Holding

Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, as amended in 2021, includes unmarried and single women, and its exclusion would be unconstitutional.

Summary

The appellant, an unmarried woman in a consensual relationship, sought to terminate a 22‑week pregnancy under Section 3(2)(b) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act and Rule 3B of the MTP Rules. The Delhi High Court held that Rule 3B applied only to married women and denied the relief, prompting a Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the purposive interpretation of Rule 3B, the legislative intent of the 2021 MTP Amendment, and constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity and reproductive autonomy under Articles 14 and 21. It concluded that the words "any woman or her partner" in the amended Act remove the marital qualifier, bringing unmarried women within the ambit of Rule 3B, and that excluding them would violate Article 14. The Court also clarified that marital rape is covered for the purposes of the MTP Act and that RMPs may not impose extra‑legal conditions. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the writ petition was ordered to stand disposed of.

Issues considered

The proper interpretation of Rule 3B of the MTP Rules with respect to unmarried or single women
Whether exclusion of unmarried women from Rule 3B violates Article 14 of the Constitution
Whether the term "rape" in Rule 3B(a) includes marital rape for the purposes of the MTP Act
Whether RMPs can impose extra‑legal conditions such as family consent for abortions under the MTP Act

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 12 (ICESCR), s. Article 14, s. Article 21, s. Article 6 (ICCPR)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 312, s. 313, s. 314, s. 315, s. 316, s. 375
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (as amended by the MTP Amendment Act, 2021)s. 3(2)(b), s. 3(3), s. 3(4), s. 4, s. 5, s. 5A, s. 8
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 (as amended 2021)s. Rule 3B
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012s. 19, s. 21
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Subjects

Medical Termination of PregnancyRule 3BUnmarried womenReproductive rightsArticle 14Article 21Marital rapePurposive statutory interpretationRight to dignityAbortion law

Judgment

686 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 7 S.C.R. 686 [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A X
v.
THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, HEALTH AND FAMILY
WELFARE DEPARTMENT, GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.
B (Civil Appeal No. 5802 of 2022)
SEPTEMBER 29, 2022
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD,
A. S. BOPANNA AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971(Amended by the
C
Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Act,2021) – s.
3(2)(b) – Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules,2003 (Amended
by Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Rules, 2021) –
Rule 3B – Constitution of India – Article 14, 21 – The Interpretation
of Rule 3B of the MTP Rules – Unmarried or single women fall
D within the ambit of Rule 3B – Purpose and object – Right to
reproductive autonomy – Right to dignity – Appellant instituted a
writ petition before the High Court and submitted that appellant
was in a consensual relationship and had become pregnant – As
her partner had refused to marry her and in absence of source of
livelihood, she would be unable to nurture a child as an unmarried
E
mother – Appellant also instituted a Criminal Miscellaneous
Application for grant of interim relief to terminate her pregnancy
during the pendency of the Writ Petition – High Court declined to
grant relief sought and observed that Section 3(2)(b) of the MTP
Act was inapplicable and since the appellant, being an unmarried
F woman, was not covered by any of the sub-clauses of Rule 3B of
the MTP Rules – Appeal was filed before the Supreme Court against
the order of High Court and Supreme Court by ad interim order
modified the order of the High court and permitted the appellant to
terminate her pregnancy – As the case involved substantial question
of law the writ petition before the High Court was transferred to
G
Supreme Court – The issue involved is the interpretation of Rule 3B
of the MTP Rules – Held: In s.3 of the MTP Amendment Act the
words used are “Any women or her partner”, by eliminating the
words (which existed before the amendment) “married women or
her husband” the legislature intended to clarify the scope of s.3 –
H Further held, the meaning of the words “sexual assault” or “rape”
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X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 687
DELHI

in Rule 3B(a) includes a husband’s act of sexual assault or rape A
(Marital rape) committed on his wife but solely for the purposes of
the MTP Act – Unmarried women have right to access safe and
legal abortions between twenty and twenty-four weeks, if they face
a change in their material circumstances, similar to married women
– Distinction between married and unmarried women does not bear
B
nexus to the basic purpose and object which is sought to be achieved
by parliament – In view of the object, there is no rationale for
excluding unmarried or single women (who face a change in their
material circumstances) from the ambit of Rule 3B.
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971(Amended by the
Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Act,2021 ) – Object C
and purpose – Discussed.
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules,2003 (Amended by
Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Rules, 2021) – Rule
3B – Purposive Interpretation of.
D
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. Despite the enactment of the MTP Act, a number
of hurdles continue to prevent full access to safe and legal
abortions, pushing women to avail of clandestine, unsafe abortions.
These barriers include insufficient infrastructural facilities, a lack E
of awareness, social stigma, and failure to ensure confidential
care. In some situations, unmarried women face particular barriers
due to gender stereotypes about women’s sexual autonomy
outside marriage. These barriers are a serious impediment and
deter single women from seeking safe and legal abortions. Such
barriers may contribute to a delay in accessing abortion services F
or a complete denial of such services, consequently negating
women’s right to reproductive autonomy. [Para 18][709-B-C]
2. Although the actions of RMPs done in good faith under
the MTP Act are protected under Section 8, the spectre of
criminalization casts a chilling effect on them. The fear faced by G
RMPs of prosecution under the penal provisions often leads to
unnecessary delays. It is a common yet lamentable practice for
RMPs to insist on compliance with extra-legal conditions such
as consent from the woman’s family, documentary proofs, or
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688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A judicial authorisation. If the woman fails to comply with these
additional requirements, RMPs frequently decline to provide their
services in conducting legal abortions. These extra-legal
requirements have no basis in law. As noted above, it is only the
woman’s consent (or her guardian’s consent if she is a minor or
mentally ill) which is material. RMPs must refrain from imposing
B
extra-legal conditions on women seeking to terminate their
pregnancy in accordance with the law. They need only ensure
that the provisions of the MTP Act (along with the accompanying
rules and regulations) are complied with. [Paras 22, 23][710-G;
711-A-C]
C 3.An RMP’s decision to provide medical termination of a
pregnancy is also influenced by social stigma surrounding
unmarried women and pre-marital sex, gender stereotypes about
women taking on the mantle of motherhood, and the role of
women in society. The social stigma that women face for engaging
D in pre-marital sexual relations prevents them from realizing their
right to reproductive health in a variety of ways. They have
insufficient or no access to knowledge about their own bodies
due to a lack of sexual health education, their access to
contraceptives is limited, and they are frequently unable to
approach healthcare providers and consult them with respect to
E their reproductive health. Consequently, unmarried and single
women face additional obstacles. [Paras 26, 28][712-C-D; 713-
A-B]
4. The question that arises is whether Rule 3B includes
unmarried women, single women, or women without a partner
F under its ambit. The answer may be discerned by imparting a
purposive interpretation to Rule 3B. The cardinal principle of
the construction of statutes is to identify the intention of the
legislature and the true legal meaning of the enactment. The
intention of the legislature is derived by considering the meaning
G of the words used in the statute, with a view to understanding the
purpose or object of the enactment, the mischief, and its
corresponding remedy that the enactment is designed to actualise.
[Paras 30, 31][713-E-F]
5. While much of law’s benefits were (and indeed are) rooted
H in the institution of marriage, the law in modern times is shedding
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 689
DELHI

the notion that marriage is a precondition to the rights of A
individuals (alone or in relation to one another). Changing social
mores must be borne in mind when interpreting the provisions
of an enactment to further its object and purpose. In Navtej Singh
Johar, this Court emphasized the transformative nature of our
Constitution. Transformative constitutionalism promotes and
B
engenders societal change by ensuring that every individual is
capable of enjoying the life and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution. This Court observed that transformative
constitutionalism places a duty on the judiciary to “ensure and
uphold the supremacy of the Constitution, while at the same time
ensuring that a sense of transformation is ushered constantly and C
endlessly in the society by interpreting and enforcing the
Constitution as well as other provisions of law in consonance
with the avowed object. [Paras 38, 40][718-D-E; 719-C-D]
6. The MTP Amendment Act 2021 also extended the benefit
of the legal presumption of a grave injury to the mental health of D
a woman on account of the failure of contraception, to all women
and not just married women. In the unamended MTP Act,
Explanation II provided that the anguish caused by a pregnancy
resulting from a failure of any device or method used by any
“married woman or her husband” for the purpose of limiting the
number of children may be presumed to constitute a grave injury E
to the mental health of the woman. After the MTP Amendment
Act 2021, Explanation I provides that the anguish caused by a
pregnancy (up to twenty weeks) arising from a failure of a
contraceptive device used by “any woman or her partner” either
for limiting the number of children or for preventing pregnancy F
can be presumed to constitute a grave injury to a woman’s mental
health. By eliminating the word “married woman or her husband”
from the scheme of the MTP Act, the legislature intended to
clarify the scope of Section 3 and bring pregnancies which occur
outside the institution of marriage within the protective umbrella
of the law. [Para 53][724-C-E] G

7. The unamended MTP Act of 1971 was largely concerned
with “married women”, as evident from paragraph 1 of its
Statement of Objects and Reasons, which stated that most of the

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690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A women seeking abortions were married, and thus “under no
particular necessity to conceal their pregnancy.” Significantly, the
2021 Statement of Objects and Reasons does not make a
distinction between married and unmarried women. Rather, all
women are entitled to the benefit of safe and legal abortions.
[Para 56][725-D]
B
8 .The expression “mental health” has a wide connotation
and means much more than the absence of a mental impairment
or a mental illness. The World Health Organization defines mental
health as a state of “mental well-being that enables people to
cope with the stresses of life, realize their abilities, learn well
C and work well, and contribute to their community.” The
determination of the status of one’s mental health is located in
one’s self and experiences within one’s environment and social
context. Our understanding of the term mental health cannot be
confined to medical terms or medical language, but should be
D understood in common parlance. The MTP Act itself recognizes
the need to look at the surrounding environment of the woman
when interpreting injury to her health. Section 3(3) states that
while interpreting “grave injury to her physical or mental health”,
account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or
reasonably foreseeable environment. [Para 64][729-B-D]
E
9. Notwithstanding Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC,
the meaning of the words “sexual assault” or “rape” in Rule
3B(a) includes a husband’s act of sexual assault or rape committed
on his wife. The meaning of rape must therefore be understood
as including marital rape, solely for the purposes of the MTP Act
F and any rules and regulations framed thereunder. Any other
interpretation would have the effect of compelling a woman to
give birth to and raise a child with a partner who inflicts mental
and physical harm upon her. [Para 75][733-A-B]
10. In order to avail the benefit of Rule 3B(a), the woman
G need not necessarily seek recourse to formal legal proceedings
to prove the factum of sexual assault, rape or incest. Neither
Explanation 2 to Section 3(2) nor Rule 3B(a) require that the
offender be convicted under the IPC or any other criminal law

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X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 691
DELHI

for the time being in force before the pregnant woman can access A
an abortion. Further, there is no requirement that an FIR must
be registered or the allegation of rape must be proved in a court
of law or some other forum before it can be considered true for
the purposes of the MTP Act. Such a requirement would be
contrary to the object and purpose of the MTP Act. In fact,
B
Explanation 2 triggers the legal presumption as to mental trauma
“where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have
been caused by rape.” [Para 76][733-C-D]
11. If Rule 3B(c) was to be interpreted such that its benefits
extended only to married women, it would perpetuate the
stereotype and socially held notion that only married women C
indulge in sexual intercourse, and that consequently, the benefits
in law ought to extend only to them. This artificial distinction
between married and single women is not constitutionally
sustainable. The benefits in law extend equally to both single
and married women. A recognition of the fact that there may be a D
change in a woman’s material circumstance animates Rule 3B(c),
Rule 3B(g) and Rule 3B(f). However, Rule 3B does not enumerate
all the potential changes that a woman’s material circumstances
may undergo. It merely specifies some of the potential changes
to a woman’s material circumstances, in sub-rules (c), (f) and (g).
From the object and purpose of the MTP Act, its overall scheme, E
and the categories of women specified in Rule 3B, it is evident
that it was not the intention of the legislature to restrict the benefit
of Section 3(2)(b) and Rule 3B only to women who may be
confronted with a material alteration in the circumstances of their
lives in the limited situations enumerated in Rule 3B. Rather, F
the benefit granted by Rule 3B must be understood as extending
to all women who undergo a change of material circumstances.
[Paras 92, 93][738-C-F]
12. The ambit of reproductive rights is not restricted to
the right of women to have or not have children. It also includes G
the constellation of freedoms and entitlements that enable a
woman to decide freely on all matters relating to her sexual and
reproductive health. Reproductive rights include the right to
access education and information about contraception and sexual

H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A health, the right to decide whether and what type of
contraceptives to use, the right to choose whether and when to
have children, the right to choose the number of children, the
right to access safe and legal abortions, and the right to
reproductive healthcare. Women must also have the autonomy
to make decisions concerning these rights, free from coercion
B
or violence. [Para 96][739-B-D]
13. If women with unwanted pregnancies are forced to carry
their pregnancies to term, the state would be stripping them of
the right to determine the immediate and long-term path their
lives would take. Depriving women of autonomy not only over
C their bodies but also over their lives would be an affront to their
dignity. The right to choose for oneself – be it as significant as
choosing the course of one’s life or as mundane as one’s day-to-
day activities – forms a part of the right to dignity. It is this right
which would be under attack if women were forced to continue
D with unwanted pregnancies. [Para 110][744-G-H; 745-A]
14. The object of Section 3(2)(b) of the MTP Act read with
Rule 3B is to provide for abortions between twenty and twenty-
four weeks, rendered unwanted due to a change in the material
circumstances of women. In view of the object, there is no rationale
E for excluding unmarried or single women (who face a change in
their material circumstances) from the ambit of Rule 3B. A narrow
interpretation of Rule 3B, limited only to married women, would
render the provision discriminatory towards unmarried women
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 requires
the state to refrain from denying to any person equality before
F the law or equal protection of laws. Prohibiting unmarried or single
pregnant women (whose pregnancies are between twenty and
twenty-four weeks) from accessing abortion while allowing married
women to access them during the same period would fall foul of
the spirit guiding Article 14. The law should not decide the
G beneficiaries of a statute based on narrow patriarchal principles
about what constitutes “permissible sex”, which create invidious
classifications and excludes groups based on their personal
circumstances. The rights of reproductive autonomy, dignity, and
privacy under Article 21 give an unmarried woman the right of

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X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 693
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choice on whether or not to bear a child, on a similar footing of a A
married woman. [Para 121][749-E-G; 750-A]
15. The state must ensure that information regarding
reproduction and safe sexual practices is disseminated to all parts
of the population. Further, it must see to it that all segments of
society are able to access contraceptives to avoid unintended B
pregnancies and plan their families. Medical facilities and RMPs
must be present in each district and must be affordable to all.
The government must ensure that RMPs treat all patients equally
and sensitively. Treatment must not be denied on the basis of
one’s caste or due to other social or economic factors. It is only
when these recommendations become a reality that we can say C
that the right to bodily autonomy and the right to dignity are
capable of being realized. [Para 134][753-E-F]
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H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

