VIKRAM SINGH @ VICKY WALIA AND ANR.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.

                        [2017] 8 S.C.R. 177


         VIKRAM SINGH @ VICKY WALIA AND ANR.                         A
                               v.
                 STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.
 (Criminal M.P. Nos.16673-16674 of2016and16675-16676 of2016)
                                 In
                                                                     B
            (Review Petition (Cr!.) Nos.192-193 of2011)
                                In
              (Criminal Appeal Nos.1396-1397 of2008)
                      JULY07,2017
            fDIPAK MISRA, R. BANUMATHI AND                           c
                  ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.J
        Constitution of India - Art. 13 7 - Review of judgments or
  orders by the Supreme Court - On facts, conviction of three 4/ss.
  302, 364A, 201 and 120B and sentenced to death - Supreme Court
  upheld the death sentence of two, however commuted the death D
  sentence of lady co~accused to life imprisonment - Review
 petitions - Held: This Court while affirming the judgment of the
  High Court, found no error apparent on the record - Submissions
  raised in the review petition do not raise any ground for review -
  Submission that tape recorded conversation was relied on without
  there being any certificate u!s. 65B as such not a valid evidence, E
  cannot be accepted - Tape recorded conversation was not secondary
· evidence which required certificate uls. 65B, since it was the original
  cassette by which ransom call was tape-recorded - Submission that
  the death was caused due to overdose of chlorofr;rm and pentazocine
  poisoning, as such the conviction ought to be uls. 304A and not u/ F .
  s. 302 cannot be accepted - Conviction of the applicants was based
  on cogent, ocular and medical evidence and there was no apparent
  error on the face of the record in recording conviction of the
  applicants ·uls. 302 and 364A - Penal Code, 1860 - 302, 364A,
  201and120B - Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 65B.
                                                                     G
      Art. 13 7 - Power of review - Scope and ambit of.-
 Explained - Or. 40 r. 1 - Supreme Court Rules, 1966.
 Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 65B - Admissibility of electronic records -
 Reliance on the tape recorded conversation - Requirement of
 certificate u/s. 65B - Held: For admission of secondary evidence H
                                177
178            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A of electronic record a certificate as contemplated by s. 65B is a
      mandatory condition - Tape recorded conversation was original
      cassette by which ransom call was tape-recorded, thus, not secondary
      evidence which required certificate u/s. 65B.
            Rejecting the review applications, the Court
B        HELD: 1.1 This Court has constitutional power to review
  its judgment as granted by Article 137 of the Constitution which
  is subject to Supreme Court Rules, 1966. As per Rule 1 of Order
  40 an application for review in a criminal proceeding can be
  entertained on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the
c record. Granting power of review to this Court by the Constitution
  is in recognition of the universal principle that the power of review
  is part of all judicial system. Rule 1 of Order 40 of Supreme Court
  Rules, 1966 provides for the procedure and manner in which the
  power of review can be exercised by this Court. Under Order 40
  Rule 1 no application for review can be entertained except on
D the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. Although
  the power of review granted to this Court is wider but normally
  and ordinarily the review in a criminal case has to be on the
  grounds as enumerated in Rule 1 of Order 40. (Paras 9, 10, 171
  [183-E-G; 189-C, DI
 E       1.2 It Is clear that scope, ambit and parameters of review
   jurisdiction are well defined. Normally in a criminal proceeding,
   review applications cannot be entertained except on the ground
   of error apparent on the face of the record. Further, the power
   given to this Court under Article 137 is wider and in an appropriate
 F case can be exercised to mitigate a manifest injustice. By review
   application an applicant cannot be allowed to re-argue the appeal
   on the grounds which were urged at the time of the hearing of
   the criminal appeal. Even if the applicant succeeds in establishing
   that there may be another view possible on the conviction or
   sentence of the accused that is not a sufficient ground for review.
 G This Court shall exercise Its jurisdiction to review only when a
   glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in earlier decision
   due to judicial fallibility. There has to be error apparent on the
   face of the record leading miscarriage of justice to exercise the
   review jurisdiction under Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule 1.
 H There has to be a material error manifest on the face of the record
    VIKRAM SINGH @ VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                     179


