WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION INC.versusANI MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.

                 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1911 : 2025 INSC 656

                     Wikimedia Foundation Inc.
                                  v.
                   ANI Media Private Limited & Ors.
                        (Civil Appeal No. 5391 of 2025)
                                   09 May 2025
                [Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose with respect to the legality and propriety of the directions
       issued by the Division Bench of the High Court to the appellant
       to take down/delete the pages and discussion with regard to the
       observations made by the High Court.

                                    Headnotes†
       Constitution of India – Arts.19(1)(a), 21 – Respondent had
       initiated a suit against the appellant wherein the Single Judge
       of the High Court passed an order dated 20.08.2024 – Later, an
       opinion piece was published in the Indian Express (E-edition)
       titled ‘why the case against Wikipedia in India is a challenge
       to freedom of speech and information’ – It was also hosted in
       the platform of the appellant – Appellant filed an appeal before
       the Division Bench of the High Court against the order dated
       20.08.2024 – Pending said appeal, a video was posted about
       the case – A talk page was hosted on appellant’s platform
       opening up discussions on the ongoing proceedings before
       the High Court – Thereafter, Division Bench of the High Court
       issued directions against the appellant to take down/delete the
       said pages and discussions as it amounts to interference in
       court proceedings, violation of sub judice principle by a party
       to proceedings and borders on contempt – Legality thereof:
       Held: The judicial attitude to the sub judice principle or interference
       in court proceedings or contempt of court have been clearly spelt
       out by this Court – Words of this Court expressed through the
       nine-Judge Bench decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar : trial held
       subject to the public scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check
       against judicial caprice or vagaries and serves as a powerful
       instrument for creating confidence of the public in the fairness,

* Author
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    objectivity and impartiality of the administration of justice – Courts,
    as a public and open institution, must always remain open to
    public observations, debates and criticisms – Infact, courts should
    welcome debates and constructive criticism – Every important
    issue needs to be vigorously debated by the people and the press,
    even if the issue of debate is sub judice before a court – However,
    those who offer criticism should remember that Judges cannot
    respond to such criticism but if a publication scandalizes the court
    or a Judge or Judges and if a case of contempt is made out, as
    highlighted by Justice Iyer in the sixth principle, certainly courts
    should take action – But it is not the duty of the court to tell the
    media: delete this, take that down – For the improvement of any
    system and that includes the judiciary, introspection is the key –
    That can happen only if there is a robust debate even on issues
    which are before the court – Both the judiciary and the media are
    the foundational pillars of democracy which is a basic feature of
    our Constitution – For a liberal democracy to thrive, both must
    supplement each other – The above position has become more
    nuanced in the digital age – Nonetheless, the Division Bench had
    reacted disproportionately while issuing the impugned directions –
    Impugned directions are set aside. [Paras 30-33]
    Constitution of India – Arts.19(1)(a), 21 – Freedom of speech
    and expression vis-à-vis sub judice principle or interference
    in court proceedings or contempt of court – Discussed.
    [Paras 22-31]

                              Case Law Cited
    Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Mahrashtra [1966] SCR 744 :
    AIR 1967 SC 1; Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v.
    Securities and Exchange Board of India [2012] 12 SCR 256 :
    (2012) 10 SCC 603 – followed.
    In Re S. Mulgaokar [1978] 3 SCR 162 : (1978) 3 SCC 339 –
    relied on.
    Reliance Petrochemicals Limited v. Proprietors of Indian Express
    Newspapers [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 212 : (1988) 4 SCC 592; Swapnil
    Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India [2018] 11 SCR 57 : (2018)
    10 SCC 639; Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC
    OnLine SC 678; Ramesh Kumaran v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine
    667 – referred to.
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                                1913

    Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Private Limited & Ors.


                                  List of Acts
     Constitution of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Contempt of
     Courts Act, 1971.

                              List of Keywords
     Criticism of court proceedings; Censorship; Threat to the flow
     of information; Legality and propriety of directions; Contempt
     proceedings; Preventive injunction; Freedom of speech and
     expression; Sub judice principle; Interference in court proceedings;
     Wikipedia; Test of present and imminent danger; Freedom of press;
     Right to know; Doctrine of prior restraint; Postponement order;
     Prejudice to fairness of trial; Public trial; Accountability of judicial
     institutions; Judges should not be hypersensitive; Foundational
     pillars of democracy; Basic feature of Constitution; Digital age.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5391 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.2024 of the High Court
     of Delhi at New Delhi in FAOOS No. 146 of 2024