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H
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 695
DELHI

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D
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F
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H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India,
(1997) 3 SCC 433 : [1997] 1 SCR 923; Devika Biswas
v. Union of India, (2016) 10 SCC 726; Paschim Banga
Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal (1996) 4
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B Case Law Reference
[2010] 5 SCR 322 referred to Para 20
[2018] 7 SCR 379 referred to Para 21
[2017] 8 SCR 212 referred to Para 25
C [2000] 2 SCR 515 referred to Para 27
[1992] 1 SCR 917 referred to Para 31
[2001] 1 SCR 221 referred to Para 31
[1958] SCR 360 referred to Para 31
D [1977] 3 SCR 412 referred to Para 31
[1965] SCR 626 referred to Para 32
[1992] 1 SCR 220 referred to Para 32
[2003] 1 SCR 975 referred to Para 32
E
[1978] 1 SCR 423 referred to Para 33
[1987] 2 SCR 1 referred to Para 33
[1955] 2 SCR 603 referred to Para 35
[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 24 referred to Para 35
F
[1995] 3 SCR 785 referred to Para 36
[1986] 2 SCR 169 referred to Para 36
[2009] 13 SCR 1139 referred to Para 36
[2008] 7 SCR 673 referred to Para 36
G
[1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 439 referred to Para 37
[2019] 14 SCR 928 referred to Para 37
[2019] 6 SCR 307 referred to Para 38

H [2013] 10 SCR 259 referred to Para 39
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 697
DELHI

[2018] 7 SCR 379 referred to Para 40 A
[2010] 5 SCR 322 referred to Para 41
[1950] SCR 869 referred to Para 49
[1992] 1 SCR 917 referred to Para 49
[2004] 1 SCR 180 referred to Para 49 B
[1962] 3 Suppl. SCR 973 referred to Para 60
[2017] 1 SCR 687 referred to Para 62
[2017] 1 SCR 261 referred to Para 62
C
2017] 8 SCR 212 referred to Para 63
[2017] 10 SCR 569 referred to Para 100
[2009] 13 SCR 989 referred to Para 101
[2018] 6 SCR 1 referred to Para 104
D
[1973] Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 111
[1981] 2 SCR 516 referred to Para 112
[2017] 13 SCR 821 referred to Para 115
[1959] Suppl. SCR 394 referred to Para 117
E
[1961] 2 SCR 295 referred to Para 117
[1989] 2 SCR 544 referred to Para 117
[1982] 1 SCR 629 referred to Para 117
[1992] 1 SCR 220 referred to Para 117 F
[1959] SCR 12 referred to Para 119
[1999] 1 SCR 669 referred to Para 120
[1997] 1 SCR 923 referred to Para 123
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 331 referred to Para 133 G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5802
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.07.2022 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in C. M. Application No.30708 of 2022 in W.P.
(C) No.10602 of 2022. H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A Dr. Amit Mishra, Rahul Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Ms. Ameyavikrama Thanvi,
Ms. Manisha Chava, Ms. Shivani, Ms. Shivika Mehra, Aman Sharma,
Manvendra Singh, Ms. Chitrangada Rastravara, Nithin Pavuluri, Abhijeet
Singh, Ms. Shagun Thakur, Ms. Poornima Singh, Gurmeet Singh Makker,
B Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, Ms. Preeti Rani, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Ketan Paul,
Adit Khorana, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

C Table of Contents
A. Background ...................................................................... 4
B. Submissions ....................................................................... 7
C. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971 and the
rules framed thereunder ........................................................ 9
D
D. Barriers to accessing safe and legal abortions ........... 16
i. RMPs’ fear of prosecution ....................................... 16
ii. Social stigma surrounding unmarried women....... 20

E E. Analysis ........................................................................... 22
i. The rule of purposive interpretation ..................... 22
ii. Transcending the institution of marriage as a
source of rights .......................................................... 27
F a. Modern or atypical forms of familial relationships ... 29
b. The equal status of married and unmarried or
single women ................................................................ 30
iii. The object and purpose of the MTP Act .............. 32
G iv. The MTP Act as an aid of interpretation:
Understanding “injury to mental health” .................. 39
v. Construing Rule 3B .................................................. 43
F. Constitutional values animating the interpretation
H
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 699
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of the MTP Act and MTP Rules ........................................... 55 A
i. The right to reproductive autonomy ...................... 55
ii. The right to dignity ................................................... 62
G. Purposive interpretation of Rule 3B furthers the
constitutional mandate ................................................... 66 B

H. India’s obligations under international law ................. 69
I. Reiterating the positive obligations of the state ........... 72

C
A. Background
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of the judgment of a Division Bench of
the High Court of Delhi dated 15 July 2022. The appellant invoked the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court seeking its permission to terminate D
her pregnancy before the completion of twenty-four weeks on 15 July
2022. Other ancillary reliefs were sought. For convenience of reference,
the reliefs claimed before the High Court are extracted below:
“A. Permit the Petitioner to terminate her ongoing pregnancy
through registered medical practitioners at any approved private E
or government center or Hospital before 15.07.2022 as her relief
will be infructuous after that as the pregnancy will be of around
24 Weeks by that time;
B. Restrain the Respondent from taking any coercive action or
criminal proceedings against the Petitioner or any Registered F
Medical Practitioner terminating the pregnancy of the petitioner
at any approved private center or hospital registered by Govt NCT
of Delhi;
C. Direct the Respondent to include unmarried woman also within
the ambit of the Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy G
Rules 2003 (as amended on 21.10.2021) for termination of
pregnancy under clause (b) of sub-section (2) Section 3 of the
MTP Act, for a period of up to twenty-four weeks;
D. Order an immediate Interim Relief of Stay during the course
of proceedings”
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700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 3. The appellant is an Indian citizen and a permanent resident of
Manipur. She is currently residing in New Delhi. The appellant averred
that she is the eldest amongst five siblings and that her parents are
agriculturists. At the time of the institution of the Writ Petition before the
High Court of Delhi,1 the appellant was carrying a single intrauterine
pregnancy corresponding to a gestational age of twenty-two weeks.
B
The appellant is an unmarried woman aged about twenty-five years,
and had become pregnant as a result of a consensual relationship. The
appellant wished to terminate her pregnancy as “her partner had refused
to marry her at the last stage.” She stated that she did not want to carry
the pregnancy to term since she was wary of the “social stigma and
C harassment” pertaining to unmarried single parents, especially women.
Moreover, the appellant submitted that in the absence of a source of
livelihood, she was not mentally prepared to “raise and nurture the child
as an unmarried mother.” The appellant stated that the continuation of
the unwanted pregnancy would involve a risk of grave and immense
injury to her mental health.
D
4. The appellant sought permission to terminate her pregnancy in
terms of Section 3(2)(b) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act
19712 and Rule 3B(c) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules
20033 (as amended on 12 October 2021). The appellant instituted a
Criminal Miscellaneous Application4 for grant of interim relief to terminate
E her pregnancy during the pendency of the Writ Petition.
5. By its order dated 15 July 2022, the High Court issued notice
restricted only to prayer C of the Writ Petition, and rejected the Criminal
Miscellaneous Application, effectively rejecting prayers A and B. The
High Court observed that Section 3(2)(b) of the MTP Act was
F inapplicable to the facts of the present case since the appellant, being an
unmarried woman, whose pregnancy arose out of a consensual
relationship, was not covered by any of the sub-clauses of Rule 3B of
the MTP Rules. The High Court held that:
“8. The Petitioner, who is an unmarried woman and whose
G pregnancy arises out of a consensual relationship, is clearly not
covered by any of the Clauses under the Medical Termination of
1
WP(C) 10602/2022
2
“MTP Act”
3
“MTP Rules”
4
H CM Application 30708/2022
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 701
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Pregnancy Rules, 2003. Therefore, Section 3(2)(b) of the Act is A
not applicable to the facts of this case.
9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner states that Rule 3B of the
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003 is violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950, inasmuch as it excludes
an unmarried woman. Whether such rule is valid or not can be B
decided only after the said rule is held ultra vires, for which
purpose, notice has to be issued in the writ petition and has been
done so by this Court.
10. As of today, Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy
Rules, 2003, stands, and this Court, while exercising its power C
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950, cannot go
beyond the Statute. Granting interim relief now would amount to
allowing the writ petition itself.”
6. The order of the High Court gave rise to the present appeal.
Notice was issued on the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal on 21 D
July 2022. This Court, by its order dated 21 July 2022 modified the order
of the High Court and permitted the appellant to terminate her pregnancy.
This Court passed the following ad interim order:
“22. In the above background, we pass the following ad interim
order: E
(i) We request the Director of the All India Institute of Medical
Sciences, Delhi to constitute a Medical Board in terms of the
provisions of Section 3(2D) of the Act, extracted in the earlier
part of this order, during the course of 22 July 2022; and(ii) In the
event that the Medical Board concludes that the fetus can be F
aborted without danger to the life of the petitioner, a team of doctors
at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences shall carry out the
abortion in terms of the request which has been made before the
High Court and which has been reiterated both in the Special
Leave Petition and in the course of the submissions before this
Court by counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Before G
doing so the wishes of the petitioner shall be ascertained again
and her written consent obtained after due verification of identity.”
7. Counsel for the petitioner and the respondent stated that a
Medical Board was constituted at the All India Institute of Medical
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702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A Sciences.5 The Board noted that the petitioner had consented to the
termination of her pregnancy and the procedure could be undertaken
without danger to her life. The report submitted by AIIMS indicates that
the termination of the pregnancy was safely carried out.
8. As the case involves a substantial question of law, this Court
B has taken it up for further consideration. The Writ Petition before the
Delhi High Court shall stand transferred to this Court. The significant
issue which comes up for determination in this appeal turns on the
interpretation of Rule 3B of the MTP Rules.
B. Submissions
C 9. Dr. Amit Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant made the following submissions:
a. The appellant was an unmarried woman whose partner had
refused to marry her. She did not wish to continue the
pregnancy and have the child out of wedlock as she lacked
D the financial resources to do so. She was not employed and
her parents were farmers;
b. She was also not mentally prepared to raise a child by herself.
If she was compelled to do so, it would cause grave injury to
her physical and mental health. The appellant was not prepared
E to face the social stigma surrounding unwed mothers; and
c. Section 3(2)(b) of the MTP Act and Rule 3B of the MTP
Rules are arbitrary and discriminatory because they exclude
unmarried women from their ambit. They discriminate against
women on the ground of marital status, in violation of Article
F 14 of the Constitution.
10. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned senior counsel and Additional
Solicitor General has ably assisted this Court in the interpretation of
Section 3(2) of the MTP Act and Rule 3B(c) of the MTP Rules. She
made the following submissions in support of the argument that Rule
G 3B(c) extends to unmarried or single women who are in long-term
relationships:
a. The interpretation of legislation must be guided by the text
and context of a statute as well as the object it seeks to achieve.

5
H “AIIMS”
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 703
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

The Statement of Objects and Reasons of a statute must also A
guide its interpretation;
b. Modern legislations ought to be read in view of the evolution
of society from the time of enactment. The literal construction
of beneficial legislations must be avoided, and they ought to
be given a purposive interpretation; B
c. A subordinate legislation should give effect to the statute it is
enacted under. If two constructions are possible, the
interpretation in consonance with the statutory scheme ought
to be adopted;
d. The term “change of marital status” in Rule 3B(c) ought to be C
interpreted as “change in the status of a relationship” to include
unmarried or single women as well as women who are not
divorced but are separated or have been deserted;
e. “Live-in relationships” are equivalent to marital relationships
because in both types of relationships, the woman is entitled D
to maintenance. Further, the children born out of such a
relationship are vested with the right of succession. Various
national legislations, including the MTP Act, do not make a
distinction between married women and unmarried or single
women; and E
f. Women enjoy the right to bodily integrity and autonomy, as
well as reproductive rights. They are entitled to exercise
decisional autonomy.
C. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971 and
the rules framed thereunder F
11. Before we embark upon a discussion on the law and its
application, it must be mentioned that we use the term “woman” in this
judgment as including persons other than cis-gender women who may
require access to safe medical termination of their pregnancies.
G
12. In India, termination of pregnancies is to be done strictly in
terms of the MTP Act. The preamble of the MTP Act states that it is an
“Act to provide for the termination of certain pregnancies by registered
medical practitioners and for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto.” The MTP Act specifies the requirements to be fulfilled for
H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A terminating a pregnancy, including the persons who are competent to
perform the termination procedure, circumstances when abortion is
permissible, and places where the procedure may be performed.
13. Section 3 of the MTP Act, as amended by the Medical
Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Act 2021 (8 of 2021),6 provides
B for when pregnancies may be terminated:
“Section 3 - When pregnancies may be terminated by registered
medical practitioners
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860), a registered medical practitioner shall not be guilty
C of any offence under that code or under any other law for the
time being in force, if any pregnancy is terminated by him in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
2[(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), a pregnancy
may be terminated by a registered medical practitioner,—
D
(a) where the length of the pregnancy does not exceed twenty
weeks, if such medical practitioner is, or
(b) where the length of the pregnancy exceeds twenty weeks but
does not exceed twenty-four weeks in case of such category of
woman as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act, if not
E
less than two registered medical practitioners are, of the opinion,
formed in good faith, that—
(i) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the
life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or
mental health; or
F
(ii) there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would
suffer from any serious physical or mental abnormality.
Explanation 1.—For the purposes of clause (a), where any
pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method
G used by any woman or her partner for the purpose of limiting the
number of children or preventing pregnancy, the anguish caused
by such pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave injury
to the mental health of the pregnant woman.