. with results in the miscarriage of the justice. [Para 21) (193-H;   A
  194-A-C)
       2.1 The conversation on the landline phone of the
 complainant situate in a shop was recorded by the complainant.
 The same cassette containing conversation by which ransom call
 was made on the landline phone was handed over by the                B
 complainant in original to the Police. This Court in its judgment
 noted that the cassette on which the conversations had been
 recorded on the. landline was handed over by RV to S.I. and on a
 replay of the tape, the conversation was clearly audible and was
 heard by the Police. The tape recorded conversation was not
 secondary evidence which required certificate under Section 65B      C
 of the Evidence Act, 1872, since it was the original cassette by
 which ransom call was tape-recorded, there cannot be any dispute
 that for admission of secondary evidence of electronic record a
 certificate as contemplated by Section 65B is a mandatory
 condition. [Paras 23, 24) [194-F-H; 195-A-B)                         D
      ·2.2 It was submitted that the death was caused due to
 overdose of chloroform and pentazocine poisoning, hence, the
 conviction ought to have been under Secti.on 304A IPC and not
 under Section 302 IPC. The conviction against the applicants
 under Section 302 and 364A IPC was recorded after considering E
 entire evidence on record. This Court while dismissing the
 criminal appeals and affirming the death Reference appreciated
 the entire evidence and approved the decision of the trial court
 and the High Court. The conviction of the applicant was based
 on cogent, ocular and medical evidence and in the review
 application applicants again asked this Court to re-appraise the F
 evidence and come to a different conclusion. There is no apparent
 error on the face of the. record in recording conviction of the
 applicants under Section 302 and 364A. [Para 251 1195-H; 196-
 A•C)
       2.3 The submission that this Court had relied on the           G
 disclosure statement of JS, which led to the recovery of the dead
 body which disclosure statement does not connect VS with the
 crime, cannot be accepted. The trial court as well as the High
 Court marshaled the ocular evidence by which role of VS was
 duly proved in commission of crime. The submission of the            H
180          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A counsel for the appellant that since this Court recorded in the
  judgment that the said cars belong to the appellant, the existence
  of finger prints cannot by itself be of any significance with regard
  to his culpability in the crime; and that by relying on finger prints,
  this Court had committed an apparent error on the face of the
  record, is misconceived and incorrect. In the judgment this Court
B
  never observed that Alto and Chevrolet cars belonged to the
  appellant. The statement of facts made in the judgment was to
  the effect that the finger prints from the Alto and Chevrolet cars
  belong to the appellants respectively. There is evidence of the
  owner of Alto car, PW.3, who had stated in his statement that the
C car was lent by him to the applicant-VS. It was no one's case that
  Alto car belonged to the appellant. [Paras 26-28) [196-C-D, E-G;
   197-B)
        2.4 This Court referred to the various mitigating and
  aggravated factors, and recorded its conclusion that balance-sheet
D has been drawn by the High Court of aggravating and mitigating
  circumstances which was duly adopted by this Court. No error
  apparent on the record is found on the record by this Court in
  affirming the judgment of the High Court. The submissions raised
  in the review petitions do not raise any ground for review of
E judgment of this Court. [Paras 29, 31) [197-E, G)
          Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court Of
          India And Others, 2014 (9) SCC 737:(2014) 11 SCR
          1009; Sow Chandra Kante and another v. Sheikh Hai,
          (1975) 1 SCC 674; P.N. Eswara Iyer and others v.
          Registrar, Supreme Court of India (1980) 4 SCC 680;
 F        Suthendraraja alias Suthenthira Raja alias Santhan and
          others v. State through Superintendent of Police, CBI,
          (1999) 9 sec 323:(19991 3 Suppl. SCR 540; Lily
          Thomas and others v. Union of India and others (2000)
          6 SCC 224:(2000) 3 SCR 1081; Devender Pal Singh
 G        v. State, NCT of Delhi and another (2003) 2 SCC
          501:(2002) 5 Suppl. SCR 332; Kamlesh Verma v.
          Mayawati and others (2013) 8 SCC 320:(2013) ll SCR
          25; Anvar P. V. v. P.K. Basheer and others, (2014) 10
          SCC 473:(2014) 11 SCR 399; Bachan Singh v. State .
          of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684; Machhi Singh and others
 H
     VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                              181



