Bombay High Court
The Zoroastrian Radih SocietyversusBehramshah Shroff Building No 6 Dadgar CHS
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED OFF
Holding
The Court held that the arbitration clause is enforceable against the cooperative society and that the Section 11 applications are maintainable, thereby appointing a sole arbitrator.
Summary
The Zoroastrian Radih Society, a charitable trust, entered individual sale agreements with flat purchasers that contain an arbitration clause. The purchasers later formed the Behramshah Shroff Building Co‑operative Housing Society, which failed to execute a lease deed and to pay ground‑lease rent, administrative, maintenance and parking charges. The Society filed an interim application before the NCDRC, but the Trust withdrew it and sought appointment of a sole arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Society objected on two grounds: (i) the pending consumer proceeding should bar arbitration, and (ii) the Society, not being a signatory to the sale agreements, cannot be bound by the arbitration clause. The Court, relying on Supreme Court precedents, held that the Trust’s undertaking to withdraw the consumer claim removes the parallel‑proceedings objection, and that a cooperative society formed by the original purchasers can be bound by the arbitration clause despite not having signed the agreements. Consequently, the Court appointed a sole arbitrator and allowed the Section 11 applications.
Issues considered
- Whether the existence of a pending consumer proceeding before the NCDRC precludes the filing of a Section 11 application for arbitration
- Whether a cooperative housing society that was not a signatory to the original sale agreements can be bound by the arbitration clause therein
- Whether an arbitration agreement exists sufficient to warrant appointment of a sole arbitrator under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s. 11(6), 11(6-A), 11(8), 12(1)
- Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950
- Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — s. 3
- Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 — s. 36
- Societies Registration Act, 1860
Subjects
- Arbitration
- Section 11 Application
- Co‑operative Housing Society
- Non‑signatory Arbitration Clause
- Consumer Forum Parallel Proceedings
- Ground Lease Rent
- Maintenance Charges
- Charitable Trust
Judgment
arbap427-2026 & connected-J.doc
AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.427 OF 2026
WITH
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25142 OF 2026
ATUL The Zoroastrian Radih Society Applicant/
GANESH … Petitioner
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
Vs.
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.10.01 Behramshah Shroff Building No.3
11:06:06 +0530
(Damavand) CHS Limited … Respondent
WITH
ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.383 OF 2026
WITH
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25357 OF 2026
The Zoroastrian Radih Society Applicant/
… Petitioner
Vs.
Behramshah Shroff Building No.7
(Shah Barham) CHS Limited … Respondent
WITH
ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.384 OF 2026
WITH
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25280 OF 2026
The Zoroastrian Radih Society Applicant/
… Petitioner
Vs.
Behramshah Shroff Building No.6
(Dadgar) CHS Limited … Respondent
WITH
ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.385 OF 2026
WITH
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25332 OF 2026
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The Zoroastrian Radih Society Applicant/
… Petitioner
Vs.
Behramshah Shroff Building No.9 (A & B)
(Rayomand) CHS Limited … Respondent
WITH
ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.386 OF 2026
WITH
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25405 OF 2026
The Zoroastrian Radih Society Applicant/
… Petitioner
Vs.
Behramshah Shroff Building No.4
(Hormuzd) CHS Limited … Respondent
WITH
ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.387 OF 2026
WITH
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25312 OF 2026
The Zoroastrian Radih Society Applicant/
… Petitioner
Vs.
Behramshah Shroff Building No.2
(Meherabad) CHS Limited … Respondent
WITH
ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO.390 OF 2026
WITH
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25360 OF 2026
The Zoroastrian Radih Society Applicant/
… Petitioner
Vs.
Behramshah Shroff Building No.8
(Chaechast) CHS Limited … Respondent
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WITH
ARBITRATION APPLICATION (L) NO.24556 OF 2026
WITH
ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.25216 OF 2026
The Zoroastrian Radih Society Applicant/
… Petitioner
Vs.