6
H “MTP Amendment Act 2021’’
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 705
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Explanation 2.—For the purposes of clauses (a) and (b), where A
any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been
caused by rape, the anguish caused by the pregnancy shall be
presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the
pregnant woman.
(2A) The norms for the registered medical practitioner whose B
opinion is required for termination of pregnancy at different
gestational age shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made
under this Act.
(2B) The provisions of sub-section (2) relating to the length of the
pregnancy shall not apply to the termination of pregnancy by the C
medical practitioner where such termination is necessitated by
the diagnosis of any of the substantial foetal abnormalities diagnosed
by a Medical Board.
(2C) Every State Government or Union territory, as the case may
be, shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a Board D
to be called a Medical Board for the purposes of this Act to
exercise such powers and functions as may be prescribed by rules
made under this Act.
(2D) The Medical Board shall consist of the following, namely:—
(a) a Gynaecologist; E
(b) a Paediatrician;
(c) a Radiologist or Sonologist; and
(d) such other number of members as may be notified in the Official
Gazette by the State Government or Union territory, as the case F
may be.
(3) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would
involve such risk of injury to the health as is mentioned in sub-
section (2), account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual
or reasonably foreseeable environment. G
(4) (a) No pregnancy of a woman, who has not attained the age
of eighteen years, or, who having attained the age of eighteen
years, is a mentally ill person, shall be terminated except with the
consent in writing of her guardian.
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706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A (b) Save as otherwise provided in clause (a), no pregnancy shall
be terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman.”
14. Section 3 provides that registered medical practitioners 7 shall
not be guilty of committing any offence under the Indian Penal Code
18608 or under any other law for the time being in force if they terminate
B pregnancies in accordance with the MTP Act. Sub-section (4) of Section
3 stipulates that a pregnancy shall not be terminated except with the
consent of the pregnant woman,9 and if the woman is below 18 years of
age or is mentally ill, with the consent of her guardian.10 Subject to the
requirement contained in sub-section (4) of Section 3, sub-section (2) of
Section 3 provides that a pregnancy may be terminated by a registered
C medical practitioner subject to the conditions laid down therein.
Pregnancies may be terminated where they do not exceed twenty
weeks11 and for certain categories of women where they do not exceed
twenty-four weeks.12 Section 3(2)(a) of the MTP Act permits the
termination of a pregnancy where the length of the pregnancy does not
D exceed twenty weeks. Section 3(2)(b) of MTP Act permits the termination
of a pregnancy, where the length of the pregnancy is between twenty
and twenty-four weeks, of such categories of women “as may be
prescribed by Rules.” These pregnancies under Section 3 may be
terminated if the medical practitioner in question (or in the case of
pregnancies between twenty and twenty-four weeks, not less than two
E registered medical practitioners) is, in good faith, of the opinion that:
a. The continuance of the pregnancy would put the pregnant
woman’s life at risk (Section 3(2)(i));
b. The continuance of the pregnancy would involve grave danger
F to the pregnant woman’s physical health (Section 3(2)(i));
c. The continuance of the pregnancy would involve grave danger
to the pregnant woman’s mental health (Section 3(2)(i)); or
d. There is a substantial risk that the child would suffer from a
serious physical or mental abnormality, if it is born (Section
G 3(2)(ii)).
7
“RMP”
8
“IPC”
9
Section 3(4)(b), MTP Act
10
Section 3(4)(a), MTP Act
11
Section 3(2)(a), MTP Act
12
H Section 3(3)(b), MTP Act
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 707
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

In determining whether the continuation of the pregnancy would A
involve grave danger to the pregnant woman’s physical or mental health,
her actual or reasonably foreseeable environment may be taken into
account.13 We are of the opinion that significant reliance ought to be
placed on each woman’s own estimation of whether she is in a position
to continue and carry to term her pregnancy.
B
15. The explanations to Section 3(2) provide for two legal
presumptions indicating what constitutes a grave injury to the pregnant
woman’s mental health. Explanation 1 stipulates that pregnancies which
occur due to the failure of a contraceptive device or method used by a
woman or her partner for limiting the number of children or preventing
pregnancy shall be presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental C
health of the pregnant woman, if the pregnancy has not exceeded twenty
weeks. A similar legal presumption is provided for in Explanation 2, which
stipulates that where a woman alleges that a pregnancy was caused as
a consequence of rape, the anguish caused by the pregnancy shall be
presumed to constitute a grave injury to her mental health. The legal D
presumption in Explanation 2 is applicable to all pregnancies which have
not exceeded twenty-four weeks.
16. Pregnancies may be terminated only in a hospital established
or maintained by the government,14 or any place approved for the
purposes of the MTP Act either by the government or by a District E
Level Committee constituted in terms of Section 4(b). Further, the
provisions of Section 4 and the provisions in Section 3(2) (which relate
to the length of the pregnancy and the requirement for the opinion of at
least two RMPs) shall not apply to the termination of pregnancies by an
RMP, where the RMP is, in good faith, of the opinion that the termination
of the pregnancy is immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant F
woman.15 The MTP Act also seeks to protect the privacy of a woman
who has terminated a pregnancy – any RMP who reveals the name or
other particulars of such a woman shall be liable to be sentenced to
imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine, or both. 16 The
MTP Act vests the Central Government with the power to enact rules to G

13
Section 3(3), MTP Act
14
Section 4(a), MTP Act
15
Section 5(1), MTP Act
16
Section 5A, MTP Act H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A carry out its provisions17 and the State Governments with the power to
enact regulations in certain cases.18
17. In exercise of this power, the Central Government notified the
MTP Rules. The MTP Rules govern various aspects of the medical
termination of pregnancies: they include rules on the District Level
B Committee,19 the Medical Board,20 RMPs,21 and the place where a
pregnancy may be terminated.22 Rule 3B, recently amended by the
Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Rules 2021, 23 is
relevant for the purposes of the present discussion. It governs the
categories of women under clause (b) of sub-section 2 of Section 3 who
may have their pregnancy terminated if the length of their pregnancy
C exceeds twenty weeks but does not exceed twenty-four weeks. It states:
“3-B. Women eligible for termination of pregnancy up to twenty-
four weeks.—The following categories of women shall be
considered eligible for termination of pregnancy under clause (b)
of sub-section (2) Section 3 of the Act, for a period of up to twenty-
D four weeks, namely—
(a) survivors of sexual assault or rape or incest;
(b) minors;
(c) change of marital status during the ongoing pregnancy
E (widowhood and divorce);
(d) women with physical disabilities [major disability as per criteria
laid down under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016
(49 of 2016)];
(e) mentally ill women including mental retardation;
F
(f) the foetal malformation that has substantial risk of being
incompatible with life or if the child is born it may suffer from
such physical or mental abnormalities to be seriously handicapped;
and
G 17
Section 6, MTP Act
18
Section 7, MTP Act
19
Rule 3, MTP Rules
20
Rule 3A, MTP Rules
21
Rules 4, 4A, MTP Rules
22
Rules 5, 6, 7, 8, MTP Rules
23
H “MTP Amendment Rules”
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 709
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(g) women with pregnancy in humanitarian settings or disaster or A
emergency situations as may be declared by the Government.”
D. Barriers to accessing safe and legal abortions
18. Despite the enactment of the MTP Act, a number of hurdles
continue to prevent full access to safe and legal abortions, pushing women
to avail of clandestine, unsafe abortions. These barriers include insufficient B
infrastructural facilities, a lack of awareness, social stigma, and failure
to ensure confidential care. In some situations, unmarried women face
particular barriers due to gender stereotypes about women’s sexual
autonomy outside marriage. These barriers are a serious impediment
and deter single women from seeking safe and legal abortions. Such C
barriers may contribute to a delay in accessing abortion services or a
complete denial of such services, consequently negating women’s right
to reproductive autonomy.
i. RMPs’ fear of prosecution
19. It is not only the factors mentioned above which hinder access D
to safe abortion but also a fear of prosecution under the country’s criminal
laws. Under the current legal framework, the MTP Act merely lays out
exceptions to the provisions criminalizing abortion in Sections 312 to 318
of the IPC. Section 3(1) of the MTP Act begins with a non-obstante
clause and stipulates that “Notwithstanding anything contained in the E
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), a registered medical practitioner shall
not be guilty of any offence under that Code or under any other law for
the time being in force, if any pregnancy is terminated by him in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.” In terms of Section 3(1),
the termination of a pregnancy is a criminal offence under the IPC,
unless it fulfils the conditions laid down in the MTP Act, including who F
can terminate a pregnancy, the place where termination can take place,
and the specific conditions in accordance with which such termination is
permissible. Section 5(2) provides penalties when termination of
pregnancy is carried out by a person who is not an RMP. Section 5(3)
provides penalties when termination of pregnancy is carried out in a G
place other than that mentioned in Section 4. RMPs and women seeking
termination of pregnancy are exempted from any legal action under the
provisions of the IPC mentioned above only when these conditions are
fulfilled.

H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 20. Presently, under the MTP Act, the opinion of an RMP (in
accordance with the restrictions and grounds laid down in the Act) is
decisive. It is on the basis of the opinion formed by RMP(s), either
under Section 3 or under Section 5, that a woman can terminate a
pregnancy under the MTP Act. This makes the MTP Act a provider-
centric law. Since women’s right to access abortion is conditional on the
B
approval by an RMP, the denial of services by an RMP compels women
to approach courts or seek abortions in unsafe conditions.24 A fear of
prosecution under this complex labyrinth of laws, including linking of the
MTP Act with the IPC, acts as a major barrier to safe abortion access,
by having a chilling effect on the behaviour of RMPs. The chilling effect
C — historically associated with protection of freedom of speech and
expression under Article 1925 — has an impact on the decision-making
of medical professionals acting under the MTP Act and consequently
impedes access to safe and legal abortions and the actualization of
women’s fundamental right to reproductive autonomy.
D 21. In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India26 a Constitution
Bench of this Court held that Section 377 had a chilling effect on the
exercise of freedom of individuals, which posed a grave danger to the
unhindered fulfilment of one’s sexual orientation, as an element of dignity
and privacy. One of us, Dr. DY Chandrachud, J., recognized the impact
of the criminalization of homosexuality on the spread of HIV/AIDS and
E how fear of prosecution and stigma created barriers to accessing HIV
prevention services, in his concurring opinion. This Court observed that:
“508. The silence and secrecy that accompanies institutional
discrimination may foster conditions which encourage escalation
of the incidence of HIV/AIDS. The key population is stigmatized
F by health providers, employers and other service providers. As a
result, there exist serious obstacles to effective HIV prevention
and treatment as discrimination and harassment can hinder access
to HIV and sexual health services and prevention programmes.”
22. Although the actions of RMPs done in good faith under the
G MTP Act are protected under Section 8, the spectre of criminalization
24
Dipika Jain, Time to Rethink Criminalisation of Abortion? Towards a Gender Justice
Approach, 12 NUJS Law Review 2 (2019)
25
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,
(2015) 5 SCC 1
26
H (2018) 10 SCC 1
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 711
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

casts a chilling effect on them. The fear faced by RMPs of prosecution A
under the penal provisions often leads to unnecessary delays. It is a
common yet lamentable practice for RMPs to insist on compliance with
extra-legal conditions such as consent from the woman’s family,
documentary proofs, or judicial authorisation.27 If the woman fails to
comply with these additional requirements, RMPs frequently decline to
B
provide their services in conducting legal abortions.
23. These extra-legal requirements have no basis in law. As noted
above, it is only the woman’s consent (or her guardian’s consent if she is
a minor or mentally ill) which is material. RMPs must refrain from imposing
extra-legal conditions on women seeking to terminate their pregnancy in
accordance with the law. They need only ensure that the provisions of C
the MTP Act (along with the accompanying rules and regulations) are
complied with.
24. Before the MTP Amendment Act 2021 was enacted, the
petitioners in a number of cases before the High Courts also sought
permission to terminate pregnancy where the gestation was below twenty D
weeks.28 The unamended MTP Act clearly stated that termination of
pregnancy between twelve and twenty weeks was permissible when
two RMPs opined that the request for termination of pregnancy meets
either of the four grounds mentioned in Section 3(2).29 Thus, there was
no legal requirement to refer cases within the legal limit of twenty weeks E
to the courts. These cases represent the barriers faced by women in
accessing safe and legal abortions, even when their decision to terminate
their pregnancy is permitted by the law.
25. This Court has recognized the disastrous effects of unnecessary
delays and lack of promptitude in the attitude of authorities when dealing F
with termination of pregnancies. In Z v. State of Bihar,30 this Court
27
Centre for Reproductive Rights, “Reform to Address Women’s and Girl’s need for
Abortion after 20 weeks “ (2018)
28
See XYZ v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 13751; Prabhavati Dattatray
Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC Online Bom 9339; ABC v. State of
Maharashtra, (2018) 4 Mah LJ 374, 2018 SCC Online Bom 144; A v. State of
Maharashtra, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1361; D. Rajeswari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1996
G
Cri LJ 3795; X v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4929; Puja Kumari v.
State of West Bengal, 2019 SCC Online Cal 1277; Velunatchiyar v. Govt. of Tamil
Nadu, 2021 SCC Online Mad 5047; M. Kala v. T
he Inspector of Police, 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 7767
29
Section 3(2)(b), MTP Act 1971
30
(2018) 11 SCC 572 H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A found that the state authorities, including Patna Medical College and
Hospital, had erred in failing to terminate the pregnancy before the
passage of twenty weeks, despite the woman seeking an abortion on the
ground that she was a victim of rape. This Court also rebuked the
“negligence and carelessness” of the authorities in failing to terminate
the pregnancy as permitted by law. It noted that the proceedings in the
B
High Court were unduly delayed, leading to a situation where the
pregnancy could not be terminated without endangering the life of the
woman in question. Compensation was awarded to the petitioner (i.e.,
the pregnant woman).
ii. Social stigma surrounding unmarried women
C
26. An RMP’s decision to provide medical termination of a
pregnancy is also influenced by social stigma surrounding unmarried
women and pre-marital sex, gender stereotypes about women taking on
the mantle of motherhood, and the role of women in society.

D 27. Due to a widespread misconception that termination of
pregnancies of unmarried women is illegal, a woman and her partner
may resort to availing of abortions by unlicensed medical practitioners in
facilities not adequately equipped for such medical procedures, leading
to a heightened risk of complications and maternal mortality. In Surendra
Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh,31 a two-Judge Bench of this
E Court upheld the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s order to convict the
accused under Section 314 read with Section 34 of the IPC for causing
a woman’s death by miscarriage. According to the facts of the case, the
accused was in an “illicit relation” with the deceased, an unmarried
woman of twenty-four years. The deceased woman had become
F pregnant as a result of this relationship. Both of them had approached
the clinic of a so-called doctor (who was named as a co-accused) to
terminate the pregnancy of around 3 months (approximately 12 weeks).
The purported doctor was neither an RMP nor was his clinic approved
by the government, in terms of the requirements laid down in the MTP
Act. During the procedure for the termination of pregnancy, the woman
G passed away. This case is illustrative of the dangers of unsafe abortions,
undertaken due to the social stigma surrounding pregnancies among
unmarried women.