                          Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Kapil Sibal, Akhil Sibal, Sr. Advs., Ms. Tine Abraham, Vijayendra
     Pratap Singh, Abhijnan Jha, Ms. Shivani Rawat, Thomas J
     Vallianeth, Aayush Marwah, Ms. Shubhangni Jain, Abhi Uday
     Singh Gautam, Bakhshind Singh, Pranav Tomar, Aparajita Jamwal,
     Krishnesh Bapat, Ms. Sarah Haque, M/S. Trilegal Advocates On
     Record.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Sidhant Kumar, Sahil Tagotra, Om Batra, Sujay Jain.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

     Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

     This appeal by special leave is directed against the order dated
     16.10.2024 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi
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     (‘High Court’ hereinafter) in FAO (OS) No.146 of 2024 (Wikimedia
     Foundation Inc. Vs. ANI Media Private Limited and Ors.).
2.   Order dated 16.10.2024 of the Division Bench of the High Court
     reads as under:
         1. On the last date of hearing, learned counsel for
         respondent No. l had drawn this Court’s attention to a
         page published on the website ‘Wikipedia ‘wherein the
         impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge
         in CS(OS)524/2024 was adversely commented upon.
         It was stated in the said publication that the impugned
         order passed by the learned Single Judge to release the
         identities of the editors who made the edits amounted to
         ‘censorship and a threat to the flow of information’.
         2. This Court is of the prima facie view that the aforesaid
         comment on the impugned order passed by the learned
         Single Judge amounts to interference in Court proceedings,
         and that too, on a website managed by Wikimedia
         Foundation Inc. who is a defendant in the suit. The
         subjudice principle, prima facie, seems to have been
         ‘violated with impunity’ by Wikimedia Foundation Inc. - the
         appellant herein.
         3. This Court is also informed by the learned counsel for
         respondent No. l that after the last hearing, the observations
         made by this Bench have been ‘opened up for discussion’
         on Wikimedia Foundation Inc. website which, according to
         us, complicates and compounds the issue at hand.
         4. At this stage, Mr. Akhil Sibal, learned senior counsel
         for the appellant, on instructions, states that neither the
         pages wherein the impugned order passed by the learned
         Single Judge have been commented upon nor the pages
         on which the discussion qua the observations made by
         the Division Bench have been created by the Wikimedia
         Foundation Inc. He further states that, in the event this
         Court were to direct to take down of the offending pages
         and discussions, the said order would be complied with.
         5. Since this Court is of the prima facie view that the
         aforesaid comments on the impugned order passed by
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     Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Private Limited & Ors.


           the learned Single Judge and the discussion on the
           observations made by this Bench amount to interference
           in court proceedings and violation of the subjudice principle
           by a party to the proceeding and borders on contempt,
           this Court directs Wikimedia Foundation Inc.- the appellant
           herein to take down/delete the said pages and discussion
           with regard to the observations made by this Court within
           thirty six (36) hours. List on 21st October, 2024.
3.   When the related special leave petition was moved on 17.03.2025,
     this Court while issuing notice to the first respondent (ANI Media
     Private Limited) observed as follows:
           We are concerned with the legality and validity of the
           directions issued by the High Court in paragraph 5 of the
           impugned order.
4.   Therefore, in this appeal we are not concerned with the inter se merit
     of the case between the parties. We are primarily concerned with
     the legality and propriety of the direction of the High Court to the
     appellant to take down/delete the pages and discussion with regard
     to the observations made by the High Court. That is the width and
     scope of this appeal.
5.   However to put the matter in proper perspective, background facts
     may be briefly noted.
6.   Respondent has instituted a suit before the High Court against
     the appellant and others being CS (OS) No. 524/2024 (appellant
     is defendant No. 1 in the suit). Following are the reliefs claimed in
     the suit:
           In view of the above, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court
           may be pleased to:
           a. Pass an order against the defendants, restraining them
           from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking,
           distributing and/ or republishing any false, misleading and
           defamatory content against the plaintiff on any platform,
           including the platform maintained by defendant No. 1;
           b. Pass an injunction against the defendant No. 1 or its
           agents or any person acting on its behalf or under its
           authority, directing it to remove all false, misleading and
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          defamatory content against the plaintiff available on its
          platform, which can tarnish the reputation of the plaintiff and
          further restrain its users and administrators from publishing
          anything defamatory against the plaintiff on its platform;
7.   On 20.08.2024, a learned Single Judge of the High Court passed
     the following order:
          10. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that
          defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are claimed to be the ‘Administrators’
          of defendant No. l.
          11. Learned senior counsel for defendant No. l submits
          that they have no connection with defendant Nos. 2 to 4.
          12. Keeping in view the above submissions, defendant
          No. l is directed to disclose the subscriber details of
          defendant Nos.2 to 4 to the plaintiff, through its counsel,
          within a period of two weeks from today. On receipt of the
          said information, the plaintiff shall take steps for ensuring
          service of summons and notice on the application on the
          said defendants.
8.   Respondent filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A,
     Order X Rule 2 and Order XI read with Section 151 of the Code of
     Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘Civil Procedure Code’ hereinafter) in the suit
     seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against the appellant for
     alleged willful disobedience to the aforesaid order dated 20.08.2024.
     The same has been registered as I.A. No. 38498 of 2024.
9.   On 17.09.2024, an opinion piece was published in the Indian Express
     (E-edition) titled why the case against Wikipedia in India is a challenge
     to freedom of speech and information. It was also hosted in the
     platform of the appellant.
10. In the piece it was mentioned that while issuing contempt notice,
    the learned Single Judge had reportedly said: If you don’t like India,
    please don’t work in India: we will ask the Government to block
    your site. Observing that there could be a failure to understand the
    nature of the medium i.e. Wikipedia, it was commented upon that
    the court’s decision to hold some members accountable and punish
    a community of volunteers by disclosing their private information
    seems to be a challenge to freedom of speech and information. The
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    Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Private Limited & Ors.