        v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470:[1983) 3 SCR                      A
        413 - referred to.
                          Case Law Reference
  [2014) 11 SCR 1009                  referred to            Para 1
  (1975) 1 sec 674                    referred to            Para 10
                                                                               B
  (1980) 4 sec 680                    referred to            Para 11
  [1999) 3 Suppl. SCR 540             referred to·           Para 12
 · [2000) 3 SCR1081                   referred to            Para 13
  [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 332             referred to            Para 15
  [2013r 11 SCR 25                    referred to            Para 17           c
  [2014) 11 SCR 399                   referred to            Para 23
  (1980) 2 sec 684                    referred to            Para 29
  [1983) 3 SCR 413                    referred to            Para 29
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
  M.P.Nos.16673-16674 of2016 and CriminalM.P. Nos.16675-16676 of D
  2016 in Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.192-193 of2011 in Criminal Appeal
  Nos.1396-1397 of2008.
        From the Judgment and Order dated 30~05.2008 of the High Court
  of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl.Appeal No. 105-DB/200.7.
        K. T. S. Tulsi, Sr. Adv., Tripurari Ray, B. S. Billowria, Raj Kamal,   E
  Ms. Pallavi Malhotra, Vijay Pratap Singh, Ms. Ambika, Ms. Shilpa Singh,
  Abid Bashir, S. K. Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
        V. Madhukar, AAG. Ms. Anvita Cowshish, Ms. Lubna Naaz,
' Kuldip Singh, Abhishek Singh, Rahul Shuam Bhandari, Sarvesh Singh,
  . Advs. for the Respondents~                                                 F
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
         ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. Delay condoned. These criminal
  miscellaneous petitions have been filed by the applicants for reopening ·
  the Review Petition (Cr!.) Nos. 192-193 of 2016 in Criminal Appeal
  Nos.1396-1397 of2008 on the basis of Constitution Bench judgment in G
  Mohd. Arif alias Aslifaq versus Registrar, Supreme Court Of India
  And Others, 2014(9) SCC 73 7, by which judgment liberty was granted
  to those petitioners whose review applications seeking review ofjudgment
  of this Court confirming death sentencewere rejected by circulation but
  death sentences were not executed."'''
                                      {'.·                                  H
182            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017) 8 S.C.R.


A             2. Both the applicants Vikram Singh @ Vicky Walia and Jasvir
      Singh@ Jassa were tried for offences under Section 302, 364A, 201
      and 120B IPC. The trial court vide its judgment dated 20'h December,
      2016/21'' December, 2016 convicted both the applicants as well as one
      Smt. Sonia wife of Jasvir Singh and awarded death sentence to all the
B     three accused under Section 302 and 364AlPC. Criminal Appeal No.l 05-
      DB of 2007 was filed before the High Court by all the accused against
      the judgment of Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur. Murder Reference No. l
      of 2007 was also made by the Sessions Judge before the High Court
      seeking confirmation of death sentence. Both Murder Reference No. l
      of2007 as well as Criminal Appeal No. l 05-DB of2007 were heard and
C     disposed of by a common judgment of the High Court dated 30.05.2008.
      The High Court accepted the Murder Reference No. I of 2007 and
      confirmed the death sentence awarded by the trial court resultantly
      Criminal Appeal No. I 05-DB/2007 was dismissed. Aggrieved by the
      judgment of the High court dated 30.05.2008 Criminal Appeal Nos.1396-
D      1397 of 2008 were filed by the accused. This court heard the criminal
      appeals. Two Judge Bench of this Court by its judgment dated 25.01.2010
      dismissed the criminal appeals of Vikram Singh and Jasvir Singh whereas
      death sentence awarded to Smt. Sonia, the third accused was converted
      into life imprisonment. Vikram Singh and Jasvir Singh filed Review Petition
      (Cr!.) Nos.192-193 of 2011 which review petitions were dismissed by
 E    circulation vi de order dated 20.04.2011 by two-Judge Bench which had
      heard the criminal appeals on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
      As noted above after the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in
      Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq (supra) Criminal M.P.Nos.16673-16674 of
      2016 and 16675-16676 of2016 were filed by the applicants for reopening
 F     the Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.192-193 of201 l.
             3. Learned counsel for the parties were permitted to advance
      their oral submissions on 24.l 0.2016 in support of Review Petition (Crl.)
      Nos.192-193 of2011.
         4. We have heard Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel
 G appearing for Vikram Singh whereas Shri Tripurari Ray has been heard
   for applicant No.2. Shri V. Madhukar, learned Additional Advocate
   General has been heard for the State of Punjab and Haryana and Ms.
   Anvita Cowshish, learned counsel for complainant.
          5. The applicants by their review petitions are seeking review of
 H the judgment of this Court dated 25.01.2010 by which judgment criminal
   VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                             183
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.)