31
H (2000) 4 SCC 110
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 713
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

28. The social stigma that women face for engaging in pre-marital A
sexual relations prevents them from realizing their right to reproductive
health in a variety of ways. They have insufficient or no access to
knowledge about their own bodies due to a lack of sexual health education,
their access to contraceptives is limited, and they are frequently unable
to approach healthcare providers and consult them with respect to their
B
reproductive health. Consequently, unmarried and single women face
additional obstacles.
29. The social stigma surrounding single women who are pregnant
is even greater and they often lack support from their family or partner.
This leads to the proliferation of persons not qualified / certified to practice
medicine. Such persons offer the possibility of a discreet abortion and C
many women may feel compelled by their circumstances to engage the
services of such persons instead of opting for a medically safe abortion.
As illustrated in Surendra Chauhan (supra), this often leads to disastrous
consequences for the woman. Keeping in view these barriers to accessing
reproductive healthcare, we now turn to the interpretation of Section D
3(2) of the MTP Act and Rule 3B of the MTP Rules.
E. Analysis
i. The rule of purposive interpretation
30. The question that arises is whether Rule 3B includes unmarried E
women, single women, or women without a partner under its ambit. The
answer may be discerned by imparting a purposive interpretation to Rule
3B.
31. The cardinal principle of the construction of statutes is to identify
the intention of the legislature and the true legal meaning of the enactment. F
The intention of the legislature is derived by considering the meaning of
the words used in the statute, with a view to understanding the purpose
or object of the enactment, the mischief, and its corresponding remedy
that the enactment is designed to actualise.32 Ordinarily, the language
used by the legislature is indicative of legislative intent. In Kanailal Sur
v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan,33 Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned Chief G

32
JUSTICE G.P SINGH, G.P. SINGH: P RINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, (LexisNexis,
2016), at page 12; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, 1992 Supp (2)
SCC 351; Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., (2001) 4 SCC
139
33
AIR 1957 SC 907 H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A Justice then was) opined that “the first and primary rule of construction
is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used
by the Legislature itself.” But when the words are capable of bearing
two or more constructions, they should be construed in light of the object
and purpose of the enactment. The purposive construction of the provision
must be “illumined by the goal, though guided by the word.”34 Aharon
B
Barak opines that in certain circumstances this may indicate giving “an
unusual and exceptional meaning” to the language and words used. 35
Before we engage in the exercise of purposive construction, we must
caution that a court’s power to purposively interpret a statutory text
does not imply that a judge can substitute legislative intent with their
C own individual notions. The alternative construction propounded by the
judge must be within the ambit of the statute and should help carry out
the purpose and object of the Act in question.
32. The interpretation of a subordinate legislation should be
consistent with the enabling Act.36 A subordinate legislation must be
D reasonable and in consonance with the legislative policy. It should be
interpreted in a meaningful manner, so as to give effect to the purpose
and object of the enabling Act. The interpretation which is in consonance
with the statutory scheme and gives effect to the statute must be adopted.
33. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh,
E it is stated that a statute must be read in its context when attempting to
interpret its purpose.37 Context includes reading the statute as a whole,
referring to the previous state of law, the general scope of the statute,
surrounding circumstances and the mischief that it was intended to
remedy.38 The treatise explains that:

F “For ascertaining the purpose of a statute one is not restricted to
the internal aid furnished by the statute itself, although the text of
34
Kanta Goel v. B.P Pathak, 1977 SCR (3) 412
35
AHARON BARAK, P URPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW, (Princeton University Press, 2007),
at page 306
36
Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 12;
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1986) 3 SCC 398; M.L. Kamra v. Chairman-cum-
G Managing Director, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (1992) 1 SCR 220; St Johns Teachers
Training Institute v. Regional Director National Council of Teacher Education, (2003)
3 SCC 321
37
JUSTICE G.P SINGH , G.P. S INGH: P RINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, (LexisNexis,
2016), at page 35
38
Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, (1977) 4 SCC 193, Reserve Bank of
H India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 715
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the statute taken as a whole is the most important material for A
ascertaining both the aspects of ‘intention’. Without intending to
lay down a precise and exhaustive list of external aids, Lord
Somervell has stated: “The mischief against which the statute is
directed and, perhaps though to an undefined extent the surrounding
circumstances can be considered. Other statutes in pari materia
B
and the state of the law at the time are admissible.” These external
aids are also brought in by widening the concept of ‘context’ “as
including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute,
but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari
materia, and the mischief which the statute was intended to
remedy.” In the words of Chinappa Reddy, J.: “Interpretation must C
depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of
interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context
is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.
That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation
match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know
D
why it was enacted.”
34. The rule of purposive interpretation was first articulated in
Heydon’s case39 in the following terms:
“for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be
they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common E
law) four things are to be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide.
F
3rd. What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of
all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress
the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
G
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro
privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono
publico”

39
(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 35. In Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar,40 the Constitution
Bench applied the mischief rule in Heydon’s case in the construction of
Article 286 of the Constitution. In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi
Admn.),41 a three-judge Bench of this Court held:
“231. During the last several years, the “golden rule” has been
B given a go-by. We now look for the “intention” of the legislature
or the “purpose” of the statute. First, we examine the words of
the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in
hand, we do not go further. We expound those words in the natural
and ordinary sense of the words. But, if the words are ambiguous,
uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, we deem
C it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature
rational meaning. We then examine every word, every section
and every provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We examine
the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the mischiefs
which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole
D situation and not just one-to-one relation. We will not consider
any provision out of the framework of the statute. We will not
view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the
motive force behind. We will consider the provisions in the
circumstances to which they owe their origin. We will consider
the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the
E law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences.
…
233. For this purpose, we call in external and internal aids:
“External aids are: the Statement of Objects and Reasons when
F the Bill was presented to Parliament, the reports of the Committee,
if any, preceding the Bill, legislative history, other statutes in pari
materia and legislation in other States which pertain to the same
subject matter, persons, things or relations.
Internal aids are: Preamble, scheme, enacting parts of the statutes,
G rules of languages and other provisions in the statutes.”
36. A catena of decisions emanating from this Court, including
Kerala Fishermen’s Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food,42 Bharat
40
(1955) 2 SCR 603
41
(1988) 3 SCC 609
42
H (1995) 4 SCC 341
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 717
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, New A
Delhi,43 Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corpn.,44 Union
of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar,45 settle the proposition that
progressive and beneficial legislation must be interpreted in favour of
the beneficiaries when it is possible to take two views of a legal provision.
37. In S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P.,46 while interpreting the B
Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (a beneficial legislation), this Court
interpreted the meaning of “dowry” by adopting the purposive
interpretation approach:
“12. It is a well-known rule of interpretation of statutes that the
text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while C
interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The courts
must look to the object which the statute seeks to achieve while
interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach
for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade
ourselves to agree with Mr Rao that it is only the property or
valuable security given at the time of marriage which would bring D
the same within the definition of “dowry” punishable under the
Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object
for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the
Act, “demand of dowry” as a consideration for a proposed
marriage would also come within the meaning of the expression E
dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr Rao that it is
only the “demand” made at or after marriage which is punishable
under Section 4 of the Act, some serious consequences, which
the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for
example a case where the bridegroom or his parents or other
relatives make a “demand” of dowry during marriage negotiations F
and later on after bringing the bridal party to the bride’s house
find that the bride or her parents or relatives have not met the
earlier “demand” and call off the marriage and leave the bride’s
house, should they escape the punishment under the Act. The
answer has to be an emphatic “no”. It would be adding insult to G
injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract
the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an interpretation would
43
(1986) 2 SCC 614
44
(2009) 9 SCC 61
45
(2008) 9 SCC 527
46
(1996) 4 SCC 596 H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A frustrate the very object of the Act and would also run contrary to
the accepted principles relating to the interpretation of statutes.”
(emphasis in original)
This principle has consistently been applied by this Court while
construing beneficial legislation. Most recently in KH Nazar v. Mathew
B K Jacob,47 Nageshwar Rao, J. writing for a two-judge Bench observed:
“11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed
with a purpose-oriented approach. The Act should receive a liberal
construction to promote its objects. Also, literal construction of
the provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the
C court’s duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making
the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should
receive a purposeful or functional interpretation.”
ii. Transcending the institution of marriage as a source of
rights
D
38. While much of law’s benefits were (and indeed are) rooted in
the institution of marriage, the law in modern times is shedding the notion
that marriage is a precondition to the rights of individuals (alone or in
relation to one another). Changing social mores must be borne in mind
when interpreting the provisions of an enactment to further its object
E and purpose. Statutes are considered to be “always speaking.”48
39. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse,49 this Court
reaffirmed that the law should be interpreted in terms of the changing
needs of the times and circumstances. AK Sikri, J. speaking for a two-
judge Bench of this Court, observed that it is the duty of courts to bridge
F the gap between law and society by advancing a purposive interpretation
of statutes:
“16. The law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes
patterns of behaviour. It reflects the values of society. The role of
the court is to understand the purpose of law in society and to
G help the law achieve its purpose. But the law of a society is a
living organism. It is based on a given factual and social reality
that is constantly changing. Sometimes change in law precedes
47
(2020) 14 SCC 126
48
Dharni Sugars and Chemicals Ltd v. Union of India, (2019) 5 SCC 480
49
H (2014) 1 SCC 188
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 719
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

societal change and is even intended to stimulate it. In most cases, A
however, a change in law is the result of a change in social reality.
Indeed, when social reality changes, the law must change too.
Just as change in social reality is the law of life, responsiveness to
change in social reality is the life of the law. It can be said that the
history of law is the history of adapting the law to society’s
B
changing needs. In both constitutional and statutory interpretation,
the court is supposed to exercise discretion in determining the
proper relationship between the subjective and objective purposes
of the law.”
(emphasis supplied)
C
40. In Navtej Singh Johar (supra), this Court emphasized the
transformative nature of our Constitution. Transformative
constitutionalism promotes and engenders societal change by ensuring
that every individual is capable of enjoying the life and liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution. This Court observed that transformative
constitutionalism places a duty on the judiciary to “ensure and uphold the D
supremacy of the Constitution, while at the same time ensuring that a
sense of transformation is ushered constantly and endlessly in the society
by interpreting and enforcing the Constitution as well as other provisions
of law in consonance with the avowed object.” 50
a. Modern or atypical forms of familial relationships E

41. The law must remain cognizant of the fact that changes in
society have ushered in significant changes in family structures. In S.
Khusboo v. Kanniammal, 51 a three-judge Bench of this Court
acknowledged that live-in relationships and pre-marital sex should not
be associated with the lens of criminality. The Court observed: F
“46. […] While there can be no doubt that in India, marriage is an
important social institution, we must also keep our minds open to
the fact that there are certain individuals or groups who do not
hold the same view. To be sure, there are some indigenous groups
within our country wherein sexual relations outside the marital G
setting are accepted as a normal occurrence. Even in the societal
mainstream, there are a significant number of people who see
nothing wrong in engaging in premarital sex. Notions of social
50
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1, at paragraph 122
51
(2010) 5 SCC 600 H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A morality are inherently subjective and the criminal law cannot be
used as a means to unduly interfere with the domain of personal
autonomy. Morality and criminality are not coextensive.”
42. In Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal,52 a
two-Judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us, Dr. DY Chandrachud,
B J. was a part) recognized that family units may manifest in atypical
ways:
“26. The predominant understanding of the concept of a “family”
both in the law and in society is that it consists of a single,
unchanging unit with a mother and a father (who remain constant
C over time) and their children. This assumption ignores both, the
many circumstances which may lead to a change in one’s familial
structure, and the fact that many families do not conform to this
expectation to begin with. Familial relationships may take the form
of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships. A
household may be a single parent household for any number of
D reasons, including the death of a spouse, separation, or divorce.
Similarly, the guardians and caretakers (who traditionally occupy
the roles of the “mother” and the “father”) of children may change
with remarriage, adoption, or fostering. These manifestations of
love and of families may not be typical but they are as real as
E their traditional counterparts. Such atypical manifestations of the
family unit are equally deserving not only of protection under law
but also of the benefits available under social welfare legislation.
The black letter of the law must not be relied upon to disadvantage
families which are different from traditional ones. The same
undoubtedly holds true for women who take on the role of
F motherhood in ways that may not find a place in the popular
imagination.”
43. Societal reality, as observed by this Court in Deepika Singh
(supra), indicates the need to legally recognize non-traditional
manifestations of familial relationships. Such legal recognition is
G necessary to enable individuals in non-traditional family structures to
avail of the benefits under beneficial legislation, including the MTP Act.
b. The equal status of married and unmarried or single women

52
H 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1088
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 721
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