     effect this would produce is that any form of critical information that
     a powerful organization does not like can be censored or become
     grounds for punishment which would set a wrong precedent.
11. Be that as it may, aggrieved by the order dated 20.08.2024 of the
    learned Single Judge, appellant preferred an appeal before the
    Division Bench of the High Court under Section 104 of the Civil
    Procedure Code read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the said Code
    for setting aside of the aforesaid order.
12. On 10.10.2024 a video was posted by news agency Medianama
    about the case. In this video again reference was made to the learned
    Judge’s warning to the appellant and discussed as to how the court’s
    decision can impact safe harbor protection and information flow in
    India; it can stifle the flow of information and knowledge, it being a
    form of censorship. In the ultimate analysis, it is the people who would
    suffer because of restrictions on knowledge and information flow.
13. It appears that when the appeal was listed before the Division Bench
    on 14.10.2024, respondent complained that publishing of such a
    page on the platform of the appellant was intended to pressurize
    the learned Single Judge. When appellant sought for time to seek
    instructions the court directed the matter to be listed for hearing on
    16.10.2024.
14. On 14.10.2024, a talk page was hosted on the appellant’s platform
    opening up discussions on the ongoing proceedings between the
    parties before the High Court. Be that as it may, on 16.10.2024, the
    impugned order was passed which we have extracted above. In the
    impugned order reference has also been made to the discussion
    page at paragraph 3.
15. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the Division
    Bench is palpably in error in holding that a prima facie case of
    interference in court proceeding, violation of the subjudice principle
    by a party to the proceeding and bordering on contempt was made
    out. He submits that High Court failed to consider that appellant is
    merely an intermediary having the limited role of providing technical
    infrastructure to host the platform and does not edit, update, maintain
    or monitor the contents on the platform. This was applicable to the
    talk page as well as to the video. Appellant, not being the author,
    cannot be said to have violated the sub judice principle merely
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     because the two pages were hosted on its platform. In any case,
     what were being hosted were secondary source material.
     15.1. Insofar the subjudice principle is concerned, learned senior
           counsel has referred to a Constitution Bench decision of this
           Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited Vs.
           Securities and Exchange Board of India1 and submits that the
           aforesaid decision provides for an order for postponement of
           publication in the event of violation of the subjudice principle
           but for determining such violation, the Constitution Bench set
           out the following criteria:
                   1.   There is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to
                        fairness of the trial or to the proper administration
                        of justice;
                   2.   Reasonable alternative methods will not prevent
                        the risk to fairness of the trial.
     15.2. He submits that there is no discussion at all by the Division
           Bench as to how the pages hosted on the platform of the
           appellant constitute a real and substantial risk of prejudice
           to the pending proceedings before the learned Single Judge.
           The impugned order is devoid of any reason.
     15.3. He further submits that the direction to take down the said
           pages is an unreasoned, unwarranted one and in violation of
           the right to open justice guaranteed under Article 21 of the
           Constitution of India. Further, it impinges upon the freedom
           of speech and expression, a guaranteed right under Article
           19(1)(a).
     15.4. Learned senior counsel submits that the view taken by the
           Division Bench that the contents of the pages hosted on the
           appellant’s platform borders on contempt is wholly unjustified.
           While observing so, the Division Bench failed to consider that
           the said pages were derived from other published secondary
           sources. Those were publicly available.
     15.5. Finally, learned senior counsel submits that passing of orders
           like the impugned one would have a chilling effect not only on