Behramshah Shroff Building No.5
(Firozgar) CHS Limited … Respondent
Mr. Cherag Balsara with Mr. H.N. Vaki, Mr. Farhad
Vakil, Mr. Samkit Shah, and Ms. Jenal Karanjawala i/by
Mulla & Mulla & Craigie Blunt & Caroe for the
Applicant/Petitioner (in all the matters).
Mr. Sarosh Damania with Ms. Riddhi Shah, Mr. Dharmi
Patel, and Mr. Madhur Shah for the Respondent (in all
the matters).
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : SEPTEMBER 30, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : OCTOBER 1, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. The eight Arbitration Petitions are not listed on the Board.
However, with the consent of the parties, all eight Arbitration
Petitions are taken up for hearing and final disposal.
2. Since the facts and the questions of law arising in all these
Applications are substantially common, all the Applications and
Petitions are being decided by this common Judgment and Order.
For convenience, the facts in Arbitration Application No. 427 of
2026 are being referred to as the facts of the lead matter.
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3. By these Applications, the Applicant seeks appointment of a
Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, to decide the disputes arising out of the
individual Agreements for Sale executed between the Applicant
Trust and the individual flat purchasers in the Respondent Society.
According to the Applicant, the disputes mainly concern the failure
of the Respondent to execute the lease deed, non-payment of
ground lease rent, non-payment of administrative and
maintenance charges, and unauthorised use of open spaces and
parking areas which, according to the Applicant, are outside the
premises of the Respondent Society. According to the Applicant,
the present Applications have been filed on account of the
following facts. The Applicant is a charitable trust registered under
the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the Bombay Public Trusts
Act, 1950. The Applicant owns the larger property situated at
Behram Baug Parsi Colony, Oshiwara, Mumbai. It has constructed
several residential buildings and societies for the benefit of
members of the Parsi Zoroastrian community. The Respondent is a
Co-operative Housing Society registered under the Maharashtra
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and is situated at Behram Baug
Parsi Colony, Oshiwara, Mumbai. On 18 May 1999, the Charity
Commissioner passed an Order granting sanction to the Applicant
to complete the construction and to sell or transfer flats to needy
and deserving members of the Zoroastrian community. Pursuant to
the said sanction, the Applicant executed individual Agreements
for Sale with the flat purchasers. Clause 36 of those Agreements
contains an arbitration clause providing for resolution of disputes
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arising out of or relating to the Agreements. In the year 2000, the
Respondent Society was registered as a Co-operative Housing
Society. According to the Applicant, despite repeated requests and
correspondence, the Respondent failed and neglected to execute
the lease deed in favour of the Applicant. It is further the
Applicant's case that the Respondent and its members have not
paid the ground lease rent for more than two decades and, as a
result, substantial dues have accumulated. Between 23 November
2020 and 5 May 2026, the Applicant and its Advocates addressed
several letters and notices to the Respondent demanding payment
of ground lease rent, administrative charges and parking charges.
The Respondent disputed the demands and did not comply with
them. On 4 October 2023, the Advocate for the Applicant issued a
notice invoking Clause 36 of the Agreements for Sale and
nominated a Sole Arbitrator. By its Advocate's reply dated 26
October 2023, the Respondent denied the applicability of
arbitration, principally on the ground that the Respondent Society
was not a signatory to the individual Agreements for Sale. The
parties could not mutually agree upon the appointment of an
Arbitrator despite the exchange of correspondence between them
and despite expiry of the statutory period contemplated under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Applicant has,
therefore, filed the present Applications seeking appointment of a
Sole Arbitrator.
4. Mr. Balsara, learned Advocate for the Applicant, submits that
the Respondent's failure to pay ground lease rent, local charges,
betterment charges, charges levied by the Government or
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Municipal Corporation, expenses towards common lights, repairs
and salaries of clerks, bill collectors, chowkidars and sweepers, and
other incidental and necessary charges incurred from time to time,
as well as parking charges, has caused loss to the Applicant Trust.