44. Over the years, the Parliament has enacted legislation bringing A
about a congruence between the rights of married and unmarried women.
The Maternity Benefit Act 1961 was enacted to provide maternity benefits
to women employed in any establishment. In terms of Section 5 of the
Maternity Benefit Act 1961, the payment of maternity benefits is
extended to all women (including unmarried women) by the use of the
B
phrase “every woman.”
45. The Hindu Succession Act 1956 was enacted to codify the
law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. Section 6 of the Hindu
Succession Act 1956 pertains to devolution of interest in coparcenary
property. In terms of this provision a daughter, irrespective of her marital
status, is a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son by C
virtue of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005.
46. Section 8 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956
stipulates that any female Hindu regardless of her marital status has the
capacity to take a son or daughter in adoption. Sections 7 and 8 of the
Guardian and Wards Act 1890 allows for persons to apply for an order D
of guardianship without making any distinction between men or women,
married or unmarried.
47. Through the above enactments, the law has emphasized that
unmarried women have the same rights as married women in terms of
adoption, succession, and maternity benefits. Importantly, these legislations E
also signify that both married and unmarried women have equal decisional
autonomy to make significant choices regarding their own welfare.
48. In the evolution of the law towards a gender equal society, the
interpretation of the MTP Act and MTP Rules must consider the social
realities of today and not be restricted by societal norms of an age which F
has passed into the archives of history. As society changes and evolves,
so must our mores and conventions. A changed social context demands
a readjustment of our laws. Law must not remain static and its
interpretation should keep in mind the changing social context and advance
the cause of social justice. G
iii. The object and purpose of the MTP Act
49. The purpose or object of an enactment is the mischief at which
the enactment is directed and the remedy which the lawmakers have
devised to address the mischief. A number of decisions, such as Chiranjit
H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India,53 A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v.
M. Venkatachalam Potti,54 State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash
Chand Mahajan,55 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran
Singh56 lay down that it is desirable to look into the legislative history
and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of an enactment to appreciate
the background and state of affairs leading up to the legislation and the
B
circumstances which were prevalent at the time the statute was enacted.
50. Prior to the enactment of the MTP Act, the medical termination
of pregnancy was governed by the IPC. Chapter XVI of the IPC contains
a segment titled “Of the causing of miscarriage, of injuries to unborn
children, of the exposure of infants, and of the concealment of births”,
C with Sections 312 to 318 forming a part of this segment. Section 312
criminalizes abortion, making any person (including the pregnant woman
herself) liable for causing the miscarriage of a woman with an unborn
foetus, except where the procedure is done in good faith in order to save
the woman’s life. Section 313 stipulates a penalty of imprisonment for
D life or imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years when the
offence of ‘causing miscarriage’ is committed without the consent of
the woman. Section 312 to Section 316 of the IPC failed to make a
distinction between wanted and unwanted pregnancies, thereby making
it extremely onerous for women to access safe abortions. Before 1971,
the criminalization of abortion under the IPC often compelled women to
E seek unsafe, unhygienic and unregulated abortions, leading to an increase
in maternal morbidity and mortality.
51. In this background, the Medical Termination of Pregnancy
Bill57 was drafted and introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 17 November
1969. On 2 August 1971, the MTP Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha
F with the intent to “liberalise some of the restrictions under section 312 of
the IPC.”58 The MTP Act was enacted by Parliament as a “health”
measure, “humanitarian” measure and “eugenic” measure. The relevant
portion of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the MTP Act is
extracted below:
G
53
1950 SCR 869
54
1950 SCR 869
55
1992 Supp (2) SCC 351
56
(2004) 3 SCC 297
57
“MTP Bill”
58
H Lok Sabha Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. VII, No. 53 (2 August 1972), at page 159
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 723
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“1. The provisions regarding the termination of pregnancy in the A
Penal Code, 1860 which were enacted about a century ago were
drawn up in keeping with the then British Law on the subject.
Abortion was made a crime for which the mother as well as the
abortionist could be punished except where it had to be induced in
order to save the life of the mother. It has been stated that this
B
very strict law has been observed in the breach in a very large
number of cases all over the country. Furthermore, most of these
mothers are married women, and are under no particular necessity
to conceal their pregnancy.
2. In recent years, when health services have expanded and
hospitals are availed of to the fullest extent by all classes of society, C
doctors have often been confronted with gravely ill or dying
pregnant women whose pregnant uterus have been tampered with
a view to causing an abortion and consequently suffered very
severely.
3. There is thus avoidable wastage of the mother’s health, strength D
and, sometimes, life. The proposed measure which seeks to
liberalise certain existing provisions relating to termination of
pregnancy has been conceived (1) as a health measure—when
there is danger to the life or risk to physical or mental health of
the woman; (2) on humanitarian grounds-such as when pregnancy E
arises from a sex crime like rape or intercourse with a lunatic
woman, etc.; and (3) eugenic grounds—where there is substantial
risk that the child, if born, would suffer from deformities and
diseases.”
The whole tenor of the MTP Act is to provide access to safe and F
legal medical abortions to women. The MTP Act is primarily a beneficial
legislation, meant to enable women to access services of medical
termination of pregnancies provided by an RMP. Being a beneficial
legislation, the provisions of the MTP Rules and the MTP Act must be
imbued with a purposive construction. The interpretation accorded to
the provisions of the MTP Act and the MTP Rules must be in consonance G
with the legislative purpose.
52. The MTP Amendment Act 2021 intended to extend the benefits
of the statute to all women, including single and unmarried women. The
MTP Amendment Act 2021, which came into force from 24 September
H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 2021, introduced a major change in Section 3 of the MTP Act by extending
the upper limit for permissible termination of pregnancy from twenty
weeks to twenty-four weeks. In terms of the unamended MTP Act, a
pregnancy could only be terminated under Section 3(2) if it did not exceed
twenty weeks. The MTP Amendment Act 2021 extended the upper
limit and allowed termination of pregnancy up to twenty-four weeks for
B
specific categories of women based on the opinion of two RMPs.
53. The MTP Amendment Act 2021 also extended the benefit of
the legal presumption of a grave injury to the mental health of a woman
on account of the failure of contraception, to all women and not just
married women. In the unamended MTP Act, Explanation II provided
C that the anguish caused by a pregnancy resulting from a failure of any
device or method used by any “married woman or her husband” for
the purpose of limiting the number of children may be presumed to
constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the woman. After the
MTP Amendment Act 2021, Explanation I provides that the anguish
D caused by a pregnancy (up to twenty weeks) arising from a failure of a
contraceptive device used by “any woman or her partner” either for
limiting the number of children or for preventing pregnancy can be
presumed to constitute a grave injury to a woman’s mental health. By
eliminating the word “married woman or her husband” from the scheme
of the MTP Act, the legislature intended to clarify the scope of Section
E 3 and bring pregnancies which occur outside the institution of marriage
within the protective umbrella of the law.
54. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment
Act locates the purpose within the framework of reproductive rights:

F “With the passage of time and advancement of medical technology
for safe abortion, there is a scope for increasing upper gestational
limit for terminating pregnancies especially for vulnerable women
and for pregnancies with substantial foetal anomalies detected
late in pregnancy. Further, there is also a need for increasing access
of women to legal and safe abortion service in order to reduce
G maternal mortality and morbidity caused by unsafe abortion and
its complications. Considering the need and demand for
increased gestational limit under certain specified
conditions and to ensure safety and well-being of women, it
is proposed to amend the said Act. The proposed Bill is a
H step towards safety and well-being of women and will
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 725
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

enlarge the ambit and access of women to safe and legal A
abortion without compromising on safety and quality of care.
The proposal will also ensure dignity, autonomy, confidentiality
and justice for women who need to terminate pregnancy.”
(emphasis supplied)
55. The Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates that the MTP B
Amendment Act 2021 is primarily concerned with increasing access to
safe and legal abortions to reduce maternal mortality and morbidity. The
increase in the upper gestational limit for terminating pregnancies under
“certain specified conditions” was considered necessary to fulfil the goal
of ensuring “dignity, autonomy, confidentiality and justice for women C
who need to terminate pregnancy.”
56. The unamended MTP Act of 1971 was largely concerned
with “married women”, as evident from paragraph 1 of its Statement of
Objects and Reasons, which stated that most of the women seeking
abortions were married, and thus “under no particular necessity to conceal D
their pregnancy.” Significantly, the 2021 Statement of Objects and
Reasons does not make a distinction between married and unmarried
women. Rather, all women are entitled to the benefit of safe and legal
abortions.
57. This is consistent with the Reply of the Ministry of Health & E
Family Welfare to the Report on ‘Women’s Healthcare: Policy Options’
by the Committee on Empowerment of Women (2020-2021). The
Ministry responded that “to increase the access of safe abortion services
to all women, the provision of abortion services is proposed for all women
irrespective of their marital status.”59 The Committee on Empowerment
of Women had recommended a “raise [in] the permissible period of F
abortions to 24 weeks” and the deletion of the word “married” in the
legislation, so that “anyone can get an abortion without having to depend
on sham clinics as a last recourse.”
58. The legislative history of the MTP Act, including the speech
of the Minister of Health and Family Welfare while introducing the G
Amendment Bill, sheds light on the social context which necessitated
59
Committee of Empowerment of Women (2020-2021), “Fourth Report (Seventeenth
Lok Sabha) on the action taken by the Government on the recommendations contained
in the Eleventh Report (Sixteenth Lok Sabha) on Women’s Healthcare: Policy Options
“(2021), at page 33 H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A the MTP Amendment Act 2021. Dr. Harsh Vardhan (who was, at the
time, the Union Minister for Health and Family Welfare) stated that the
purpose of extending the upper gestational limit was to strengthen access
to comprehensive abortion care,60 especially for special categories of
women.61 Elaborating on the prevailing circumstances, the Union Minister
for Health and Family Welfare stated that “26 petitions have been filed
B
in the Supreme Court and over hundred petitions have been filed before
High Courts”, seeking permission for aborting pregnancies at a gestational
age beyond the twenty week limit. In view of this, the “long-awaited
amendment” was introduced.62 Responding to the objections raised on
the inclusion of a woman and her partner instead of a married woman
C and her husband, the Minister opined that in keeping abreast with the
evolution of social norms, the failure of contraceptive must encompass
access to abortion facilities to all women. 63 Explaining the object behind
this amendment, the Minister observed that taking into consideration an
ever-changing society, rights of single women, widows, and sex workers
must be considered.64 After the amendment, the scheme of the MTP
D
Act does not make a distinction between married and unmarried women
for the purpose of medical termination of pregnancies. The Amendment
Bill was termed as a “progressive legislation” introduced to uphold
women’s right to live with dignity.65
59. A statutory text concerned with a significant aspect of the
E right to life and enhancing access to reproductive rights should be given
the widest construction. The legislative history of the MTP Amendment
Act 2021 provides insight into the hardship at which the amendment
aimed. During the Parliamentary debates concerning the MTP
Amendment Act 2021, statistics were shared on the connection between
F unsafe abortions and maternal deaths. The continuing crisis of unsafe
abortions looms large in the parliamentary history of the MTP Act since
1971. Unsafe abortions are a leading but preventable cause of maternal
mortality and morbidity. However, despite the enactment of the MTP
Act in 1971, unsafe abortions continue to be the third leading cause of
maternal mortality, and close to eight women in India die each day due
G
60
Lok Sabha Debates, Seventeenth Series, Vol. VIII, Third Session, 2020/1041, No. 1
9 (17 March 2020), at page 271 (“Lok Sabha Debates, Seventeenth Series”)
61
Lok Sabha Debates, Seventeenth Series, at page 336
62
Lok Sabha Debates, Seventeenth Series, at page 272
63
Lok Sabha Debates, Seventeenth Series, at page 337
64
Lok Sabha Debates, Seventeenth Series, at page 337
H 65
Lok Sabha Debates, Seventeenth Series, at page 274
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 727
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

to causes related to unsafe abortions.66 Another study published in the A
BMJ Global Health points out to the grim statistics of unsafe abortions in
India: between the years 2007 and 2011, an estimate of 67% of abortions
carried out were classified as unsafe. 67 It further observes that
disadvantaged women in India, including women from a lower socio-
economic status, are at a higher risk of undergoing unsafe abortions. By
B
denying access to safe abortion services, restrictive abortion laws have
been shown to increase the incident of unsafe abortions.68 In view of
the serious social malady due to illegal and unsafe abortions, the MTP
Amendment Act 2021 intended to improve the availability and quality of
legal abortion care for women by liberalizing certain restrictive features
of the unamended MTP Act and by increasing the legal limit of the C
gestational period within which abortions could be conducted from twenty
to twenty-four weeks.
iv. The MTP Act as an aid of interpretation: Understanding
“injury to mental health”
60. When interpreting a sub-clause or part of a statutory provision, D
the entire section should be read together with different sub-clauses
being a part of an integral whole.69 In terms of Section 3(2)(b) of the
MTP Act, not less than two RMPs must, in good faith, be of the opinion
that the continuation of the pregnancy of any woman who falls within
the ambit of Rule 3B would involve (i) a risk to her life; (ii) grave injury E
to her physical health; or (iii) grave injury to her mental health.
Alternatively, not less than two RMPs must, in good faith, be of the
opinion that there is a substantial risk of the child suffering from a serious
physical or mental abnormality, if born. Women who seek to avail of the
benefit under Rule 3B of the MTP Rules continue to be subject to the
requirements of Section 3(2) of the MTP Act. F

66
United Nations Population Fund, “Seeing the Unseen: The case for action in the
neglected crisis of unintended pregnancy, State of World Populations’’ (2022)
67
Ryo Yokoe, Choudhury SS, et al., Unsafe abortion and abortion-related death among G
1.8 million women in India, 4(3) BMJ Global Health (2019)
68
Jonathan Baerak, et al., Unintended pregnancy and abortion by income, region, and
the legal status of abortion: estimates from a comprehensive model for 1990–2019, 8(9)
Lancet Global Health (2020)
69
Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Bababhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1
SCC 606; Madanlal Fakirchand v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., 1962 Supp (3)
SCR 973 H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 61. One of the grounds on the basis of which termination of
pregnancy may be carried out is when the continuance of a pregnancy
would involve risk of injury to the mental health of the woman. The
expression “grave injury to her physical or mental health” used in Section
3(2) is used in an overarching and all-encompassing sense. The two
explanations appended to Section 3(2) provide the circumstances under
B
which the anguish caused by a pregnancy may be presumed to constitute
a grave injury to the mental health of a woman.
62. Courts in the country have permitted women to terminate
their pregnancies where the length of the pregnancy exceeded twenty
weeks (the outer limit for the termination of the pregnancy in the
C unamended MTP Act) by expansively interpreting Section 5, which
permitted RMPs to terminate pregnancies beyond the twenty week limit
when it was necessary to save the life of the woman. In X v. Union of
India,70 Mamta Verma v. Union of India,71 Meera Santosh Pal v.
Union of India,72 Sarmishtha Chakrabortty v. Union of India,73 this
D Court permitted the termination of post twenty week pregnancies after
taking into account the risk of grave injury to the mental health of a
pregnant woman by carrying the pregnancy to term.
63. The grounds for approaching courts differ and include various
reasons such as a change in the circumstances of a woman’s environment
E during an ongoing pregnancy, including risk to life,74 risk to mental health,75
discovery of foetal anomalies,76 late discovery of pregnancy in case of
minors and women with disabilities,77 and pregnancies resulting from
sexual assault or rape.78 These are illustrative situations thrown up by

70
(2017) 3 SCC 458
F 71
(2018) 14 SCC 289
72
(2017) 3 SCC 462
73
(2018) 13 SCC 339
74
A v. Union of India, (2018) 14 SCC 75; X v. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 458; Meera
Santosh Pal v. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 462; Tapasya Umesh Pisal v. Union of
India, (2018) 12 SCC 57; Mamta Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 14 SCC 289
75
X v. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 458; Meera Santosh Pal v. Union of India, (2017)
G 3 SCC 462; Sarmishtha Chakrabortty v. Union of India, (2018) 13 SCC 339; Mamta
Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 14 SCC 289; Z v. State of Bihar, (2018) 11 SCC 572
76
A v. Union of India, (2018) 14 SCC 75; Sarmishtha Chakrabortty v. Union of India,
(2018) 13 SCC 339; Tapasya Umesh Pisal v. Union of India, (2018) 12 SCC 57; Mamta
Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 14 SCC 289
77
X v. Union of India, (2020) 19 SCC 806
78
H Z v. State of Bihar, (2018) 11 SCC 572; X v. Union of India, (2020) 19 SCC 806
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 729
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

cases which travel to the court. Although the rulings in these cases A
recognized grave physical and mental health harms and the violation of
the rights of women caused by the denial of the option to terminate
unwanted pregnancies, the relief provided to the individual petitioner
significantly varied.
64. The expression “mental health” has a wide connotation and B
means much more than the absence of a mental impairment or a mental
illness. The World Health Organization defines mental health as a state
of “mental well-being that enables people to cope with the stresses of
life, realize their abilities, learn well and work well, and contribute to
their community.”79 The determination of the status of one’s mental health
is located in one’s self and experiences within one’s environment and C
social context. Our understanding of the term mental health cannot be
confined to medical terms or medical language, but should be understood
in common parlance. The MTP Act itself recognizes the need to look at
the surrounding environment of the woman when interpreting injury to
her health. Section 3(3) states that while interpreting “grave injury to her D
physical or mental health”, account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s
actual or reasonably foreseeable environment. The consideration of a
woman’s “actual or reasonably foreseeable environment” becomes
pertinent, especially when determining the risk of injury to the mental
health of a woman.
E
65. There have been numerous decisions of the High Courts where
a purposive interpretation is given to the phrase mental health as used in
the MTP Act. In High Court on its Own Motion v. State of
Maharashtra,80 the High Court of Bombay correctly held that compelling
a woman to continue any unwanted pregnancy violates a woman’s bodily
integrity, aggravates her mental trauma and has a deleterious effect on F
the mental health of the woman because of the immediate social, financial
and other consequences flowing from the pregnancy.
66. In Sidra Mehboob Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra,81 the
High Court of Bombay permitted the petitioner to undergo medical
termination of her pregnancy on the ground that compelling her to continue G
with her unwanted pregnancy would be oppressive, and would likely
79
World Health Organization, “Promoting mental health: concepts, emerging evidence,
practice (Summary Report)’’ (2004)
80
2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8426
81
2021 SCC Online Bom 1839 H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A cause a grave injury to her mental health. The petitioner, a victim of
domestic violence, had approached the court to allow her to undergo an
abortion as she pleaded that she did not want to raise a child in the
absence of financial and emotional support from her husband; and raising
a child on her own would be burdensome. The High Court observed that
“mental state of a person is a continuum with good mental health being
B
at one end and diagnosable mental illness at the opposite end. Therefore,
mental health and mental illness, although sound similar, are not the
same.” 82
67. We note the correct interpretation adopted in two other
judgments from the Bombay High Court, where the Court permitted
C unmarried petitioners to abort, after purposively construing the effects
of carrying an unwanted pregnancy on the mental health of a woman. In
XYZ v. State of Maharashtra,83 an unmarried petitioner aged about 18
years was allowed to terminate her pregnancy in the 26th week after
considering her socio-economic condition, and the impact of the
D continuation of pregnancy on her mental health. In Siddhi Vishwanath
Shelar v. State of Maharashtra,84 a twenty-three year old petitioner
contended that she was not mentally ready to be an unwed mother and
sought the termination of her pregnancy of approximately twenty-three
weeks. The Petitioner was engaged in a consensual relationship but had
since parted ways from her partner, and thus wanted to terminate the
E unwanted pregnancy. While permitting the abortion, the High Court of
Bombay observed that insisting upon continuance of pregnancy would
involve a grave injury to the petitioner’s health. The High Court took
note of the woman’s submissions regarding her actual and foreseeable
environment.
F v. Construing Rule 3B
68. By framing Rule 3B, the legislature intended to solve the
mischief, so to speak, of women being unable to access abortions when
their lives underwent significant changes impacting their physical and
mental health, and their decision to have a child was impacted after the
G length of the pregnancy exceeded twenty weeks. The Minutes of the
Meeting of the Expert Committee held on 22 June 2021 for deliberating
upon and drafting the MTP Rules dealt with, inter alia, category of
82
2021 SCC Online Bom 1839, at paragraph 22
83
Judgment dated 6 October 2021 in WP(L) 21977 of 2021 (Bombay High Court)
84
H 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 11672
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 731
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

women under Rule 3B. The members of the Expert Committee suggested A
different categories of women such as “survivors of sexual violence/
rape; mentally challenged women, minors, women with disabilities; foetal
anomalies; conception in lactational amenorrhea period; single women
(such as unwed women (major), divorced and widowed, separated
women); women who are facing difficulties in contexts of humanitarian
B
setting/ emergencies and/or natural disasters; women victims of domestic
violence/ gender-based violence etc.” The members of the Expert
Committee urged the inclusion of women in Rule 3B, who often delay
revealing the pregnancy or making decisions as to its continuance, for
various reasons.
69. The common thread running through each category of women C
mentioned in Rule 3B is that the woman is in a unique and often difficult
circumstance, with respect to her physical, mental, social, or financial
state. All the different categories in Rule 3B represent women who
seek an abortion after twenty weeks either due to a delay in recognizing
pregnancy, or some other change in their environment impacting their D
decision on whether the pregnancy is wanted or unwanted. The law
recognizes the myriad ways in which a pregnancy may cause distress in
such situations and cause grave injury to her physical and mental health.
It gives such women latitude in seeking out the termination of an
unwelcome pregnancy by extending the gestational period up to which
the termination is legally permissible. E

70. Rule 3B(a) is based on an acknowledgement of the reality
that survivors of sexual assault, rape, or incest may face immense stigma
if and when they share the fact of their assault with others, including
family members. It is no secret that a culture of shame surrounds sexual
violence in India. Survivors are often hesitant to speak about the violence F
inflicted upon them. This is doubly the case with victims of incestuous
sexual assault or rape, whose close relatives abuse their power and
authority over the woman and other family members oftentimes being
unwilling to believe that the perpetrator (that is to say, their relative) is
guilty of sexual violence. Many survivors, including minors, may not even G
be aware that pregnancy is a possible consequence of rape. Hence, the
delay in revealing the fact that a man has raped them may lead to a
delay in discovering the pregnancy. Alternatively, the woman in question
may be unable to access medical facilities in a timely fashion and may
therefore find herself unable to terminate the pregnancy before the
completion of twenty weeks. H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 71. Married women may also form part of the class of survivors
of sexual assault or rape. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘rape’ is
sexual intercourse with a person, without their consent or against their
will, regardless of whether such forced intercourse occurs in the context
of matrimony. A woman may become pregnant as a result of non-
consensual sexual intercourse performed upon her by her husband. We
B
would be remiss in not recognizing that intimate partner violence is a
reality and can take the form of rape. The misconception that strangers
are exclusively or almost exclusively responsible for sex- and gender-
based violence is a deeply regrettable one. Sex- and gender-based
violence (in all its forms) within the context of the family has long formed
C a part of the lived experiences of scores of women.
72. Existing Indian laws recognize various forms of familial violence
– the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act 1994
criminalises the communication of the sex of the foetus to the pregnant
woman or her relatives. Section 498A of the IPC criminalises physical,
D mental, and emotional abuse. The Dowry Prohibition Act 1961
criminalises the giving and taking of dowry (a form of economic and
social violence). Physical abuse or sexual abuse by family members and
female infanticide are also criminalized under the IPC. Marital assault
merely forms a part of a long list of deeds that amount to violence in the
context of the family.
E
73. It is not inconceivable that married women become pregnant
as a result of their husbands having “raped” them. The nature of sexual
violence and the contours of consent do not undergo a transformation
when one decides to marry. The institution of marriage does not influence
the answer to the question of whether a woman has consented to sexual
F relations. If the woman is in an abusive relationship, she may face great
difficulty in accessing medical resources or consulting doctors.
74. It is only by a legal fiction that Exception 2 to Section 375 of
the IPC removes marital rape from the ambit of rape, as defined in
Section 375. Understanding “rape” under the MTP Act and the rules
G framed thereunder as including marital rape does not have the effect of
striking down Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC or changing the
contours of the offence of rape as defined in the IPC. Since the challenge
to Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC is pending consideration before
a different Bench of this Court, we would leave the constitutional validity
H to be decided in that or any other appropriate proceeding.
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 733
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

75. Notwithstanding Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC,85 the A
meaning of the words “sexual assault” or “rape” in Rule 3B(a) includes
a husband’s act of sexual assault or rape committed on his wife. The
meaning of rape must therefore be understood as including marital rape,
solely for the purposes of the MTP Act and any rules and regulations
framed thereunder. Any other interpretation would have the effect of
B
compelling a woman to give birth to and raise a child with a partner who
inflicts mental and physical harm upon her.
76. In order to avail the benefit of Rule 3B(a), the woman need
not necessarily seek recourse to formal legal proceedings to prove the
factum of sexual assault, rape or incest. Neither Explanation 2 to Section
3(2) nor Rule 3B(a) require that the offender be convicted under the C
IPC or any other criminal law for the time being in force before the
pregnant woman can access an abortion. Further, there is no requirement
that an FIR must be registered or the allegation of rape must be proved
in a court of law or some other forum before it can be considered true
for the purposes of the MTP Act. Such a requirement would be contrary D
to the object and purpose of the MTP Act. In fact, Explanation 2 triggers
the legal presumption as to mental trauma “where any pregnancy is
alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape.”
77. Rule 3B(b) includes minors within the category of women
who may terminate their pregnancy up to twenty-four weeks. They have E
been included in the list of special categories of women because
adolescents who engage in consensual sexual activity may be unaware
that sexual intercourse often results in pregnancy or be unable to identify
the signs of a pregnancy. The Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act 201286 is gender neutral and criminalizes sexual activity
by those below the age of eighteen. Under the POCSO Act, factual F
consent in a relationship between minors is immaterial. The proscription
contained in the POCSO Act does not – in actuality – prevent adolescents
from engaging in consensual sexual activity. We cannot disregard the
truth that such activity continues to take place and sometimes leads to
85
G
See Exception 2 to Section 375, IPC – Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife,
the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. It is to be noted that in
Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 800, this Court read Exception
2 to Section 375 down such that the words “eighteen years” replaced the words “fifteen
years” thereby raising the age of consent to eighteen years, notwithstanding the marital
status of the woman.
86
“POCSO Act” H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A consequences such as pregnancy. The legislature was no doubt alive to
this fact when it included adolescents within the ambit of Rule 3B of the
MTP Rules.
78. The absence of sexual health education in the country means
that most adolescents are unaware of how the reproductive system
B functions as well as how contraceptive devices and methods may be
deployed to prevent pregnancies. The taboos surrounding pre-marital
sex prevent young adults from attempting to access contraceptives. The
same taboos mean that young girls who have discovered the fact that
they are pregnant are hesitant to reveal this to their parents or guardians,
who play a crucial role in accessing medical assistance and intervention.
C
79. Furthermore, Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act requires that
any person, including a child, who has knowledge of the commission of
an offence punishable under the POCSO Act, or an apprehension that
such an offence may be committed, is mandatorily required to provide
information to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police. Section
D 19(2) of the POCSO Act stipulates that every such report under Section
19(1) shall be ascribed an entry number and recorded in writing, read
over to the informant, and entered in a book to be kept by the police unit.
Failure to report, as mandated by Section 19, is a punishable offence
under Section 21 of the POCSO Act. Neither the POCSO Act nor the
E Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules 2012 prescribe a
template or a format for the report mandated under Section 19(1).
80. When a minor approaches an RMP for a medical termination
of pregnancy arising out of a consensual sexual activity, an RMP is
obliged under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act to provide information
F pertaining to the offence committed, to the concerned authorities. An
adolescent and her guardian may be wary of the mandatory reporting
requirement as they may not want to entangle themselves with the legal
process. Minors and their guardians are likely faced with two options –
one, approach an RMP and possibly be involved in criminal proceedings
under the POCSO Act, or two, approach an unqualified doctor for a
G medical termination of the pregnancy. If there is an insistence on the
disclosure of the name of the minor in the report under Section 19(1) of
POCSO, minors may be less likely to seek out RMPs for safe termination
of their pregnancies under the MTP Act.
81. To ensure that the benefit of Rule 3B(b) is extended to all
H women under 18 years of age who engage in consensual sexual activity,
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 735
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

it is necessary to harmoniously read both the POCSO Act and the MTP A
Act. For the limited purposes of providing medical termination of
pregnancy in terms of the MTP Act, we clarify that the RMP, only on
request of the minor and the guardian of the minor, need not disclose the
identity and other personal details of the minor in the information provided
under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act. The RMP who has provided
B
information under Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act (in reference to a
minor seeking medical termination of a pregnancy under the MTP Act)
is also exempt from disclosing the minor’s identity in any criminal
proceedings which may follow from the RMP’s report under Section
19(1) of the POCSO Act. Such an interpretation would prevent any
conflict between the statutory obligation of the RMP to mandatorily report C
the offence under the POCSO Act and the rights of privacy and
reproductive autonomy of the minor under Article 21 of the Constitution.
It could not possibly be the legislature’s intent to deprive minors of safe
abortions.
82. As opposed to consensual sexual activity among adolescents, D
minors are often subjected to sexual abuse by strangers or family
members. In such cases, minor girls may (due to their tender age) be
unaware of the nature of abuse the abuser or rapist is subjecting them
to. In such cases, the guardian of minor girls may belatedly discover the
fact of the pregnancy, necessitating the leeway granted by Rule 3B.
E
83. Rule 3B(d) includes women with physical disabilities within
the special category of women. They may face additional complications
arising from their disabilities and be unable to carry the pregnancy to
term. They may also decide against carrying their pregnancy to term
due to any personal difficulties (mental or physical) which may arise
from their disability, either directly or indirectly. F

84. Women who are mentally ill (including “mental retardation”)
are covered by Rule 3B(e). It extends to all categories of women who
have mental illness. Women with mental illnesses may realize the fact of
their pregnancy or determine that they do not want to carry it to term,
later than usual. Further, men often sexually assault women with mental G
illnesses, especially if they have speech or communication disabilities, or
reside in psychiatric care facilities. Their speech / communication disability
may inhibit them from expressing that somebody has raped them. This
may lead to a delay in the discovery of the pregnancy and its termination.
H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A This was found to be the case in X v. Union of India,87 where a woman
with Down’s Syndrome had been raped by an unknown person. Her
guardian discovered the pregnancy after the passage of twenty weeks.
85. Rule 3B(f) includes that class of women where foetal anomalies
have a substantial risk of being incompatible with life or where the child,
B if born, may suffer from physical or mental “abnormalities” and be
seriously handicapped.
86. Rule 3B(g) comprehends within its fold a change in the material
circumstances of the pregnant woman by accounting for pregnant women
in “humanitarian settings or disaster or emergency situations.” Refugees
C who have had to flee their homes for any reason or those who find
themselves the victims of a natural or man-made disaster, or otherwise
in an emergency would fall within the ambit of this rule. They may not
realise that they are pregnant due to difficulty in accessing medical
facilities. For instance, in Siddhi Vishwanath Shelar (supra), the
petitioner was unable to visit a doctor due to the lockdown instituted by
D the government in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and became aware
of her pregnancy only after twenty weeks had elapsed.
87. Further, the decision to give birth to and raise a child is
necessarily informed by one’s material circumstances. By this, we mean
the situational, social, and financial circumstances of a woman or her
E family may be relevant to her decision to carry the pregnancy to term.
Those who fall victim to emergencies or disasters may unexpectedly
find themselves without a home or separated from their families. They
may have lost loved ones. Their livelihood may be adversely affected
and they may undergo other deeply impactful changes in their lives, both
F material and psychological. The possibility that they have suffered grave
injuries which alter their mobility or quality of life cannot be discounted.
The myriad changes that may take place in the aftermath of a disaster,
emergency, or humanitarian crisis cannot be exhaustively listed or
envisaged. Each woman’s circumstances are unique and we have merely
listed (by way of illustration) some of the many potential repercussions
G of the catastrophes accounted for in Rule 3B(g).
88. A woman in such situations may have decided to have a child
before the emergency or disaster which changed her material
circumstances. However, this change may understandably impact each
87
H 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9334
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 737
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