appeals filed by the applicants were dismissed and death sentence A
awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court was maintained
by dismissing the appeals.
       6. Before we proceed to examine the review petitions, it is
necessary to note the ambit, scope and parameters of the review
jurisdiction of this Court.                                        B
     7. Article 137 of the Constitution oflndia provides for review 'of
judgments or orders of this Court in following words:
               "137. Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme
         Court.-Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament
         or any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall       C
         have power to review any judgment pronounced or order made
         by it."
        8. Order 40 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966 deals with the review,
Rule 1 of which provides:
               "J, The Court may review its judgment or order. but no       D
         application for review will be entertained in a civil
         proceeding except on the ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule
          1 of the Code, and in a criminal proceeding except on the
         ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. "
        9. This Court has constitutional power to review its judgment as
granted by Article 137 of the Constitution which is subject to provisions   E
of any law made by Parliament or any Rules made under Article 145.
Under Article 145 the Supreme Court has framed Rules, 1966 as noted
above. As per Rule 1 of Order 40 an application for review in a criminal
proceeding can be entertained on the ground of an error apparent on the
face of the record.                                                         F
        10. Granting power of review to this Court by the Constitution is
in recognition of the universal principle that the power ofreview is part
of all judicial system. Rule 1 of Order 40 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966
provides for the procedure and manner in which the power of review
can be exercised by this Court. The ambit and scope of power ofreview       G
of this Court has come up for consideration time and again before this
Court. Justice Krishna Iyer in Sow Chandra Kante and another vs.
Sheikh Hai, (1975) 1SCC674, held that to review of a judgment of
this Court are subject to the rules of the game and cannot be lightly
entertained. Explaining the scope and ambit of the review jurisdiction of
this Court following was stated:                                            H
184          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A            "A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort
            to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake
            or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility.
            A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and
            overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered
            ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are
B
            obviously insufficient. "
          11. As noticed above although Rule l of Order 40 prohibits filing
  of review application in a criminal proceeding except on the ground of
  error apparent on the face of the record. The Constitution Bench of this
  Court has occasion again to consider the ambit and scope of review
C jurisdiction in P.N. Eswara Iyer and others vs. Registrar, Supreme
  Court of India, (1980) 4 SCC 680. In the above case Order 40 Rule
  3 as amended in 1978 was under challenge. In the above context this
  Court had occasion to consider contour of the review jurisdiction and
  the Constitution Bench speaking through Justice Krishna Iyer
D categorically held that although Order 40 Rule l limits the ground viz-a-
   viz criminal proceedings to errors apparent on the face of the record but
  the power to review in Article 137 is wide and framers of the rules
  never intended a restrictive review over criminal orders or judgments.
   In paragraphs 34 and 35 following was laid down:
 E           "34. The rule, on its face, affords a wider set of grounds for
            review for orders in civil proceedings, but limits the ground
             vis-a-vis criminal proceedings to "errors apparent on the
            face of the record". If at all, the concern of the law to avoid
            judicial error should be heightened when life or liberty is in
            peril since civil penalties are often less traumatic. So, it is
 F           reasonable to assume that the framers of the rules could not
             have intend.ed a restrictive review over criminal orders or
            judgments. It is likely to be the other way about. Supposing
             an accused is sentenced to death by the Supreme Court and
             the "deceased" shows up in court and the court discovers
 G           the tragic treachery of the recorded testimony. Is the court
             helpless to review and set aside the sentence of hanging?
             We think not. The power to review is in Article 13 7 and it is
             equally wide in all proceedings. The rule merely canalises
             the flow from the reservoir of power. The stream cannot stifle
             the source. Moreover, the dynamics of interpretation depend
 H
  VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                              185
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       on the demand of the context and the lexical limits of the A
       test. Here "record" means any materiql which is already on
       record or may, with the permission of the court, be brought
       on record. If justice summons the Judges to allow a vital
       material in, it becomes part of the record; and if apparent
       error is there, correCtion becomes necessitous.
                                                                        B
       35. The purpose is plain, the language is elastic and
       interpretation of a necessary power must naturally be
       expansive. The substantive power is derived from Article 137
       and is as wide for criminal as for civil proceedings. Even
       the difference in phraseology in the rule (Order 40 Rule 2) C
       must, therefore, be read to encompass the same area and not
       to engraft an artificial divergence productive of anomaly.. If
        the expression "record" is read to mean, in its semantic sweep,
        any material even later brought on record, with the leave of
        the court, it will embrace subsequent events, new light and
        other grounds which we find in Order 47 Rule J, CPC. We D
        see no insuperable difficulty in equating the area in Civil
        and criminal proceedings when review power is invoked from
        the same source. "
       12. This Court in subsequent judgments has also noticed that scope
of review in criminal proceedings has been considerably widened by the      E
Constitution Bench of.this Court in P.N. Eswara (supra). Jn
Suthendraraja alias Suthenthira Raja alias Santhan and others vs.
State through Superintendent of Police, CBI, (1999) 9 SCC 323,
Justice D.P Wadhwa made the following observation:
       "5. It would be seen that the scope of review in criminal            F
       proceedings has been. considerably widened by the
       pronouncement in the aforesaid judgment. In any case review
       is not rehearing of the appeal all over again and to maintain
       a review petition it has to be shown that there has been a
       miscarriage of justice. Of course, the expression
       "miscarriage of justice" is all-embrqcing ... "                      G

