment
is that Respondent No.1, despite grave misconduct in securing
appointments in both the Bihar and Jharkhand Police through
fabricated documents and thereafter remaining unauthorisedly
absent from service, has been allowed to go scot-free.
4.9. On these submissions, learned counsel prayed that the present
appeal be allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench be
set aside.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 2 submitted
that the State of Bihar fully adopts and supports the submissions
advanced by the appellants – State of Jharkhand and others, as the
misconduct alleged against Respondent No. 1 concerns fraudulent
conduct committed simultaneously against both States.
5.1. It was submitted that Respondent No. 1 – Ranjan Kumar
had initially applied pursuant to the advertisement issued for
recruitment to the post of Constable in the Jharkhand Police
Department. Merely twelve days thereafter, in response to a
separate recruitment process initiated by Bihar Police, another
application was submitted in the name of Santosh Kumar seeking
appointment as Constable in Bihar Police.
2 (1977) 2 SCC 491
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 529
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
5.2. According to learned counsel, the photograph affixed in the
Bihar Police application was that of the same individual who
had applied before the Jharkhand authorities. However, the
supporting certificates annexed thereto described the candidate
as “Santosh Kumar”, son of Kamta Sharma, whereas in the
Jharkhand records, Respondent No. 1 was reflected under a
different name and parentage. This itself demonstrates deliberate
impersonation and conscious use of dual identities for securing
public employment.
5.3. It was further submitted that on the basis of documents
furnished by Respondent No. 1, his candidature was accepted
by the Jharkhand Police authorities, and he was appointed
as Constable in Garhwa District on 18.05.2005. Thereafter,
while posted at Dhurki Police Station as Reserve Guard, he
was granted compensatory leave for two days, namely from
the afternoon of 20.12.2007 till 23.12.2007. However, instead
of rejoining duty, he absented himself without authorisation.
Learned counsel submitted that during the said unauthorised
absence, Respondent No. 1 joined Bihar Police as Constable
vide Patna District Order No. 10524 of 2007 dated 26.12.2007
in the assumed name of Santosh Kumar, son of Kamta
Sharma, by relying upon forged and fabricated certificates.
It was contended that Respondent No. 1 thus managed to
secure employment in two disciplined police forces at the
same time by deception.
5.4. Learned counsel further submitted that the enquiry initiated
by the Superintendent of Police, Jehanabad through the
Officer-in-Charge of Onkari Police Station, revealed that the
same individual was functioning under two names, namely as
Ranjan Kumar in Jharkhand and Santosh Kumar in Bihar. The
Superintendent of Police, Jehanabad thereafter addressed
Memo No. 2512/go to the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Patna recording that Constable No. 1331 Santosh Kumar, son
of Kamta Sharma, resident of Pitambarpur, Police Station Ghosi
(Onkari), had already been serving in Jharkhand Police for
about two years; that he had recently joined Bihar Police but
absconded during training; and that his family members were
concealing material facts regarding his whereabouts. Thus,
the contemporaneous official communications clearly establish
530 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
that Respondent No. 1 was indulging in fraud upon both State
Governments by securing dual appointments through forged
credentials and false representation.
5.5. It was next submitted that in view of grave misconduct
committed by Respondent No. 1, namely cheating, forgery,
misleading authorities, suspicious conduct, unauthorised
absence, and obtaining simultaneous employment in two
police forces, a regular departmental proceeding was initiated
against him by the Jharkhand authorities. Learned counsel
pointed out that along with the memorandum of charge, all
relevant documents forming the basis of the proceedings
were supplied to Respondent No. 1, including recruitment
advertisements, educational certificates, domicile certificate,
official correspondence from Bihar authorities, enquiry reports
and memoranda issued by the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Jehanabad. Hence, the allegation of non-supply of documents
is wholly misconceived.
5.6. It was submitted that Respondent No. 1 submitted a written
statement of defence, but failed to furnish any truthful, cogent,
or transparent explanation regarding the incriminating findings
of the Onkari Police Station enquiry or the dual identities used
by him. The Enquiry Officer, after considering the documentary
evidence and defence reply, held the charges proved.
5.7. Learned counsel emphasised that a copy of the enquiry report
was duly furnished to Respondent No. 1 and that he submitted
a detailed representation thereto. Thus, full opportunity of
defence was granted and the principles of natural justice were
scrupulously complied with.