woman’s evaluation of her ability to raise a child as well as her willingness A
to carry the pregnancy to term. While many women may decide to carry
the pregnancy to term, others may no longer find the pregnancy to be a
viable or practical option. It is ultimately the prerogative of each woman
to evaluate her life and arrive at the best course of action, in view of the
changes to her material circumstances.
B
89. Rule 3B(c) states that a “change in the marital status during
the ongoing pregnancy (widowhood and divorce)” renders women eligible
for termination of their pregnancy under Section 3(2)(b). The impact of
the continuance of an unwanted pregnancy on a woman’s physical or
mental health should take into consideration various social, economic,
and cultural factors operating in her actual or reasonably foreseeable C
environment, as provided in Section 3(3). The rationale behind Rule 3B(c)
is comparable to the rationale for Rule 3B(g) i.e., a change in a woman’s
material circumstances during the ongoing pregnancy.
90. Rule 3B(c) is based on the broad recognition of the fact that a
change in the marital status of a woman often leads to a change in her D
material circumstances. A change in material circumstance during the
ongoing pregnancy may arise when a married woman divorces her
husband or when he dies, as recognized by the examples provided in
parenthesis in Rule 3B(c). The fact that widowhood and divorce are
mentioned in brackets at the tail end of Rule 3B(c) does not hinder our E
interpretation of the rule because they are illustrative.
91. A change in material circumstance may also result when a
woman is abandoned by her family or her partner. When a woman
separates from or divorces her partner, it may be that she is in a different
(and possibly less advantageous) position financially. She may no longer F
have the financial resources to raise a child. This is of special concern to
women who have opted to be a homemaker thereby forgoing an income
of their own. Moreover, a woman in this situation may not be prepared
to raise a child as a single parent or by coparenting with her former
partner. Similar consequences may follow when a woman’s partner dies.
G
92. Women may undergo a sea change in their lives for reasons
other than a separation with their partner (Rule 3B(c)), detection of
foetal “abnormalities” (Rule 3B(f)), or a disaster or emergency (Rule
3B(g)). They may find themselves in the same position (socially, mentally,
financially, or even physically) as the other categories of women
H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A enumerated in Rule 3B but for other reasons. For instance, it is not
unheard of for a woman to realise that she is pregnant only after the
passage of twenty weeks.88 Other examples are if a woman loses her
job and is no longer financially secure, or if domestic violence is
perpetrated against her,89 or if she suddenly has dependents to support.
Moreover, a woman may suddenly be diagnosed with an acute or chronic
B
or life-threatening disease, which impacts her decision on whether to
carry the pregnancy to term. If Rule 3B(c) was to be interpreted such
that its benefits extended only to married women, it would perpetuate
the stereotype and socially held notion that only married women indulge
in sexual intercourse, and that consequently, the benefits in law ought to
C extend only to them. This artificial distinction between married and single
women is not constitutionally sustainable. The benefits in law extend
equally to both single and married women.
93. A recognition of the fact that there may be a change in a
woman’s material circumstance animates Rule 3B(c), Rule 3B(g) and
D Rule 3B(f). However, Rule 3B does not enumerate all the potential
changes that a woman’s material circumstances may undergo. It merely
specifies some of the potential changes to a woman’s material
circumstances, in sub-rules (c), (f) and (g). From the object and purpose
of the MTP Act, its overall scheme, and the categories of women specified
in Rule 3B, it is evident that it was not the intention of the legislature
E torestrict the benefit of Section 3(2)(b) and Rule 3B only to women who
may be confronted with a material alteration in the circumstances of
their lives in the limited situations enumerated in Rule 3B. Rather, the
benefit granted by Rule 3B must be understood as extending to all women
who undergo a change of material circumstances.
F 94. It is not possible for either the legislature or the courts to list
each of the potential events which would qualify as a change of material
circumstances. Suffice it to say that each case must be tested against
this standard with due regard to the unique facts and circumstances that
a pregnant woman finds herself in.
G F. Constitutional values animating the interpretation of the
MTP Act and the MTP Rules

88
Siddhi Vishwanath Shelar v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 11672
89
H Sidra Mehboob Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 1839
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95. Certain constitutional values, such as the right to reproductive A
autonomy, the right to live a dignified life, the right to equality, and the
right to privacy have animated our interpretation of the MTP Act and
the MTP Rules. A brief discussion of these values is undertaken below.
i. The right to reproductive autonomy
96. The ambit of reproductive rights is not restricted to the right B
of women to have or not have children. It also includes the constellation
of freedoms and entitlements that enable a woman to decide freely on
all matters relating to her sexual and reproductive health. Reproductive
rights include the right to access education and information about
contraception and sexual health, the right to decide whether and what C
type of contraceptives to use, the right to choose whether and when to
have children, the right to choose the number of children, the right to
access safe and legal abortions, and the right to reproductive healthcare.
Women must also have the autonomy to make decisions concerning
these rights, free from coercion or violence.
D
97. Zakiya Luna has, in a 2020 publication, argued that reproduction
is both biological and political.90 According to Luna, it is biological since
physical bodies reproduce, and it is political since the decision on whether
to reproduce or not is not solely a private matter. This decision is intimately
linked to wider political, social, and economic structures. A woman’s
role and status in family, and society generally, is often tied to childbearing E
and ensuring the continuation of successive generations.
98. To this, we may add that a woman is often enmeshed in complex
notions of family, community, religion, and caste. Such external societal
factors affect the way a woman exercises autonomy and control over
her body, particularly in matters relating to reproductive decisions. Societal F
factors often find reinforcement by way of legal barriers restricting a
woman’s right to access abortion. The decision to have or not to have an
abortion is borne out of complicated life circumstances, which only the
woman can choose on her own terms without external interference or
influence. Reproductive autonomy requires that every pregnant woman G
has the intrinsic right to choose to undergo or not to undergo abortion
without any consent or authorization from a third party.

90
ZAKIYA LUNA, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR AND FIGHT FOR
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (NYU Press, 2020) H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 99. The right to reproductive autonomy is closely linked with the
right to bodily autonomy. As the term itself suggests, bodily autonomy is
the right to take decisions about one’s body. The consequences of an
unwanted pregnancy on a woman’s body as well as her mind cannot be
understated. The foetus relies on the pregnant woman’s body for
sustenance and nourishment until it is born. The biological process of
B
pregnancy transforms the woman’s body to permit this. The woman
may experience swelling, body ache, contractions, morning sickness,
and restricted mobility, to name a few of a host of side effects. Further,
complications may arise which pose a risk to the life of the woman. A
mere description of the side effects of a pregnancy cannot possibly do
C justice to the visceral image of forcing a woman to continue with an
unwanted pregnancy. Therefore, the decision to carry the pregnancy to
its full term or terminate it is firmly rooted in the right to bodily autonomy
and decisional autonomy of the pregnant woman.
100. In K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India,91 a nine-judge bench
D of this Court recognized the right to privacy as a constitutionally protected
right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In Puttaswamy (supra), this
Court held that the right to privacy enables individuals to retain and
exercise autonomy over the body and mind. The autonomy of the
individual was defined as “the ability to make decision on vital matters of
concern to life.”92 The judgement delivered on behalf of four judges
E described the right to privacy in the following terms:
“297. … Privacy postulates the reservation of a private space for
the individual, described as the right to be let alone. The concept
is founded on the autonomy of the individual. The ability of an
individual to make choices lies at the core of the human personality.
F The notion of privacy enables the individual to assert and
control the human element which is inseparable from the
personality of the individual. The inviolable nature of the
human personality is manifested in the ability to make
decisions on matters intimate to human life. The autonomy
G of the individual is associated over matters which can be
kept private. These are concerns over which there is a
legitimate expectation of privacy. The body and the mind
are inseparable elements of the human personality. The
91
(2017) 10 SCC 1
92
H KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, at paragraph 298 (“Puttaswamy”)
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integrity of the body and the sanctity of the mind can exist A
on the foundation that each individual possesses an
inalienable ability and right to preserve a private space in
which the human personality can develop. Without the ability
to make choices, the inviolability of the personality would be in
doubt.”
B
(emphasis supplied)
101. Importantly, Puttaswamy (supra) also deals with facets of
reproductive autonomy. Chelameshwar, J. held that a “woman’s freedom
of choice whether to bear a child or abort her pregnancy are areas
which fall in the realm of privacy.”93 This Court recognized the right to C
bodily integrity as an important facet of the right to privacy. Puttaswamy
(supra) considered Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh
Administration94 to reiterate that the statutory right of a woman to
undergo termination of pregnancy under the MTP Act is relatable to the
constitutional right to make reproductive choices under Article 21 of the
Constitution.95 D

102. In Suchita Srivastava (supra) this Court explicitly recognized
the concept of reproductive autonomy. In this case, the victim, an
orphaned woman of around 19 years, with mental retardation, became
pregnant as a result of a rape that took place while she was an inmate at
a government-run welfare institution. After the discovery of her E
pregnancy, the Chandigarh Administration approached the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana seeking approval for the termination of her
pregnancy. The High Court constituted an expert body to conduct an
enquiry into the facts. The expert body recorded that the victim had
expressed her willingness to bear the child and accordingly recommended F
the continuation of the pregnancy. However, the High Court directed
the termination of the pregnancy on the ground that the victim was
mentally incapable of making an informed decision on her own.
103. A three-judge Bench of this Court disagreed with the High
Court’s decision. In a judgment authored by K G Balakrishnan, C.J., this G
Court emphasized that the consent of the pregnant woman is an essential
requirement to proceed with the termination of a pregnancy under the
MTP Act. It was held that the state administration cannot claim
93
Puttaswamy, at paragraph 373
94
(2009) 9 SCC 1
95
Puttaswamy, at paragraph 82 H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A guardianship of the woman as she was a major. It was further held that
the woman only had “mild mental retardation” and was therefore
competent to give her consent in terms of Section 3(4)(a) of the MTP
Act. This Court concluded that the state must respect the reproductive
rights of women with “mental retardation” with regard to decisions about
terminating their pregnancy. In the process, this Court recognized that a
B
woman’s right to reproductive autonomy is a dimension of Article 21 of
the Constitution:
“22. There is no doubt that a woman’s right to make reproductive
choices is also a dimension of “personal liberty” as understood
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is important to
C recognise that reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate
as well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial consideration
is that a woman’s right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity should
be respected. This means that there should be no restriction
whatsoever on the exercise of reproductive choices such as a
D woman’s right to refuse participation in sexual activity or
alternatively the insistence on use of contraceptive methods.
Furthermore, women are also free to choose birth control methods
such as undergoing sterilisation procedures. Taken to their logical
conclusion, reproductive rights include a woman’s entitlement to
carry a pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to subsequently
E raise children. However, in the case of pregnant women there is
also a “compelling State interest” in protecting the life of the
prospective child. Therefore, the termination of a pregnancy is
only permitted when the conditions specified in the applicable
statute have been fulfilled. Hence, the provisions of the MTP Act,
F 1971 can also be viewed as reasonable restrictions that have been
placed on the exercise of reproductive choices.”
104. Suchita Srivastava (supra) rightly recognised that the right
of women to make reproductive choices is a dimension of personal liberty
under Article 21. It held that reproductive rights include a woman’s
G entitlement to carry the pregnancy to full term, give birth, and raise
children. More importantly, it also recognised that the right to reproductive
choice also includes the right not to procreate. In doing so, it situated the
reproductive rights of women within the core of constitutional rights.
105. Decisional autonomy is an integral part of the right to privacy.
H Decisional autonomy is the ability to make decisions in respect of intimate
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relations.96 In Puttaswamy (supra) this Court held that personal aspects A
of life such as family, marriage, procreation, and sexual orientation are
all intrinsic to the dignity of the individual.97 The right to privacy safeguards
and respects the decisional autonomy of the individual to exercise intimate
personal choices and control over the vital aspects of their body and life.
In Common Cause v. Union of India,98 this Court observed that right
B
to privacy protects decisional autonomy in matters related to bodily
integrity:
“441. The right to privacy resides in the right to liberty and in the
respect of autonomy. The right to privacy protects autonomy in
making decisions related to the intimate domain of death as well
as bodily integrity. Few moments could be of as much importance C
as the intimate and private decisions that we are faced regarding
death. Continuing treatment against the wishes of a patient is not
only a violation of the principle of informed consent, but also of
bodily privacy and bodily integrity that have been recognised as a
facet of privacy by this Court.” D
106. The right to decisional autonomy also means that women
may choose the course of their lives. Besides physical consequences,
unwanted pregnancies which women are forced to carry to term may
have cascading effects for the rest of her life by interrupting her
education, her career, or affecting her mental well-being. E
107. In High Court on its Own Motion (supra), an under-trial
prisoner requisitioned for obtaining permission to terminate her 4-month
pregnancy to a judge of the City Civil & Sessions Court visiting the
prison. The woman stated that it would be too difficult for her to maintain
another child in addition to her five-month-old child, who was suffering F
from various malaises such as epilepsy, hernia and other illnesses. In
such circumstances, the woman stated that it was difficult for her to
maintain and take care of another child. The judge forwarded a letter to
the High Court of Bombay along with the woman’s requisition for
information and further action, which was converted into a suo moto
PIL. The High Court referred to the relevant provisions of the MTP Act G
to observe that mental health can deteriorate if the pregnancy is forced
or unwanted:
96
Puttaswamy, at paragraph 248
97
Puttaswamy, at paragraph 298
98
(2018) 5 SCC 1 H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A “14. A woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy is not a frivolous
one. Abortion is often the only way out of a very difficult situation
for a woman. An abortion is a carefully considered decision taken
by a woman who fears that the welfare of the child she already
has, and of other members of the household that she is obliged to
care for with limited financial and other resources, may be
B
compromised by the birth of another child. These are decisions
taken by responsible women who have few other options. They
are women who would ideally have preferred to prevent an
unwanted pregnancy, but were unable to do so. If a woman does
not want to continue with the pregnancy, then forcing her to do so
C represents a violation of the woman’s bodily integrity and
aggravates her mental trauma which would be deleterious to her
mental health.”
108. A woman can become pregnant by choice irrespective of
her marital status. In case the pregnancy is wanted, it is equally shared
D by both the partners. However, in case of an unwanted or incidental
pregnancy, the burden invariably falls on the pregnant woman affecting
her mental and physical health. Article 21 of the Constitution recognizes
and protects the right of a woman to undergo termination of pregnancy
if her mental or physical health is at stake. Importantly, it is the woman
alone who has the right over her body and is the ultimate decision-maker
E on the question of whether she wants to undergo an abortion.
ii. The right to dignity
109. The right to dignity encapsulates the right of every individual
to be treated as a self-governing entity having intrinsic value. It means
F that every human being possesses dignity merely by being a human, and
can make self-defining and self-determining choices. Dignity has been
recognized as a core component of the right to life and liberty under
Article 21.
110. If women with unwanted pregnancies are forced to carry
G their pregnancies to term, the state would be stripping them of the right
to determine the immediate and long-term path their lives would take.
Depriving women of autonomy not only over their bodies but also over
their lives would be an affront to their dignity. The right to choose for
oneself – be it as significant as choosing the course of one’s life or as
mundane as one’s day-to-day activities – forms a part of the right to
H
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 745
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dignity. It is this right which would be under attack if women were forced A
to continue with unwanted pregnancies.
111. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,99 it was held
that dignity forms a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Such
is its fundamental value in our legal system - the concept of dignity
forms the very foundation to the Constitution and the rights enshrined in B
it. Dignity inheres in every individual and is an inalienable aspect of
one’s humanity.
112. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union
Territory of Delhi,100 a two-judge bench of this Court was dealing with
the rights of detenus under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and C
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act. This Court recognized that the
right to dignity is an essential part of the right to life under Article 21 of
the Constitution. It was observed:
“8. … We think that the right to life includes the right to live with
human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare D
necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter
and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse
forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow
human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the
components of this right would depend upon the extent of the
economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of E
the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and
also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute
the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which
offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute
deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in F
accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established
by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights.”
113. In Puttaswamy (supra) one of us (Dr. D Y Chandrachud, J.)
emphasized the interlinkage between privacy, dignity, and liberty as
follows: G
“298. Privacy of the individual is an essential aspect of dignity.
Dignity has both an intrinsic and instrumental value. As an intrinsic
value, human dignity is an entitlement or a constitutionally protected
99
(1973) 4 SCC 225
100
(1981) 1 SCC 608 H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A interest in itself. In its instrumental facet, dignity and freedom are
inseparably intertwined, each being a facilitative tool to achieve
the other. The ability of the individual to protect a zone of privacy
enables the realisation of the full value of life and liberty. Liberty
has a broader meaning of which privacy is a subset. All liberties
may not be exercised in privacy. Yet others can be fulfilled only
B
within a private space. Privacy enables the individual to retain the
autonomy of the body and mind. The autonomy of the individual is
the ability to make decisions on vital matters of concern to life.
Privacy has not been couched as an independent fundamental
right. ... The intersection between one’s mental integrity and
C privacy entitles the individual to freedom of thought, the freedom
to believe in what is right, and the freedom of self-determination.
When these guarantees intersect with gender, they create a private
space which protects all those elements which are crucial to gender
identity. The family, marriage, procreation and sexual orientation
are all integral to the dignity of the individual. Above all, the privacy
D
of the individual recognises an inviolable right to determine how
freedom shall be exercised. … Dignity cannot exist without
privacy. Both reside within the inalienable values of life, liberty
and freedom which the Constitution has recognised.”
114. In Navtej Singh Johar (supra), this Court read down Section
E 377 of the IPC insofar as it criminalized consensual sexual conduct
between adults of same sex. Importantly, this Court also recognised that
the members of the LGBTQ+ community are entitled to a full range of
constitutional rights protected under the Constitution, including the right
to dignity. Dipak Misra, CJ indicated the importance of dignity:
F “144. Dignity is that component of one’s being without which
sustenance of his/her being to the fullest or completest is
inconceivable. In the theatre of life, without possession of the
attribute of identity with dignity, the entity may be allowed entry
to the centre stage but would be characterised as a spineless
G entity or, for that matter, projected as a ruling king without the
sceptre. The purpose of saying so is that the identity of every
individual attains the quality of an “individual being” only if he/she
has the dignity. Dignity while expressive of choice is averse
to creation of any dent. When biological expression, be it
an orientation or optional expression of choice, is faced
H
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 747
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