1   (2012) 10 SCC 603
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    Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Private Limited & Ors.


            free speech but also on the right to know. It would impinge
            upon the right to freely access and use the medium of internet.
     15.6. He, therefore, submits that in any view of the matter the
           impugned order cannot be sustained and is liable to be set
           aside.
16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued
    that the impugned order is only in the nature of an interim order.
    Appeal is pending as well as the suit. Therefore, this Court should
    not entertain the appeal.
     16.1. He further submits that such airing of adverse comments, that
           too on the platform of a party to the suit, certainly amounts
           to interference in court proceedings. Therefore, the Division
           Bench was justified in directing the appellant to take down/
           delete the offending pages. No interference is called for.
17. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received
    the due consideration of the Court.
18. At the outset, it would be appropriate to advert to the two pages which
    are the subject matter of the present proceeding. The page hosted
    on the platform of the appellant titled “Asian News International vs.
    Wikimedia Foundation (article page) along with the discussions
    concerning the article page hosted on its corresponding “talk page”
    (talk page) (collectively hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned page’)
    contain the details regarding the defamation case filed by respondent
    No. 1 against the appellant and some comments allegedly made by
    the learned Single Judge of the High Court in the case.
19. There was also a talk page hosted on the appellant’s platform on
    14.10.2024, where discussions were held on the ongoing proceedings
    between the parties before the High Court which was noticed by the
    Division Bench in paragraph 3 of the impugned order. Division Bench
    of the High Court in paragraph 5 of the impugned order opined that
    the comments and discussion on the observations made by the
    Bench amounts to interference in court proceedings and violation
    of the subjudice principle by a party to the proceeding and borders
    on contempt. It therefore directed the appellant to take down/delete
    the said pages and discussion within thirty-six (36) hours.
20. As noticed above, while directing the appellant to take down/delete
    the concerned pages and discussion, the Division Bench was of
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     the prima facie view that those amounted to interference in court
     proceedings, violation of the subjudice principle by a party to the
     proceeding and borders on contempt.
21. Let us deal with the above grounds.
22. In Reliance Petrochemicals Limited Vs. Proprietors of Indian Express
    Newspapers2, respondent had published articles containing adverse
    remarks on the issue of debentures by the appellant while the matter
    was subjudiced before this Court. When this was complained of by
    the appellant who sought initiation of contempt proceedings against
    the respondent, this Court granted an injunction against the said
    publication. At a later stage, this Court considered the question as
    to whether there was need for continuance of the order of injunction.
    It was in that backdrop that this Court formulated the principle of
    preventive injunction. It has been held that preventive injunction
    against the press can be granted only if reasonable grounds for
    keeping the administration of justice unimpaired necessitate so.
    This Court accepted the test of present and imminent danger on
    the basis of balance of convenience and clarified that it would be
    justified to grant preventive injunction against the press only if the
    danger apprehended is real and imminent.
     22.1. In the facts of that case, this Court reiterated that continuance
           of the injunction would amount to interference with the freedom
           of press in the form of preventive injunction. People at large
           have a right to know in order to be able to take part in a
           participatory development in the industrial life and democracy.
           Right to know is a basic right which citizens of a free country
           like ours aspire in the broader horizon of the right to live in
           this age under Article 21 of our Constitution. This right has
           reached new dimension and urgency.
23. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Sahara India Real Estate
    Corporation Limited (supra) considered a gamut of issues to find
    an acceptable constitutional balance between freedom of the press
    and administration of justice; as to when publishing matters relating
    to cases which are sub-judice interferes with or obstructs or tends
    to obstruct with the due course of justice. In that case, appellant


2   (1988) 4 SCC 592
[2025] 5 S.C.R.                                                       1921

    Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Private Limited & Ors.