5.8. It was submitted that upon consideration of the entire record,
the Superintendent of Police, Garhwa passed final order dated
20.08.2010 in Departmental Proceeding No. 48/08 dismissing
Respondent No. 1 from service. The departmental appeal
preferred before the Deputy Inspector General of Police was
dismissed on 21.05.2011. Thereafter, the memorial petition
preferred before the Director General-cum- Inspector General
of Police (Revisional Authority) was also rejected by a reasoned
order in February 2012.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 531
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
5.9. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Single
Judge, by a detailed judgment dated 30.10.2015, rightly
dismissed the writ petition after finding no infirmity in the
disciplinary process. However, the Division Bench erroneously
allowed the Letters Patent Appeal, vide impugned judgment
dated 25.08.2022. According to learned counsel, the Division
Bench exceeded the settled limits of judicial review by
reappreciating evidence in a departmental matter despite
concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the disciplinary,
appellate, and revisional authorities, as affirmed by the
learned Single Judge.
5.10. Considering the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel submitted
that the impugned judgment of the Division Bench deserves
to be set aside and the order of dismissal passed against
Respondent No. 1 restored.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent
No. 1 – Ranjan Kumar, at the outset, submitted that the appellants
have failed to make out any case warranting interference by this
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. According to
the learned counsel, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench
is a well-reasoned judgment passed in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
6.1. It was submitted that the entire disciplinary proceedings suffer
from a fundamental defect, namely, that it is a case of no
evidence. The charge against Respondent No. 1 pertained
to alleged acts said to have occurred in the State of Bihar,
yet not a single material witness from Bihar was examined to
substantiate the allegations. Though several witnesses were
cited in the memorandum of charge, only one formal witness
was examined, and none of the persons connected with the
alleged appointments, records, or complaints were produced
before the Enquiry Officer. In such circumstances, the findings
recorded against Respondent No. 1 are wholly unsupported
by legal evidence.
6.2. Learned counsel contended that mere production of documents
does not amount to proof of their contents. The disciplinary
authority relied upon letters and reports purportedly issued
by the Superintendent of Police, Patna and Superintendent of
Police, Jehanabad, but neither of the authors was examined
532 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
during the enquiry. Since the makers of those documents were
withheld, Respondent No. 1 was denied the valuable right
of cross-examination. It was urged that reliance upon such
unproved documents is contrary to settled principles of natural
justice and fair procedure.
6.3. It was further submitted that the so-called enquiry report referred
to by the department was nothing but a preliminary enquiry
report, and punishment could not have been founded upon such
material without proving the allegations in a regular departmental
enquiry. To punish Respondent No. 1 solely on the basis of a
preliminary fact-finding exercise, without examining the author
thereof, renders the entire proceeding vitiated.
6.4. According to the learned counsel, the service conditions of
Respondent No. 1 are governed by the provisions of the
Jharkhand Police Manual, including Rule 828 read with Appendix
49, which contemplate a full-fledged disciplinary process.
However, the present proceedings were conducted de hors the
prescribed procedure and reduced to a mere formality, with the
conclusion predetermined.
6.5. It was argued that although strict rules of the Indian Evidence
Act may not apply to departmental proceedings, the charge must
nonetheless be established on the touchstone of preponderance
of probabilities through cogent and reliable material. Suspicion,
conjecture, or departmental assumptions cannot substitute
proof. In the present case, there was no credible evidence to
establish impersonation, forgery, or dual employment.
6.6. Learned counsel further submitted that there was no conceivable
reason for Respondent No. 1, already serving as a constable
in Jharkhand, to seek another appointment in Bihar under a
false identity. The allegation itself is inherently improbable and
unsupported by any independent evidence.
6.7. It was urged that the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the
writ petition, failed to appreciate that the disciplinary authority
had ignored relevant materials and relied upon irrelevant
considerations. The Division Bench, therefore, rightly corrected
the manifest illegality in the order of dismissal while allowing
the Letters Patent Appeal.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 533
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
6.8. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in M.V.
Bijlani v. Union of India and others3 to contend that where
findings in disciplinary proceedings are based on no evidence or
are perverse, judicial review under Article 226 is fully available.