      13. Again a two-Judge Bench in Lily Thomas and others vs.
Union of India and others, (2000) 6 SCC 224, had the occasion to
consider the scope ofreview jurisdiction of this Court. In paragraph 52
following was laid down:
                                                                            H
186    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A     "52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of
      looking, offer something again with a view to correction or
      improvement". It cannot be denied that the review is the creation
      of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v.
      PradyumansinghjiArjunsinghji,-(1971) 3 SCC 844, held that the
      power ofreview is not an inherent power. It must be conferred
B
      by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review
      is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice
      is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or
      procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of
      administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the
 c    Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was
      under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been
      passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist
      and its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage ofjustice nothing
      would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in
       S. Nagaraj v. State ofKamataka 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, held:
D
       (SCC pp. 619-20, para 19)
      "19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination
      or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal
      acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm oflaw the courts
      and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision
 E    legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and
      judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or
      miscarriage ofjustice. Even when there was no statutory provision
      and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the
      circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled
 F    out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage ofjustice.
      In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai AIR 1941
      FC 1, the Court observed that even though no rules had been
      framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was
       available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the
       Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the
 G     principle laid down by the Privy Council in Raj under Narain Rae
       v. Bijai Govind Singh, (1836) 1 Moo PC 117: 2 MIA181, that an
       order made by the Court was final and could not be altered:
         ' ... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments,
         errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common
 H
VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                             187
            [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

    law, the same power which the courts of record and statute A
    have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in .... The
    House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes
    made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must
    possess the same authority. The Lords have however gone a
    step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through B
    inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied
    manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced,
    or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled
    inconsistencies.'
   Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same                C
   decision as under:
    'It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in
    such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing
    to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of
    last resort, where by some accident, without any blame,
    the party has not been heard and an order has been D
    inadvertently made as if the party had been heard. '
    Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental
    principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the
    error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was
    framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order          E
    passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137
    of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the
    practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision
    expressly conferred the substantive power to review any
    judgment or order by Article 13 7 of the Constitution. And clause     F
    (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the
    conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be
    reviewed. In exercise of this power Order XL had been framed
    empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings
     on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule I of the Civil Procedure
    Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the       G
     clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or
     order passed under misapprehension of true state of
     circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise
     the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court
     Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders         H
188             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A               as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the
                abuse of process of court. The Court is thus not precluded
                from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it
                is necessary to do so for sake of justice."
              The mere fact that two views on the same subject are possible
B             is no ground to review the earlier judgment passed by a
              Bench of the same strength. "
              14. It was further held that mere possibility of two views on the
      same subject is not a ground for review. In paragraph 56 following was
      stated:
c             "56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be
              exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a
              view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the
              statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot
              be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of
D             two views on the subject is not a ground for review ... "
            15. Further in Devender Pal Singh vs. State, NCT of Delhi and
      another, (2003) 2 SCC 501, Arijit Pasayat,J., elaborately examined
  the scope and ambit of review jurisdiction of this Court after referring to
  all earlier relevant judgments of this Court. In paragraph 11 following
E was stated:
              "11. Though the scope of review in criminal proceedings
              has been widened to a considerable extent, in view of the
              aforesaid exposition of law by the Constitutional Bench, in
              any case review is not rehearing of the appeal all over again,
              and as was observed in Suthendraraja in order to maintain
 F
              the review petition, it has to be shown that there is a
              miscarriage of justice. Though the expression "miscarriage
              ofjustice" is of a wider amplitude, it has to be kept in mind
              that the scope of interference is very limited ...... "
G           16. It was further held that resort to review is proper only where
      a omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier
      judgment by judicial fallibility. In paragraph 16 following has been stated:
              "16. As was observed by this Court in Col. Avtar Singh
              Sekhon v. Union of India. 1980 Supp SCC 562, review is
              not a routine procedure. A review of an earlier order is not
 H
   VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB.                              189
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