     was directed by the respondent to refund amounts invested with the
     appellant in certain optionally fully convertible bonds with interest.
     This came to be challenged by the appellant. This Court had issued
     notice to the respondent. While putting the appellant to notice as
     to how it intended to secure the liabilities incurred by them to the
     optionally fully convertible bond holders during the pendency of
     the civil appeals, it was directed to file an affidavit together with
     a valuation certificate indicating fair market value of the assets
     proposed to be offered as security. Pursuant thereto, appellant
     filed an affidavit before this Court explaining the manner in which it
     proposed to secure its liability. While the matter was subjudiced, this
     Court communicated to the parties that they should try to reach a
     consensus with respect to an acceptable security in the form of an
     unencumbered asset. Learned counsel for the appellant addressed
     a letter to the learned counsel for the respondent enclosing the
     proposal with details of security to secure repayment to the bond
     holders as a pre-condition for stay during the pendency of the
     appeals. There were also correspondences between the respective
     Advocates-on-Record. A day prior to the hearing, one of the news
     channel flashed on television the details of the said proposal which
     was a confidential communication, obviously not meant for public
     circulation. The television channel concerned also named the valuer
     who had done the valuation of assets proposed to be offered as
     security. There was no information forthcoming from the respondent
     either of acceptance or rejection of the proposal. In the hearing it was
     complained on behalf of the appellant that disclosure of such details
     to the media by the respondent was in breach of confidentiality which
     was of course denied by the learned counsel for the respondent. It
     was in that context that this Court rendered its decision in Sahara
     India Real Estate Corporation Limited (supra).
     23.1. This Court examined the interplay between the constitutional
           safeguard of free speech on the one hand and the doctrine of
           prior restraint on the other hand. It was observed that Supreme
           Court is not only the sentinel of the fundamental rights but is
           also a balancing wheel between the rights, subject to social
           control. Freedom of expression is one of the most cherished
           values of a free democratic society. Freedom of the press
           which is a facet of freedom of expression includes the right
           to receive information and ideas of all kinds from different
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              sources. In essence, freedom of expression embodies the right
              to know. After noticing the development of law on the issue of
              prior restraint, this Court observed that while open justice is
              the corner stone of our judicial system as it instills faith in the
              judicial and legal system, it is not absolute. It can be restricted
              by the court in its inherent jurisdiction as done in the case of
              Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs. State of Mahrashtra3 wherein
              this Court upheld the decision of the High Court directing that
              deposition of the defence witnesses should not be reported
              in the newspapers. An order of a court passed to protect the
              interest and administration of justice cannot be treated as
              violative of Article 19(1)(a). This Court held that there is power
              in the courts to postpone reporting of judicial proceedings in
              the interest of administration of justice but burden lies on the
              applicant to demonstrate substantial risk of prejudice to the
              pending trial which would therefore justify postponement of
              offending publication.
     23.2. This Court posed the question as to whether a postponement
           order constitutes a restriction on Article 19(1)(a) and whether
           such restriction is saved under Article 19(2). Answering the
           above question, this Court observed that a postponement
           order is actually a balancing measure. It seeks to balance the
           right to free speech as well as the right to information on the
           one hand and the presumption of innocence of the accused
           on the other hand. However, this Court cautioned that given
           that postponement orders curtail the freedom of expression of
           third parties, such orders have to be passed only in cases in
           which there is real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness
           of the trial or to the proper administration of justice. Therefore,
           such orders of postponement should be ordered for a limited
           duration and without disturbing the content of the publication.
           It should be passed only when necessary to prevent real
           and substantial risk to the fairness of the court proceedings.
           The order of postponement will only be appropriate in cases
           where the balancing test otherwise favours non-publication
           for a limited period. If a High Court or the Supreme Court,
           being courts of record, pass postponement orders under their


3   AIR 1967 SC 1
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    Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Private Limited & Ors.


              inherent jurisdiction, such orders would fall within ‘reasonable
              restrictions’ under Article 19(2).
     23.3. This Court concluded that a postponement order is a
           neutralizing device evolved by the courts to balance interests
           of equal weightage viz freedom of expression vis-a-vis
           freedom of trial. However, this Court observed that keeping
           in mind the important role of the media, such a postponement
           order should be subject to the twin tests of necessity and
           proportionality to be applied only in cases where there is real
           and substantial risk of prejudice to the proper administration
           of justice or to the fairness of the trial. However, it would be
           open to the media to challenge such an order in appropriate
           proceedings. A postponement order is not a punitive measure
           but is a preventive measure.
24. A three-Judge Bench of this Court was considering the issue of live
    streaming of court proceedings in Swapnil Tripathi Vs. Supreme Court
    of India4. The Bench observed that our legal system subscribes to the
    principle of open justice and highlighted that right to access justice
    flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution would be meaningful only if
    the public gets access to the proceedings unfolding before the courts.
    Right to know and receive information is a facet of Article 19(1)(a)
    of the Constitution. Therefore, the public is entitled to witness court
    proceedings involving issues having an impact on the public at large
    or even on a section of the public.
     24.1. In his concurring opinion Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud (as
           His Lordship then was) referred to the observations of Lord
           Diplock in the following manner:
                   69. Lord Diplock, speaking for the House of Lords in
                   Attorney General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd., remarked
                   that open courts are a safeguard against judicial
                   arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy. Open courts, in his view,
                   help build public confidence in the administration
                   of justice. The public’s trust in the judicial system
                   depends on their perception of how courts function.
                   Open courts make it possible for the public to develop