6.9. Learned counsel submitted that Respondent No. 1 has
consistently maintained one identity throughout. He has
been recorded with the Bihar School Examination Board,
Patna as “Ranjan Kumar” son of Kamta Singh. He appeared
in the matriculation examination under the same name and
was thereafter issued mark-sheets, school leaving certificate,
character certificate, and final matriculation certificate bearing
identical particulars. Even the voter identity card issued by the
Election Commission of India reflected the same credentials.
It was further submitted that on the basis of these genuine
records, Respondent No. 1 was appointed as Constable in
Garhwa District (Jharkhand). Thus, there was never any
attempt to suppress identity or assume a false name. The
allegation that he served as “Santosh Kumar”, son of Kamta
Sharma, is wholly baseless and unsupported by evidence.
6.10. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the respondent was
dismissed from service on 20.08.2010 and more than thirteen
years have elapsed. In the facts of the case, where the charge
itself remains unproved, no liberty ought to be reserved for
initiating any fresh departmental enquiry at this belated stage.
6.11. With the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel prayed that
the impugned judgment of the Division Bench is just, legal, and
equitable, and hence, this appeal deserves to be dismissed
as being devoid of merit.
7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties at considerable length and have carefully perused the materials
placed on record.
8. This Court by order dated 20.03.2023 granted stay of the operation
and implementation of the impugned judgment passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court.
3 (2006) 5 SCC 88
534 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
8.1. Thereafter, by order dated 14.07.2025, this Court impleaded
the Director General of Police, Bihar, as Respondent No. 2, to
facilitate an effective adjudication of the controversy arising in
the present proceedings.
8.2. Subsequently, by order dated 10.02.2026, this Court impleaded
Santosh Kumar, Son of Kamta Sharma, resident of Village
Pitambarpur, Post Pitambarpur, Police Station Ghoshi (Onkari),
District Jehanabad as Respondent No. 3. By the same order,
this Court directed Respondent No. 2 to conduct an enquiry
regarding the identity of two persons namely, Ranjan Kumar
and Santosh Kumar, who were stated to be residents of the
same village and whose fathers’ names were similar, namely
one Kamta Singh and the other Kamta Sharma.
8.3. Pursuant thereto, Respondent No. 1, Ranjan Kumar, appeared
before this Court along with his learned counsel on 17.03.2026.
This Court directed Respondent No. 1 to appear before
Respondent No. 2 on 23.03.2026 at 11.00 a.m. in his office,
where the Superintendent of Police, Jehanabad, Bihar was
also directed to remain present. This Court further directed that
Respondent No. 1 shall accompany the Superintendent of Police,
Jehanabad, who was to cause an enquiry to be conducted as
to whether Respondent No. 1 was the same person who had
worked in Patna, Bihar as well. It was additionally directed that
a Special Team be constituted by the Superintendent of Police,
Jehanabad, to verify whether Santosh Kumar, Respondent No.
3, was a real person and, if so, to trace and locate him, and that
a report be submitted through the Director General of Police,
Bihar, to this Court in a sealed cover.
8.4. In compliance with the aforesaid directions, the Director General
of Police, Bihar, submitted a detailed enquiry report dated
11.04.2026. The said report is taken on record. The same shall
form part of the present judgment and has been duly considered
along with the entire material available on record.
9. The principal issue which falls into consideration is whether the
disciplinary action taken against Respondent No. 1 Ranjan Kumar,
culminating in his removal from service, suffers from any legal infirmity
warranting interference in exercise of judicial review.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 535
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
10. As already stated, it is the specific case of the appellants that the
charges framed against Respondent No. 1 stood duly proved on
the basis of the material available on record in the departmental
proceedings, including photostat copies of the forms, photographs
and certificates submitted before the Police Department of Bihar,
as also the forms, photographs, and certificates produced before
Garhwa Police, Jharkhand, at the time of joining service together
with reports obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Patna and
the Superintendent of Police, Jehanabad. The learned Single Judge
rightly dismissed the writ petition challenging the order of dismissal
passed by the disciplinary authority, as affirmed by the Appellate
Authority and the Revisional Authority. However, the Division Bench
erred in setting aside the said orders by holding that there was no
evidence to establish that Respondent No. 1 had secured appointment
with the Bihar Police while continuing in service under the Jharkhand
Police. Whereas Respondent No. 1 denied the same, by stating
that there was no legally acceptable material to establish forgery,
impersonation, or dual employment and therefore, the punishment
of dismissal was wholly unwarranted. According to him, the Division
Bench rightly interfered with the findings of the learned Single Judge
and the departmental authorities.