According to him, the non-payment of these amounts has affected
the charitable objects of the Applicant Trust. In these
circumstances, by the letter dated 4 October 2023, the Applicant,
through its Advocates, invoked Clause 36 of the Agreements for
Sale executed between the Applicant and the individual flat
purchasers in the Respondent Society and nominated Advocate Mr.
Aksh Doctor as the Sole Arbitrator in accordance with the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
5. Mr. Balsara, on instructions, makes a statement that the
Applicant will not press and shall withdraw the Interim
Application filed before the Consumer Forum. According to him,
this would ensure that the subject matter of the consumer
proceedings does not overlap with the disputes sought to be
referred to arbitration. He submits that, in view of this statement,
the judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Hemalatha Devi v. B.
Udayasri, 2023 INSC 870, would have no application to the
present case. In support of his submissions, Mr. Balsara has relied
upon the judgment of this Court in Shri Shivranjan Towers
Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit v. Bhujbal Constructions
& Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 3097 , and the judgment of the
Karnataka High Court in Scenic Beauty Homes Private Limited v.
Nag Kiran Kempanoon, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 24843.
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6. Mr. Damania, learned Advocate for the Respondent, submits
that, by Interim Application No. 5157 of 2023 dated 19 April 2023
filed in Consumer Complaint No. 1326 of 2016, the Applicant had
already sought monetary reliefs against the present Respondent.
According to him, the Applicant had sought a direction for deposit
of Rs.11,75,190/- towards ground lease rent, together with
interest calculated up to 31 March 2023, or, in the alternative, a
sum of Rs.52,56,720/- calculated on the basis of its alternative
proposal for a one-time payment. The Applicant had sought
disclosure relating to vehicles and parking charges at Rs.600/- per
month, Rs.3,04,920/- towards administrative and security charges
as stated in prayer clause (c), and directions concerning other
common outgoings. It is submitted by Mr. Damania that the
Applicant's Interim Application before the NCDRC, dated 19 April
2023, was filed before the invocation of arbitration on 4 October
2023. He further points out that the subsequent letter dated 5 May
2026 forms part of the Applicant's Exhibit E at printed pages 138
to 147. He relies upon paragraph 24 of the present Application,
wherein the Applicant has claimed a sum of Rs.72,36,564/-.
7. According to the Respondent, Section 3 of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 preserves an additional remedy available to a
consumer and this aspect is material for deciding the present
Applications. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in M. Hemalatha Devi, wherein the Supreme Court upheld
the rejection of a request under Section 11 made by a builder in
circumstances where the consumer had elected to pursue the
statutory remedy under the Consumer Protection law. According to
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the Respondent, the material consideration is the consumer's
choice to pursue the statutory remedy and not merely the question
as to which party approached the forum first. The Respondent
submits that this principle applies to the consumer dispute which is
already pending before the NCDRC.
8. The Respondent does not contend that the mere pendency of
a consumer proceeding automatically prevents every arbitration
agreement from being acted upon or that every claim arising
independently between the parties becomes incapable of
arbitration. The Respondent's case is narrower. According to the
Respondent, the Applicant has already chosen the statutory forum
for adjudication of the housing dispute and the present
Applications seek reference of issues which form part of the same
controversy. The monetary claims made by the Applicant in the
consumer proceedings are relied upon as further evidence of such
overlap. It is, therefore, submitted that the Applicant must
establish a legally sustainable distinction between a claim which
can independently be referred to arbitration and the consumer
dispute which is already pending before the NCDRC. Such
distinction, according to the Respondent, cannot merely be
assumed.
REASONS AND FINDINGS:
9. I have considered the submissions made by the learned
Advocates. There are two main objections raised by the
Respondent. One objection is regarding the consumer proceedings
which are pending. The other objection is that the Respondent
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Society was not a signatory to the Agreements for Sale containing
the arbitration clause.
10. First, the statement made by Mr. Balsara on behalf of the
Applicant is required to be considered. He has stated that the
Applicant will not press and will withdraw Interim Application No.