4   (2018) 10 SCC 639
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                  reasonable perceptions about the judiciary, by
                  enabling them to directly observe judicial behaviour,
                  and the processes and outcomes of a case.
     24.2. He also referred to what Jeremy Bentham had said regarding
           publicity about courtroom proceedings as a mechanism to
           prevent improbity of Judges: it is the surest of all guards against
           improbity. It keeps the Judge himself, while trying, under trial.
     24.3. Referring to Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra), it was observed
           that various judgments of this Court have reinforced the
           importance of open courts. Public trial in open court is
           undoubtedly essential for the healthy, objective and fair
           administration of justice. Trial held subject to the public
           scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against judicial
           caprice or vagaries and serves as a powerful instrument for
           creating confidence of the public in the fairness, objectivity
           and impartiality of the administration of justice. Public
           confidence in the administration of justice is of such great
           significance that there can be no two opinions on the broad
           proposition that in discharging functions as judicial tribunals,
           courts must generally hear causes in open and must permit
           the public admission to the court-room. Publicity is the very
           soul of justice.
     24.4. Justice Chandrachud concluded that live streaming of
           court proceedings is a significant instrument for enhancing
           the accountability of judicial institutions and of all those
           who participate in the judicial process. It will result in the
           dissemination of information in the widest possible sense,
           imparting transparency and accountability to the judicial
           process. Above all, sunlight is the best disinfectant.
25. In a recent decision, this Court in Imran Pratapgadhi Vs. State of
    Gujarat 5 highlighted the importance of freedom of expression and the
    duty of the courts to uphold such freedom. This Court observed that
    sometimes Judges may not like spoken or written words but still it is
    the duty of the courts to uphold the fundamental right under Article
    19(1)(a). Except the courts there is no other institution which can


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     uphold the fundamental rights of the citizens. The courts must not
     be seen to regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and expression.
     This Court held thus:
           38. Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals
           or groups of individuals is an integral part of a healthy,
           civilised society. Without freedom of expression of
           thoughts and views, it is impossible to lead a dignified life
           guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. In a healthy
           democracy, the views, opinions or thoughts expressed by
           an individual or group of individuals must be countered by
           expressing another point of view. Even if a large number
           of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the
           right of the person to express the views must be respected
           and protected. Literature including poetry, dramas, films,
           stage shows, satire and art, make the life of human beings
           more meaningful. The Courts are duty-bound to uphold
           and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed under the
           Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may
           not like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty
           to uphold the fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a).
           We Judges are also under an obligation to uphold the
           Constitution and respect its ideals. If the police or executive
           fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights guaranteed
           under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty of the
           Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights. There
           is no other institution which can uphold the fundamental
           rights of the citizens.
           39. Courts, particularly the constitutional Courts, must be at
           the forefront to zealously protect the fundamental rights of
           the citizens. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to ensure
           that the Constitution and the ideals of the Constitution are
           not trampled upon. Endeavour of the courts should always
           be to protect and promote the fundamental rights, including
           the freedom of speech and expression, which is one of
           the most cherished rights a citizen can have in a liberal
           constitutional democracy. The Courts must not be seen to
           regulate or stifle the freedom of speech and expression.
           As a matter of fact, the Courts must remain ever vigilant
           to thwart any attempt to undermine the Constitution and
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            the constitutional values, including the freedom of speech
            and expression.
26. Ramesh Kumaran Vs. State6 is a case which arose out of a dispute
    between two lawyers of the same Bar leading to lodging of first
    information reports (FIRs) by both the sides. While hearing the
    matter, this Court impressed upon the parties to put an end to the
    entire controversy. It was observed that the second respondent had
    tendered an apology to the first appellant. Thereafter, he tendered
    a sincere and unconditional apology not only to this Court but also
    to the first appellant, Bar Council and to the Bar Association. This
    Court therefore suggested an amicable settlement. However, the
    first appellant was unwilling to accept such apology and thereby
    compromise the proceedings. Not only that, he even went to the
    extent of threatening the court that if the FIR filed by him against
    the second respondent was quashed, he would commit suicide. It
    was in that context the Bench observed as under:
            13.…………….In normal course, such threats must be
            taken very seriously by the Courts. Action for criminal
            contempt against the person giving such a threat must be
            initiated, which should be taken to its logical end, especially
            when the first appellant is a member of the Bar.
            14. However, we believe that if magnanimity is to be shown
            by someone, the same should be done by the persons
            holding the highest constitutional office. Moreover, the first
            appellant has shown some repentance by tendering an
            unconditional apology and by giving an undertaking not
            to repeat such misconduct. In view of this apology and in
            the peculiar facts of this case, we deem it proper not to
            initiate any action against the first appellant.
27. The contours of criminal contempt are well delineated. Section 2(c) of
    the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines criminal contempt as under:
            (c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether
            by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
            representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of
            any other act whatsoever which— (i) scandalises or tends