11. For appreciating the rival contentions, it would be apposite to notice
the findings concurrently recorded by the authorities below, the
relevant portions of which are usefully extracted below:
Superintendent of Police, Garhwa (Disciplinary Authority)
“…. The delinquent in the query made in his defence
explanation, has mentioned that all the charges framed
against him are wrong but has not produced any strong
evidence in his defence.
The Conducting Officer, in his opinion, has found the
delinquent completely guilty for the charges framed
against him.
I also perused the case file of these departmental
proceedings. In the advertisement No. 1/04 of Jharkhand,
Ranchi, he was appointed in Garhwa Police on dated
18.05.05, where Police (Constable) No. 659. But, at the
time, the delinquent was appointed as Reserve Guard
536 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
at Kandi Police Station, on dated 20.12.07, he left on
compensatory leave for two days and started remaining
absent. For the charge of remaining absent, vide District
order No. 1261/07, salary of the delinquent was stopped.
During the period of absent of the delinquent from Garhwa
District, he got an appointment as a Constable in the name
of Santosh Kumar vide Patna District Order No. 10524/2007
dated 26.12.07 pursuant to the Advertisement No. 01/2004
of the State of Bihar, where Constable No. 1331 in Patna
District Force was allotted. In the above said appointment,
name of the delinquent is mentioned Santosh Kumar, son
of Kamta Sharma, resident of Village and post office –
Pitamberpur, Police Station – Goshi, District – Jahanabad.
Charges framed against the delinquent are supported by
the Exhibits available in the case file. Thus, the delinquent,
by keeping the department in dark, committing forgery and
cheating and making open violation of the Government
Service Code got appointment as a Constable in Patna
District Force by changing his name, which is not only the
violation of Civil Service Code but can be considered as
a matter of criminal case
Hence, I Richard Lakada (I.P.S.) Superintendent of Police,
Garhwa, in exercise of the powers conferred under Police
Manual Rule – 824 (which are approved under Section
7 of the Police Act - 05,861), find Police-659 Ranjan
Kumar guilty for the above offence and dismiss him from
the service.”
Deputy Inspector General of Police, Palamu Region (Appellate
Authority)
“….
I perused the charge framed against the delinquent, opinion
of the Conducting Officer, explanation submitted against
dismissal from service submitted by the delinquent, Final
Order passed by the Superintendent of Police, Garhwa,
Appeal representation received from the delinquent,
para-wise comments sent with reference to the points
raised in the appeal representation of the delinquent
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 537
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
by the Superintendent of Police and other documents
available in the case file. At the time, the delinquent got
appointment in Garhwa Police on dated 18.05.05 pursuant
to the advertisement No. 01/04 of the Police Headquarters,
Jharkhand Ranchi, Garhwa District Police No. 659 was
allotted to him. But at the time, he was posted in Kandi
Police station, he left on two days’ compensatory leave
on dated 20.12.07 and started remaining absent and
for the charge of being absent from duty, his salary was
stopped vide Garhwa District Order No. 1261/07. During
the period of his absent from duty itself, by changing his
name, he got appointment in the name of Santosh Kumar
on dated 26.1.07 in Patna District Force pursuant to the
advertisement No. 01/04 of the State of Bihar. Constable
No. 1331 was allotted to him in Patna District Force.
Thus, the delinquent police, by keeping the department
in dark, committing forgery and cheating, making open
violation of Civil Service Code, got appointment on the
post of Constable in Patna District Force by changing
his name, which is not only the violation of Civil Service
Code but can be considered a criminal matter as well.
Therefore, penalty awarded to the delinquent police 659
Ranjan Kumar by the Superintendent of Police, Garhwa
is appropriate.
Therefore, appeal representation received from the
delinquent police 659 Ranjan Kumar is dismissed.”
Director General and Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranch
(Revisional Authority)
“…A letter was written by the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Patna to the Superintendent of Police, Jehanabad
to conduct an investigation during which, it was found that
the same person is posted as constable in Garhwa District
Force in the name of Ranjan Kumar, accordingly the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Patna. The Superintendent of
Police, Garhwa was informed about the fact. During the
investigation in this regard by the Superintendent of Police,
Garhwa, all the certificates submitted by Police Ranjan
Kumar for appointment were found to be forged.
538 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The operation of this departmental action was completed
as per the prescribed procedure and on the basis of
the conducting officer being found guilty of misconduct,
an order of dismissal was passed against him by the
Superintendent of Police, Garhwa. Against this dismissal
order, an appeal was submitted by the offender to the
Regional Deputy Inspector General of Police, which has
been rejected. The allegation against the offender is very
serious and he has been found guilty. The offender has not
presented any clinching facts in his appeal representation
to prove his innocence, a criminal case is also made
against the offender. The dismissal order passed against
the delinquent is in accordance with the seriousness of the
allegation and is absolutely correct. Therefore, retaining
the sentence of dismissal from the service passed by the
Superintendent of Police, Garhwa in this departmental
proceeding for the above serious allegation, the appeal
representation of the delinquent is rejected.”
12. The disciplinary authority, upon consideration of the enquiry report,
documentary exhibits, service records, appointment forms, photographs
and reports obtained from the concerned authorities at Patna and
Jehanabad, concluded that the charges of fraud, impersonation,
forgery, cheating, unauthorised absence from duty and violation of
service discipline stood proved. A categorical finding was recorded that
Respondent No. 1, while serving as a Constable in Garhwa District
Police, clandestinely secured another appointment in the Bihar Police
under a different identity, namely “Santosh Kumar”, by suppressing his
existing employment and by using forged or manipulated documents.
12.1. The Appellate Authority independently reappraised the material
available on record and concurred with the findings of guilt,
holding that the punishment of dismissal was commensurate
with the gravity of the misconduct.
12.2. The Revisional Authority also affirmed the same, recording
that the departmental proceedings had been conducted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, that the allegations
were of a grave nature affecting the integrity of the police force,
and that Respondent No. 1 had failed to place any convincing
material to establish his innocence.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 539
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
12.3. Thus, the findings recorded by all three authorities were
concurrent findings of fact founded on relevant material
produced during the enquiry and cannot be characterised as
conjectural or based on no evidence.
13. The gravamen of the charge against Respondent No. 1 is not a mere
procedural lapse or unauthorised absence simpliciter. The allegations
concern a deliberate and premeditated fraud upon two State police
forces, namely the States of Jharkhand and Bihar, by securing or
attempting to secure public employment under two different names
with inconsistent parentage particulars, supported by fabricated or
manipulated documents.
14. The record reveals that Respondent No. 1 first applied for recruitment
in the Jharkhand Police and thereafter submitted another application
for appointment in the Bihar Police under the name “Santosh Kumar”.
The contemporaneous material indicates that the photograph used
in both applications was of the same person. It further appears that
while serving in the Jharkhand Police, he absented himself from duty
and joined the Bihar Police under the alternate identity.
15. Most significantly, pursuant to the directions of this Court, an
independent enquiry was conducted by the Bihar Police authorities.
The report dated 11.04.2026 submitted through the Director General
of Police, Bihar, indicates that forensic comparison of fingerprints,
biometric records, and photographs established that “Ranjan Kumar”
and “Santosh Kumar” were one and the same person. Genealogical
records and electoral rolls further suggested that the variance in the
father’s name and surname formed part of a manipulated identity
trail rather than proof of separate persons.
16. The aforesaid report is founded on objective scientific material,
including fingerprint examination and photographic comparison. Such
material substantially dislodges the defence of mistaken identity
or absence of proof that sought to be projected by Respondent
No. 1.
17. It is well settled that a member of the police force is expected to
maintain the highest degree of integrity, honesty and discipline.
Fraud at the threshold of entry into service strikes at the very root
of public employment. In the present case, the material available
goes far beyond mere suspicion and reasonably establishes a
540 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
conscious course of deceit adopted by Respondent No. 1 for
obtaining employment benefits from two sovereign employers in a
disciplined force.
18. The submission that some witnesses were not examined, or certain
documents were not formally proved does not advance the case of
Respondent No. 1. Departmental enquiries are not criminal trials.
So long as a fair opportunity is afforded and the conclusion is based
on relevant material having probative value, the Court would not
interfere. In the present matter, Respondent No. 1 was served with
a charge memorandum, furnished with the materials relied upon,
permitted to submit his defence, supplied with the enquiry report
and heard at every departmental stage.
19. The law is settled that the findings of fact recorded by the disciplinary
authority are not to be interfered with by the Court as a matter
of course, particularly while exercising jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. In departmental proceedings, the
standard of proof is one of preponderance of probabilities. Where
the material on record reasonably supports the departmental case,
the High Court would not reappreciate the evidence as if sitting
in appeal. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision
of this Court in Union of India and others v. Subrata Nath, in
Civil Appeal Nos. 7939-7940 of 2022 decided on 22.11.2022,
wherein the limits of judicial review in service disciplinary matters
have been authoritatively reiterated. The following paragraphs are
pertinent:
“15. It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from
interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental
inquiry except in circumstances where such findings
are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the
evidence on record, based on no evidence. However,
if principles of natural justice have been violated or the
statutory regulations have not been adhered to or there
are malafides attributable to the Disciplinary Authority, then
the courts can certainly interfere.
16. In the above context, following are the observations
made by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C.
Chaturvedi (supra):
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 541
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is
made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure
that the individual receives fair treatment and not
to ensure that the conclusion which the authority
reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the
court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges
of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/
Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the
inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether
rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether
the findings or conclusions are based on some
evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to
hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding
must be based on some evidence. Neither the
technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact
or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence
and conclusion receives support therefrom, the
disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/
Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act
as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence
and to arrive at its own independent findings on
the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere
where the authority held the proceedings against
the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory
rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the
conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have
ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with
the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so
as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority
has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence
542 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry,
the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that
evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence
or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be
canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of
India v. H.C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718 this Court held
at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration
of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority,
is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face
of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ
of certiorari could be issued.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
18. A review of the above legal position would
establish that the disciplinary authority, and on
appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding
authorities have exclusive power to consider the
evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are
invested with the discretion to impose appropriate
punishment keeping in view the magnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal,
while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot
normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty
and impose some other penalty. If the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/
Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief,
either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority
to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten
the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare
cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent
reasons in support thereof.”
[Emphasis laid]
17. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584, a two Judge Bench of this
Court held as below :
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 543
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as
an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in
the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that
another view is possible on the material on record.
If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and
the findings are based on evidence, the question of
adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of
the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with
the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore,
courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded
in departmental enquiries, except where such findings
are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have
arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material
on record. The courts will however interfere with the
findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural
justice or statutory regulations have been violated
or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious,
mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.
(Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6
SCC 749, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997)
7 SCC 463, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana
(1999) 5 SCC 762, and High Court of Judicature at
Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil (2000) 1 SCC 416).
[Emphasis laid]
18. In Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and others v.
Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu (2008) 5 SCC 569,
a two Judge Bench of this Court referred to several
precedents on the Doctrine of Proportionality of the order
of punishment passed by the Disciplinary Authority and
held that :
“21. Once it is found that all the procedural
requirements have been complied with, the courts
would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of
punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee.
The superior courts only in some cases may invoke
544 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an
employer is found to be within the legal parameters,
the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when
the misconduct stands proved.”
19. Laying down the broad parameters within which the
High Court ought to exercise its powers under Article
226/227 of the Constitution of India and matters relating to
disciplinary proceedings, a two Judge Bench of this Court
in Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2
SCC 610 held thus :
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as
an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by
the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by
the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise
of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice
in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 545
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed
to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the
finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in
case the same has been conducted in accordance
with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless
it shocks its conscience.”
20. In Union of India and others v. Ex. Constable Ram
Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373, a two Judge Bench of this Court
made the following pertinent observations :
“23. The well-ingrained principle of law is that it is
the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in
appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment
to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in
view the seriousness of the misconduct committed
by such an employee, it is not open for the courts
to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary
authority.
24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to
546 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority should be directed
to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The
scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment
is available but with a limited scope. It is only when
the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly
disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that
the courts would frown upon. Even in such a case,
after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left
to the disciplinary/ appellate authority to take a call
and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by
prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it
is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court
might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting
its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place
of punishment awarded by the competent authority
that too after assigning cogent reasons.”