        permissible unless the Court is satisfied that material error,        A
        manifest on the face of the order undermines its soundness
        or results in miscarriage ofjustice. A review ofjudgment in
        a case is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper
        only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave
        error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility .... The stage     B
        of review is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier
        order which has the normal feature of finality."
        17. As noted above under Order 40 Rule 1 no application for
 review can be entertained except on the ground of an error apparent on
 the face of the record. Although, the power of review given to this Court
 is wider as has been held by the Constitut~on Bench in P. N. Eshwara C
 (supra), Justice Krishna Iyer has given an illustration where the Court
  will not hesitate in exercising its power to review in a case where
  deceased himself walks in the Court. on whose murder accused were
  convicted. Justice Krishna Iyer rightly observed that Court is not
  powerless to do justice in such case. Thus, although the power of review D
  granted to this Court is wider but normally and ordinarily the review in a
  criminal case has to be on the grounds as enumerated in Rule 1 of
· Order40.
       18. What is "an error apparent on the face of the record" has
also been a subject matter of consideration by this Court in a large number   E
of cases. What are the grounds on which this Court shall exercise its
jurisdiction and what is the error apparent on the face of the record
came to be considered by this Court in Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati
and others, (1013) 8 SCC 320 (in which case one of us Dipak Misra,
J. was also a party). This Court held that an error which is not self-
evident and has to be detected by a process ofreasoning is not an error       F
apparent on the face of the record. In paragraphs 15 and 16 following
was laid down:
         "15. An error which iS not self-evident and has to be detected
         by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error
         apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to           G
         exercise its power of review. A review is by no means an
       . appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard
         and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court in
         Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi· 1997 (8) SCC 715, held as
         under: (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9)                                   H
190    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A     "7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly
      confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
      Thungabhadra industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.• AIR 1964 SC
      1372, this Court opined: (AIR p. 1377, para 11)
        '11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether
8      the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case
       did not involve any substantial question of law is an "error
       apparent on the face of the record". The fact that on the
       earlier occasion the court held on an identical state of
       facts that a substantial question of law arose would not
       per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be
c      erroneous. Similqrly, even if the statement was wrong, it
        would not follow that it was an "error apparent on the
       face of the record", for there is a distinction which is real,
        though it might not always be capable of exposition,
        between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which
D       could be characterised as vitiated by ''error apparent". A
        review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
        erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only
       for patent error. '
      8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury
       1995 (I) SCC 170, while quoting with approval a passage
 E
      from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma
       1979 (4) SCC 389, this Court once again held that review
      proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be
       strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1
       CPC.
 F    9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
      review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent
      on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident
      and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly
      be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record
 G    justifying the court to exercise its power of review under
      Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under
       Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous
      decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it
       must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be
       allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'. "
 H                                           (emphasis in original)
   VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                         191
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

          16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be such which A
       is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which
       has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of
       inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for
       correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere
       possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for B
       review."
      19. Further elaborating on the parameters ofreview jurisdiction
following was laid down in paragraphs 17 and 18:
           "17. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to
       reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion,      c
       even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on
       appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review
       petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on
       theface of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This
       Court in Kera/a SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower
       Ltd. 2005 (6) SCC 651 held as under: (SCC p. 656, para           D
       JO)
             "JO. ... In a review petition it is not open to this Court to
         reappreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion,
         even if that is possible. The learned counsel for the Board
         at best sought to impress us that the correspondence E
         exchanged between the parties did not support the
         conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a
         submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review
         petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully
         within the domain of the appellate court. lfon appreciation F
          of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of
         fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be
         assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is
          an error apparent on the face of the record or for some
         reason akin thereto. it has not been contended before us
          that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. G
          To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of
          appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a
          review petition into an appeal in disguise. "
          18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The
       power of review cannot be confused with appellate power H
192           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017) 8 S.C.R.


A           which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed
            by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled
            argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
            This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co.
            Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 501, held as under: (SCC pp. 504-505,
            paras 11-12)
B
                   "11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits
              is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right
              in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same
              relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the
              main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer
 c            had been refused, no review petition would lie which would
              convert rehearing of the original matter. it is settled law
              that the power of review cannot be ~33'!>confused with
              appellate power which enables a superior court to correct
              all errors committed by a subordinate court. it is not
 D            rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and
              overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded
              adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with
              extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in
              exceptional cases.