with impediment, albeit through any imposition of law, the A
individual’s natural and constitutional right is dented. Such
a situation urges the conscience of the final constitutional
arbiter to demolish the obstruction and remove the
impediment so as to allow the full blossoming of the natural
and constitutional rights of individuals. This is the essence
B
of dignity and we say, without any inhibition, that it is our
constitutional duty to allow the individual to behave and
conduct himself/herself as he/she desires and allow him/
her to express himself/herself, of course, with the consent
of the other. That is the right to choose without fear. It has
to be ingrained as a necessary prerequisite that consent is C
the real fulcrum of any sexual relationship.”
(emphasis supplied)
115. In Independent Thought v. Union of India,101 this Court
held that sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age is rape
regardless of whether or not she is married. This Court emphatically D
rejected the argument that the state had a compelling state interest in
preserving the institution of marriage (even child marriages), and observed
that the impact of Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC has to be considered
with the social realities of the present. It is important to note that the
broader issue of marital rape of adult women was not dealt with since E
the issue was not specifically raised in that case. In the context of right
to dignity, it was observed:”90. We must not and cannot forget the
existence of Article 21 of the Constitution which gives a fundamental
right to a girl child to live a life of dignity. The documentary material
placed before us clearly suggests that an early marriage takes away the
self-esteem and confidence of a girl child and subjects her, in a sense, to F
sexual abuse. Under no circumstances can it be said that such a girl
child lives a life of dignity. The right of a girl child to maintain her bodily
integrity is effectively destroyed by a traditional practice sanctified by
IPC. Her husband, for the purposes of Section 375 IPC, effectively has
full control over her body and can subject her to sexual intercourse without G
her consent or without her willingness since such an activity would not
be rape. Anomalously, although her husband can rape her but he cannot
molest her for if he does so he could be punished under the provisions of
IPC. This was recognised by LCI in its 172nd Report but was not
101
(2017) 10 SCC 800 H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A commented upon. It appears therefore that different and irrational
standards have been laid down for the treatment of the girl child by her
husband and it is necessary to harmonise the provisions of various statutes
and also harmonise different provisions of IPC inter se.”
116. In the context of abortion, the right to dignity entails
B recognising the competence and authority of every woman to take
reproductive decisions, including the decision to terminate the pregnancy.
Although human dignity inheres in every individual, it is susceptible to
violation by external conditions and treatment imposed by the state. The
right of every woman to make reproductive choices without undue
interference from the state is central to the idea of human dignity.
C Deprivation of access to reproductive healthcare or emotional and
physical well-being also injures the dignity of women.
G. Purposive interpretation of Rule 3B furthers the
constitutional mandate

D 117. Where two constructions of a provision are possible, courts
ought to prefer the construction which gives effect to the provision rather
than rendering the provision inoperative. 102 Courts must prefer a
construction which is in favour of the constitutionality of the statutory
provision.103 A narrow, strict interpretation of a statutory provision which
runs counter to the constitutional mandate should be avoided.
E
118. It seems to us that to give Rule 3B a restrictive and narrow
interpretation would render it perilously close to holding it unconstitutional,
for it would deprive unmarried women of the right to access safe and
legal abortions between twenty and twenty-four weeks if they face a
change in their material circumstances, similar to married women.
F
119. The Constitution Bench in Express Newspapers Ltd v.
Union of India,104 gave a wider meaning to Section 9(1) of the Working
Journalists (Condition of Service) and Miscellaneous Provision Act
1955,105 to avoid rendering it unconstitutional. The Working Journalists
102
JUSTICE G.P SINGH, G.P. S INGH: PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, (LEXISNEXIS,
G 2016), at page 48; CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352; M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa
Muddal, 1961 (2) SCR 295; Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam,
(1989) 3 SCC 709
103
K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173; M.L. Kamra v. Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, New India Assurance Co. Ltd, 1992 SCR(1) 220
104
1959 SCR 12, AIR 1958 SC 578
105
H “Working Journalists Act”
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Act provides for the relevant criteria for the fixation of the rate of wages. A
The petitioners in that case argued that the Working Journalists Act
imposed unreasonable restrictions on the freedom to carry on business
inter alia on the ground that the capacity of the industry to pay was not
set out as one of the criteria in the fixation of wages by the Wage Board.
This Court held that the capacity of the industry to pay was one of the
B
essential circumstances which should be taken into consideration for
fixation of rate of wages, higher than the bare subsistence or minimum
wage.
120. In Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India,106 a three-
Judge Bench of this Court had to interpret the term “after him” in Section
6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956, which provides C
that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in the case of a boy or an
unmarried girl, is “the father and after him the mother.” This Court
interpreted “after him” to mean “in the absence of” to further the
constitutional mandate of gender equality as enshrined in Article 14 and
Article 15 of the Constitution. This Court stated that narrowly interpreting D
the phrase to mean a disqualification of a mother to act as a guardian
during the lifetime of the father, would have made the section
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional prohibition against
discrimination on the grounds of sex.
121. The object of Section 3(2)(b) of the MTP Act read with Rule E
3B is to provide for abortions between twenty and twenty-four weeks,
rendered unwanted due to a change in the material circumstances of
women. In view of the object, there is no rationale for excluding unmarried
or single women (who face a change in their material circumstances)
from the ambit of Rule 3B. A narrow interpretation of Rule 3B, limited
only to married women, would render the provision discriminatory towards F
unmarried women and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article
14 requires the state to refrain from denying to any person equality before
the law or equal protection of laws. Prohibiting unmarried or single
pregnant women (whose pregnancies are between twenty and twenty-
four weeks) from accessing abortion while allowing married women to G
access them during the same period would fall foul of the spirit guiding
Article 14. The law should not decide the beneficiaries of a statute based
on narrow patriarchal principles about what constitutes “permissible sex”,
which create invidious classifications and excludes groups based on their
106
(1999) 2 SCC 228 H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A personal circumstances. The rights of reproductive autonomy, dignity,
and privacy under Article 21 give an unmarried woman the right of choice
on whether or not to bear a child, on a similar footing of a married
woman.
122. In view of the purposive interpretation accorded to Rule 3B,
B we are not required to adjudicate upon its constitutional validity.
H. India’s obligations under international law
123. Article 51 of the Constitution requires the state to foster
respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of
organised people with one another. The Protection of Human Rights
C Act 1993 recognises and incorporates international conventions and
treaties as part of Indian human rights law.107 International human rights
norms contained in treaties and covenants ratified by India are binding
on the state to the extent that they elucidate and effectuate the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.108
D 124. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights recognises and protects the inherent right to life of all human
beings. The UN Human Rights Committee has remarked that, in terms
of Article 6, State Parties have the responsibility to provide safe, legal,
and effective access to abortion.109 Further, it was suggested that State
E Parties should disseminate quality and evidence-based information and
education about sexual and reproductive health to prevent stigmatisation
of women and girls seeking abortion.
125. India has also ratified the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,110 which enumerates in detail the right to
F mental and physical health. The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in their comment on Article 12 of ICESCR has observed
that the right to sexual and reproductive health is an integral part of the
right to the highest attainable physical and mental health.111
107
Section 2(1)(d), Protection of Human Rights Act 1993
108
People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 433
G 109
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, CCPR/C/GC/
36 (30 October 2018)
110
“ICESCR”
111
Economic and Social Council, General Comment No. 22 (2016) on the right to sexual
and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
H and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/GC/22 (2 May 2016)
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 751
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

126. India has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All A
Forms of Discrimination against Women.112 Article 12 of CEDAW
requires the State Parties to take appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field health care services in
connection with family planning, pregnancy, confinement, and post-natal
period. Similarly, Article 16 urges State Parties to eliminate all forms of
B
discrimination against women and to ensure that they have the same
right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of
children and access the relevant information to effectively exercise these
rights.
127. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women emphasized that State Parties should undertake C
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in their
access to health-care services, particularly in areas of family planning,
pregnancy and confinement, and post-natal period.113 It is also urged
that State Parties should refrain from imposing barriers on women who
seek to pursue their right to access healthcare, including reproductive D
healthcare.
128. India’s obligations under international law require the state
to bring the MTP Act in conformity with said obligations. The reproductive
rights of women must be harmonised in light of the principles laid down
under the Constitution as well as the principles of international law codified E
in the various international conventions ratified by India. Our interpretation
of the MTP Act and the MTP Rules furthers India’s obligations under
international law. However, the state must act proactively in order to
ensure that women in India are able to actualize their right to reproductive
health and healthcare, in line with the obligations assumed by the country
under international law. F

I. Reiterating the positive obligations of the state
129. True realization of reproductive autonomy is possible only by
addressing problems in the societal contexts within which individuals,
particularly women, are situated. It is not only social stigma which prevents G
women from realizing the right to health but also caste and economic

112
“CEDAW”
113
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), A/54/38/
Rev.1, chap. I (1999) H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A location. The cost of an abortion at a private hospital may be prohibitive
for those whose monthly salaries are a fraction of that cost. Public
hospitals in rural areas are often not equipped with the resources to
provide the kind and quality of healthcare that ought to be provided free
of cost or at highly subsidized rates. A lack of awareness about the
resources that public hospitals offer coupled with the discriminatory
B
attitudes of many health providers only serve to exacerbate this problem.
130. The MTP Act recognises the reproductive autonomy of every
pregnant woman to choose medical intervention to terminate her
pregnancy. Implicitly, this right also extends to a right of the pregnant
C woman to access healthcare facilities to attain the highest standard of
sexual and reproductive health. It is meaningless to speak of the latter in
the absence of the former. Reproductive health implies that women should
have access to safe, effective, and affordable methods of family planning
and enabling them to undergo safe pregnancy, if they so choose.

D 131. The Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the
Constitution lay down the fundamental principles in the governance of
the country and press upon the state to apply them while making laws.
Article 38(2) of the Constitution requires the state to promote the welfare
of people and eliminate inequalities in opportunities:

E “Article 38. State to secure a social order for the promotion of
welfare of the people - ***
(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimize the inequalities
in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities
and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst
F groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different
vocations.”
132. Article 47 of the Constitution contains a call to the state to
improve public health:

G “47. Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard
of living and to improve public health – The State shall regard the
raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its
people and the improvement of public health as among its primary
duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about

H
X v. PR. SECY., HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPTT., GNCT 753
DELHI [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

the prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes A
of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.”
133. In Devika Biswas v. Union of India,114 the petitioners
challenged the mass sterilisation program that was implemented by the
government in highly unsanitary conditions. This Court recognized the
need to respect and protect different facets of reproductive health as B
delineated in international human rights law. It noted that government
policies affecting reproductive freedoms must be aimed at remedying
the systemic discrimination prevailing in society and ensuring substantive
equality. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West
Bengal,115 this Court observed that Article 21 imposes an obligation on C
the state to safeguard the right to health and the right to life of every
person. It was held that this constitutional obligation exhorts the state to
provide adequate medical services to the people and to ensure timely
medical treatment to everyone. The above conspectus of cases reveals
that the state has a positive obligation under Article 21 to protect the
right to health, and particularly reproductive health of individuals. In terms D
of reproductive rights and autonomy, the state has to undertake active
steps to help increase access to healthcare (including reproductive
healthcare such as abortion).
134. The state must ensure that information regarding reproduction
and safe sexual practices is disseminated to all parts of the population. E
Further, it must see to it that all segments of society are able to access
contraceptives to avoid unintended pregnancies and plan their families.
Medical facilities and RMPs must be present in each district and must
be affordable to all. The government must ensure that RMPs treat all
patients equally and sensitively. Treatment must not be denied on the F
basis of one’s caste or due to other social or economic factors. It is only
when these recommendations become a reality that we can say that the
right to bodily autonomy and the right to dignity are capable of being
realized.
135. We clarify that nothing in this judgment must be construed as G
diluting the provisions of the Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic
Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act 1994.

114
(2016) 10 SCC 726
115
(1996) 4SCC 37 H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 136. We dispose of the present appeal in terms of the reasons
stated above. The writ petition before the High Court shall accordingly
stand disposed of.
137. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

B
Ankit Gyan Appeal disposed of.
(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)

C

D

E

F

G

H