5157 of 2023 filed before the consumer forum. This statement is
made on instructions. The purpose of giving such statement is that
the same monetary claims should not continue before the
consumer forum when the Applicant is seeking to take the disputes
to arbitration. There is substance in the submission. As pointed out
by the Respondent, the Interim Application dated 19 April 2023
was filed before the notice invoking arbitration dated 4 October
2023. It is not disputed that in the said Interim Application the
Applicant had claimed monetary reliefs towards ground lease rent,
administrative and security charges, parking charges and other
outgoings. Therefore, the earlier consumer proceeding cannot be
ignored while considering the present Applications. But merely
because the Applicant had approached the NCDRC earlier cannot
decide whether the present Section 11 Applications can be
entertained. The Supreme Court in M. Hemalatha Devi, considered
the issue of consumer proceedings and arbitration. In paragraph
22, the Supreme Court made it clear that the question is of
election or choice and depends upon the nature of the dispute. The
Supreme Court observed:
“The question is of election, or of choice, and not of which
party had approached the court first. More importantly it
would be the nature of the dispute, which would determine
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the forum for its redressal.”
11. The Supreme Court further observed in paragraph 23:
“Now merely because the builder had approached a court
first (under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996) will not
oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Courts. The jurisdiction
of a court is not determined by the fastest finger first, but the
nature of the dispute, the public policy in the matter, the will
of the legislature, the election or choice of the consumer
amongst various factors.”
12. From these observations, the position is clear. The fact that
one party approached one forum first is not enough to decide the
matter. The nature of the dispute has to be seen. The choice which
is available to the concerned party in law has to be considered. In
the present case, there is one more important circumstance. The
Applicant has now stated before this Court that it will not press the
Interim Application filed before the NCDRC and will withdraw the
same. This statement is made in the present proceedings. The
purpose is to avoid the same monetary claims being considered at
the same time before the consumer forum and before the Arbitral
Tribunal. I therefore accept the undertaking given by Mr. Balsara
on behalf of the Applicant. The Applicant shall not press Interim
Application No. 5157 of 2023 and shall withdraw the same from
the proceedings before the NCDRC. This undertaking shall remain
binding upon the Applicant. After giving such undertaking before
this Court, the Applicant cannot again seek the same reliefs
contained in the said Interim Application before the NCDRC.
13. The Respondent relies upon the fact that the main consumer
complaint is still pending. This submission requires consideration.
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But from the material placed before this Court, the particular
monetary claims which, according to the Respondent, overlap are
the claims made in the Applicant's Interim Application dated 19
April 2023. Once that Interim Application is not pressed and is
withdrawn, the immediate basis for saying that the same monetary
claims are being pursued before two forums does not remain. I
therefore cannot accept the submission that merely because the
consumer complaint is pending, the Applicant must be prevented
from invoking the arbitration agreement. The judgment in M.
Hemalatha Devi was concerned with the statutory choice available
to a consumer who had chosen to pursue the remedy before the
Consumer Forum. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the
Section 11 application was not maintainable. In paragraph 51, the
Supreme Court observed:
“The application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act,
1996 for appointment of an arbitrator, was not maintainable
in the present case, and consequently we uphold the
impugned orders dated 19-5-2022 [M. Hemalatha Devi v. B.
Udayasri, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 3434] and 25-11-2022,
which held this position.”
14. The facts before this Court are different. The Applicant has
stated that it will not continue with the same interim monetary
reliefs before the consumer forum. Therefore, the Applicant cannot
be permitted to ask for the same relief at the same time before two
different forums. The undertaking given by the Applicant and
accepted by this Court takes care of the objection raised by the
Respondent regarding parallel proceedings for the same monetary
claims. I therefore reject the objection of the Respondent based on
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the NCDRC proceedings. This does not mean that the Consumer
Protection Act has no separate or independent operation. It is not
necessary to hold that every dispute between parties having an
arbitration agreement must necessarily be referred to arbitration.