 E                  12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the
               applicant herein had been made at the time when the
               arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same
               relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a
               review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature
               of 'second innings' which is impermissible and
 F             unwarranted and cannot be granted. ""
            20. Summarising the principles when review will be maintainable
      and review will not be maintainable following was held in paragraphs
      20.l and20.2:

 G               "20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
                  (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence
             which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within
             knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by
             him:
 H
  VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                            193
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

           (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;      A
           (iii) Any other sufficient reason.
       The words "any other sufficient reason" have been
       interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neid AIR 1922 PC 112 and
       approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos
       v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 to             B
       mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to
       those specified in the rule". The same principles have been
       reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron
       Ores Ltd.(2013) 8 SCC 337.
           20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:                c
          . (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not
       enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
           (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
          (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the             D
       original hearing of the case.
          (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,
       manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness
       or results in miscarriage of justice.
           (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby      E
       an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only
       for patent error.
          (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot
       be a ground for review.
                                                                          F
         (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should
       not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
          (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within
       the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to
       be advanced in the review petition.                                G
          (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same reliefsought
       at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived. "
       21. In view of above, it is clear that scope, ambit and parameters
of review jurisdiction are well defined. Normally in a criminal proceeding,
review applications cannot be entertained except on the ground of error H
194           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A apparent on the face of the record. Further, the power given to this
  Court under Article 137 is wider and in an appropriate case can be
  exercised to mitigate a manifest injustice. By review application an
  applicant cannot be allowed to re-argue the appeal on the grounds which
  were urged at the time of the hearing of the criminal appeal. Even ifthe
  applicant succeeds in establishing that there may be another view possible
B
  on the conviction or sentence of the accused that is not a sufficient
  ground for review. This Court shall exercise its jurisdiction to review
  only when a glaring omission or patent mistake has crept in earlier decision
  due to judicial fallibility. There has to be error apparent on the face of
  the record leading miscarriage ofjustice to exercise the review jurisdiction
C under Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule 1. There has to be a material
  error manifest on the face of the record with results in the miscarriage
  of the justice.
         22. In view of parameters of the review jurisdiction as noticed
  above, we now proceed to examine the review petition to find out as to
D whether there are sufficient grounds as enumerated above for reviewing
  the judgment of the criminal appeal affirming the death sentence awarded
  to the applicants.
           23. Learned counsel contended that the tape-recorded conversation
   has been relied on without there being any certificate under Section 658
 E of the Evidence Act, 1872. It was contended that audio tapes are recorded
   on magnetic media, the same could be established through a certificate
   under Section 658 and in the absence of the certificate, the document
   which constitutes electronic record, cannot be deemed to be a valid
   evidence and has to be ignored from consideration. Reliance has been
   placed by the learned counsel on the judgment of this Court in Anvar
 F P. V. vs. P.K. Basheerand others, (2014) JOSCC 473. The conversation
   on the landline phone of the complainant situate in a shop was recorded
   by the complainant. The same cassette containing conversation by which
   ransom call was made on the landline phone was handed over by the
   complainant in original to the Police. This Court in its judgment dated
 G 25.01.2010 has referred to the aforesaid fact and has noted the said fact
   to the following effect:
             "The cassette on which the conversations had been recorded
             on the landline was handed over by Ravi Verma to S.J. Jiwan
             Kumar and on a replay of the tape, the conversation was
 H           clearly audible and was heard by the Police. "
    VIKRAM SINGH@ VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                            195
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.)

         24. The tape recorded conversation was not secondary evidence A
  which required certificate under Section 65B, since it was the original
  cassette by which ransom call was tape-recorded, there cannot be any
  dispute that for admission of secondary evidence of electronic record a
  certificate as contemplated by Section 65B is a mandatory condition. In
  Anvar P. V. (supra) this Court had laid down the above proposition in B
  paragraph 22. However, in the same judgment this Court has observed
  that the situation would have been different, had the primary evidence
  was produced. The conversation recorded by the complainant contains
  ransom calls was' relevant under Section 7 and was primary evidence
  which was relied on by the complainant. In paragraph 24 of the judgment
· of this Court in Anvar P. V. it is categorically held that if an electronic C
  record is used as primary evidence the same is admissible in evidence,
  without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B. Paragraph 24 is
  as extracted below:
             "24. The situation would have been different had the
         appellant adduced primary evidence, by making available D
         in evidence, the CDs used for announcement and songs. Had
         those CDs used for objectionable songs or announcements
         been duly got seized through the police or Election
         Commission and had the same been used as primary
         evidence, the High Court could have played the same in court
         to see whether the allegations were true. That is not the E
         situation in this case. The speeches, songs and
         announcements were recorded using other instruments and
         by feeding them into a computer, CDs were made therefrom
         which were produced in court, without due certification.
         Those CDs cannot be admitted in evidence since the F
         mandatory requirements of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act
         are not satisfied. It is clarified that notwithstanding what we
         have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the
         secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to
         Sections 59, 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, if an
         electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under .G
         Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible _in
         evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section
          65-B of the Evidence Act. "
     25. He has further contended that on the plain reading of the
 Chemical Examiner's report, it is clear that the death was caused due to    H
196           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017) 8 S.C.R.


A overdose of chloroform and pentazocine poisoning. Hence, the conviction
  ought to have been under Section 304A !PC and not under Section 302
  lPC. The conviction against the applicants under Section 302 and 364A
  was recorded after considering entire evidence on record. This Court
  while dismissing the criminal appeals and affirming the death Reference
B No.I has appreciated the entire evidence and approved the decision of
  the trial court and the High Court. The conviction of the applicant was
  based on cogent, ocular and medical evidence and in the review application
  applicants have again asked this Court to re-appraise the evidence and
  come to a different conclusion. There is no apparent error on the face of
  the record in recording conviction of the applicants under Section 302
C and364A.
         26. It is further contended that this Court had relied on the
   disclosure statement of Jasvir Singh, which led to the recovery of the
   dead body which disclosure statement does not connect Vikram Singh
   with the crime. The trial court as well as the High Court marshaled the
 D ocular evidence by which evidence role ofVikram Si.ngh was duly proved
   in commission of crime. Hence, this submission deserves to be rejected.
          27. Lastly, Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel submits that
   this Court in paragraph 18 has recorded its conclusion that the finger
   prints of Vikram Singh were found on the Alto and Chevrolet cars,
 E therefore, connection of Vikram Singh is established in the crime. It is
   submitted that since this Court recorded at para 18 that the said cars
   belong to Vikram Singh, the existence of finger prints cannot by itself be
   of any significance with regard to his culpability in the crime. It is
   submitted that by relying on finger prints, this Court had committed an
   apparent erroron the face of the record. The above submission ofleamed
 F counsel is misconceived and incorrect. In para 18 of the judgment this
   Court never observed that Alto and Chevrolet cars belonged to Vikram
   Singh. The statement of facts made in para 18 was to the effect that the
   finger prints from the Alto and Chevrolet cars belong to Vikram Singh
   and Jasvir Singh respectively. It is useful to extract below para 18 of the
 G judgment:
             "18. We also find that the prosecution has been able to show
             that the finger prints lifted by the Police Officers from the
             Alto and Chevrolet cars belonged to Vikram Singh and jasvir
             Singh respectively. It is significant that the Chloroform bottle
 H           recovered from Darshan Kaur s residence was also examined
   VIKRAM SINGH @VICKY WALIA v. STATE OF PUNJAB                                     197
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

         and the thumb impression of Jasvir Singh was detected A
         thereon."
      28. There is evidence of the owner of Alto car, PW.3, Naresh
Kumar Sharma who had stated in his statement that the car was lent by
him to Vikram Singh in the morning of 141h February, 2005 at about 7
a.m. to 7.30 a.m. Thus, it was no one's case that Alto car belonged to B
Vikram Singh. The argument raised by Shri K.T.S. Tutsi is misconceived
and we unhesitatingly repel the same.
       29. Learned counsel has further contended that present was not
a case where death penalty could have been awarded to the applicants.
In the review petition reliance has been placed by the applicants on c
Constitution Bench judgment in Bachan Si11gh vs. State of Pu11jab,
(1980) 2 SCC 684, and judgment in Machhi Singh a11d others vs.
State ofPunjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470. This Court in its judgment dismissing
the appeals referred to Bacha11 Singh and Machhi Si11gh and has
categorically applied its mind to various parameters laid down in the
aforesaid judgments and on the broad principle which emerged from the D
judgments for evaluating the category of the rarest of the rare case.
Various mitigating and aggravated factors which have been noted in the
judgment of the High Court were referred to by this Court, and this
Court recorded its conclusion that balance-sheet has been drawn by the
High Court of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which was duly E
adopted by this Court. We do not find any error apparent on the record
in the above consideration by this Court in affirming the judgment of the
 High Court.
       30. Learned counsel appearing for Jasvir Singh adopted the
submissions of Shri K.T.S. Tulsi on legal issues and on the question of F
sentence. Certain other submissions have been raised on behalf of the
second applicant which also do not disclose any ground which can be
said to be a valid ground for exercising review jurisdiction.
      31. We, after carefully considering the submissions of the
applicants, are of the considered opinion that submissions raised in the            G
review petitions do not raise any ground for review of judgment of this
Court dated25.0l.2010.
        32. In the result, the review applications are rejected.


Nidhi Jain                                          Review applications rejected.