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            to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority
            of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to
            interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding;
            or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs
            or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any
            other manner;
28. Definitely, if a member of the public or a litigant or for that matter
    even the media tries to scandalize the court by making sweeping
    unfounded allegations against the court or the Judge(s) or by
    imputing motives against the Judge or Judges who had passed a
    judicial order or had conducted the court proceedings, certainly the
    courts would be justified to initiate criminal contempt proceedings
    against such contemnors. This would also be a ground to direct
    postponement of publication as contempt of court is a reasonable
    restriction enumerated under Article 19(2) on the freedom of speech
    and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
29. In Re S. Mulgaokar7 is a classic case qua attitude of Judges towards
    contempt of court. Speaking for the Bench, Chief Justice Beg in his
    opening remarks said that if criticism of court proceedings or court
    orders is done in a reasonable manner, which pre-supposes accuracy
    of information about a matter on which any criticism is offered, and
    arguments are directed fairly against any reasoning adopted, I would,
    speaking for myself, be the last person to consider it objectionable
    even if some criticism offered is erroneous. In the ultimate analysis,
    the Bench while dropping the proceedings observed that the need for
    appropriate norms of conduct exist in practically every sphere of life
    in which enlightened people strive to attain exalted ends irrespective
    of consequences.
     29.1. In his concurring opinion Justice Krishna Iyer culled out several
           principles. Relevant portion of his opinion reads thus:
                   27. The first rule in this branch of contempt power is
                   a wise economy of use by the court of this branch
                   of its jurisdiction. The court will act with seriousness
                   and severity where justice is jeopardised by a gross
                   and/or unfounded attack on the Judges, where the