The finding here is based on the facts of the present case. In view
of the undertaking given by the Applicant, the alleged overlapping
claims relied upon by the Respondent are not sufficient to refuse
appointment of an Arbitrator.
15. The next objection of the Respondent is that the Respondent
Society was not a signatory to the Agreements for Sale. There is no
dispute that the individual Agreements for Sale were entered into
with the individual flat purchasers. At that time, the Respondent
Society had not been registered. Therefore, according to the
Respondent, the arbitration clause contained in those Agreements
cannot bind the Society. This submission has to be considered by
keeping in mind how a cooperative housing society comes into
existence and how its members are connected with the property.
Merely because the Society did not sign the Agreements for Sale
cannot finish the issue. The Agreements were executed for the
flats which later became part of the cooperative housing society.
The Society was thereafter registered and the individual flat
purchasers became its members. The Society represented the
common interests of those members concerning the property.
16. The judgment of this Court in Shri Shivranjan Towers
Sahakari Griha Rachana Sanstha Maryadit, is relevant on this
issue. In paragraph 20, this Court considered the same objection
that the Society was not a signatory and observed:
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“Undoubtedly, the Petitioner-society is not a signatory to the
said Agreement for Sale and it could not have been a
signatory as it was yet to be formed. Therefore, the issue
cannot be determined only on the premise that the
Petitioner-society is not a signatory to those Agreement for
Sale which contains the Arbitration Clause.”
17. This observation has relevance to the present case. The
Respondent Society could not have signed an Agreement before it
was formed. Therefore, merely because it was not a signatory
cannot answer the entire issue. The Court has to see the actual
relationship between the parties and from where the rights and
obligations being claimed have arisen. The same judgment
considered the legal status of a cooperative society and referred to
Section 36 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. In
paragraph 23, after considering Daman Singh v. State of Punjab,
this Court observed:
“In the case of Daman Singh (Supra) the Supreme Court
expounded the position in law as to what happens to the
person who formed themselves into a society or subsequently
became members of the society. The Supreme Court
enunciated that once a person becomes a member of a
cooperative society, he looses his individuality qua the
society and has no independent rights except those given to
him by statute and by-laws. He must act and speak through
the society or rather, the society alone can act and speak for
him qua rights or duties of the society as a body.”
18. This principle has relevance in the present case. The
Respondent Society is not some separate body having no
connection with the Agreements for Sale. Its members are the
same flat purchasers who acquired their rights under those
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Agreements. The Society was thereafter formed for dealing with
the common rights and obligations connected with those flats and
the property. This question was considered in paragraph 30 of Shri
Shivranjan Towers. This Court held:
“The learned Arbitrator was, therefore, justified in holding
that if the Petitioner-society was seeking to enforce the rights
created in favour of the individual members under the
Agreements for Sale, the Petitioner-society cannot claim that
it is not bound by the arbitration clause contained in those
Agreements.”
19. The facts of that case were in the context of the Society
seeking to enforce rights arising from the Agreements for Sale. The
present case is somewhat different because here the Applicant
seeks to enforce obligations against the Society. Even then, the
principle shows that the legal relationship cannot be decided only
by looking at who signed the original Agreement and ignoring
what happened after the Society was formed. In paragraph 34 of
the said judgment, this Court considered the argument that the
Society should be treated as a stranger to the arbitration
arrangement and observed:
“For the forgoing reasons, I find it difficult to agree with the
submission of Mr. Kumbhakoni that the case at hand is
governed by the principles of law which apply to the
arbitrability of the dispute with a non-signatory to the
contract. The Petitioner-society cannot be said to be a third
party to the arbitration dispute.”
20. The present case has to be considered in this background.
The Respondent Society is admittedly the cooperative society of
the flat purchasers to whom the Agreements for Sale were
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executed. The claims made by the Applicant are not against some
unrelated third party. They concern the same property and relate
to ground lease rent, common charges, administrative outgoings
and parking, all of which are connected with the flats and the
Society. I therefore cannot accept the submission of the
Respondent that merely because the Society did not sign the
Agreements for Sale, the arbitration agreement cannot be acted
upon against the Society. At this stage, this Court is not required to
finally decide whether every claim made by the Applicant is
covered by Clause 36. It is not necessary to decide now whether a
particular amount is payable, whether any claim is barred by
limitation, whether some amount has already been paid, or
whether a particular charge can ultimately be recovered under the
Agreement or under law. These matters can be considered by the
Arbitral Tribunal.
21. At the stage of considering a Section 11 Application, the
Court has to see whether an arbitration agreement exists and
whether the dispute can be referred to arbitration. Section 11(6-A)
limits the examination at this stage to the existence of an
arbitration agreement. Therefore, a full trial of all claims and
defences is not required at this stage. In the present case, Clause
36 of the Agreements for Sale admittedly contains an arbitration
agreement. The Applicant invoked that clause by notice dated 4
October 2023. The Respondent disputed the reference mainly on
the ground that it was not a signatory. The correspondence
between the parties shows that there is a real dispute concerning
the contractual and property-related obligations claimed by the
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Applicant. I find that the Respondent cannot at this stage rely only
on the fact that the Society was registered after the Agreements for
Sale were executed and say that the contractual arrangement from
which the rights of its members arose has no connection with the
Society. The Society was formed by the very flat purchasers who
had entered into those Agreements. The rights and obligations
concerning the flats and common property cannot be separated
from the Agreements under which those members acquired their
rights.
22. I am conscious that the facts in Shri Shivranjan Towers were
somewhat different. In that case, the Society was seeking to
enforce rights flowing from the Agreements for Sale. In the present
case, the Applicant is seeking to enforce obligations against the
Society. This difference is relevant. But the basic principle from
that judgment still has relevance. The legal character of the
cooperative Society and the manner in which the rights of its
members are dealt with through the Society cannot be ignored
merely because the Society did not exist when the original
Agreements for Sale were executed.
23. The Respondent has disputed the liability for the amounts
claimed by the Applicant. This objection cannot be a reason at this
stage to refuse appointment of an Arbitrator. The Invocation Notice
contains a specific monetary demand. Clause 7 of the Invocation
Notice states:
“Our Client states that you and your members are using the
land appurtenant to your building and are bound and liable
to pay the lease rent Rs.56,65, 800/- (as mentioned in
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paragraph 5 hereinabove), and other maintenance charges
Rs.3,04,923/- (as mentioned in Paragraph 6 hereinabove) as
they are statutory/contractual dues owed to our client. The
total sum due from your society is Rs.59,70,723/-(Rupees
Fifty Nine Lakhs Seventy Thousand Seven Hundred and
Twenty Three Only). Our client reserve their rights to charge
appropriate car parking charges, maintenance charges and
other statutory contractual charges payable by your society.
In spite of giving regular demand notices, you and your
society members have failed to pay the outstanding dues.”
24. The Respondent has disputed these demands. Therefore,
there is a dispute which requires adjudication. This Court is not
required in these Section 11 proceedings to decide whether
Rs.59,70,723/- or the subsequently claimed amount of
Rs.72,36,564/- is actually payable. The Applicant will have to
prove its claim before the Arbitral Tribunal. The Respondent will
have full opportunity to oppose the claim and place its defence.
25. Thus, both objections of the Respondent have been
considered. The first objection is based on the pending consumer
proceedings. That objection is taken care of by the undertaking
given by the Applicant and accepted by this Court. The second
objection is that the Society is not a signatory. That objection
cannot be accepted merely because the Society was not in
existence when the Agreements for Sale were executed and
therefore could not have signed them. It is necessary to make one
position clear. The finding in these Applications does not mean
that every monetary claim made by the Applicant will succeed in
arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal will decide the disputes
according to law. The Applicant will have to establish its
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entitlement to ground lease rent, administrative charges,
maintenance charges, parking charges and other amounts claimed.
The Respondent will have full right to dispute the liability, amount,
period, contractual basis and all other defences available in law. At
the same time, after the undertaking given before this Court and
accepted by this Court, the Applicant cannot continue to pursue
the same interim monetary reliefs before the NCDRC. This
undertaking is an important part of the order being passed. It shall
therefore remain binding upon the Applicant.
26. On considering the entire material and the submissions of
both sides, I find that there is sufficient basis for appointing a Sole
Arbitrator. There is an arbitration clause in the Agreements for
Sale. The Applicant invoked the clause. The parties could not agree
upon appointment of an Arbitrator. There are disputes between the
parties regarding the obligations claimed by the Applicant. The
objections raised by the Respondent do not, in the facts of the
present case, justify refusing the reference to arbitration.
27. The Applications therefore deserve to be allowed. The
statement made by Mr. Balsara, learned Advocate for the
Applicant, on instructions, that the Applicant shall not press and
shall withdraw Interim Application No. 5157 of 2023 filed before
the NCDRC, is accepted as an undertaking given to this Court. The
said undertaking shall bind the Applicant. In view of the above
findings, the present Applications are allowed. A Sole Arbitrator
shall be appointed to decide the disputes between the Applicant
and the Respondent arising from the Agreements for Sale and
covered by the arbitration clause invoked by the Applicant.
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28. The Arbitrator shall decide all questions which arise before
him in accordance with law. Both sides shall have full and equal
opportunity to place their respective cases. Nothing stated in this
order shall be treated as a final decision on whether the Applicant
is entitled to the amounts claimed, the exact amount payable, or
on the individual claims and defences of the parties, except to the
extent required for deciding these Applications.
29. In the result, the Arbitration Applications are allowed in the
above terms. The undertaking given by the Applicant is accepted
and taken on record.
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, and upon overall
assessment of the material record, the following order is passed:
(a) Mr. Vikramjit Garewal Advocate of this Court is
appointed as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the
disputes and differences between the parties arising out of
an in connection with Clause 36 of the Agreements for Sale
executed between the Applicant and the individual flat
purchasers in the Respondent Society;
Office Address: 102, Oval House, British Hotel Lane,
Kalaghoda, Fort, Mumbai – 400023.
Email: [email protected]
(b) A copy of this order will be communicated to the
learned Sole Arbitrator by the Advocates for the petitioner
within a period of one week from the date of upload of this
order. The petitioner shall provide contact and
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communication particulars of the parties to the Arbitral
Tribunal along with a copy of this order;
(c) The learned Sole Arbitrator is requested to forward the
statutory State of Disclosure under Section 11(8) read with
Section 12(1) of the Act to the parties within a period of two
weeks from receipt of a copy of this order;
(d) The parties shall appear before the learned Sole
Arbitrator on such date and at such place as indicated, to
obtain appropriate directions with regard to conduct of the
arbitration including fixing a schedule for pleadings,
examination of witnesses, if any, schedule of hearings etc. At
such meeting, the parties shall provide a valid and functional
email address along with mobile and landline numbers of the
respective Advocates of the parties to the Arbitral Tribunal.
Communications to such email addresses shall constitute
valid service of correspondence in connection with the
arbitration;
(e) All arbitral costs and fees of the Arbitral Tribunal shall
be borne by the parties equally in the first instance, and shall
be subject to any final Award that may be passed by the
Tribunal in relation to costs.
(f) The petitions filed before this Court under Section 9 of
the Act shall stand converted into an application under
Section 17 of the Act and shall be considered by the learned
Sole Arbitrator in accordance with law.
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31. Needless to say, nothing contained in this order is an
expression of an opinion on merits of the matter or the relative
strength of the parties. All issues on merits are expressly kept open
to be agitated before the arbitral tribunal appointed hereby.
32. All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall
be taken upon receive of a downloaded copy as available on this
Court’s website.
33. The Arbitration Petition stands disposed of in above terms.
34. All Arbitration Application stands disposed of.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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