21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa
and Others (supra) held that if the order of dismissal is
based on findings that establish the prima facie guilt of great
delinquency of the respondent, then the High Court cannot
direct reconsideration of the punishment imposed. Once the
gravity of the misdemeanour is established and the inquiry
conducted is found to be consistent with the prescribed
rules and reasonable opportunity contemplated under the
rules, has been afforded to the delinquent employee, then
the punishment imposed is not open to judicial review by
the Court. As long as there was some evidence to arrive
at a conclusion that the Disciplinary Authority did, such
an order becomes unassailable and the High Court ought
to forebear from interfering. The above view has been
expressed in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur (1972) 4
SCC 618.
22. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding
authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine
the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On
finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 547
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has
the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the
delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the
misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial
review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal
cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its
own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless
and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to
the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as
enumerated in P.Gunasekaran (supra). If the punishment
imposed on the delinquent employee is such that shocks
the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then
the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon
to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional
circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should
the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate
punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefor.
23. Applying the law laid down above to the instant
case, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to
have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by the
Disciplinary Authority.”
20. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,
we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge
correctly appreciated the limited scope of judicial review and declined
to substitute judicial opinion in place of the findings recorded in
the disciplinary proceedings. However, the Division Bench, while
exercising appellate jurisdiction in the Letters Patent Appeal,
clearly transgressed the settled parameters of judicial review by
reappreciating the evidence and disturbing concurrent findings of
fact recorded by the disciplinary authority, the Appellate Authority and
the Revisional Authority. Such an approach cannot be countenanced
in law.
21. Rule 828 of the Jharkhand Police Manual read with Appendix 49,
prescribes the procedure for imposition of major penalties. In the
present case, it is evident that Respondent No. 1 was duly served
with a charge memorandum, furnished with relevant materials,
afforded adequate opportunity to submit his defence, participated in
548 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the enquiry proceedings, received a copy of the enquiry report, and
submitted his representation thereon. The requirements of procedural
fairness and substantial compliance with the prescribed procedure
thus stand satisfied.
22. Since the allegations levelled against Respondent No. 1 pertain to
impersonation, fraud, use of forged credentials, dual employment
in police departments and unauthorised absence, the continuance
of such an employee in service would be wholly detrimental to
institutional discipline, public confidence, and the credibility of the
police force. The order of dismissal passed against Respondent No. 1
was a proportionate and justified administrative measure arising
out of a fair and lawful enquiry. Therefore, the Division Bench was
not justified in reappreciating the evidence and setting aside the
punishment imposed.
23. We are further of the considered view that the matter does not rest
merely within the realm of departmental misconduct. The allegations,
now reinforced by forensic findings, prima facie disclose the
commission of cognizable offences such as cheating, impersonation,
forgery, use of forged documents and furnishing false information to
public authorities under the Indian Penal Code or the corresponding
provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, as applicable.
24. Public employment, particularly in the police service, cannot be
converted into an instrument of fraud. If individuals entrusted with
enforcing the law themselves secure entry into service through
deception and fabricated credentials, it would seriously erode the
rule of law. In these circumstances, while restoring the disciplinary
action, it is both necessary and appropriate to direct initiation of
criminal proceedings in accordance with law.
25. Accordingly, the Director General of Police, Bihar and the Director
General of Police, Jharkhand, shall ensure that the matter is examined
by the competent jurisdictional police authority and appropriate steps
be taken, in accordance with law.
26. It is clarified that the observations made herein are for the purpose
of adjudication of the present service matter and for directing
examination of the criminal aspect. Any criminal proceedings shall
be decided on their own merits.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 549
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Ranjan Kumar & Ors.
27. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is accordingly set
aside. The judgment of the learned Single Judge along with the
order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority, as affirmed by
the appellate authority and the revisional authority stands restored.
27.1. In the background of the discussions made in this judgment,
we deem it necessary to exercise our jurisdiction under Article
142 of the Constitution of India, to do complete justice in
the matter. Accordingly, Patna District Order No. 10524 of
2007 dated 26.12.2007 is quashed, and the appointment of
Respondent No. 3, “Santosh Kumar”, son of Kamta Sharma as
a Constable in the Bihar Police is set aside. The consequences,
in law, shall follow.
28. This Civil Appeal stands allowed on the aforesaid terms. There shall
be no order as to costs.
29. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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