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              attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial
              process. The court is willing to ignore, by a majestic
              liberalism, trifling and venial offences — the dogs
              may bark, the caravan will pass. The court will not be
              prompted to act as a result of an easy irritability. Much
              rather, it shall take a noetic look at the conspectus
              of features and be guided by a constellation of
              constitutional and other considerations when it
              chooses to use, or desist from using, its power of
              contempt.
              28. The second principle must be to harmonise the
              constitutional values of free criticism, the Fourth
              Estate included, and the need for a fearless curial
              process and its presiding functionary, the Judge. A
              happy balance has to be struck, the benefit of the
              doubt being given generously against the Judge,
              slurring over marginal deviations but severely proving
              the supremacy of the law over pugnacious, vicious,
              unrepentant and malignant contemners, be they the
              powerful press, gang-up of vested interests, veteran
              columnists of olympian establishmentarians. Not
              because the Judge, the human symbol of a high
              value, is personally armoured by a regal privilege
              but because “be you — the contemner — ever so
              high, the law — the people’s expression of justice —
              is above you”. Curial courage overpowers arrogant
              might even as judicial benignity forgives errant or
              exaggerated critics. Indeed, to criticise the Judge
              fairly, albeit fiercely, is no crime but a necessary
              right, twice blessed in a democracy For, it blesseth
              him that gives and him that takes. Where freedom
              of expression, fairly exercised, subserves public
              interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot
              gag it or manacle it, constitutionally speaking. A
              free people are the ultimate guarantors of fearless
              justice…………..
    29.2. Justice Iyer culled out four more principles. The third principle
          is to avoid confusion between personal protection of a libeled
          Judge and prevention of obstruction of public justice (and
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            the community’s confidence in that great process). While
            the former is not contempt, the latter is although there can
            be an overlapping between the two situations. According to
            him, the fourth functional canon which controls discretionary
            exercise of the contempt power by the court is that the
            media which is an indispensable intermediary between
            the state and the people and a necessary instrumentality
            in strengthening the forces of democracy, should be given
            free play within responsible limits even when the focus of
            its critical attention is the court, including the highest court.
            The next normative guideline i.e. the fifth is that Judges
            should not be hypersensitive even when distortions and
            criticisms overstep the limits; Judges should deflate vulgar
            denunciation by dignified bearing, condescending indifference
            and repudiation by judicial rectitude. Finally, and that is the
            sixth principle, after evaluating the totality of factors, if the
            court considers the attack on the Judge or Judges scurrilous,
            offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits,
            the strong arm of the law must strike a blow. This is to uphold
            public interest and public justice.
     29.3. Justice Krishna Iyer referred to a judgment of Lord Denning
           and observed that it was a very valuable and remarkably fresh
           approach to the question of criticism of courts in intemperate
           language and invocation of contempt of court against the
           contemnor. Justice Krishna Iyer highlighted a few observations
           of Lord Denning as under:
                40. A very valuable and remarkably fresh approach
                to this question of criticism of courts in intemperate
                language and invocation of contempt of court against
                the contemner, a person of high position, is found
                in Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner,
                ex. p. Blackburn. Lord Denning’s judgment is
                particularly instructive in the context of the obnoxious
                comments made by Quintin Hogg in an article in the
                “Punch” about the members of the Court of Appeal.
                The remarks about the Court of Appeal were highly
                obnoxious and the barbed words thrown at the Judges
                obviously were provocative. Even so, in a brief but
                telling judgment, Lord Denning held this not to be
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        contempt of court. It is illuminating to excerpt a few
        observations of the learned Judge:
             This is the first case, so far as I know, where
             this Court has been called on to consider an
             allegation of contempt against itself. It is a
             jurisdiction which undoubtedly belongs to us
             but which we will most sparingly exercise: more
             particularly as we ourselves have an interest in
             the matter.
             Let me say at once that we will never use this
             jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own
             dignity. That must rest on surer foundations.
             Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak
             against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do
             we resent it. For there is something far more
             important at stake. It is no less than freedom
             of speech itself.
             It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out
             of it, in the press or over the broadcast, to make
             fair comment, even outspoken comment, on
             matters of public interest. Those who comment
             can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court
             of justice. They can say that we are mistaken,
             and our decisions erroneous, whether they
             are subject to appeal or not. All we would ask
             is that those who criticise us will remember
             that, from the nature of our office, we cannot
             reply to their criticisms. We cannot enter into
             public controversy. Still less into political. We
             must rely on our conduct itself to be its own
             vindication.
             Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism,
             nothing which is said by this person or that,
             will deter us from doing what we believe is
             right; nor, I would add, from saying what the
             occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent
             to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option
             when things are ill done.”
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30. Thus, the judicial attitude to the subjudice principle or interference
    in court proceedings or contempt of court have been clearly spelt
    out by this Court which we have noted. Further accretion to the
    analysis would only be repetitive which we should avoid. However,
    before moving on, we may once again remind ourselves of the
    profound words of this Court expressed through the nine-Judge
    Bench decision in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar (supra): trial held subject
    to the public scrutiny and gaze naturally acts as a check against
    judicial caprice or vagaries and serves as a powerful instrument
    for creating confidence of the public in the fairness, objectivity and
    impartiality of the administration of justice. Courts, as a public and
    open institution, must always remain open to public observations,
    debates and criticisms. Infact, courts should welcome debates and
    constructive criticism. Every important issue needs to be vigorously
    debated by the people and the press, even if the issue of debate is
    subjudice before a court. However, those who offer criticism should
    remember that Judges cannot respond to such criticism but if a
    publication scandalizes the court or a Judge or Judges and if a case
    of contempt is made out, as highlighted by Justice Iyer in the sixth
    principle, certainly courts should take action. But it is not the duty of
    the court to tell the media: delete this, take that down.
31. For the improvement of any system and that includes the judiciary,
    introspection is the key. That can happen only if there is a robust
    debate even on issues which are before the court. Both the judiciary
    and the media are the foundational pillars of democracy which is a
    basic feature of our Constitution. For a liberal democracy to thrive,
    both must supplement each other.
32. The above position has become more nuanced in the digital age.
    Though the contention of the appellant is that it is an intermediary
    in terms of Section 2(1)(w) read with Section 79 of the Information
    Technology Act, 2000 providing only technical infrastructure that host
    the platform and does not (a) publish, add or remove content on the
    platform, (b) decide which users are vested with certain technical
    privileges or (c) continually judge and censor the content posted on
    the platform, thereby not liable for any third party information, data,
    or communication link made available or hosted by it, we are not
    inclined to examine this aspect of the matter since it may have a
    bearing on the proceedings of the pending suit. Nonetheless, we are
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     of the firm view that the Division Bench had reacted disproportionately
     while issuing the impugned directions.
33. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above, we have no
    hesitation in our mind that such directions could not have issued.
    Accordingly, the impugned directions contained in para 5 of the
    impugned order dated 16.10.2024 are hereby set aside.
34. Appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan